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TURKISH EURASIANISM AND ITS IMPACT ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR TURKEY

by
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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the University’s requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations
Coventry University, UK
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ABSTRACT

This research explores the impact of Eurasianism on Turkish foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. It investigates the discourses of Eurasianism and the way they are interpreted by the polity and consequently implemented in the foreign policy making in Turkey.

In this sense, this research was carried out using literature reviews and interviews in order to respond to the following question:

*Considering that Turkey has increasingly been pursuing an active and multi-dimensional foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, how have the discourses of Eurasianism been influencing the contemporary Turkish foreign policy making?*

The research unpacks the dynamics of contemporary Turkish foreign policy and responds to the debate on whether or not Turkey’s international relations axis is shifting eastwards. Having questioned if such a foreign policy shift exists, the thesis then questions to what extent the process has been informed and channelled by Eurasianism by focussing on three periods since the early 1990s: Özal era (1983-1993), Cem era (1997-2002), Davutoğlu era (2003-2011). Finally, the research presents a set of conclusions on how Eurasianism has been a strong influence on foreign policy making in Turkey and what internal and external socio-economic and political factors have played a critical role in this process.

**Key Words:** Eurasianism, Turkish Eurasianism, Turkish Foreign Policy.
For my Dearest Wife, Sözen

and

Daughter, Göksu Leyla
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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Coventry University. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

Özgür Tüfekçi
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

This research explores the impact of Eurasianism on Turkish foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. It investigates the discourses of Eurasianism and the way they are interpreted by the polity and consequently implemented in the foreign policy making in Turkey. By undertaking such an examination the research unpacks the dynamics of contemporary Turkish foreign policy and responds to the debate on whether or not Turkey's international relations axis is shifting eastwards. Having questioned if such a foreign policy shift exists, the thesis then questions to what extent the process has been informed and channelled by Eurasianism by focussing on three periods since the early 1990s: Özal era (1983-1993), Cem era (1997-2002), Davutoğlu era (2003-onwards). Finally, the research presents a set of conclusions on how Eurasianism has been a strong influence on foreign policy making in Turkey and what internal and external socio-economic and political factors have played a critical role in this process.

To explain the main parameters of this research and set its research question and objectives, this chapter starts with a brief overview of Eurasianism with its historical development. Exploring its political roots starting in Russia in the early 20th Century, the chapter will also explain the way Eurasianism has entered into the political lexicon of Turkish politics with particular reference to the post-Cold War era. Such a review will present a number of key indicators for the way Eurasianism has always played a significant role within Turkish politics even under strikingly different political ideologies. To understand and explore the reasons behind such a phenomenon and how that has informed the foreign policy making in the country, the chapter will then present the overall research question and its main aim and objectives. As part of this overall presentation, the scope of the research will be defined and the literature review and research methodology will be explained. Finally, the chapter will present the chapterisation of the thesis.
1.2. **Background**

Eurasianism, as its name indicates, makes a reference to the term ‘Eurasia’ which literally means Europe plus Asia. In relation to such a meaning, the main geographical reference point is the territory of Russia and according to N. S. Trubetskoy¹, “The territory of Russia ... constitutes a separate continent ... which in contrast to Europe and Asia can be called *Eurasia* ... Eurasia represents an integral whole, both geographically and anthropologically.” Furthermore, this separate continent was a self-contained geographical entity whose boundaries coincided roughly with those of the Russian Empire in 1914.² This way of thinking is called Classical Eurasianism and by the 1930s, losing all of its ideological forefathers and eminent figures caused this Eurasianism ideology to die down until Lev N. Gumilev led similar ideas and a new kind of Eurasianism ideology around the 1980s. Hence, it was the milestone that gave rise to this revised approach being named Neo-Eurasianism. Gumilev brought the Eurasianist ideas to light and prepared an intellectual background for them. Shortly after his death, the new and dedicated supporters of Neo-Eurasianism became Alexander S. Panarin and Alexander G. Dugin. Alexander Panarin was a well-known theorist and the Chair of Political Science at the Department of Philosophy in Moscow State University.³ He was also prolific as an author as Dugin. Nevertheless, the international community has not found an opportunity to meet with Panarin’s works as they have never been translated into English. On account of this, Dugin has remained the only well-known global figure on the ideology of Eurasianism and its application on the foreign policy course of the Russian Federation. Although he has had several books that have been translated into many foreign languages, there is no doubt that his most influential book is *The Foundation of Geopolitics*.⁴ What makes him highly popular as a Russian nationalist are his proposals, which he puts forward in the book, regarding a new vision and a new

future of Russian Foreign Policy. By means of these proposals, he tries to manage leading the policy-makers in Russia as a policy advisor.\(^5\)

As for the differences between the Classical and Neo-Eurasianisms, the perception of the concept of the West is a major divergence. Classical Eurasianism was an idea which was against the West, like Neo-Eurasianism. However, Classical Eurasianists interpreted the concept synonymously with Western Europe, whereas for Neo-Eurasianists, the West means the United States of America (USA). All in all, both ideologies emerged with the imminent collapsing of the Empires (Russian Empire and Soviet Union) to save and keep them alive. Despite not reaching their goals, Eurasianism is still a relatively influential political ideology in Russia and its neighbouring regions. Besides, it keeps aspiring to establish a new and stronger Russia as a superpower and attempts to unite the countries in the Eurasian continent against the USA.

When it comes to Turkish intelligentsia’s meet with Eurasianism and modelling new conceptual interpretations of Eurasianism, the demise of the Soviet Union was a turning point. It was also significant for the Turkic states of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The collapse has led to the emergence of six independent states among others which have had cultural, historical, ethnic, and linguistic bonds with Turkey. Although Turkish public opinion has been sensitive towards the Turkic people of Central Asia and the Caucasus and has also perceived Central Asia as a “fatherland”, up until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey had not developed a specific foreign policy approach towards these regions during the Cold War years. The main reasons for such a lack of interest to Turkic people were because Turkey played a buffer state role against the Soviet Union and other adversaries of the Western world and also pursued a passive, bilateral and security-oriented foreign policy course during the Cold War era.\(^6\)


On the other hand, the imperial historical background and customs and the geopolitical/geostrategic stand between Asia and Europe have had a significant influence on Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies. These circumstances have given rise to fluctuation on the decisions of policy-makers and have caused many confrontations within society. Turkey has always had a fertile environment and circles for the debates on ‘secularism’ and ‘Islam’; ‘Pan-Turkism’ and ‘Pan/Neo Ottomanism’ etc. These debates and confrontations can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire which – in the 18th century - initiated Western-inspired reforms to overcome its rival powers. Furthermore, in Bülent Gökay’s words, this westernisation process in the early times of newly established Republic of Turkey caused cutting all links with the ‘old’, the ‘Ottoman’. In this sense, as a side-effect, such initiatives contributed to the division of the society into several factions such as Westernists (supporters of Western culture), Anti-Westernists, Pan-Turkist (in favour of unification of Turkish origin states), Pan-Islamists (in support of unification of Islamist states), and so on. In spite of the fact that the newly established Turkish Republic’s main official direction was toward the West, these factions still exist today. For instance, while the Democratic Party (1946-1960) to Justice Party (1961-1980) line and the National Salvation Party (1972-1980) to Welfare Party (1983-1998) line had pro-Ottomanist and pro-Islamist approaches respectively, the centre-left Republican People’s Party (CHP), by and large, embraced a Western-oriented approach from the establishment of the Republic of Turkey until the early 2000s even though it seems that CHP (the main opposition party today) has recently lost its enthusiasm toward the Western world and radiated mixed signals on whether it will continue to support Turkey’s Westernist foreign policy discourse.

Under these conditions, as it is abovementioned, Turkey gradually became acquainted with Eurasianism after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, it is possible to claim that while a certain group of Turkish intellectuals was gradually starting to deal with the

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ideology in the early 1990s along with the emergence of newly established Turkic states in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Eurasianism became relatively more popular among the Turkish community after the Ergenekon trial that started in June 2007. Ergenekon is the name given to arguably the most important legal process in Turkish history in which around 100 suspects - retired military officers, politicians, journalists, lawyers, businessmen, academics, and known criminals - were charged with a range of crimes; they included "attempting to destroy the government of the Republic of Turkey", "membership in an armed terrorist group", and "inciting people to rebel against the Republic of Turkey". In this regard, generally speaking the majority of the suspects were accused of being Eurasianist, who want to topple the Government and change Turkey's foreign policy course in the name of building robust relations with the Eastern World, such as Russia, Iran, and Turkic States etc.\(^9\) This accusation was being made by people who think that Eurasianism is merely about Turkey’s eastern neighbours and it was an alternative for Turkish foreign policy. The rationale behind this thinking was what Turkey experienced after the demise of the Soviet Union.

The post-Cold War era, was a new epoch in which Turkey needed to find a new identity as it faced a rather troubled environment between three major unstable zones as the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. The instability of these zones and Turkey’s geographical location at the nexus of them put Turkey in an important position and paved the way for Turkey to emerge as a potential dynamic player.\(^10\) This potential was used to generate a relatively activist foreign policy by Turgut Özal\(^11\) and İsmail Cem\(^12\) during the 1990s.

In this sense, it is safe to say that despite the fact that the first decade of the 2000s witnessed a significant transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkey’s opening


\(^11\) Turgut Özal was sworn in as President of Turkey on 9 November 1989. On 17 April 1993, Özal died of a heart attack in office.

\(^12\) The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey between 1997 and 2002.
towards Central Asia and the Caucasus, namely Turkic States, was launched in the Özal era (1983-1993). Özal was Prime Minister of Turkey between 1983 and 1989 and then President of Turkey between 1989 and 1993. During his era, Turkey’s economy became more globalised by his liberal policies and by his Turkism centred foreign policy; meanwhile, the Republic of Turkey built new relations with the Turkic states in order to make possible the economic and cultural presence of Turks in the neighbouring region. This way of thinking was stirred by the collapse of the Soviet Union. In December 1991, the dissemination of the Soviet Union gave rise to a power vacuum in Central Asia. In fact, decision makers in Turkey wanted to fill this vacuum and play a big brother role, knowing what was best for the region as well. For instance, the then Turkish President Turgut Özal in his opening speech of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) on 1 September 1991 described the situation as a “historic opportunity” for the Turks to become a “regional power” and urged the GNAT not to “throw away this chance which presented itself for the first time in 400 years.”\textsuperscript{13} It seems that the Turkish decision makers were willing to undertake such a leadership as they hoped that it would enhance the importance of Turkey. Thus, it is safe to say that the stimulator of this new active and multi-dimensional foreign policy towards the Turkic states was the then Turkish President Turgut Özal.

As for the Cem era, it is assumed that during that time while Turkey built new relations with the neighbouring countries, at the same time it reinforced its relations with the EU. Regarding relations with the neighbouring countries and finding opportunities in Eurasia, İsmail Cem continued Özal’s way of understanding. According to him, Turkey has had a common history, language and culture with the countries in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. In his mind-set, this feature makes Turkey a central state in this emerging Eurasian reality. Besides, it puts Turkey into position which links Western Europe to Eastern horizons.\textsuperscript{14} Along with the Cem’s vision, Turkish foreign policy’s acquisition was a positive atmosphere in the bilateral relations of Turkey and

\textsuperscript{13} Quoted in M. Aydin, “Geopolitics of Central Asia and The Caucasus: Continuity and Change since the End of the Cold War”, Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, No. XXXII, 167-216 (186).
Greece. In Papandreou’s words, “… what we are living through today in our Greek-Turkish relationship is simply a ‘fairy tale.’ And yet it is not. Because our people demand it! I therefore say this: it is time to dare the impossible.”\textsuperscript{15} It might be set forth that Özal’s way of foreign policy understanding influenced İsmail Cem, and Cem’s vision has been carried on by the AKP (Justice and Development Party) and Davutoğlu. It is highly believed that the AKP era foreign policy course has been, in a manner, influenced by İsmail Cem, who expressed the intention to ‘use Turkey’s cultural and historical affinities as major inputs to international relations’ during his tenure as foreign minister.\textsuperscript{16} In this sense, the pro-activism in Turkish foreign policy during the Özal and Cem eras has been observed in the AKP era as it is assumed that it was based on the previous ones.

In this sense, during the AKP era by and large three main developments have played a crucial role in moulding the Turkish Foreign Policy course and these developments are also significant regarding this thesis’s topic: Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu’s posts within the government; the Second Gulf War, and the Ergenekon trial.

Davutoğlu was appointed as Chief Adviser to the Prime Minister and Ambassador at large by the 58\textsuperscript{th} Government of the Republic of Turkey. After that, he was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 1 May 2009. During his presence within the government, his foreign policy slogan “Zero Problem Policy with the neighbours\textsuperscript{17}” has

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{17} Zero Problem Policy is in favour of cultivating new friendships in the region instead of the phrase ‘the Turk’s only friend is another Turk’. Prof. Davutoğlu deduces this policy from his major academic work Strategic Depth which was published in 2001. According to Davutoğlu, ‘It is possible to have zero problems if the other actors respect our values. It doesn’t mean that we will be silent in order to have good relations with all parties.’... ‘As a Turk, now I am European in Brussels, or Iraqi in Baghdad, Bosnian in Sarajevo, or Samarkandi in Central Asia. And these are not conflicting identities. If you want to contribute to regional and global peace, you have to speak from within. You should not impose. You should not dictate’. B. Hounshell, ‘Interview with Prof. Ahmet Davutoğlu’, 29 November 2010, Available from \url{http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/29/mr_zero_problems?page=0,1}, [Accessed 10/01/2011].
\end{itemize}
been dominant. Yet, this policy has raised a new debate on the Turkish Foreign policy course in terms of whether Turkey is forming a Neo-Ottomanist\textsuperscript{18} perspective. Although Davutoğlu has repeated several times that Turkey must become more than just a regional power and promote close relations with not only the European countries and the USA but also the Eastern countries, the debates on the Neo-Ottomanist foreign policy course continue.

The Second Gulf War had significance as a confrontation emerged between Turkey and the USA in 2003. In March 2003, the USA along with the coalition forces including the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland invaded Iraq. It might be considered as a continuation of the 1990-1991 Gulf War as Saddam Hussein had failed to comply with the terms of the 1990-1991 Gulf War ceasefire.\textsuperscript{19} Before starting the operation, as a consequence of the negotiation between Turkey and the USA, GNAT voted a motion which was to allow the USA air and ground forces to use Turkey’s bases. This motion proposed the deployment of 62,000 troops and equipment through Southern Turkey into Northern Iraq. However, it was surprisingly rejected by GNAT.\textsuperscript{20} And this last minute development escalated the tension between the two states and caused a number of speculations that Turkey’s foreign policy course was shifting.

As for the Ergenekon investigation, it began in June 2007, when 27 handgrenades, explosives and detonators were found in a shanty house belonging to a retired

\textsuperscript{18} The term was first articulated by Cengiz Çandar, journalist and special adviser to the then Turkish President Turgut Özal between 1991 and 1993 in order to make Turkey rediscover its imperial legacy and seek a new national consensus where the multiple identities of Turkey can coexist.


\textsuperscript{20} “On March 1, 533 out of 550 Members of Parliament were present to vote on the resolution authorizing the U.S. deployment of 62,000 troops to Turkey and the “foreign deployment” of an unspecified number of Turkish troops to an unspecified place (Iraq). The opposition CHP, ideologically nationalistic as well as opportunistically negative, exercised party discipline and voted as a bloc to reject the resolution. The AKP allowed its members a “free vote,” without party discipline. An absolute majority of those present, or 267 votes, was required to pass the resolution, but it got only 264 votes, failing by three. Ninety-nine members of the AKP voted against the measure; 19 abstained. Although the cabinet had unanimously referred the matter to parliament, three ministers voted against the resolution.” C. Migdalowitz. “Iraq: Turkey, the Deployment of US Forces and Related Issues”, \textit{Report for Congress}, 2003, Available from <http://congressionalresearch.com> [Accessed on 10.03.2014].
noncommissioned officer in Istanbul’s Ümraniye district.21 Also, the diaries written late in 2003 by Özden Örnek, then commander of Turkey’s navy22, were substantial in terms of revealing several alleged plots to topple the government. These incidents induced a criminal investigation into a group dubbed ‘Ergenekon’. On the one hand, during this trial it had been alleged that Turkey’s democratic future will be assured.23 On the other hand, some Turkish intellectual circles cried out that Turkish Eurasianism24 is being got rid of.25 Herein, the tie between Eurasianism and the Ergenekon trial needs more clarification. From a holistic perspective, in the context of the Ergenekon trial, several senior military figures – some retired and some on active duty – have been brought to court regarding the charges of involvement in plots to topple the AKP Government. This prospect led some circles to believe that there is a reconstruction process of the Turkish Military being carried out by the AKP Government itself in order to eliminate any anti-Western/anti-American sentiment and their supporters such as General (ret.) Tuncer Kilınç.26 General Kilınç was a General

24 Briefly, Eurasianism as a political movement was first advanced by Russian emigre thinkers in the 1920s, such as Nikolai Trubetskoy, Petr Savitsky, and Suvchinsky. According to them, Russian civilisation does not belong in either the European or the Asian category. As for Neo-Eurasianism, it was popularised during the demise of the Soviet Union. It takes its inspiration from the Classical Eurasianists and assumes that Russia is culturally closer to Asia than to the West (in this version the West symbolises the United States of America). Lev Gumilev, Aleksandr Panarin, and Aleksandr Dugin are the main promoters. Both Eurasianisms are mostly regarded as a method to create an area where Russia and its neighbours can be immune to the effect of the West. For further information see Chapter III.  
26 N. Eslen, ‘Ergenekon Neyin Nesi? (What is Ergenekon?)’, Daily Radikal, 21/01/2009; N. Eslen, ‘TSK Atlantik Yöntegesine Oturtuluyor (TAF is Oriented towards Atlanticism)’, Daily Radikal, 06/03/2010; O. Asiltürk, ‘Ergenekon ABD Karşıtlarının Tasfiyesidir (Ergenekon is an Operation which Provides
Secretary of the National Security Council between 2001 and 2003. He is well-known for his speech at a meeting in London organized by the Kemalist Thought Association (ADD – Kemalist Düşünce Derneği), at which he declared that “Turkey should leave NATO” and also should “protect its secular state and territorial integrity against Western efforts to promote moderate Islam and Kurdish independence”.\(^\text{27}\) It should be noted that it would be irrational to build the whole Ergenekon trial on the elimination of Anti-Western/Anti-American discourse. Those who allege that Eurasianists are being got rid of by the trial, also put forward that not all Ergenekon suspects have had an Eurasianist approach; but many Eurasianists stood accused of plotting coups against the AKP Government in the scope of the Ergenekon trial. In this context, General (ret.) Çetin Doğan\(^\text{28}\) claims that in Turkey people who have any kind of contact with Alexander Dugin\(^\text{29}\) and his movement are suspects of the Ergenekon trial, nowadays.\(^\text{30}\)

In this regard, the Eurasian oriented camp has been regarded as a circle which sets back Turkey because they have an inclination to shift Turkey’s face towards the East - Russia, Iran and the Turkic World. Bearing in mind these factors, supporters of the Eurasian oriented camp have therefore embraced the idea that by the Ergenekon trial they are being got rid of in order to protect the respectability of the USA and the EU and prevent any criticism towards them.\(^\text{31}\) Also, these developments have created an atmosphere in Turkey whereby Eurasianism has become a highly controversial issue to


\(^{28}\) Çetin Doğan is a prime suspect in the Sledgehammer case from 2010 and is accused of masterminding an elaborate plot in 2002 and 2003 to topple the country’s newly elected conservative Islamist government.

\(^{29}\) One of the main promoters of Neo-Eurasianism.


discuss, particularly questioning its implementation in such spheres as foreign policy making.

While the Ergenekon trial has relatively familiarised people in Turkey with the Eurasianism concept, it has failed to provide a proper discussion. The Classical Eurasianism was an intellectual movement among the interwar community of émigrés from the Soviet Union and imagined a multinational Russian empire. This ideology was developed around the uniqueness of Russia and Russian culture and the geographical significance of the Eurasian continent. Turkish Eurasianism on the other hand, adopted the geographical significance of the Eurasian continent and blended it with its own way of thinking. According to Turkish Eurasianists, Turkey and Turkish culture is also unique and it is a rightful quest for Turkey to become a global power since it has a glorious imperial past. In this context, they claim that Turkey should, in a general sense, focus on improving relationships with its neighbouring countries as well. From this perspective, it is safe to say that Turkish Eurasianism aims to counterbalance Western-dominated Turkish foreign policy. However, Turkish Eurasianism is divided into branches according to how their relations with the Western and the Eastern world may develop in the future. These branches will be analysed in-depth in the coming chapters.

1.3. The Research Question

To understand and investigate to what extent Eurasianism has had an impact on Turkish foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, the research question I am trying to explore for this thesis is as follows:

*Considering that Turkey has increasingly been pursuing an active and multidimensional foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, how have the discourses of Eurasianism been influencing the contemporary Turkish foreign policy making?*

Therefore, the argument of this thesis is built around the following hypotheses:
If Turkey’s foreign policy making process
  • has been experiencing an activation since the 1990s,
  • has been influenced by alternative ideologies for Turkey’s Westernness,
  • and Turkey’s international relations are broadening their horizons and launching an opening towards the East,

it can be taken into consideration that Eurasianism might be one of the leading ideologies in Turkey for the purpose of producing more comprehensive policies to become a middle power in the neighbouring region.

1.4. **Aim and Objectives**

The overall aim of this research is to understand the way Eurasianism has been influencing Turkish foreign policy making over the last 30 years and investigate what internal and external political factors have played a role in such a close-woven relationship. By undertaking such an analysis the research aims to identify the main parameters of future trajectories for foreign policy making in Turkey.

To address the aim of this research, the following objectives are set up to provide a framework for the development of this thesis:

Objective 1 - To develop a theoretical understanding of Eurasianism through examining the following concepts:
  • Classical Eurasianism in Russia around the 1920s.
  • Neo-Eurasianism in Russia in the 1980s and Post-Cold War era.

Objective 2 - To investigate Turkish public opinion and intellectuals’ awareness of the concept of Eurasianism in Turkey and their approaches towards the Eurasianism ideology and the East-West dichotomy.

Objective 3 - To explore the impact of Eurasianism on Turkish foreign policy making through three distinctive political periods since the end of the Cold War.
Objective 4 – To analyse a number of internal and external socio-political and economic factors that played a role in the emergence of Eurasianism-centred foreign policy outcomes.

Objective 5 - To conclude by presenting a set of political trajectories for the possible impact of Eurasianism on Turkish foreign policy making in the future.

1.5. Scope and Limitations

This research explores the discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey and their impact on Turkish foreign policy making during the Post-Cold War era. While classifying the discourses and what impact they have had on foreign policy making, the research will limit itself to the above mentioned specific timespan from the end of the Cold War to 2012.

The research focuses on the context of Turkish Eurasianism, excluding Eurasianism in other countries such as Kazakhstan, Belarus or Ukraine. It is in fact a difficult task to make a distinction between the discourses as the concept of Eurasianism originated in Russia and is highly influenced by Russian culture and literature.

Tsygankov\(^\text{32}\) and Clover\(^\text{33}\) examine the Russian Eurasianism and put forward that there are two discourses of Russian Eurasianism: Milder and Hard-line Eurasianism. While milder Eurasianism “simply stresses Russia's uniqueness and argues that Russia need not Westernize in order to modernize, the latter envisions the Eurasian heartland as the geographic launch pad for a global anti-Western movement whose goal is the ultimate expulsion of "Atlantic" (read: "American") influence from Eurasia.”\(^\text{34}\) Contrary to this way of presentation of the discourses, this thesis will embrace another way of


classification of the discourses of Turkish Eurasianism: Nationalist, Multiculturalist, and Westernist.

After classifying the discourses, the thesis analyses the scope of the application of the discourses in Turkish foreign policy making. In doing so, the three periods of Turkish foreign policy since the late Ottoman era are taken into account, Özal, Cem, and Davutoğlu. The reason for this limitation is that the activism in these periods has been quite high compared to other periods.

Another limitation is that although this study analyses a relatively long historical period for the purpose of presenting a historical background, it does not detail all the developments in this period, as it is not a chronological history of Turkish foreign policy. It only emphasises the principal events/developments since the late Ottoman era.

1.6. Literature Review

Eurasianism experienced its most dynamic and creative period during the 1920s and the 1930s. While this dynamism was lasting, Classical Eurasianism could not manage to penetrate into Turkey. However, it should be mentioned that Classical Eurasianism had interactions with coeval ideologies such as Pan-Turkism, Pan-Turanianism, Pan-Islamism, etc. Yet, it was not successful in creating its own supporters among the Turkish intellectuals. On the other hand, throughout the 1980s and the 1990s circumstances changed and Turkish intellectual circles became familiar with Eurasianism; but this time it was called Neo-Eurasianism and was led by Gumilev until the early 1990s. Since Gumilev, Aleksandr Dugin and Aleksandr Panarin have become the ideologists of Neo-Eurasisinism. Despite being respectively popularised as a Russian school of thought, the academic sources not only on Neo-Eurasianism but also on Eurasianism in Turkey or ‘Turkish Eurasianism’ are limited. This limitedness derives from the lack of interest in Turkish academic and intellectual circles on Eurasianism.

In this sense, the general tendency among the intellectual circles has been to produce some sources at the level of newspaper articles and presentations. Besides, they prefer
to speculate on their approaches to Eurasianism instead of making a collective classification or conducting research. That is why those approaches are needed to be classified in a way that will most likely explain the discourses of Turkish Eurasianism. In this context, it is a fact that there are five notable academic works written about the Eurasianism ideology in Turkey. These works give the reader a hint about what Eurasianism is and reveal some of the discourses of Eurasianism; however, they are far from comprehensive or up to date.

The first prolific author on Eurasianism and Turkish Eurasianism is considered to be Marlene Laruelle. In this context, she has two works; one book ‘Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire’ (2008)\(^{35}\) and one article ‘Russo-Turkish Rapprochement through the Idea of Eurasia’ (2008)\(^{36}\) dealing with the reflections of Eurasianist thoughts in Turkey. However, while Laruelle delves into Classical and Neo-Eurasianism, her research on Turkish Eurasianism is considerably limited. Whereas her works are restricted and do not offer a comprehensive approach towards Turkish Eurasianism and its discourses, another researcher, Vugar Imanov’s book ‘Avrasyacılık: Rusya’nın Kimlik Arayışı’ (Eurasianism: Russia’s Seeking for an Identity)\(^{37}\) is not topical. Despite being published in 2008, the author has used obsolete information to make a classification of Turkish Eurasianism.

Another article which approaches from one particular perspective and analyses Turkish Eurasianism’s Kemalist subdivision is Emel Akçağlı and Mehmet Perinçek’s ‘Kemalist Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in Turkey’ (2009).\(^{38}\) As a matter of fact this article is a well-written source which thoroughly analyses the Kemalists’ approach towards Eurasianism. Yet, in terms of covering all discourses, it cannot be regarded as a holistic work. Whereas this article is dealing with Kemalist intellectuals


\(^{37}\) V. Imanov, *Avrasyacılık: Rusya’nın Kimlik Arayışı* (Eurasianism: Russia’s Seeking for an Identity), (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2008).

who evaluate Eurasianism in a similar way to Alexander Dugin, Şener Aktürk’s article ‘Counter-Hegemonic Visions and Reconciliation through the Past: the Case of Turkish Eurasianism’ (2004) pays attention to emerging Eurasianist thoughts in Turkey. It is counted as the first article in English about Turkish Eurasianism. The final work of these five main sources is Fatih Akgül’s book ‘Rusya ve Türkiye’de Avrasyacılık’ (Eurasianism in Russia and Turkey) (2009). The author dedicates a small part of the book to Turkish Eurasianism and analyses it under different approaches. He makes subdivisions such as Nationalist approach, Socialist approach, and Conservative approach.

When comparing Akçalı and Perinçek’s article and Fatih Akgül’s book it can be said that both of them do not make detailed analyses. With a cursory examination, Akçalı and Perinçek recount that there are three main discourses regarding Turkish Eurasianism. The first discourse’s supporters are the right-wing, religious, and ultra-nationalist political movements in favour of establishing closer links with the Turkic countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The second discourse’s supporters are the centre-right and liberal political parties which approach Eurasianism to gain geo-economic opportunities. The third and last discourse is Kemalist Eurasianism. According to this discourse, Kemalist Eurasianists are against any type of pro-Western policy in ‘Eurasian space’ and back an alliance with Russia, China and Iran. Herein, Akçalı and Perinçek’s main deficiency is to ignore the perception of Russia among the Turkish society. It is obvious that there are different approaches towards Russia among the Turkish political movements. Despite these differences within the right-wing, religious, and ultra-nationalist political movements on whether bridges should be built with Russia, Akçalı and Perinçek neglect them and put these movements under the same classification.

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Akgül also classifies the discourses as three different subdivisions and tries to make a general breakdown of Eurasianism without being more specific. Furthermore, he inspects the Eurasianism’s effect on the foreign policy-making process of both countries, Turkey and Russia. At the same time, his book, like Laruelle’s, has a bias in dealing with the conceptual background of the Eurasianism ideology instead of finding out the practices or impacts of it.

In this context, Vugar Imanov, in his book, makes a better classification. He takes into consideration the Russia issue and in the light of this information makes six subdivisions of Turkish Eurasianism. 42 Despite these subdivisions being made appropriately, the problem arises in terms of keeping the data au courant. He uses two journals and their circles as subdivisions. One of them is the Journal of Ulusal which was published between 1996 and 1997 and the other is the Journal of Yarın, which was on the market between 2002 and 2006.

Unlike Vugar Imanov, Marlene Laruelle uses current data. Instead of making a classification of Turkish Eurasianism discourses, Laruelle is an expert on Alexandr Dugin and examines his personal networks in Turkey. Contextually, she, in both the book and the article, analyses the historical background of Eurasianism, to contrast Eurasianism to ‘Pan’ thoughts such as Pan-Turkism, Pan-Islamism, etc. and also the process of conceptualising Eurasia and Eurasianism and emancipating it through intellectual circles such as the modernizing Islamists around incumbent Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Fethullah Gülen’s movement43.

42 V. Imanov, Avrasyacılık:..., (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2008).
43 R. Muzalevsky in his article ‘Fethullah Gülen’s Movement in Central Asia: A Blessing or a Curse?’ CACI Analyst, Available from <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5167> [Accessed on 20/11/2009] describes this movement as follows: ‘The Gülen movement started out in the late 1960s in Turkey as an Islamic-based and officially non-political project. The modernist Islamic thinker Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, the founder of the Nurcu sect, influenced Fethullah Gülen. The Gülen movement promotes inter-faith dialogue and common values, with its leader adhering to Sufism, seemingly being nostalgic about the heyday of the Ottoman Empire and eager to repay a debt to Central Asia for the latter’s contribution to civilization in Turkey. Numbering millions of followers globally, it is represented by foundations, businesses, media outlets, and educational institutions.
Ahmed Yasawi Foundation, the Marmara Group Foundation\textsuperscript{44}, etc.\textsuperscript{45} Although she made a conceptualisation, she had no inclination to make a classification in this case.

1.7. Methodology

In this study, I have used the Case Study Design in which I employed ‘historical development’ of the key phenomenon with the support of interviews and undertook a discourse analysis to benefit from an extensive literature review and other secondary sources. In this sense, this section describes the research design and research methodology comprising the method of data collection (gathering documents and interviewing) and analysis.

1.7.1. Case Study Research Design

Research Design aims to represent the significant methodological thrust of the study, being the distinctive and specific approach most appropriate to answer the research questions.\textsuperscript{46} While the selection of the research design is affected by the research questions, the aim and the objectives of the study\textsuperscript{47}, it also has the purpose of achieving greater control of the study and improving the validity of the study when examining the research problem.\textsuperscript{48}

There are various classifications of research designs. For instance, Yin makes a simple list regarding research design types. According to this list, five primary research design

\textsuperscript{44} The Marmara Foundation (henceforth MF) is a Turkish “public benefit organization”, operating in Istanbul since 1985. For more than two decades, MF has had the privilege of working with statesmen, government officials, parliamentarians, academicians, chairmen and directors of chambers of commerce and industry, along with various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) representatives throughout the world interested in its works.
\textsuperscript{47} H. Brink, \textit{Fundamentals of Research Methodology for Health Care Professionals}, (Cape Town: Juta and Company Limited, 2006).
types are considered: experiment, survey, archival analysis, history, and case study.\textsuperscript{49} His detailed list displays the relationships between the types, research question forms and events.

\textbf{Table 1.1 Research Design Strategies}\textsuperscript{50}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Form of Research Question</th>
<th>Requires Control over Behavioural Events</th>
<th>Focuses on Contemporary Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>How, Why</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>Who, What, Where, How many, How much</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archival Analysis</td>
<td>Who, What, Where, How many, How much</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES/NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>How, Why</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>How, Why</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Marczyk, DeMatteo, and Festinger’s classification “although there are endless ways of classifying research designs, they usually fall into one of three general categories: experimental, quasi-experimental, and nonexperimental”.\textsuperscript{51} In contrast to Marczyk, DeMatteo, and Festinger, Creswell makes another classification which is built on the separation of quantitative and qualitative approaches. According to him, quantitative methods consist of two types, Experiments and Surveys, and qualitative methods include four types; Ethnographies, Grounded Theory, Case studies, and Phenomenological studies.\textsuperscript{52}

In the light of the information, what is clear is that research design is a phase to help researchers plan their research meticulously before deciding on methods of data collection and analysis. Having said that the design that has been applied to this thesis is

\textsuperscript{49} R. K. Yin, \textit{Case Study Research: Design and Methods}, (California: SAGE, 1994), (p. 6).
case study research design. The case study research design investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; where the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used. Schramm points out that in case studies documents, interviews, observations, and secondary analyses are the main data sources; and researchers are urged to make greater use of documents, interview the right people, and make observations more objective.

Within a particular context, different designs have different attributes and these attributes influence the research in different ways. In addition, case studies and qualitative studies typically involve interviews and observations without formal measurement and do not attempt to quantify their results through statistical summary or analysis. With regard to the discourses of Eurasianism, conducting a range of interviews is the main way to make inferences. Regarding conducting interviews, Bechhofer and Paterson point out that ‘when researchers are deciding on an appropriate research design and deciding how to collect their data, many of them immediately think of talking to people’. It should be expressed that it was not easy to collect data through interviews in my case. Due to the fact that Eurasianism is perceived as part of the Ergenekon trial, it was therefore challenging to investigate by means of interviews. In my study the data collection method has been mostly documents and, if necessary, interviews. During the research, the case study design helped me to obtain the necessary information to classify the discourses, verify my claims and support my discussions in general.

This design’s advantage is to provide more realistic responses than a statistical survey. Unlike other designs, case studies have much more flexibility regarding finding unexpected results. It is plausible to claim that the challenge of this design for this

57 “Ergenekon” is the name given to arguably the most important legal process in Turkish history, which will be described in Chapter V.
research is properly interpretation of outcomes to classify the discourses. However, my research is application of ‘historical development’ of the phenomenon in the context of Case Study approach and I am investigating how Eurasianism has changed in the context of Turkish polity and at the same time, how it has influenced the Turkish foreign policy making. To do this I am looking at three distinctive eras in the post-Cold War context in order to make an overall assessment of the role of Eurasianism in Turkish political scene and foreign policy making. By doing so, determining and choosing a number of indicators after in-depth analyses of Özal, Cem, and Davutoğlu’s speeches, mind-sets, and initiatives removed this weakness in the name of putting together proper interpretation of discourses.

**1.7.2. Data Collection**

Once the research designs to be applied to the research are determined, it is necessary to decide upon the manner in which evidence will be collected and analysed. During the data collection process, Yin elucidates six different sources: Documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, and physical artifacts.\(^{58}\) Regarding the process, Ranjit Kumar makes another typology through similar methods. His detailed typology can be found below (Table 1.2). In contrast to Kumar’s typology, it is crucial to mention that documents which are going to be collected do not have to be secondary sources; sometimes they can be primary sources from written or visual sources.

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Table 1.2 Methods of Data Collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Sources</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Participant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interviewing</td>
<td>Non-participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Questionnaire</td>
<td>Structured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unstructured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Sources</td>
<td>Documents</td>
<td>Mailed questionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collective questionnaire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.7.2.1. Documents Gathering

Regarding the methods of data collection which have been mentioned above, the data collection methods of my research are interviewing and gathering documents. As noted earlier, the main aim of this thesis is to classify the discourses of the Eurasianism ideology in Turkey and analyse their impact in foreign policy making. In doing so, speeches, writings, conversations have been scrutinised and analysed to understand the Turkish intellectual environment’s demeanours and approaches. In this context, my documents gathering process has been conducted through searches of bibliographic databases as well as scanning of journals, newspapers and library searches of books. During the process, the following databases were scanned: ScienceDirect, EBSCO, Ingenta Select, and Jstor. In particular, the following journals were useful for finding relevant articles: Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies, Avrasya Dosyasi (Eurasian File), Political Geography, Turkish Political Quarterly, Insight Turkey, Middle Eastern Studies, Perceptions, Geopolitics, Ab Imperio, Central Eurasian Studies Review, Türkiye Günliğü (Diary of Turkey), Türk Yurdu (Turkish Homeland), Teori (Theory). The initial terms used for the search in both languages (English and Turkish) were:

• Eurasia (Avrasya)
• Eurasianism (Avrasyacılık)
• Turkish Foreign Policy (Türk Dış Politikası)
• Turkish Eurasianism (Türk Avrasyacılığı)
• Geopolitics (Jeopolitik)
• Turkism (Türkülcülük)
• Turanianism (Turancılık)
• Ottomanism (Osmanlıcılık)

The search was generally limited to the period 1990s-present.

Key newspapers were also scanned. During the process, all major Turkish newspapers were searched, such as Hürriyet, Zaman, Milliyet, Today’s Zaman and Hürriyet Daily News. Also, several small-size newspapers, which are known for their closeness to particular groups and have a significant effect on the public opinion, were scanned, such as Yeniçağ60, Radikal61, Cumhuriyet62, Yeni Şafak63 and Aydınlık64. Books related to the [Turkish] Eurasianism were identified through library searches. The majority of them consist of Turkish books written by Turkish academics. In addition, several masterpieces were used such as “The Clash of Civilizations and The Remaking of World Order” by Samuel P. Huntington and “The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives” by Zbigniew Brzezinski. All in all, I identified over 450 references from this search strategy.

1.7.2.2. Interviewing

Interviews are a relatively common way of collecting data in research and the data they collect and the forms they take are limited only by the requirements of the research

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60 Yeniçağ’s daily circulation rate is on average 50,000 copies.
61 Radikal’s daily circulation rate is on average 40,000 copies.
62 Cumhuriyet’s daily circulation rate is on average 51,000 copies.
63 Yenişafak’s daily circulation rate is on average 103,000 copies.
64 Aydınlık’s weekly circulation rate is on average 10,000 copies.
question and the related research design.\textsuperscript{65} There are several types of interview methods. Creswell expounds three different types: face-to-face (in-person interview), telephone (researcher interviews by phone), and group (researcher interviews informants in a group).\textsuperscript{66} According to Ranjit Kumar, the method of interviewing can be divided into two main sub-categories, unstructured interviews and structured interviews. In-depth interviews, focus group interviews, narratives, and oral histories are given as examples for unstructured interviews; whereas the questionnaire is given as an example for structured interviews.

In this thesis, the unstructured, in-depth interview method was adopted to understand the distinctions between the discourses and especially to learn of participants’ biases regarding how Turkish elites and intellectuals approach Eurasianism ideology. Interviewees were chosen by judgmental sampling which is a type of non-probability sampling technique. By this technique, interviewees were included in the research after their writings and speeches were examined. In doing so, the convenience of the participants for the research would be revealed.

The interviewing method has several advantages and disadvantages. Some advantages can be listed as: appropriate for studying complex and sensitive areas, useful for collecting in-depth information, information can be supplemented with those gained from observation of non-verbal reactions, researcher can control the line of questioning, can be used with almost any type of population.\textsuperscript{67} As for the disadvantages, these include: time-consuming and expensive process, quality of the interaction and interviewer affect the quality of data, the bias of the researcher.\textsuperscript{68} Realising the advantages and disadvantages of interviewing and conducting interviews ensures the quality of the research.

\textsuperscript{65} G. Marczyk, D. DeMatteo, D. Festinger, Essentials of Research..., 2005, (p. 117).
I initially hoped that my interview participants could actually waive their confidentiality as they are primarily public figures, politicians, academics and well-known proponents of Eurasianism in Turkey. Besides, the mode of the research requires that the participants should be explicit and can be used for the typology. However, in terms of being anonymous I might use the information which I gain, without citing in the thesis, to mould the discourses. I anticipated that most of the participants would view the interview as an opportunity to articulate their thoughts on Turkish Eurasianism. What made me think in that way was that I would explain the title of research and its aims before making arrangements for the interviews. During the interviews, I planned to ask the participants from their perspective where they think Eurasia is as a geographical region. Furthermore, I would search the meaning of the concept of Eurasianism in terms of the approaches under the special circumstances in Turkey. Is that concept an alternate for Turkish Foreign Policy as some propose or is it a pipe-dream? These main research questions were the pillars of a healthy classification. In addition to these questions, I would let my interviewees guide the flow with open-ended questions. Prior to the interviews, being prepared about the interviewees and having, already, adequate information about their past and current thoughts would helped me to gain essential knowledge in terms of their approaches towards Eurasianism.

To prevent being misled or perplexed by the interviewees, I was going to conduct my interviews based on a guide. In so doing, I planned to control the course of the interview and avoid digression from the topic. I assumed that these interviews, which would be an amalgam of two types (general interview guide approach and standardised, open-ended interview), would last on average one hour, as the participants were chosen from the Turkish intellectual environment and have a wide range of perspectives.

However, although I had planned to conduct several interviews in Turkey in order to classify the discourses of Eurasianism and evaluate the state of Turkish foreign policy more thoroughly, after conducting five interviews in Turkey with three journalists and two academics, it occurred to me that the interviewees had some reservations about sharing their opinions on Eurasianism in the current climate, as it is a quite controversial
While some of them did not want to meet despite expressing that their identity would not be disclosed, some others consented to meet but did not reveal their opinion or repeated their thoughts already stated in their previous speeches or articles. However, I kept pushing to meet more people to conduct more interviews. After a number of interviews, I found out that it was not that difficult to find interviewees as long as I had valuable references as endorsements of my research. Yet, I had to keep their identity confidential. In the end, during my field study, I conducted 19 interviews. In this regard, the classification of the discourses has been arranged according to speeches, op-eds, articles of chosen intellectuals, and interviews in Turkey.

1.7.2.3. Discourse Analysis

‘The concept of discourse was developed by writers such as Michel Foucault. In his works, a discourse is characterised as a set of rules – rules for determining truth and rules for declaring the objects about which it is sensible and meaningful to speak’.70 Philips and Jorgensen indicate that the assumptions of discourse analysis methodologies are: a critical approach to taken-for-granted knowledge, a link between knowledge and social processes, and a link between knowledge and social action.71 Therefore, by and large it can be said that discourse analysis stands as a general term for a number of approaches in order to analyse writings, speeches, conversations, communicative events etc. Concerning its realm, Sapsford explains discourse analysis ‘considers the rules of the language game, which is the form of conceptual life expressed in a text or series of utterances or actions – what counts as a valid argument and what count as meaningful objects of discussion’.72

Bearing in mind all these issues, the main goal of this study is to classify the discourses of Eurasianism among the Turkish elites and policy-makers and to find out the impact

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69 This controversy is presented in Chapter one and five in detail.
of discourses on Turkish foreign policy making in three periods, Özal, Cem, and Davutoğlu. By doing so, selected intellectuals’ speeches, writings and conversations have been scrutinised and analysed to understand their demeanours and approaches by means of the discourse analysis method, one type of qualitative research.

1.8. Structure

This thesis begins with an introduction chapter in which an historical background is presented in order to give the reader a better idea of the importance of the Eurasianism ideology to Turkey and the current climate of Turkish foreign policy.
The second chapter is a review of Geopolitical thinking from the 19th century onwards. In this context, three main geopolitical ideologies (the concept of Lebensraum; the Heartland thesis; the Rimland thesis) are analysed in order to explore what kind of motives inspired the founding fathers of Classical Eurasianism in the first half of the 1900s and Neo-Eurasianism in the second half of the 1900s. Further, in this chapter the relations of these geopolitical ideologies with Turkey and its stance in world politics are presented.

Chapter three consists of a theoretical review of Classical Eurasianism. The conditions of Russia during the emergence of Eurasianism and its founding fathers are examined. Then the founders of Neo-Eurasianism – Lev Gumilev, Alexandr Panarin, and Aleksandr Dugin – and their lives, thoughts, and perspectives are analysed, briefly. The chapter continues with a comparison between Pan-Slavism and Eurasianism. Since these ideologies overlap across the same region, people have a tendency to approach both of them as if they are productions of the same frame of mind. This chapter reveals their differences to make Eurasianism more comprehensible. The chapter ends with an analysis of how Russian Eurasianism has been transformed into Turkish Eurasianism by Turkish intellectual circles. First it analyses the reasons why Classical Eurasianism could not penetrate into Turkey and then examine the embracement of Neo-Eurasianism by some intellectual circles in Turkey. Lastly, a brief comparison of Russian and Turkish Eurasianism concepts is revealed.

Without looking through the Turkish foreign policy since the late Ottoman era, one cannot perceive the circumstances in Turkey. In this regard, Turkish foreign policy making is discussed over four different periods in Chapter four: New Republic’s Foreign Policy: Peace at home, peace in the world (late Ottoman era - 1945), Turkish Foreign Policy during the Cold War (1945 - 1990), ‘New World Order’ and Turkish foreign policy (1990 - 2002), A New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy (2002 and onwards).

Chapter five analyses the discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey by first presenting four ideologies – Neo-Ottomanism, Islamism, Pan-Turkism, and Pan-Turanianism – produced
by rightist/leftist parties and activists in Turkey in order to prove that Turkey has other alternatives in its own neighbouring area. Besides, since these four ideologies are highly influential on the discourses of Eurasianism it is significant to analyse them as the roots of diversity in Eurasianism in Turkey. After these alternatives for Turkey’s Westernness, the Eurasianism ideology and its different versions in the Turkish intellectual environment are put forward. In doing so, the discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey are classified for the first time from the author’s own perspective in three different categories: Nationalist, Multiculturalist, and Westernist Eurasianism.

Following this, Chapter six deals with three periods of Turkish foreign policy, Özal, Cem, and Davutoğlu eras and the scope of application of the discourses. In this chapter, by and large foreign policy approaches by the then Prime Minister and President Turgut Özal, the then Foreign Minister İsmail Cem, and the incumbent Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu are investigated for the purpose of finding out whether the discourses of Eurasianism have been applied or performed during these three periods.

The final, concluding chapter draws together the arguments developed throughout the thesis. It reviews the discourses which have been built through the thesis by the author’s own approach. This chapter also produces a set of recommendations regarding what the discourses would mean for future foreign policy making in Turkey. In this regard, it is believed that this work will make a contribution to the literature with its uniqueness.
CHAPTER II:

GEOPOLITICAL THINKING AND WORLD POLITICS

2.1. Introduction

Geopolitics has been an excessively used term since Rudolph Kjellen first coined it in 1899. In one sense, the term “geopolitics” came close to losing its credibility because of overuse and also its association with the intellectual apparatus of Nazi expansionism in the 1930s and 1940s. Nevertheless, it is still a useful term to explain, describe or analyse specific perspectives of world affairs. Especially, along with the emergence of Critical Geopolitics after the 1990s, the concept “Geopolitics” has started to get attention. To make the concept more understandable, the following taxonomy of Classical Geopolitics which is more state-centric and Critical Geopolitics which focuses on space, identity, vision and statecraft is used.

In order to make a thorough geopolitical analysis, geographical knowledge is sine qua non. Throughout history, geography has always had a significant impact on human affairs. Its effect on nations’ identities and social and economic development is obvious. In this sense, its effects emerge from its permanency. Geography is one of the essential factors which influence the context of world affairs as it is permanent and given. And also geography is one of the determinants of the limits of states. While it imposes limitations on some states regarding their relations with neighbours, the importance of some states is boosted by their geography. Meanwhile, geography is not the sole component to becoming an important actor on the world stage. It is a combination of

size, geopolitical location, population, economics, technology, military power, and leadership.\textsuperscript{75} However, geography is differentiated from these components as it is the only one that is permanent while the others are subject to change in the course of time. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that geography’s importance can change by the effects of technological and scientific advances as well.\textsuperscript{76}

In this manner, it may be logical to correlate between geography and geopolitics and explain geopolitics as the links between political power, space and location.\textsuperscript{77} This is a more traditional approach to the term Geopolitics. In this traditional explanation, space is emphasised and comprehended as an existential condition for all-politics and a factor which affects the political process\textsuperscript{78}, while location is regarded as a factor which made the space occupied by a state.\textsuperscript{79} In classical geopolitics, location is a fact that does not change but “its significance alters with every shift in the means of communication, in routes of communication, in the technique of war, and in the centres of world power”.\textsuperscript{80} However in the critical approach, location is assessed by perceptions and imagination. These perceptions and imagination include “the civilizational grouping of a state (are we part of the West?); feelings of status, influence, and power relative to other states; and perceptions of the national identity of the state”.\textsuperscript{81}

Geopolitics as a perception can be identified in different times and spaces throughout history from Athens to the Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire to the Ottoman

\textsuperscript{75} F. P. Sempa, Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century, (London: Transaction Publishers, 2002).
\textsuperscript{76} G. O. Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, (London: Routledge, 2005); C. Flint, Introduction to Geopolitics, (London: Routledge, 2006); F. P. Sempa, Geopolitics: From the Cold War ....,
Empire. However, it gained recognition as a “science” after the age of Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{82} During this era several intellectuals who are accepted as the founding fathers such as Kjellen, Ratzel, Mackinder, Mahan, Spykman, and Haushofer, presented their own perspectives on geopolitics. Their insights were mostly motivated by nationalistic ambitions and based on state power and superiority in order to rationalize foreign policy. In the light of this knowledge Kjellen describes Geopolitics as follows: “the theory of state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in space”\textsuperscript{83}, while Haushofer characterises the term “a doctrine on the spatial determinism of all political processes, based on the broad foundations of geography, especially of political geography”.\textsuperscript{84}

More or less, for the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century thinkers Geopolitics was the study of the impact of geographical factors on state behaviour.\textsuperscript{85} From this perspective, it is logical to say that geopolitics was a state-centric theory. Having said that, another definition also endorses this deduction: “Geopolitics has been primarily concerned with the geographical embodiment of political power in the form of the political state – its location, territory, resources, population and boundaries.”\textsuperscript{86} As aforementioned, this approach belongs to the pre-1945 period. Along with the emergence of Critical Geopolitics, the way that Geopolitics is conceptualized is different from the understanding of Classical Geopoliticians. The main argument of Critical Geopolitics is that states and other powerful institutions are not the key players. In this regard, Critical Geopolitics is in favour of anti-geopolitics. Besides, critical geopolitics aims to deconstruct [traditional] geopolitical discourses.\textsuperscript{87} While Critical Geopolitics drifts away from the assumptions that world affairs are state-centric and geopolitics is an arm of foreign policy and international relations, it puts state power under scrutiny and deals with the operation of power relations instead of power itself. In addition, critical


\textsuperscript{87} D. Cowen and N. Smith, “After Geopolitics?…”, 2009.
geopolitics is concerned with the sources, practices and representations that let non-state actors control territory and extract sources.\textsuperscript{88} State is still important but statecraft and individuals are foregrounded as new key themes by critical geopolitics. Therefore, from this modern geopolitical understanding perspective, geopolitics is the multiple practices and multiple representations of a wide variety of territories.\textsuperscript{89}

In this chapter, I shall review the main geopolitical concepts which have mostly been put forward by the founding fathers of geopolitical thinking; Friedrich Ratzel, Sir Halford Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, and Nicholas J. Spykman. Obviously, I will not be able to delve into their geopolitical understanding in any detail here. My main purpose is simply to introduce these concepts such as \textit{Lebensraum}, the \textit{Heartland} thesis, and the \textit{Rimland} thesis. And then in the following chapter, I will investigate whether these concepts inspired Classical and Neo-Eurasianism at the beginning and end of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, respectively.

2.2. The Concept of “Lebensraum”

2.2.1. Darwin and Ratzel’s Organic State Conception

In the second half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Darwin was one of the brilliant brains that inspired geographers to conduct more research on the relationship between the environment and humanity. Hereafter, a Darwinian concept of natural selection was applied to the study of human societies by social scientists. Friedrich Ratzel was one of them. As Ratzel started his career as a zoologist, he had an advantage in applying Darwin’s biological laws of natural selection to the study of human societies. Apart from Darwin’s concept, Herbert Spencer’s study on the close resemblance of human societies to natural organisms was a new impetus for Ratzel.

\textsuperscript{88} C. Flint, \textit{Introduction to Geopolitics}, p. 16.

The emphasis on space in Darwinian Theory attracted Ratzel’s attention to the importance of territory and space in the history of nations. To him, just as the plant community needs space and resources in order to survive, nations too need space and territory. Ratzel adapted the Darwinian concept of natural selection and environmental adaptation and Spencer’s “the survival of the fittest” concept as the main framework of his *Politische Geographie* (1897).  

With this book, Ratzel produced the foundations of political geography.

Ratzel’s belief in space, territory, and expansionism proceeded in this book where the emphasis is on the core of political geography. He describes the state as “a fragment of humanity on a piece of soil”.  

After this explanation, he argues that the state “is a living organism and therefore cannot be contained within rigid limits-being dependent for its form and greatness on its inhabitants, in whose movements, outwardly exhibited especially in territorial growth or contraction, it participates.”  

From this point of view the core of the approach was that states behave as organisms. And those states need more acquisition of space/territory in order to survive.

### 2.2.2. Emergence of the Concept of Lebensraum

The term *Lebensraum*, which was coined by Ratzel and was used as a slogan in Germany in the first half of the 20th century, was one of Ratzel’s hypotheses. The emergence of the hypothesis was influenced by a variation on Neo-Lamarckism which is known as Social Darwinism. Neo-Lamarckists were of the opinion that genetic changes of species can directly be influenced and directed by environmental factors.  

And the influence of environmental factors led Ratzel to correlate between space and state. This correlation owes its existence simply to Ratzel’s background. He started his career as a zoologist and then became a journalist and eventually a geographer.

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Reflection of his career transformation can be found in the comment of his persona, put forward by G. J. Ashworth and L. M. Ashworth as follows: “Ratzel as a political geographer had three personas which are often not easy to disentangle, namely that of the journalist, the activist and the theorist.”\(^94\)

On the road towards theorizing the concept *Lebensraum*, Darwin came into Ratzel’s life via K. von Zittel.\(^95\) And his intellectual effects merged with Ratzel’s patriotism. While Ratzel was one of the founders of political geography, he was also a German patriot and an active member of German national-conservative movements.\(^96\) In this vein, he was a fervent supporter of the colonisation of Africa by Germany. Besides, Ratzel was in favour of the development of German sea-power. The reason for that is that according to him, a state needed to develop into a sea-power in order to be a world power such as the United Kingdom (UK) and France.

Ratzel’s use of environmental determinism can be traced in the creation of his thinking. Ratzel puts forward that expansionism into new regions is essential for people and their states in order to exist for a long time. From this expansionism perspective, the natural environment is quite effective in the determination of the extent of expansionism. If the state is a living organism and expansionism is an imperative, then states cannot be contained within rigid limits.\(^97\) These states need more space/territory in order to survive.

Since space has significant importance, every state in search of being a great power should seek *Lebensraum*, especially Germany. From Ratzel’s perspective, Germany must join the colonialist states in order to be a great power, as the USA, China and


\(^97\) F. Ratzel, “The Territorial Growth of States”, 1898, p. 351.
Russia are “Grossraum” (large space) states, which are destined to become world powers. According to Ratzel, Germany’s Lebensraum was Africa, as Europe was crowded and lacked territory. For him Germany had to join the “scramble for Africa” as soon as possible in order to sustain its own existence. The reason for that is well-summarised by E. C. Semple: “the earlier a state fixes its frontier without allowance for growth, the earlier comes the cessation of its development.”

2.2.3. Contribution of Others

The concept Lebensraum was furthered by scholars of the day such as Karl Haushofer and Friedrich von Bernhardi. According to Bernhardi, war was a biological necessity in order to achieve Lebensraum. He was of the belief that to Germany, Lebensraum was Eastern Europe. And with a special emphasis on Latin and Slavic races, “Without war, inferior or decaying races would easily choke the growth of healthy budding elements.” That is why the quest for Lebensraum was a necessary means to defend the German race against stagnation and degeneration.

After the First World War, in the name of a total vindication and total revival of Germany’s wealth and power, the Institute for Geopolitik was established in Munich in 1924 and General-major Prof. Dr. Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) was appointed its chairman. According to Haushofer, Germany’s post-war geopolitical realities dictated her to pursue the correct policy. This policy was territorial expansion. In his belief, populous states need living space (Lebensraum). And the growth of Germany, at the expense of her less virile neighbours such as Czechoslovakia and Poland, should

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In this regard, the need for more space on the road towards being a world power led Haushofer to embrace Mackinder’s *Heartland* thesis. In Haushofer’s view, only the *Heartland* thesis would enable Germany to acquire the necessary *Lebensraum*.

Haushofer emphasises two elements in his definition of *Lebensraum*: space and power. *Lebensraum* is “the right and duty of a nation to provide ample space and resources for its people.”

And it is the responsibility of the stronger state to expand at the expense of the weaker. Re-conceptualisation of the term *Lebensraum* by Haushofer and Hitler’s implementation attempts turned the term into a racist kind of expansionism. Furthermore, that caused the term to lose popularity during the post-World War II era.

### 2.2.4. Turkey’s *Lebensraum*

Turkey’s geopolitical importance derives from its land bridge location between Europe and Asia. This geostrategic location actually puts Turkey in an advantageous position among the neighbouring states and provides Turkey with an ability to play a role in world politics greater than its size, population and economic strength. Nevertheless, it cannot be claimed that Turkey has exploited that position very well so far. Since the beginning of the 2000s, Turkey has shown signs of realising its own geopolitical importance and developed its first post-Cold War strategic concept, called “Active Deterrence” in 1998. After that Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu developed a new concept “Strategic Depth”, which emphasises Turkey’s historical and cultural affinities with the regional states in order to foster its regional and global influence. This has been one of the few visionary concepts Turkey has ever applied to its own foreign policy-making process. Besides, that visionary thinking paved the way for Turkey to get involved in its own *Lebensraum*.

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103 R. D. Dikshit, *Political Geography*..., p. 27.
105 Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis, Sam Papers*, 2004, p. 23
Turkey’s Lebensraum is the main factor which provides it with a distinctive geostrategic significance. In the region where Turkey is located and wants to be influential there are three Grossraum states, Russia, China and India. According to its new strategic concept “Strategic Depth”, Turkey needs to create a Lebensraum in order to get rid of its long-lasting status quo-oriented and static geostrategic stance. This Lebensraum consists of immediate land basin, immediate continental basin and immediate maritime basin. Immediate land basin represents the Balkans, Middle East and the Caucasus while immediate continental basin shows Turkey's depth in Asia, projection into Europe and African axis. Immediate maritime basin refers to the spheres

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106 This classification has been made by Prof. Dr Ahmet Davutoğlu in his own book A. Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu* (Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position), (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2003);
of influence within the Black, Eastern Mediterranean and Caspian seas and the Gulf of Basra.\textsuperscript{107}

\subsection*{2.2.4.1. Turkish Lebensraum during the early days of the Republic}

The establishment process of the Republic of Turkey is one of the best examples of the struggle for a \textit{Lebensraum}. The Republic was a successor state of the Ottoman Empire (1299-1923) which was one of the largest and longest lasting empires in history. However, the stagnation of the empire began during the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, followed by the decline of the empire around the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. Its defeat along with the Central Powers by Allied Powers during the First World War brought its dissolution. After the War, the Turkish War of Independence began in order to halt the occupation of Turkey’s territory, as the Treaty of Sevres had abolished the Ottoman Empire and obliged Turkey to renounce all rights over Arab Asia and North Africa.\textsuperscript{108}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{ottoman_empire.png}
\caption{The Ottoman Empire at its Greatest Extent}
\end{figure}

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The terms of the Treaty of Sèvres\textsuperscript{109} were harsh and many in the Ottoman Empire were left angered. Especially recognition of Armenia as a sovereign state and a Greek presence in eastern Thrace and on the Anatolian west coast, as well as Greek control over the Aegean islands commanding the Dardanelles were not acceptable for most Turks. That is why this treaty was rejected by the new regime in Turkey and after a three year war of independence it was replaced with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. By this new treaty the boundaries of modern Turkey were recognised by the Allied Powers and to some extent the struggle for a \textit{Turkish Lebensraum} was turned into a great success. In this regard, securing its boundaries and founding a new state in a

geopolitically important location created room for the debates on Turkey’s central state identity in the Heartland thesis.

**Figure 2.4: Partitioning of Anatolia and Thrace according to the Treaty of Sevres**
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**Figure 2.5: Boundaries of the Modern State of Turkey**
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2.3. The “Heartland Thesis”

Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) was the theoretician of the Heartland thesis. Not only was he a prominent educator, but also Halford Mackinder was the creator of political geography as an academic discipline in the United Kingdom in order to catch up with continental Europe— as the most important names in the field of Geopolitics were German during the late 1800s.

Like most of the prominent geographers, Mackinder was a patriot too. His main motive was to generate a geopolitical thinking in order to sustain Britain’s imperial power. In his way of thinking, Germany and Russia were the two main rivals. And their expansionist policies were posing a grave threat to the British government and its allies. In order to make possible the survival of the British Empire, the dangers of German and Russian expansion should be eliminated. Mackinder was surely proposing this way of thinking for the good of world peace too. However, in the final analysis he was a believer of the saying “the sun never sets on the British Empire”. This approach can be clearly observed in his publications and lectures especially the ones which were published and given before 1904. The first one was presented at the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) soon after undertaking an expedition to climb Mount Kenya in 1899. The purpose of the expedition was to focus a British scientific and imperial eye on the region.110 The second one was a series of lectures on the “Great Trade Routes” which he gave to the Institute of Bankers in 1899. In these lectures, Mackinder presented Britain as the leading power in the system of free trade111 although later he converted from free trade to protectionism as he realised that a free-trade Britain would not be able to compete with the other great powers all of which had protective tariffs.112 The third and last one was a textbook Britain and the British Sea which was published in 1902. In this book, Mackinder foresaw the emergence of a new balance of power with five great

world states: Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the USA. In order to compete with these states Britain had to grow economically and, with the daughter nations, create a Navy of the Britains.¹¹³

By means of this thinking, Mackinder left his most significant mark upon history. Over 100 years ago, Halford Mackinder delivered a provocative essay entitled “The Geographical Pivot of History”¹¹⁴. In this essay he examined the relationship between politics and geography. The core of the essay was the vitality of the “heartland of Euro-Asia”. Mackinder pictured Europe and Asia as one great continent “Euro-Asia” and described Euro-Asia as: “a continuous land, ice-girt in the north, water-girt elsewhere, and measuring twenty-one million square miles”.¹¹⁵ Besides, this landmass was significantly important to international security due to its geographic position. In addition, states that have access to this great continent would be able to play a critical role on the international arena.¹¹⁶

Mackinder’s presentation was considered a defining moment in the history of geopolitics. He started the address by announcing that geography as a science of discovery was over as unexplored space was not available anymore.¹¹⁷ Tuathail quotes the reason why Mackinder formed such an opinion:

“Of late it has been a common-place to speak of geographical exploration as nearly over, and it is recognised that geography must be diverted to the purpose of intensive survey and philosophic synthesis. In four hundred years the outline of the map of the world has been completed with approximate accuracy, and even in the Polar Regions the voyages of Nassen and Scott have very narrowly reduced the last possibilities of dramatic discoveries”.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ F. P. Sempa, Geopolitics: From..., p. 11.
¹¹⁷ C. Flint, Introduction to Geopolitics.
In this vein, Mackinder argued that there was no land to discover and the fight was over even for the Europeans. Due to lack of unexplored space, international politics became a “closed system”. Thus, the actions of different countries were meant to affect each other. In this closed system, the main axis of conflict was between land- and sea-powers.\textsuperscript{119} In Mackinder’s mind, the world was a battlefield in which the one who controls the key geopolitical positions would be able to acquire global hegemony. That is why Mackinder generated different zones which divided the world map.

In 1904, he defined the core of Eurasia as the Pivot Area and then renamed it as “Heartland” in 1919.\textsuperscript{120} Mackinder put his theory into words on three occasions: 1904, 1919, and 1943.\textsuperscript{121} Mackinder’s first and foremost motive was the preservation and promotion of the British Empire. He believed that the British Empire would have to keep up with its contemporaries in order to maintain its leading position in the world. France, Germany and Russia were three rising powers of their times and the British Empire would not compete against them without altering and renewing itself.

\textbf{Figure 2.6: Mackinder’s Heartland Concept: 1904}\textsuperscript{122}

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} C. Flint, \textit{Introduction to Geopolitics}, p. 18.
\item \textsuperscript{120} C. Flint, \textit{Introduction to Geopolitics}, p. 18.
\item \textsuperscript{121} C. Seiple, \textit{Revisiting the Geo-Political…}, p. 3.
\end{itemize}
In this sense, Mackinder suggested that “great industrial wealth in Siberia and European Russia and a conquest of some of the marginal regions would give the basis for a fleet necessary to found the world empire”.\textsuperscript{123} Tsarist Russia was building railways in order to harness the Heartland’s power. If it happens, the British Empire would not be strong enough to save itself and spread its democratic values. Besides, those values were the most distinguishing specifications of the British Empire.

For Mackinder, geographical realities lay in the advantages of centrality of place, and efficient movement of ideas, goods, and people. In 1904, he theorised that the inner area of Eurasia was the pivot area of world politics (figure 2.6).\textsuperscript{124} The pivot area was balanced by the power of inner crescent states. But if Germany (one of the inner crescent states) and Russia formed an alliance, then a world empire would be possible. And that would denote that Britain and its allies would be at a strategic disadvantage.\textsuperscript{125}

Figure 2.7: Mackinder’s Heartland Concept: 1919\textsuperscript{126}

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\textsuperscript{123} C. Seiple, \textit{Revisiting the Geo-Political...}, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{124} S. B. Cohen, \textit{Geopolitics of the...}, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{125} A. Sengupta, \textit{Heartlands of Eurasia;...}, p.5
\textsuperscript{126} S. B. Cohen, \textit{Geopolitics of the...}, p. 15.
In *Democratic Ideals and Realities* (1919), Mackinder started to use the term “Heartland” which was first coined by the English geographer James Fairgrieve\textsuperscript{127} in 1915. Times were changing and Mackinder knew that his theory would also have to be changed. In this new re-conceptualisation, the pivot area was wider than the previous one with the annexation of Eastern Europe (figure 2.7). And this became the basis of his popular dictum “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the World”.\textsuperscript{128} Due to Germany’s rising threat to international security and balance of power, Russia must be allowed to keep the heartland for a while to make an alliance possible with Great Britain. During these years, Mackinder was in search of an international unification as the stakes were now much greater than just Great Britain.\textsuperscript{129}

**Figure 2.8: Mackinder’s Heartland Concept: 1943**\textsuperscript{130}

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Mackinder lastly reformulated its theory in an article “*The Round World and the Winning of the Peace*” which was published in Foreign Affairs Magazine, on July 1943.

\textsuperscript{129} C. Seiple, *Revisiting the Geo-Political*..., p. 50.
\textsuperscript{130} S. B. Cohen, *Geopolitics of the*..., p. 17.
In this last reformulation, he took out Eastern Europe (figure 2.8) and detached Lenaland (central Siberia) from the Heartland. \(^{131}\) Mackinder also proposed new geographical features. One of them was “Midland Ocean Basin” including the Mediterranean, Baltic, Arctic, and Caribbean Seas, which is as significantly important as the Pivot area. The rest of the features were “Mantle of Vacancies” extending from the Sahara Desert eastward to Arabia, Tibet, and Mongolia to eastern Siberia; “South Atlantic Ocean Basin” consisting of South America, the South Atlantic Ocean and Africa; and “Asiatic Monsoon Lands”. \(^{132}\) Similar to the second reformulation, international security and balance of power were in the foreground. Mackinder, therefore, was hoping that those lands would prosper and balance each other out. For this reason, he was in support of the cooperation of the Heartland (Russia) and the Mid- Ocean Basin (France, the UK and America) against the main enemy “Nazi Germany”. After taking out Eastern Europe from the dictum, Central Asia became decisive for secure international relations and a balanced world. In these conditions, the cooperation would have to be a necessity against any breach of the peace.

2.3.1. Turkey and Heartland

Turkey’s geographical stance provides it with not only advantages, but also disadvantages. As aforementioned, Turkey has had the ability to negotiate with the great powers thanks to its geographical location. At the same time Turkey is located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia and has played a bridge role between oil-rich and oil- needing markets. While that might be seen as an advantage, it causes disadvantages from time to time as well. For instance, Turkey might be the hub of human trafficking or targeted by some terrorist groups as it is in the foreground.

Having said that, in Turkey it is believed that the potential of Turkey to play a role in world politics derives from its centrality. Turkey has been widely presented as a

\(^{131}\) C. Seiple, *Revisiting the Geo-Political…*, p. 51.

“central state” based on Halford Mackinder’s “Heartland” concept. It has even been expressed by incumbent Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as follows:

Turkey is not a periphery state of Europe, Asia or Middle East. In contrast, Turkey is located at the crossroads of these regions and has an ability to influence them.

According to Mackinder’s Heartland concept, especially the revised version of 1919, the pivot area is wider than the previous one with the annexation of Eastern Europe. While Turkey (the Ottoman Empire) was included in the inner crescent in the concept of 1904, this new conceptualisation included Turkey in the Heartland. By doing that Mackinder attached more importance to Turkey and its surrounding regions. Besides, his way of thinking paved the way for Turkey to be perceived as one of the central states. That is to say, Mackinder’s conceptualisation emphasised Turkey’s role in world politics and influenced many politicians and academics to apply the Turkish foreign policy-making process, particularly during the last decade.

Turkey’s centrality discourse is perceived by the majority of the Turkish community. Besides, it dominates the intellectual debates and geopolitical assumptions in Turkey, too. Before giving some of the intellectual figures’ approaches, it is worth presenting the following political cartoon to give an impression about the perception of Turkey’s geopolitical importance among the Turkish community:

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Figure 2.9. Political cartoon by Behiç AK demonstrating “geopolitics as common sense” in Turkey

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Man: ‘Germany has harsh winters. They have to plan ahead. This has resulted in German advance in development and planning’; ‘The English have a small country, they have travelled to other lands. As a result, they have advanced in seafaring and science’; In Israel water and land are scarce; they have developed new irrigation techniques’; ‘the United States is far from Europe. To be able to monitor from far, they have advanced in information technology.’

Boy: ‘But then what did we develop?’

Man: ‘Nothing. For we are a country of immense geopolitical significance.’

Following the general assumption on Turkey’s centrality and geopolitical significance, the discourses among the intellectual and political figures are not different from the general assumption among the Turkish community. On this account, incumbent Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu, emphasises Turkey’s centrality at every turn. In an interview conducted by Marc Grossman, Davutoğlu mentions that

What is the uniqueness of Turkey? Turkish uniqueness is just the opposite, the geographical continuity. Not the discontinuity; Turkey is right at the centre of Afro-Euro-Asia, having multidimensional

characters of geopolitics. Turkey is a European country, an Asian country, a Middle Eastern country, a Balkan country, a Caucasian country, neighbour to Africa, a Black Sea country, Caspian Sea, all these. Another emphasis can be made as follows:

As a major country in the midst of the Afro-Eurasia landmass, Turkey is a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one, unified category. In terms of its sphere of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country all at the same time.

Identifying the discourse which puts Turkey on the focus of geopolitics dogma, another intellectual, General (Ret.) Suat İlhan gives us clues about the Turkish community’s awareness on Turkey’s geopolitical significance. According to İlhan, “we (people who live in the Republic of Turkey) are not aware of how significant Turkey’s geographical location is. Besides, we, Turks, ignore our values/assets, which derive from being Turkish. However, they have huge effects on global politics, especially on geographical location.”

On this account, Prof. Anıl Çeçen’s approach towards the significance of Turkey’s geographical location is not much different from Davutoğlu’s and İlhan’s approaches. While Çeçen emphasises Turkey’s centrality and geopolitical significance, he also merges his own approach with current technological developments. According to Çeçen, the USA has launched a programme which enables itself to open the Eurasian continent through İstanbul, which is the most populous city of Turkey. This programme has been developed by Bill Gates and his team in order to control the world through the internet and they called it “İstanbul”. Besides, for this programme Istanbul has been

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139 After a long research, I could not find any information about this programme and USA’s ambitions, which Anil Çeçen emphasises.
chosen as the headquarters. Çeçen continues that the USA is having trouble controlling the world beyond the Atlantic Ocean. That is why it is preparing to move to the geopolitical centre of the world, and in this sense Istanbul has been chosen as the capital of the world by the USA.¹⁴⁰

These quotes clearly present that Turkey’s geopolitical location and its significance is perceived as a dogma among most of the intellectuals in Turkey. Besides, this dogma is shared by the majority of the Turkish community, to some extent. It is this dogma which has significantly influenced the Turkish foreign policy making process, particularly during the Davutoğlu era. Also, through this dogma it is believed that significant importance is added to Turkey’s role in the international system and it is perceived by the majority of the Turkish population that Turkey is destined to be a powerful state in the region. Similar to the Heartland thesis, this dogma’s reflections can be found in the Rimland thesis as well. In the next section, the Rimland thesis and Turkey’s place in the Rimland will be examined.

2.4. The “Rimland Thesis”

2.4.1. Spykman and Foreign Policy of the USA

The Rimland thesis is another perspective on geopolitics and was the brainchild of Nicholas J. Spykman. Spykman was a Dutch-born American scholar and one of the most important geopolitical thinkers. As well as Spykman being recognised by his main work the “Rimland thesis”, it is an obvious fact that this thesis had a significant impact on the USA and Western strategic thinking in the second half of the 20th century.¹⁴¹

Spykman was a Professor of Yale University; like Ratzel he began his career as a foreign correspondent. One way or another it might be claimed that Spykman’s two major geopolitical works “America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and

¹⁴¹ F. Bordonoro, “Rediscovering Spykman”…
the Balance of Power (1942)” and “The Geopolitics of the Peace (1944)” caused their author to become one of the most well-known geopolitical intellectuals. In particular, a Spykmanesque type of security discourse became hegemonic within the post-war USA strategic discourse. That security discourse was set out on the basis of the prevention of hegemony, meaning Spykman was against American isolationism. Conversely, the USA should have embraced an interventionist foreign policy, especially in the Eurasian continent. According to Spykman, if any power dominates the Eurasian continent, then that would pose a grave threat to the security of the Western powers.142 This approach brought a new perspective to the foreign policy course of USA. It meant that Isolationism in foreign policy was over for the USA. Instead of passivity in foreign affairs, it was the right time for the USA to engage with European power politics actively.

Spykman’s views were widely accepted in intellectual environments in the USA. One of the reasons for that was his emphasis on the importance of the North Atlantic basin. In his way of thinking, the USA had a decisive strategic and economic advantage while in Mackinder’s thinking, this advantage belonged to Russia. In addition to the USA’s power potential, the Pacific Ocean would become a key route for world trade.143 This also was a contradiction to Mackinder’s thinking. In this regard, it might be argued that Nicholas Spykman was in search of ways to promote the interests of the USA as he was a proponent of realism in international relations.144

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2.4.2. The Emergence of the Rimland Thesis

The Rimland thesis was a production of a USA-centred way of thinking and was generated as a critical response to Sir Halford Mackinder’s Heartland theory. In World War II, two big powers (the USA and the Soviet Union) were in cooperation in order to control the Pivot area against Nazi Germany. However, it seemed that no one was thinking what would happen in the case of a defeat for Nazi Germany and Japan. It was obvious that the consequences of a victory for the Axis powers would be disastrous for the USA and its allies.145 That is why, notwithstanding the main goal was to defeat the Axis powers, yet it was not enough. Spykman was the first one who pointed out the danger in the coming days. According to him, the defeat of Nazi Germany and Japan would further increase the power of the Soviet Union. The form of the post-war world therefore needed to be analysed regarding power balances, sphere of influence and boundaries.146 Spykman firstly presented his concerns in his book America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power in 1942.

A while later, he reformulated his approaches to the post-war world and introduced them as the Rimland thesis in his book “The Geography of the Peace (1944)” published posthumously after his untimely death.147 In this book, Spykman urges American policymakers against the peril which would come true if the whole Eurasian landmass unifies. And, Spykman continues:

“The strength of power centres of the Eastern Hemisphere would then have been overpowering. It would have been impossible for us to preserve our independence and security. If we are to avoid the conclusion of such encirclement in the future, our constant concern in peacetime must be to see that no nation or alliance of nations is allowed to emerge as a dominating power in either of the regions of the Old World from which our security could be threatened.”148

145 F. P. Sempa, Geopolitics: From..., p. 76.
147 Nicholas John Spykman (1893-1943) died of cancer at the age of 49.
148 N. J. Spykman, The Geography of Peace, p.34.
Herein, it is important to identify what the Old World is in terms of Spykman’s thinking. According to Spykman’s geographical division of the world, the Old World was consisting of the Eurasian continent, Africa and Australia. The New World included the Americas in the western hemisphere. This division was similar to previous geopoliticians’ ideas. The difference was the way of approaching the division and for the good of whom. Following the conceptualisation of the division, Spykman kept advising that although the USA dominated the New World of the Americas, the Old World was posing a grave danger to the USA and that is why it must also be dominated through an active, non-isolanist foreign-policy.

To this end, Spykman identified the “Rimland” thesis or as some point out a reinterpreted Mackinder’s Heartland thesis. In this sense, Spykman argued that the Heartland was not vital for controlling Eurasia. Instead, Eurasia could be controlled by the Rimland or the Marginal/Inner Crescent surrounding Eurasia. Contrary to Mackinder, Spykman asserted that without the “Marginal/Inner crescent” (the Rimland), Mackinder’s Pivot was nothing more than a geographic area. In addition, while the Pivot area had no independent historical role to play and its geopolitical significance was overestimated, the Rimland was the key to world domination.

In this vein, Spykman’s formula was as follows:

Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia,
Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.

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151 M. P. Gerace, “Between Mackinder and Spykman…”.
Spykman describes the Rimland as follows:

The Rimland of the Eurasian land mass must be viewed as an intermediate region, situated between the heartland and the marginal seas. It functions as a vast buffer zone of conflict between sea power and land power. Looking in both directions, it must function amphibiously and defend itself on land and sea.  

Figure 2.10: The Rimland Concept

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In his conceptualisation, the Rimland consisted of Western Europe, the Middle East, southwest Asia, China and the Far East. The importance of the Rimland stems from its geographic position between the Heartland and the seas. Therefore, the Rimland could act as both a land power and a sea power, and also a buffer zone. As the countries of Spykman’s Rimland had greater industrial and manpower resources than the Heartland, it strategically was more important than the Heartland. 

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156 F. P. Sempa, “Spykman’s World”.

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All in all, from Spykman’s perspective, Mackinder was the one who exaggerated the prospects of the Heartland. In addition, the Heartland was less important than the Rimland. Spykman’s assumptions were based on backwardness of the Pivot area. The development of railway infrastructure and agriculture had not progressed in the way Mackinder had expected in his original thesis. Besides, Mackinder underestimated the importance of sea power. According to Spykman, the combination of land and sea powers was crucial in order to maintain the balance of power and control the Rimland, thereby ruling the Heartland.\footnote{R. D. Dikshit, *Political Geography...* ; R. R. Hanks, *Encyclopaedia of Geography Term...*; C. S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of Superpower*, (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1988).}

### 2.4.3. Turkey’s Place in the Rimland

As previously mentioned, while Turkey is included in Mackinder’s Heartland concept of 1919, he left it out of the Heartland area and put it in a new geographical zone called “Midland Ocean Basin” including the Mediterranean, Baltic, Arctic, and Caribbean Seas, which is as significantly important as the Heartland (the Pivot area). Even though Mackinder had emphasised that the new zone was as significant as the Heartland, the perception of Turkey’s geo-strategic importance had slightly deteriorated. However, Spykman along with his conceptualisation attached great importance to the Rimland and Turkey’s location once again.

In Spykman’s visionary thinking Turkey is included in the Rimland area instead of being in the Pivot area (Heartland). However, it needs to be emphasised that in contrast to Mackinder’s Heartland theory, according to Spykman the Rimland area is the most important geopolitical zone in order to dominate Eurasia by means of the industrialised states of the Rimland. In this systematised world politics, Turkey’s place is defined by policy makers and academics as follows:

> Turkey is a country with a close land basin, the *epicentre* of the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, the *centre* of Eurasia in general and is
in the middle of the Rimland belt cutting across the Mediterranean to the Pacific.\textsuperscript{158}

Despite the Rimland thesis being understudied in Turkey regarding defining the place of Turkey in this thesis, it was still another perspective justifying Turkey’s enormous geopolitical importance—whether located in the Heartland or in the Rimland. Both theses were drawing lines to control the world and Turkey was included by both of them in the most important area. That is why it might be acknowledged that the Rimland thesis is another motive for Turkish intellectuals to promote Turkey’s geopolitical stance and significance.

As mentioned in the previous section, these theses caused the emergence of geopolitics dogma in Turkey as they kept emphasising Turkey’s geopolitical significance in Turkish intellectual environments. It was their effect that led incumbent Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to claim that “Istanbul is not only a centre combining the continents but also a central symbol combining and synthesizing the civilisations”.\textsuperscript{159} In addition, Erdoğan also presents their effect on intellectual environments:

Turkey is a centre that combines Asia and Europe… [b]y becoming a member of the European Union, Turkey will not only contribute to the economic, social and legal structure of Europe but will also become an important centre for communication of the Asian countries with Europe.\textsuperscript{160}

On account of this, even if the Rimland thesis has remained under the shadow of the Heartland thesis’s popularity, it is widely accepted that to some extent it brings an added value to Turkey’s geopolitics as Turkey is located in the Rimland belt and also near to the Pivot area. The theses’ underlying effect on Turkey’s geopolitical stance has created an environment in which people believe that Turkey is one of the regional powers in all conditions. As will be presented in the coming chapters, this perception


\textsuperscript{160} C. Rumsford, “Cosmopolitan Spaces:…”, p. 128.
has been one of the main motives which make Turkey aspire to become a mediator, an actor, and a rule-maker in the region.

2.5. Conclusion

“Every century has had its own geographical perspective”.\textsuperscript{161} This statement belongs to one of the greatest minds of the time, Halford J. Mackinder. There is no harm in completing Mackinder’s statement with “… as every country and every nation has had its own perspective.” For instance, although the intellectuals Mackinder, Ratzel, and Spykman put forward their own theory/thesis/concepts in the same century, all of these intellectuals gained recognition from their own countries and nations. Friedrich Ratzel was a staunch German and his \textit{Lebensraum} concept was about spiritual and racial expansion of Germany. Furthermore the quest for \textit{Lebensraum} was a necessary means to defend the German race against stagnation and degeneration. On the other hand, although Halford J. Mackinder’s Heartland thesis was one of the popular geopolitical perspectives and he was an English geographer, his thesis influenced several states such as Britain, Germany, and the USA (during the Cold War era).

As a Dutch-born American, scholar Nicholas Spykman laid out a concept for the USA in order to keep the balance of power. Additionally, it might be said that Spykman influenced the American policy of containment which was implemented in order to prevent the spread of communism abroad by using numerous strategies until the end of the Cold-War era.\textsuperscript{162} In this regard, it might be claimed that the Rimland thesis was the more successful one compared with Mackinder’s Heartland thesis, as it failed to keep up with the realities brought about by the rapid pace of change in technology and balance of power in the world after the post-war era.\textsuperscript{163} As for the \textit{Lebensraum} concept, to give it its due and instead of labelling it as a failed initiative, it would be right to

\textsuperscript{161} Quoted in D. W. Meining, “Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History”, \textit{The Western Political Quarterly}, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 553-569 (553).
\textsuperscript{162} M. T. Owens, “In Defense of Classical Geopolitics” \textit{Naval War College Review}, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 59-76 (60).
mention that it was a generalisation and a regular behaviour of states in the seeking of national survival.

Nevertheless, these all are remarkable geopolitical perspectives which were *bona fide* in their own right and it is obvious that these perspectives interact with each other. In the light of this knowledge, it would be wise to claim that the founding fathers of Classical and Neo-Eurasianism were also influenced by these great intellectuals and their opinions on the grounds of establishing a living-space for their own nation, realising the importance of their own land, and finding out how to keep the balance of power. In particular, Eurasianists were influenced by the *Heartland* thesis since it presented the Pivot area as the core of Eurasia. Besides, the invasion of the Pivot area would enable the invader to emerge as a world power since the region guarantees self-sufficiency in food for the invader and its inaccessibility by sea plays a barrier role to protect the region. This thinking was the main rationale behind the Eurasianist ideology which urges the establishment of the Eurasian Union. In this vein, the next chapter will focus on the Eurasianism theory (Classical and Neo) and present a more comprehensive theoretical approach.
CHAPTER III:

EURASIANISM: AN IDEOLOGICAL REVIVAL

3.1 Introduction

Russia’s intellectual circles have spent a significant amount of time determining Russia’s place in the world. Particularly, these investigations reached their peak during the cataclysmic times of the Russian Revolution, World War I, the collapse of the USSR (The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) etc. Both Classical Eurasianism and Neo-Eurasianism came out in such times as a conclusion to seeking a historical, geopolitical, and cultural identity along with other nationalist movements.

This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, I will focus on the concept of Eurasianism, and its initial version, namely Classical Eurasianism; and then its current version ‘Neo-Eurasianism’, which evolved in a slightly different way through the Cold War era. And then, Turkish Eurasianism will be briefly presented and compared to Russian Eurasianism. By doing so, the section will provide a brief analysis on why Classic Eurasianism could not find any proper ground in Turkey while Neo-Eurasianism has had, to some extent, influence in Turkey.

Nowadays, the term ‘Eurasianism’ is synonymous with the term ‘neo-Eurasianism’, although the latter represents different perspectives. To understand and assess Eurasianism thought from a holistic perspective, its background should be known and understood. For instance, under which conditions has it been developed? What was the rationale behind it? When was it brought about by its supporters? That is why this chapter aspires to reveal the whole background of Eurasianism, its fathers, and their goals from the early days of the 20th century till present time for the purpose of providing a broad review of Eurasianism as the groundwork to evaluate the discourses of Eurasianism in contemporary Turkish politics. In the second part, the Eurasianism ideology will be briefly compared with Pan-Slavism as it is one of the ideologies which
is confused most with the ideology of Eurasianism. By doing so it is aimed that the commonalities and also the differences would be presented explicitly.

3.2 Classical Eurasianism: A Historical Context, Emergence and Principles

In Ancient Greece, the earth was divided into three separate pieces of land; Europe, Asia, and Africa. The boundaries were waterways. For instance, the Mediterranean Sea was the boundary between Africa and Europe; the Nile was the boundary between Africa and Asia. While the boundaries which separate Africa from Europe and Asia were clear, there was no certain boundary between Europe and Asia. Whereas this is one of the geographical divisions of the world, there are other claims which divide the world. For instance, Herodotus defines Europe in another way. According to him, “Europe has no independent existence, since it is only a part of Eurasia, which has no real internal boundaries of its own.” Having several perceptions of geographical divisions of the world led to producing many inclusions and exclusions to describe the placement of Europe and Asia in the modern world.

Eurasianism thought is one of the conclusions of such perceptions. It makes a reference to the term “Eurasia”. It literally means Europe plus Asia. As a geographical term, it was Alexander Von Humboldt’s contribution to the literature. Humboldt (1769-1859) was a German naturalist and explorer who explored much of Central and South America. Also, he travelled through Russia and Siberia as far east as the Altai Mountains and south to the Caspian Sea from 12 April to 28 December 1829. Whereas Humboldt’s perspective was purely and simply geographical, the Russian Eurasianists approached the term from a different angle. According to them, the most crucial point was the territory of Russia. According to N. S. Trubetskoy, “The territory

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of Russia...constitutes a separate continent...”\textsuperscript{167} Moreover, this separate continent was a self-contained geographical entity whose boundaries coincided roughly with those of the Russian Empire in 1914.\textsuperscript{168}

The reason why these Russian Eurasianists embraced this perspective was the conditions which the Russian Empire experienced during the difficult times of the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century. Herein, probing the early times of the 1900s is necessary to display some information about the founders of Eurasianism and to learn under which conditions Eurasianism emerged. First and foremost, in Dmitry V. Shlapentokh’s words, “Eurasianism is a quasi-political and intellectual movement”.\textsuperscript{169} By and large, this movement emphasised the uniqueness of Russian culture which was composed of a mix of Slavic and non-Slavic cultures and according to them, Russia was a separate third continent, neither Europe nor Asia.

In studying historical events, the conditions of the ages should be taken into account. Therefore, assessing Classical Eurasianism without a holistic approach may give rise to several misunderstandings. For instance, as a result of this way of thinking, Eurasianism is sometimes accused of being a racial theory or a utopia. Instead, the events of the early days of the 1900s, such as World War I, the Revolution of 1905 and the Revolution of February 1917 must be considered.

The Russian Revolution of 1905 led to the establishment of the State Duma of the Russian Empire, multi-party system and the Russian Constitution of 1906. Throughout this process many uprisings, assassinations and mutinies occurred. Eventually the Russian government was transformed from an autocracy into a constitutional monarchy.\textsuperscript{170} Nevertheless, the revolution’s effects did not solve the problems. In 1917,

\textsuperscript{167} Quoted in S. Wiederkehr, ‘Forging a Concept...’, 2007a, p.1.
the well-known October Revolution flared up and caused the collapse of the Russian Empire, and the establishment of the USSR.

Generally speaking, this period was crucial and critical for the people of Eurasia. Moreover, it was full of disappointments and disillusionments for the Russian intelligentsia. Under this situation, a group of Russian intellectuals, including a number of important ethnographers, philosophers, historians who were in exile, developed a different kind of thought. The most eminent figures in this group were a geographer and economist Petr Nikolaevich Savitsky (1895 - 1968), an ethnographer and linguist Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetskoy (1890 - 1938), an aesthetic critic and historian Petr Petrovich Suvchinsky (1882 - 1985), a theologian Georgii Vasilevich Florovsky, a philosopher Lev Platonovich Karsavin (1882 - 1952), a historian Georgii Vladimirovich Vernadsky (1887 - 1973), a religious thinker Georges V. Florovsky (1893 - 1979), and a legal philosopher Nikolai Nikolayevich Alekseev (1879 - 1964). Over time, several adherents joined the movement. They were a linguist Roman Osipovich Jakobson (1896 - 1982), a theologian A. V. Kartasev, a philosopher Vsevlov Nikaranovic Ivanov, a jurist Vyačeslavovich Šahmatov, an Orthodox priest A. Liven, a literary critic D. Sviatopolk-Mirskii (1880 - 1939), V. Il’in, and S. Efron.171 Despite the fact that Eurasianism was produced and promoted by all these intellectuals, it is fair to say that its principal fathers were Savitsky, Suvchinsky and Trubetskoy. However, before long, the participants of Eurasianism separated into factions and Classical Eurasianism faded away until Gumilev put together Neo-Eurasianism.

Regarding the characterisation of Classical Eurasianism, four main principles can be explored. The first was anti-Westernism. At that time, the West was perceived as Western Europe. In this context, the creators of Eurasianism eschewed Western

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civilisation and sympathised with non-European cultures. 172 As mentioned before, Eurasia was neither Europe nor Asia. It was a separate continent; however, the Eurasianists perceived themselves closer to Asia than Europe. On this point, Vladimir Bilenkin points out that “they described Western civilisation as a specific ethno-cultural phenomenon and, in fact, a dangerous aberration that relentlessly imposes its imperial domination over other ethnic groups by means of military, economic, and cultural aggression”. 173 So, the Eurasianists who lived in Prague, Paris and the Balkans anticipated putting an end to the cultural hegemony of the West and instead uplift the Eastern culture. Although the Eurasianists aimed to become closer to Asia, their main goal was to establish a distinctive state that was different from both Europe and Asia. Therefore, it would not be fair to say that it was a purely separatist movement. Contrary to the common understanding, it was not their aim to move Russia from Europe and toward Asia.

The second principle was the uniqueness of Russia and Russian culture. As mentioned in the first principle, Eurasia was a separate continent and at the same time it was a unique culture. For the Eurasianists, the specification which made it unique was the Turanian effect. Contrary to Slavophiles, the Eurasianists advocated that Turanians had a huge impact over the genesis of Russian culture. Paradowski points out that “The ‘Turanian’ (or Ural-Altaic) nations include, according to the Eurasians, the Finno-Ugric nations (Estonians, Karelians, Finns, Ugrians – both the Hungarian and Western Siberian ones), Samoyeds, Turks – including Ottoman Turks, various Tatars, Bashkirs, Turkmen, Kirgiz, Yakuts, Chuvash, a few extinct peoples such as Khazars, Polovtsy, Ugurians and, finally, Mongols (in Russia-Kalmik and Buriats, outside Russia-Mongols proper) and Manchurians”. 174 In this context, Trubetskoy asserted the Turanian influence as follows:

“...the living together of the Russians with the Turanians is a recurring motif throughout Russian history. If the association of Eastern Slavs and Turanians is the fundamental fact of Russian history ..., then it is perfectly obvious that for a

172 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism... p. 26;  
174 R. Paradowski, ‘The Eurasian idea and...’.
correct national self-knowledge we, Russians, have to take into account the presence of the Turanian element in ourselves, we have to study our Turanian brothers”. Albeit including various national groups, from the perspective of the Eurasianists, the Tatars more than any other group moulded the Russian culture and state structure. Contrary to the principal impression which is that the Tatar hegemony, in this context Genghis Khan, had a destructive influence over Russia, the creators, especially Trubetskoy, put forward that Russians learned many things from Tatars particularly about the constitution of the state:

“Eurasia is a geographically, ethnographically, and economically integrated system whose political unification was historically inevitable. Genghis Khan was the first to accomplish this unification ... In time the unity of Eurasia began to break up. Instinctively the Russian state has striven and is striving to recreate this broken unity; consequently, it is descendant of Genghis Khan, the heir and successor to his historical endeavours.

... The Legacy of Genghis Khan is inseparable from Russia. Whether Russia wants it or not, she remains forever the guardian of this legacy...Even during the period of the antinational monarchy [i.e. in the post-Petrine era S. W.]...Russia was compelled by the very nature of things to continue the historical enterprise of uniting Eurasia into one state – the enterprise of Genghis Khan. The annexations of the Crimea, the Caucasus, the Transcaspian region, and Turkestan ... were all steps along the path toward reunification of the scattered parts of the Eurasian ulus of Genghis Khan’s empire, while the colonisation and cultivation of the steppe ... consolidated the transfer of the Eurasian state idea from the Turians to the Russians”.

The third principle was that Eurasianism was a third way between capitalism and socialism, liberalism and dictatorship. It was a theory to build a nation, so it must have been different from the existing currents at that time. It was a product of a normal process. Throughout history, a number of nationalists have put forward several theories to prevent the collapse of their countries or empires. For example, during the late 1800s and the early 1900s, some ideologies such as Pan-Turkism, Pan-Turanianism, Pan-

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176 S. Wiederkehr, ‘Eurasianism as a reaction...’, p. 54-55 – Emphasis in original.
Ottomanism, and Pan-Islamism were produced by nationalists living in the Ottoman Empire to transform it into a long-lived empire. These kinds of Pan-isms were rejected definitely by the Eurasianists. From their perspective, “Eurasianism, rather than Pan-Slavism for Russians, Pan-Turanianism for Eurasian Turanians, or Pan-Islamism for Eurasian Moslems, should become predominant”.  

Regarding this point, on the one hand it is important to emphasise that many specialists believe that Eurasianism was envisaged to protect the existing state in Eurasia against the Pan-Turkist and Pan-Turanianist thoughts. On the other hand, protagonists of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanianism produced similar discourses in the name of promoting what they were arguing. In this context, the similarity between Ziya Gökalp’s (one of the leaders of the Pan-Turkic movement in the late Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish Republic era), Nikolai S. Trubetskoy’s and Georgii Vladimirovich Vernadsky’s statements is intriguing.

Ziya Gökalp stated outspokenly his opinions about Pan-Turanianism in his poem *Turan* in 1911;

> For the Turks, Fatherland means neither Turkey nor Turkestan
> Fatherland is a large and eternal country *Turan*.  

Nikolai S. Trubetskoy described Eurasia as follows;

> “The territory of Russia...constitutes a separate continent...which in contrast to Europe and Asia can be called Eurasia...Eurasia represents an integral whole, both geographically and anthropologically”.  

At the same time Georgii Vasilevich Vernadsky depicted it as follows;

> “Russia is neither Europe nor Asia but Eurasia”.  

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178 S. Wiederkehr, ‘Eurasianism as a reaction...’, p. 52.
181 C. J. Halperin, George Vernadsky, p. 486.
In this sense, the founders totally rejected the Western culture, thoughts, traditions, and currents to uphold Russian cultural distinctiveness. \textsuperscript{182} Eurasianism was a kind of nationalist idea which rejected Bolshevism, Capitalism, Liberalism, Communism etc. It was not an aberration, but was a kind of different way of thinking. In addition, in early stages of the movement, the theoreticians perceived themselves different from Bolsheviks, Marxists and Communists, albeit Eurasianism had some similarities to them. For example, being an oriental-based ideology would be counted as the first similarity as these ideologies did not have any relationships with the West. Another similarity is that on the one hand, Bolshevism and Eurasianism both rejected the entire culture of the pre-revolution period in Russia. On the other hand, Communism and Eurasianism were totally against the West. Furthermore, Laruelle clarifies these similarities as follows: “Eurasianism adopted Marxism’s dialectic approach, turning the idea of humanity evolving in stages against Communism; Russia would then go from Capitalism as a thesis and Communism as an antithesis to Eurasianism as their synthesis”. \textsuperscript{183}

The fourth and last principle was that Eurasianism had an anti-monarchist vision. As mentioned in the third principle, they were opposed to the monarchy which existed before the Revolution. Due to that reason, they were interested in a kind of democracy and a kind of totalitarian system. On the one hand, they did not accept the democracy because of its western roots. On the other hand, they did not give support to the totalitarian administration system because of the importance they attached to the Eurasian people.

Paradowski draws attention to the hostility toward democracy among the Eurasianists as follows:

“In their political opinions, the Eurasians declared themselves first of all as opponents of democracy, and, by all means, of its parliamentary-liberal variant. They especially jeered at democratic procedures which, in their opinion, transform society into a ‘herd of electors’ and a victim of degenerate elites. In

\textsuperscript{182} M. Laruelle, \textit{Russian Eurasianism}..., p. 26;
\textsuperscript{183} M. Laruelle, \textit{Russian Eurasianism}..., p. 28;
order for the elites to be healthy and the state ‘genuinely democratic’, the nation itself must be organised, not centrally, according to some ‘rational plan’ (whether a Communist or liberal one) – as the national life has an irrational character – but based on the ‘natural process of self-organisation’, on ‘living social groups’.”  

The roots of distance to totalitarianism can be found within Shlapentokh’s words. He asserts that:

“The excessive government control over the political and intellectual life of society was one of the major reasons that early Eurasianism maintained its opposition to the regime. Eurasianists insisted that their view on the relationship between the individual and the state was still rooted in the orthodox idea of sobornost. This implied that while a person could not assert his individualism at the expense of society, he was absolute and did not dissolve into the society either.”

In the light of this knowledge, it can be said that the ideologists of Eurasianism who experienced the collapse of the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires anticipated a kind of theory in order to prevent the collapse of the Russian Empire. Even if it collapses, this theory was to build a new nation which covers all Eurasian people under a Eurasian state. This state would have a unique culture which reflects the characteristics of all Turanian races. Related to this new state, Trubetskoy argued that “Russia’s existence as an empire was a thing of the past. The identifiably Russian element could no longer legitimately claim its traditional hegemonic position within the larger geographical-political realm of Eurasia.” In addition, this state would be, in Laruelle’s words, “demotic rather than democratic”. And, this state would be a state which took some special features of contemporary currents, absorbed them and produced a sui generis characteristic called the third way.

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184 R. Paradowski, ‘The Eurasian idea and...’.
187 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 28.
3.3. Neo-Eurasianism

Neo-Eurasianism is a slightly differentiated version of Classical Eurasianism, popularised during the demise of the Soviet Union. It takes its inspiration from the Classical Eurasianists and assumes that Russia is culturally closer to Asia than to the West (in this version the West symbolises the USA). However, Neo-Eurasianism comes to prominence with its geopolitical approach rather than cultural perspective. Classical Eurasianists do not cite any founder of Geopolitics such as Friedrich Ratzel, Halford Mackinder and so on, although Neo-Eurasianists, especially Dugin, state a geopolitical perspective and emulate not only the founder of geopolitics but also Samuel Huntington and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Lev Gumilev is considered the leader and founder of Neo-Eurasianism, while, Aleksandr Panarin and Aleksandr Dugin are two of the most important figures of this school of thought. Neo-Eurasianism is known as one of the restorationist movements in Russia. Vladimir Zhirinovsky (the Leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation) and Gennady Zyuganov (the Leader of the Communist party of the Russian Federation) can be counted as two other restorationists. Apart from being one of the restorationist movements, it has strength due to being one of the rare ideologies which emerged during the post-Cold War and its capacity to contribute to the intellectual milieu as it benefits from postmodern values. In a sense, it is Russia’s ‘third way’ in its own right.

In this part of the chapter, three pillars of Neo-Eurasianism will be featured: Lev Gumilev, Aleksandr Panarin, and Aleksandr Dugin. The reason for choosing these three

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188 Restorationism is briefly defined by Eduard Volodin as “The nation together with its social structure possesses a certain geographical (territorial) space and this space has to be defended against outside invaders.” Quoted in P. Kolsto, 'Territorialising Diasporas; The case of the Russians in the former Soviet republics', 28 (1999), 607-631.

189 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 83.

190 “The Third Way is something different and distinct from liberal capitalism with its unswerving belief in the merits of the free market and democratic socialism with its demand management and obsession with the state. The Third Way is in favour of growth, entrepreneurship, enterprise and wealth creation but it is also in favour of greater social justice and it sees the state playing a major role in bringing this about”. Available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/458626.stm> [Accessed on 23/09/2010].
intellectuals is that they are perceived as founders and the most prominent figures of Neo-Eurasianism by many scholars.\(^1\) Instead of making a new classification, this common view will be applied to this part.

### 3.3.1. Lev Gumilev (1912-1992)

Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev was the son of Nikolai Gumilev and Anna Akhmatova. Nikolai Gumilev (1886-1921) was a very well-known poet, a traveller, an adventurer, and an Officer of the Russian Imperial Army, who was shot by Bolsheviks in 1921. His mother Anna Akhmatova was also a well-known poet. Gumilev, historian and ethnologist of the Turkic nomadic world, managed to sustain his academic work, although he spent a large part of his life (14 years) in GULags (\textit{Glavnoye Upravlenie Lagerei} - Главное управление лагерей)\(^2\). He earned his fame toward the end of his life and after his death, a university in Astana-Kazakhstan was named after him in 1996.

Following the demise of Classical Eurasianism, throughout the Soviet era there was no active Eurasianist apart from Gumilev. It is fair to say that he is the main link between classical Eurasianism and neo Eurasianism. Gumilev’s works are more popular in Asia than the Western World. The reason is that many of his articles were not translated into other languages. Nonetheless, during the last two decades the demand for his works has gathered momentum. Herein, it should be clarified that this momentum has given rise to an acceleration of articles and books on Gumilev and his works.

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What makes Gumilev different and special is the content of his works. He did research on the nomadic people of Central Asia and ethnics, respectively. His first book was published in 1960, *The Huns*. And then *The Old Turks* (1967) and *The Huns in China* (1974) can be taken as a trilogy. While he was dealing with the nomadic people of Central Asia, at the same time he wrote three more books about Khazaria, Caspian and the Mongols: *The Discovery of Khazaria* (1966), *In Search of the Imaginary Kingdom* (1970), and *One Thousand Years around the Caspian* (1990).

Although Gumilev’s professional training was in history and archaeology, he produced a unique system of thought on ethnics and ethnogenesis — a distinctive identity formation process — to be in the debate on the nature of ethnicity in the USSR throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The quality and quantity of his studies on ethnics increased after 1965 when his first article was published on this subject. And then from the 1970s onward several articles were published by Gumilev on the theory of ethnicity and ethnogenesis, although some of them remained unpublished due to being rejected. It is fair to say that one of the reasons for these rejections was that some of Gumilev’s publications irritated important figures of his era such as Iulin Bromlei (1921-90) and Viktor I. Kozlov (1924- ). However, as mentioned before, Gumilev gained his reputation during perestroika. Many of his books were republished and most of his articles were published as collection books.

What can be said about Gumilev’s ethnics concept is that it was idiosyncratic. His perspective was that ethnics is a natural element of the biosphere rather than biological. And, landscape is rich regarding the diversity of ethnics. To emphasise the naturality of ethnics, he claims that ethnics which changes its landscape is confronted with re-adaptation, emigration or will perish. As an example of this confrontation, Italy is a perfect match, according to Gumilev:

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“All of the peoples who settled in Italy – Etruscans, Latins, Gauls, Greeks, Syrians, Langobards, Arabs, Normans, Schwabians, and French – lost their former character (oblik) gradually, over two or three generations and combined to form an Italian mass, a distinctive and mosaic ethnos with specific character traits, behaviour, and structure.”

Although his theory argues that in the case of landscape change ethnos is confronted with three options, Gumilev is in favour of necessity of living for all ethnos. In this sense, he expresses “There are no good reasons for advocating a policy of assimilation and fusion... why should we try to squeeze the behaviour of an Abkhazian and a Chukchi, a Lithuanian and a Moldavian into a single model? Why indeed seek to create a planet Earth ‘a single ethnos’ and a ‘giant communal apartment?’”

Apart from this ethnos approach, Gumilev developed a super-ethnos concept, according to which through merging two or several ethnos geographically, a single super-ethnos can be formed. In this sense, the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, together with Mongol-Turkish people formed the Great-Russian super-ethnos. It is necessary to repeat that in Gumilev’s super-ethnos approach, this merge can only be geographically without any assimilation or fusion.

Unlike Trubetskoy or Savitsky, Gumilev did not focus on Eurasianism or share Eurasianist ideas. He even criticised them harshly and claimed that the founding fathers lacked knowledge on the theory of ethnogenesis. Furthermore, unlike the founding fathers, Gumilev’s works were on the Huns and the Old Turkic Peoples not all nomadic people of Eurasia. Nonetheless, especially in Kazakhstan, he is regarded as ‘the last Eurasianist’. In an interview he also stated that “they call me a Eurasian – I do not reject it. I accept the basic historical methodological theses of Eurasians”.

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200 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism... p. 58.
201 Quoted in R. Paradowski, ‘The Eurasian idea and...’. 
In fact, Gumilev cannot be blamed for not being a Eurasianist. He lived in a different time and in different conditions and he did not need to produce an alternative state model. He spent most of his life as a citizen of the USSR which was one of the superpowers of the world, although the founding fathers lived in the Russian Empire which was about the collapse. That is why they felt that they need to produce a model which could embrace all people of Eurasia and become a leading power in the world. Gumilev did not need to feel that way. If he had to feel that way, his only motive would have been undemocratic conditions of the USSR, but he did not deal with this feature of the USSR. On the other hand, with regard to his way of handling the concept of Eurasia and Russia’s identity, it is unequivocal that he is one of the supporters of Eurasianism. According to Gumilev, Eurasia is the Great Steppe between the Yellow river and the Arctic Ocean.\textsuperscript{202} And like the founding fathers, he took into account that Eurasia equates with the territory of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{203}

Regarding the history of Russia and its rivals, Gumilev’s thoughts overlapped with Classical Eurasianism. Like the Classical Eurasianists, Gumilev also regarded the West as the most important enemy which Russia needs to get rid of. According to him;

“The Turks and the Mongols can be genuine friends, but the English, the French and the Germans, I am convinced, can only be cunning exploiters... Let me tell you a secret: If Russia will be saved, then only as a Eurasian power, and only through Eurasianism”, because “harm has always come to us from the West”.\textsuperscript{204}

He also thought that Mongols had special impacts on Russian statehood. Genghis Khan’s principles were embraced to build a successful state structure. What distinguishes Gumilev from the founding fathers is his approach to religion. He thought that Orthodox Christianity was one of the determinants which moulded the Russian identity. And when the Golden Horde\textsuperscript{205} adopted Islam, Mongols lost their impact.

\textsuperscript{202} Quoted in M. Laruelle, \textit{Russian Eurasianism}..., p. 70.

\textsuperscript{203} M. Laruelle, \textit{Russian Eurasianism}..., p. 70.

\textsuperscript{204} Quoted in M. Laruelle, \textit{Russian Eurasianism}..., p. 73.

\textsuperscript{205} Golden Horde, also called Kipchak Khanate, Russian designation for the Ulus Juchi, the western part of the Mongol empire, which flourished from the mid-13th century to the end of the 14th century. The
3.3.2. Aleksandr Panarin (1940-2003)

Aleksandr Panarin was a Professor of Philosophy at Moscow State University until 2003 when he passed away. He was a prolific academic. In particular, during the last 10 years of his life, a myriad of books and articles were written by Panarin but none of them were translated into English. That is why although Aleksandr Panarin is a well-known Neo-Eurasianist thinker his reputation did not extend far beyond the boundaries of Russia.

In contrast to Gumilev and Dugin, Panarin was a more liberal and centrist Eurasianist and he had more respect for democracy and human rights. Furthermore, Laruelle claims that many Russian scholars consider Panarin intellectually superior to Dugin. Having embraced liberalist and democratic features, Panarin was still in favour of the anti-globalisation movement. According to Panarin, the West was the exploiter of human rights and a source of oppression. He was a believer that the USA is a potential risk not only for Russia, but also for the rest of the world. The plans for a unipolar world, therefore, must be prevented.

One of his main arguments was the condemnation of ethnic nationalism. He regarded ethnicity as a production of Europe’s pagan sentiment. Furthermore, Panarin considers that ethnic separatism is a means to pave the way for a unipolar world which will be led by the USA. For all of these reasons, he was in contradiction with Gumilev and his


207 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 86.
ethnicism and in favour of pluralism. His work featured Eurasian pluralism and indicated:

“Europe upholds pluralism for individuals, but has a unitarian and hegemonic approach to relations between nations. Eurasia is the exact opposite of the European model; the absence of Western-type political democracy’s tantamount to the recognition of a right to autonomy for the empire’s regions and nations, a cult of the diversity of ways of life.”

Yet, he was a supporter of the Russian Empire. The reason why he espoused the Empire approach is that from a Panarin perspective the Russian Empire could be an alternative to globalisation. Besides, according to Panarin, being an empire is a natural right of Russia. All in all, Panarin was relatively pro-democracy, pro-liberalism, pro-equality, and pro-modernity, although he was an anti-globalist and anti-western. In his view, the West has some good values but uses them for the benefit of itself not for humanity. For example, according to him “Modernity is not, in itself, a bad thing; but a sustained attack on the value system of one’s own civilisation can lead the way to horrors down the road”.

As for the Eurasianist views of Panarin, there is a differentiation between his views and the founding fathers of Classical and Neo Eurasianism. Similar to the Classical Eurasianists, Panarin argues that the true Russia was a combination of Orthodoxy and Mongol statehood. He accepted, as do all Eurasianists, that the Turkic world is a significant part of Russia. However, he accepted that view as long as the Turkic world is an element of Russian identity, not for its own sake. That is why he claimed that there are two Eurasianist projects; a northern one led by Russia and a southern one led by Turkey. In this sense, he believed that another power’s domination of Eurasia would mean the death of Russia. Therefore, he was against the pan-Turkic ideologies. According to Panarin, “the Eurasian continent breathes like a single organism, and preserves in its deep cultural memory the archetype of original unity. It is for this

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precise reason that the southern, pan-Turkic project more and more actively conflicts with the northern Eurasianist project, which is weakened by Russia’s civilizational self-denial”.211

3.3.3. Aleksandr Dugin (1962-Present)

Aleksandr Gel’evich Dugin has been the leading figure of Eurasianist thought in Russia over the last two decades. He was born in 1962 in Moscow. His family is known for their closeness to Russian Military Services. His father, grandfather, and great-grandfather worked for GRU (Russian Military Intelligence).212 In 1979, Dugin entered the Moscow Aviation Institute, and then became an archivist in the secret KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti)213 archives. After that, he was a journalist until becoming involved in politics. Dugin is probably the most prolific politologist on Eurasianism. He has published over a dozen books and several articles. In addition to these publications, he has also edited several journals: Elementy (1992-1998), Milyi Angel (1991-1999), Evraziiskoe Vtorzhenie (2000), and Evraziiskoe Obozrenie (2001-2004).

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211 Quoted in M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 102-103.
213 KGB, Russian in full Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, English Committee for State Security, was the foreign intelligence and domestic security agency of the Soviet Union. During the Soviet era the KGB’s responsibilities included the protection of the country’s political leadership, the supervision of border troops, and the general surveillance of the population. Established in 1954, the KGB was the most durable of a series of security agencies. The KGB was created in 1954 to serve as the “sword and shield of the Communist Party. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the KGB came under the control of Russia. The government of Russian President Boris Yeltsin supervised the division of the KGB into several major services responsible for internal security and foreign intelligence. At its peak the KGB was the largest secret-police and foreign-intelligence organization in the world. Researchers with access to Communist Party archives put the number of KGB personnel at more than 480,000, including 200,000 soldiers in the Border Guards. Estimates of the number of informers in the Soviet Union are incomplete but usually range in the millions. For further information see Britannica Online Encyclopaedia, Available from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/315989/KGB>.
Aleksandr Dugin’s life is full of controversies. In the early stage of his career Dugin joined Pamiat. Pamiat was an anti-Semitic Russian nationalist organisation, headed by photographer Dmitrii Vasil’év. However, even Dugin himself could not bear Pamiat’s anti-Semitism and conservatism and after spending almost a year within this organisation, he left it and strived to found his own institution. While he was dealing with these institutions he got closer to the Communist Party. Moreover, the new National Bolshevik Party (NBP) became a centrifugal power for Dugin. He even ran in the Duma elections with the NBP in 1995. The result was a failure for him and it paved the way for Dugin’s departure from the NBP in 1998.

This became a landmark in Dugin’s life. Between 1998 and 2000, he took up chairmanship in the geopolitical section of Duma’s Advisory Council on National Security. Following Putin’s election as President on 21 April 2001, Dugin initiated the Evraziia movement and transformed it into a political party on 30 May 2001. Then it was formalised as the “International Eurasianist Movement” on 20 November 2003.

With this party, Dugin himself has been transformed and become a patriotic liberal who has embraced his traditionalist, national Bolshevik, and esoteric ideas under the same rubric. His main aim has been to formulate and promote the “national idea” among Russian elites and young Russians. Since the emergence of Classical Eurasianism, no one embracing and theorising Eurasianism thought has achieved such a widespread and influential movement. Currently, the International Eurasianist Movement has participants from many countries such as Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Belarus etc.

With the help of this movement, Dugin is trying to reach countries that play an important role in his Geopolitical Theories. Before explaining what Dugin’s geopolitical theories are, something needs to be mentioned here. With his most popular book being The Foundations of Geopolitics: Russia’s Geopolitical Future (1997) Dugin is influenced by the great geopoliticians such as Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), Karl

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215 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 111.
Haushofer (1869-1946), Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919), and Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947).  

In this sense, Dugin divides the world into four civilizational zones/poles: the Anglo-American zone, the Euro-African zone, the Pan-Eurasian zone, and the Pacific-Far East zone. According to Dugin, these zones counterbalance each other. In fact, the reason why Dugin proposes such a division is to prevent the globalisation process and widespread Atlanticism as he perceives that the most important enemy of the nation-states of the world is the USA. He describes globalisation as;

“A one-dimensional, one-vector phenomenon that tries to universalise the Western (Anglo-Saxon, American) point of view of how to best manage human history. It is (very often connected with suppression and violence) the unification of different social-political, ethnic, religious, and national structures into one system”.  

With regard to the zones, the globalisation and the hegemony of Atlanticism can only be halted and controlled by these zones. In the Anglo-American zone, the USA’s hegemony is unequivocal. And according to Dugin, “both American continents will form one common space oriented and controlled by the USA within the framework of the Monroe Doctrine”. The Euro-African zone integrates North, Trans-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, while the Pan-Eurasian zone consists of Russia, several countries of the CIS, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Last but not least, the Pacific-Far East zone includes China, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, and Australia. 

Once these zones are determined, Dugin claims that Russia should lead the Eurasianism thought and establish several axes to deepen its relationships on the basis of preventing globalisation and Atlanticism. In this regard, Dugin names the relationships between Moscow and the countries which are located in Eurasia as axes. First of all, he is in

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218 A. Dugin, ‘The Eurasian...’.
favour of establishing a Moscow-Tehran axis which is in his mind able to create its own organisational strategic model of the region. The second one is the Moscow-Delhi axis which is important due to the diversity of Indian society and her economic potential. Dugin regards the Moscow-Ankara axis as another significant relationship between Russia and Turkey to complete the integration of Central Asia.

**Figure 3.1: Dugin’s Civilisational Zones/Poles**

What forms the basis of Dugin’s zones is his ethnopluralist approach. Whilst Dugin dismisses ethnonationalism, he extols ethnopluralism. From Dugin’s perspective, the Russian nationalists are divided into two different groups. The first group consists of Pan-Slavists and Monarchists which are regarded by Dugin himself as outdated. The second group includes Eurasianists, Communists, and Prostatists who are the genuine nationalists that care about the future. From this ethnopluralist perspective, Dugin

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219 A. Dugin, ‘The Eurasian Idea’...
makes a separation between different Jewish groups. According to this separation, Jewish people who prefer to live in Russia are bad, while the ones who migrate to Russia are good. That is why Dugin seeks an opportunity to develop relationships with the state of Israel to enable all Jews to live in Israel.

**Figure 3.2: Dugin’s Spaces**

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On the one hand, after sorting out the Jewish problem, Dugin upholds embodying a Eurasian Union in the Russian Federation. And recentralisation of the Federation is the only way to prevent any nationalist separation. On the other hand, Dugin does not

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221 M. Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism*..., p. 136. “In Dugin’s texts, the distinction is different. The ‘good’ Jews are the citizens of Israel, as well as those who choose to leave for Israel, because this act signals their awareness of their irreducible Jewish specificity. The ‘bad’ Jews are those who continue to live in the diaspora and try to be assimilated by the surrounding cultures, be it in the Atlanticist or the post-Soviet world.”

222 A. Dugin, ‘The Eurasian Idea’....

believe in the likelihood of any clash between civilisations. While Brzezinski supports the idea that civilisations are in a state of conflict, Dugin thinks that a Russia-led Eurasia and the USA-led West are destined to clash.\footnote{224}{D. V. Shlapentokh, ‘Russia’s Foreign Policy and Eurasianism’, 2005.}

What Dugin has left unanswered is that whilst he is building the pillars of a potential Eurasian Union, he does not propose any economic perspective which enables this union to be long-lived. It is obvious that he has been influenced by the European Union model, but in return, he has not produced or promoted any economic motives for this proposed Union. He only approaches this Union from the cultural-geopolitical perspective. This is one of the drawbacks of the proposed Union and harms its credibility.

3.4. Comparison of Eurasianism with Pan-Slavism

Eurasia is the largest continent in the world. It therefore attracts the attention of states who want to dominate the globe. According to Brzezinski “about 75 percent of the world’s people live in Eurasia, and most of the world’s physical wealth is there as well, both in its enterprises and underneath its soil. Eurasia accounts for about 60 percent of the world’s GNP and about three-fourths of the world’s known energy resources”.\footnote{225}{Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, (New York: The Perseus Books Group, 1998).}

That is why Brzezinski follows that the USA is destined to control the Eurasian continent for its global hegemony.\footnote{226}{Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard:..., 1998.}

This is one of the reasons why a myriad of Pan-nationalist movements have emerged across the continent. Pan-Slavism, Pan-Turkism, and Pan-Turanianism are some of them. Fundamentally, Eurasianism is also a kind of pan-nationalist movement and in terms of its sphere of influence, this school of thought overlaps with Pan-Slavism. Although the main objectives put forward by the forefathers of Pan-Slavism are sui generis, Eurasianism and Pan-Slavism have a lot in common. In this part of the chapter,
in the name of comprehending these commonalities and also differences, Eurasianism
will be briefly compared with Pan-Slavism. In doing so, four variables will be used:
thoretical approach, open-closed nationalism dichotomy, characterisation of a potential
union, and philosophy of territory.

3.4.1. An Outline of Pan-Nationalism

The roots of the concept of “Nationalism” date back to the 16th century. However, the
contemporary concept was not refined during the emergence of the modern state until
the 18th century. ‘Nationalism’ was shaped throughout the second part of the 18th
century. That is why in Europe, the 19th century is called the age of nationalism. In this
sense, the French Revolution is a landmark in terms of being produced and being the
spread of nationalistic ideas. From that time onwards, the concept of ‘Nationalism’ has
been developed and been separated into several branches. Ethnic nationalism, Civic
nationalism, Cultural nationalism, and Pan-nationalism are some of them. Explaining all
branches within this chapter’s framework is not possible. Instead, this chapter will focus
on Pan-nationalism and in the same vein Pan-movements. But, before doing that, for a
better clarification and understanding of Pan-nationalism, the meaning of Nationalism
and its resonances will be elucidated.

First of all, the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology defines the concept of nationalism as
follows:

“Sentiment, aspiration, and consciousness are all terms applied to what
constitutes nationalism, or the valuation of the nation-state above all else.
However, it also entails certain assumptions about the will to self-
determination, the existence and indeed desirability of diversity, the
superiority of the sovereign state over other forms of rule, and the
centrality of national loyalty to political power as a basic form of
legitimation”.

In this respect the concept of nationalism resonates the attitudes and the actions of a
nation when they are being self-aware of their identities and fulfilling self-

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determination. On the grounds of nationalism there is the sentiment of belonging. When several components which are settled in a country realise that they have distinctive specifications from the rest of the components, the likelihood is that the traces of an uproar will emerge. If a government of a state does not sooth this unrest, these kinds of troubles may be transformed into secession. In one sense, this is the natural process and there is no way to avoid it.

Generally speaking, humans have an inclination to being independent; they want to control their own resources, govern themselves, instead of being governed by exogenous factors. They want to decide their own destiny, have their own homeland, culture, and tradition. They are disposed to transfer their own specifications to the next generations. To succeed in that they need to survive without being assimilated otherwise all these desires become meaningless.228 The sentiment of nationalism exactly at this point comes out and is ramified. Pan-nationalism is one of these ramifications.

In this sense, it is worth mentioning that pan-nationalism is a wide type of a present-day nationalism. The idea of pan-nationalism “is that national groups may participate in or even be subsumed under, a higher unity based upon ethnic, religious, geographical, or other common features”.229 Briefly, pan-nationalism can be perceived as an expansion of local nationalism on the one hand; and it can be comprehended as diaspora nationalism on the other.

From the etymological perspective, the word “pan” meant “the whole of something” in ancient Greece, which aims to unite all the people who share the same geography, language, race, or religion.230 In this respect, pan-nationalism transcends the concepts of “nation” and “nationality”. In addition, Hans Kohn who divided nationalism into eastern

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type and western type asserts that pan-nationalism is an eastern type of nationalism.\textsuperscript{231} Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Americanism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism, and Pan-Turanianism are some of the eminent samples of pan-nationalist movements. In this essay, one of them, Pan-Slavism will be analysed.

3.4.2. Pan-Slavism: A Dream of a Slavic Union

Pan-Slavism was one of the oldest movements, growing in Europe especially within the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. It emerged after the Crimean War (1853-1856) and had two forms. The first form arose among the Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, Bulgars, Poles, and Ukrainians. However it failed as they could not find any common ground.\textsuperscript{232} Kazemzadeh’s argument to explain why the first form was unsuccessful is the geopolitical conjuncture of the international relations:

“Austrian Slavs tended to be loyal to the Hapsburg multinational state, to fear both the Germans and the Russians, and to have but little concern for the liberation of Ottoman Slavs. The Poles saw their principal enemy in Russia and sought support against the tsar, while the Serbs and the Bulgars looked to St. Petersburg for help in overthrowing the Turkish yoke”.\textsuperscript{233}

As for the second form, the main impetus was to unite all Slavic people under the umbrella of Russia. In this form, Russia was the dominant power and Pan-Slavism was used for the benefit of it. Chronologically, as a nationalist idea, the movement came out at the 1848 Prague Congress in which many Slav envoys were represented. The year 1856 was a turning point in terms of European Slav leadership. The defeat of Russia in the Crimean War altered the approach to pan-Slavism among the Russian scholars. This alteration of Russian politicians and intellectuals gave rise to a conference in Moscow in 1867. Henceforward, the Russians, who thought that by means of strengthening the

\textsuperscript{233} F. Kazemzadeh, Pan-Movements..., p. 366.
Slavic identity they could seize all the lands on which the Slavs live, including the Aegean Sea and Constantinople (Istanbul), started to lead the movement.²³⁴ That is why it turned into Russian nationalism and substantially lost its effect on Slavs. Although Pan-Slavism experienced this evolution, it was still a failure.

From different countries, many scholars moulded the movement; among the Czechs and Slovaks, a Slovak Protestant minister Jan Kollar (1793-1852), Pavel Josef Safarik (1795-1861), Frantisek Palacky (1798-1876), Ludevit Stur (1815-1856); among the Poles, Stanislaw Statischg (1773-1866), Bronislav Tretowski (1808-1869), Adam Mackiewich (1789-1866); among the Illyrian Slavs, Stanko Vras (1810-1851), Valentin Vodnik (1758-1819), Ljudant Gaj (1809-1872); among the Ukrainians, Ivan Kontyerevski (1769-1838), Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861); among the Russians, Peter J. Cadayev (1794-1856), Mikhail Petrovich Pogodin (1800-1875), Fyodor Ivanovich Tyuchev (1803-1875), Nikolai Danilevskii (1822-1885).²³⁵ All these people believed that they had a common cultural heritage.

All in all, Pan-Slavism had three main aims; self-determination and independence, sustaining superiority of Slavic people over non-Slavic people, and establishing a Slavic Union. By and large, the self-determination and independence of Slavs were accomplished after the demise of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. Nevertheless, Pan-Slavism never achieved the rest of the aims as Slavs had been deprived of a common ground. It is fair to say that pan-Slavism was not a down to earth idea, like most of the other Pan movements. On the one hand, in order to materialise the unity, pan-Slavists must have grappled with the states in which Slav people were settled and it was not even close to the reality. On the other hand, it was a movement which stimulated the Slav nationalism and influenced other pan-isms.

In this sense, Eurasianism has several commonalities with Pan-Slavism. It is true to say that Pan-Slavism was also inspirational for early Eurasianists, albeit showing some divergences; such as territory and characterisation. Both schools have a slightly different philosophy on territory. Eurasianists, fundamentally, embrace what Pan-Slavists put forward regarding the territory of a Slavic Union and broaden the borders toward the regions of Mongols and Turks. Another divergence is the characterisation of a Eurasian Union. Pan-Slavists were strict with the ethnic roots. According to them, a Slavic Union must consist of only people who have Slavic roots. However, the characterisation issue has been moved to the next stage by Eurasianists and now includes Mongols and Turks. Thus, the importance of Mongols and Turks is emphasised and it is pointed out that without their contribution the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union would not exist.

Last but not least, another important divergence is ‘open-closed nationalism’ dichotomy. From the perspective of the ‘open-closed nationalism’ dichotomy, it is fair to say that unlike Pan-Slavism, Eurasianism is an ‘open’ nationalism. In the name of clarifying the ‘open’ nationalism, Whitman’s analysis must be applied. According to this analysis, ‘open’ nationalism represents the more modern form, while ‘closed’ nationalism stresses the nation’s autochthonous character, the common origins (race, blood) and rootedness in the ancestral soil.\(^{236}\) That is why Eurasianism is unequivocally an ‘open’ nationalism although Pan-Slavism is ‘closed’ nationalism.

3.5. From Russian Eurasianism to Turkish Eurasianism: A Digression from the Mainstream?

As it is noted earlier, when Classical Eurasianism was put together in the beginning of 20th century, it did not have any influence among Turkish intelligentsia. Turkey’s first meet with the Eurasianism ideology was around the 1990s when the USSR collapsed and new Turkic states emerged. To understand why Classical Eurasianism could not

penetrate into Turkey, it is needed to have a close look at the relationships between Turkey and Russia since the beginning.

3.5.1. Turkey’s Relationships with Russia: An Eternal Enemy or A Neighbour at the Door?

The relations between the two Empires – Ottoman and Russian –, which had European and Asian characteristics, date back to 1492.\(^{237}\) Those relations were mostly strained and even antagonistic due to power struggle between both empires. The reason for the struggle is the inclination of broadening their borders to include European territories. And this inclination eventually caused several clashes between the two Empires since late 1500s. In course of time, the relations transformed as the two Empires transformed, as well. Toward the end of the 19\(^{th}\) century when the Czar Nicholas I of Russia described the Ottoman Empire as “the sick man of Europe”, the power of Ottoman Empire started to decline, significantly and in 1923, the Republic of Turkey emerged as the successor state. On the other hand, the Russian Empire also transformed into the Russian Provisional Government (1917-1922), then The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922-1991), and the Russian Federation (1991-present), respectively.

As for the rapprochement, the recognition of the Republic of Turkey by the Soviet Union during the Turkish War of Liberation was the first attempt. Another rapprochement between the sides was the Soviet Union’s gold and armaments supply to Turkey during the same war. However, the following days did not cause to improve the relations between the two states due to the Soviet Union’s unacceptable desires on Turkey such as to control both Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits. Besides, the relations, from time to time, got strained further due to the emergence of the Cold War until the demise of the Soviet Union.

In this climate, it is logical to claim that there are two main reasons for Turkey not to embrace Classical Eurasianism. First one is that Classical Eurasianism was a rejection

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of Western-oriented ideologies and an acknowledgement of the superiority of Russian history and culture against the West. In this sense, for Classical Eurasianists, it was a panacea for the decline of Russian Empire. The second reason was that Classical Eurasianism was produced to save the Russian Empire or in other words to build a new motherland to encompass diverse peoples who dwell on the Eurasian landmass.

Based on two reasons, it is safe to say that there was a perception among Turkish intellectuals towards the ideology that had no good for Turkey as both states were seeing each other as rivals despite the aforementioned rapprochements. The establishment of Turkish Communist Party would be a proper example to explain the circumstances in Turkey during the early days of the Republic. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was the one who instructed to set up a communist party on 18 October 1920 in order to secure Bolshevik help against the Western Allies. However, the rationale behind Mustafa Kemal’s communist party move was tactical. That tactical approach would be clearly seen in a telegram to Ali Fuat Pasha:

... that this movement [communism] was being diffused in our country from internal and external sources and aiming at various goals, and unless necessary measures were taken, the peace and unity of the Turkish people would be put in jeopardy. Thus it was concluded that the wisest step would be to get some reasonable friends to form a communist party under the guidance of the government.238

Besides, the murder of the founder of the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), Mustafa Subhi and 14 leading Turkish communists was another indicator to explain the perception in Turkey towards Russia-oriented ideologies. Although Mustafa Subhi and his friends were invited to Turkey by Mustafa Kemal himself, they were forced to return to the Soviet Union and then were murdered off the coast of Trabzon.239 By and large, the conditions had not changed until the collapse of Soviet Union.

3.5.2. Ideological Interaction as a Result of Rapprochement during the Post-Cold War Era

The dissolution of the Soviet Union caused a thorough transformation of the relations. From that time on, the mutual perception has changed from enemy state to rival regional power in spite of conflicts of interests in the mutually shared areas of their near-abroad. After the Cold War, the Russian Federation has, to some extent, embraced several Western values such as democracy, market economy and etc. This transformation has led to a mutual trust and good neighbourliness between two states. As a consequence of this mutual trust, the first visit was paid by the then Prime Minister of Turkey Mr Süleyman Demirel in 1992 in order to sign "Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation". This treaty is the one which grounded the mutual respects between both sides.

The 1990s were an era when the relations were strained in terms of security issues, while economic relations were improving. The concern was the former Soviet States on which both sides had influence. In terms of this concern, Turkey’s approach was based on ethnical, linguistic, and cultural ties with Turkic States of Central Asia and the Caucasus. In this context, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused Turkey to develop a discourse “The Great Turkish World – from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China”. Along with this discourse, Turkey envisioned expansive road, energy and communication links with the former Soviet Central Asian Republics. Whereas Russia was in favour of the status quo in Central Asia, Turkey was supporting a deep-

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rooted change in the former Soviet States by the help of the United States of America. And this confrontation was the principal issue caused tension between both sides. However, after 1992 when Turkey recognised the Russian Federation, reciprocal high level visits started and ease the tension between two states. In this respect, another Joint Declaration on the Fight against Terrorism was issued in 1999.

The aforementioned visits continued and yielded new perspectives on the relations. On November, 2001 the then Foreign Minister of Turkey Mr İsmail Cem and the then Foreign Minister of Russia Mr Igor Ivanov signed the “Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia”. With this Joint Action Plan, Turkey and the Russian Federation upgraded their relations from bilateral relations to Multidimensional Partnership. This plan was signed in the 9/11 environment. Both states was eager to emphasise the importance of cooperation in Eurasia after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York, which also highlighted Turkey’s willingness to form an international cooperation against international terrorism. By implementing this plan, from now onward the two states added other dimensions to their economic-based relations, such as security and politics.

The atmosphere between Moscow and Ankara was improved by this new level partnership. And it had also an effect on economic relations. Since 2002, there is an improving momentum in the bilateral economic partnership (see table 3.1). And by 2004, Russia had become Turkey’s second largest trade partner after Germany. As a matter of fact, the personal relations between the then Prime Minister of Russia Mr Vladimir Putin and the then Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan have been effective in terms of deepening the bilateral relations. In this context, Putin recalls their first meeting as follow:

He was not Prime Minister yet. He came to Moscow and told me about the politics he will follow. He talked about his views regarding the outlawed

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244 O. Aksoy, “Turkish-Russian cooperation in Eurasia”, Foreign Policy, the Foreign Policy Institute, Vol. 34 (3-4), pp. 162-165 (163).
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). I explained to him what the Chechen terrorists do and asked for his support. He said Turkey will not give support to Chechen terrorists. First, I could not believe it, because his former party (Refah) was supporting the Chechens, even collecting and sending money here. However, it surprisingly dawned a while later that Turkey indeed did not allow terrorists. For this reason, I have a great confidence in Turkey.

Table 3.1 Turkey - Russian Federation Foreign Trade (million dollars)

Although, this statement was made by Putin in 2007 in Sochi, Putin paid a visit to Turkey on December 5-6, 2004. This was the first Presidential visit in the history of Turkish-Russian relations since nominal head of state Nikolai Podgorny visited in 1972. The Putin’s visit was the beginning of another era regarding the relationships.

During the Putin’s visit in 2004, the Joint Declaration on the Intensification of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership was signed by the two states. With this joint declaration, the relations of Turkey and the Russian Federation have gained another dimension “Enhanced Multidimensional Partnership”. Besides the two states

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emphasised the trust and importance of deepening the relations between these two Eurasian powers which are in favour of peace and stability in their neighbouring areas.

Subsequently, the reciprocal visits continued. Even Mr. Kınıklıoğlu coined the year 2005 as *annus mirabilis*.\(^{249}\) During 2005, Putin and Erdogan met four times (December 2004, 10-13 January 2005, 17 July 2005, and 17 November 2005).\(^{250}\) All these visits have reinforced the relations, which were mainly economic, and have gradually turned them into multidimensional. In this sense, economic relations have been complemented by political and security relations. For instance, Turkey has abandoned its expansionist policies in favour of closer relations with Russia. In addition, military cooperation between both states has been increased in order to sustain the peace and stability in the Caucasus and Black Sea Area.\(^{251}\)

As Hüseyin Bağcı expressed that “rivalry between Russia and Turkey in their immediate regions seems to be a geopolitical *fait accompli*”\(^{252}\). However, the two actors have managed to reconcile the geopolitical rivalry so far. It seems that this reconciliation environment will last as long as Turkey’s new multi-dimensional perspective and Russia’s openness remain exist. The abandonment of visa regime between Turkey and Russia as of April 16, 2011 is a solid evidence of that the two states are in favour of improving the relations as much as they can.

Unlike the conditions of pre-war and cold war eras, the Post-Cold War era let both states to build closer relationships. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union created an ideological vacuum in the region. For some intellectuals it was the victory of Western liberal democracy. For instance, Francis Fukuyama in his article *The End of History* argues that “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is,

\(^{249}\) S. Kınıklıoğlu, ‘Turkey and Russia: Partnership…’, p. 3.

\(^{250}\) M. Çelikpala, ‘1990’lardan Günümüze Türk-Rus İlişkileri’ (Turkish-Russian Relations since 1990s), *Avrasya Dosyası*, 13 (1), 267-298, (p. 286).


the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”. Another argument for the Post-Cold War era came from Samuel Huntington who proposed that the age of ideology was over. Samuel Huntington’s argument was as follows:

“It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

These kinds of propositions were to fill in the ideological vacuum which the collapse of the Soviet Union created. Besides, there were other counter propositions from the East. Neo-Eurasianism has been one of them. This ideological understanding has been spread over the neighbouring areas of the Soviet Union after the collapse. Yet, at first place it was not welcomed by Turkish intelligentsia because of one of the progenitors, Alexander Dugin’s statements towards Turkey. During the 1990s, Dugin’s approach towards Turkey was hostile as he was arguing that Turkey was among the allied countries of the Atlanticist bloc, led by the USA. However, this approach changed around the 2000s and Dugin started to talk about Moscow-Ankara axis.

This rhetoric has triggered the embracement of Neo-Eurasianism in Turkey. Dugin himself explains how some intellectual circles have gotten attracted to the ideology as follows:

“The idea of Eurasianism in Turkey took root first in the left-wing environment... The Workers Party of Turkey under the leadership of Mr. Doğu Perinçek, its organ the journal Aydınlık and other institutions close

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to them, accepted Eurasianism ... But also right-wing nationalists, centrists, some religious circles, some military leaders of Turkish army, intellectual foundations like the Ahmed Yesevi Foundation and ASAM (Eurasian Strategic Research Centre), the “Dialog Eurasia Platform” movement, which tries to bring members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Turkish intellectuals closer together, and other institutions or movements showed interest to this Eurasia concept. 256

Herein, the embrace of Neo-Eurasianism needs further clarification. As Dugin mentions that the new concept has found a space among some intellectual circles, the rest of them have an inclination to identify Eurasianism with the East and its underdeveloped institutions are despised by opponents. 257 The West is associated with democracy and development in the minds of many people in Turkey, while the East is associated with backwardness and underdevelopment. From this point of view, these same circles have tendency to consider Eurasianism as a shift from the traditional Turkish foreign policy. 258 In this sense, it is the same circles who allege that in any kind of Eurasianist dream Turkey would stay in the shadow of Russia.

Having said that, this discriminatory approach is embraced by Turkish public opinion. For instance, some of the intellectuals allege that Eurasianist mind-sets are being gotten rid of through the Ergenekon 259 trial to eliminate any Russian influence in intellectual circles and to consolidate pro-American elements in Turkey. 260 This tendency has been concluded by means of examining the opinions of the Ergenekon trial defendants. For example, some of those defendants are Tuncer Kılınç, a former General Secretary of the

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259 Ergenekon is a far-reaching investigation into the ‘deep state’ activities which was launched by Turkish prosecutors in 2007.

National Security Council; retired General Şener Eruygur, the former commander of the Turkish Gendarmerie and current head of the Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (Association for Atatürkist Thought or ADD), the largest NGO in the country with 448 branches nationwide and a leading force behind the organization of mass public protests in spring 2007 against the AKP’s plans to appoint Abdullah Gül to the presidency; retired General Hurşit Tolon, who had served as commander first of the Third Army and then the First Army of the Turkish Land Forces and all are very well known for their Anti-American and Anti-AKP opinions. Furthermore, the discriminatory approach toward Eurasianism thought has been experienced by the author of this thesis during the preparation of this work too. For instance, while most of the interviewees were sceptical and reluctant to be interviewed on the subject of Eurasianism as explained in the methodology section, some of them rejected to get interviewed as they stated that it is not worth talking about Eurasianism.

3.5.3. Comparison of Russian Eurasianism with Turkish Eurasianism

Although in some intellectual circles of Turkey the Eurasianism concept has been welcomed, its new interpretations have been produced instead of accepting the ideology as it was in Russia, as well. Without delving into the details as Turkish Eurasianism and its discourses will be examined in Chapter V, Turkish Eurasianism’s distinctive features will be presented here, shortly:

- Both Turkey and the Russian Federation are post-imperial states. In this sense, while Russian Eurasianists claim back, at least, all the territories of the Soviet Union, Turkish Eurasianists do not have any demand over all the territories of the Ottoman Empire.

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While Russian Eurasianists are the combination of communists and the ultra-nationalists, Turkish Eurasianists consisted of the left-wing environment and right-wing nationalists.

While Russian Eurasianists advocate balanced foreign policy understanding with equal emphasis on Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, one of the discourses of Turkish Eurasianism (Nationalist Eurasianism) is in favour of turning Turkey’s face to the East and making alliances with countries such as Iran, India, Pakistan, Syria, Russia, and so on.

Turkish Eurasianism is far less politicised than Russian Eurasianism as it lacks deep historical and theoretical roots comparing to other ideologies such as Ottomanism, Islamism, and Pan-Turkism.

Although Russian Eurasianism has Alexander Dugin as its progenitor, Turkish Eurasianism does not anyone like Dugin. That makes Turkish Eurasianism vulnerable. As it is mentioned above, Classical Eurasianism died down because of losing all of its ideological forefathers and eminent figures. In this regard, Turkish Eurasianism would struggle with the same fate.

3.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, first I tried to explain Classical Eurasianism by dividing it into four main principles to make the theory understandable. In spite of all the endeavours, it remains intangible. As Mark Bassin emphasises “various incarnations were and are crafted to fit highly differing political contexts and advance fundamentally different political and ideological agendas, for which reason it is simply impossible to reduce Eurasianism in any meaningful way to a common set of doctrinal denominators, however limited and rudimentary”.


264 For further information please see section 5.3.1: ‘Nationalist Eurasianism’.


Then, Neo-Eurasianism has been discussed from the perspective of its supporters. Although it is complicated, the differences and similarities have been shown to give a holistic approach. Both Classical and Neo Eurasianism describe the West as an imperial hegemon which endlessly dominates over other ethnic groups by means of military, economic and cultural enforcement. Whilst Classical Eurasianists aspired to carry out the “Eurasian unity” which was lost during the demise of the Russian Empire, Neo-Eurasianists aimed at almost the same unity during the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

According to Neo-Eurasianists, by means of globalisation, the Western civilisation has launched a new world order which is against Russia. In this order Russia is no longer a global player let alone a superpower. That is why Russia has felt humiliated by Western civilisation. The only way for Russia to save itself from this trap is to reposition its place within a Eurasian Union led by Russia itself.

This approach is embodied by Andrei Klimov’s words: “We have twice tried to take western theories and apply them in Russia: Marxism and Liberalism. We must rely on our own thinking and values now”. Another example for this approach comes from Sergei Guriev, head of the New Economic School in Moscow: “There is a sense that Gorbachev and Yeltsin integrated with the West and failed. Putin was anti-western and worked well. By being anti-western, it seems, you live better.”

Neo-Eurasianists pursue a Eurasian Union on the basis of cultural traditionalism, statism, and modernisation. But this modernisation must be without westernisation. That is a multinational and multiconfessional union which includes inhabitants of Siberia, the Far East, Volga, and the Northern Caucasus. These people accept Russian hegemony in exchange for respect of their national traditions and the maintenance of

268 J. Thornhill, ‘A Russia United...’.
interethnic peace. As for the economy, it should be dominated by super cartels to ensure that they will complement rather than compete with one another.

In the second part of the chapter, I compared the Eurasianism thought with a similar school of thought, Pan-Slavism so that the reader can easily figure out what kind of features Eurasianism tries to expose and the differences between Eurasianism and Pan-Slavism.

In this sense, one of the main differences of Eurasianism from the aforementioned Pan-Slavism is, in contrast to John Stuart Mill’s criticism toward the idea of nationalism, that by and large it gives an undertaking to national groups that race and religion are not determinants on this thought. Having made a criticism toward nationalism, John Stuart Mill paves the way for comprehending Eurasianism’s diversifying trait. Mill advocates that “nationalism makes men indifferent to the rights and interests ‘of any portion of the human species save that which is called by the same name, and speaks the same language, as themselves’.” Conversely, from the perspective of supporters of Eurasianism, this thought is against any assimilation process. Every national group has the right to save their religions, cultures, traditions, and so on. Any obstacle to prevent them from continuing should be suppressed.

Another difference is regarding interpretation. Eurasianism is more able to be interpreted in different ways by intellectuals and scholars than Pan-Slavism. By and large, Pan-Slavism delineates their borders, although the protagonists of Eurasianism are not agreed on several issues such as religion and borders. While some of them approach Eurasianism thought on a religious basis and promote an anti-Catholic perspective, some intellectuals choose to ignore that perspective. Therefore, it seems paradoxical. However, Pan-Slavism explicitly points out its choice of religion by dreaming an Orthodox Slavic Union. As for the borders of Eurasia or the Eurasian

271 V. Bilenkin, ‘The Ideology of Russia’s...’.
272 Quoted in H. Kohn, ‘Nationalism’, p. 67.
Union, this issue has not been made clear so far. Even Dugin himself was inconsistent regarding Turkey’s place in the Eurasian Union until recently.

It is worth saying that pan-Slavism may be a destabilising and destructive doctrine. Nevertheless, it should not be perceived from one angle. Pan-Slavism is multi-dimensional and it has a pure and honest impetus in its background despite its own ambitions. For instance, pan-Slavists anticipated that Slav peoples would live in peace under the auspices of Russia and of course for the reason that the Russian state would be a super power.

To sum up, human beings have motives of welfare and power. In this respect, by means of an organisation, institution or establishment, they have tried to reach these aims through the concepts of ethnicity, nation, nation-state, nationalism etc. Many examples, Pan-Americanism, Pan-Africanism, Pan-Europeanism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Slavism, Pan-Turkism, and so on can be given. However, the majority of these movements have failed; indeed, Pan-Europeanism might be regarded as the most successful example.

Lastly, Turkish Eurasianism has been briefly analysed and Russian Eurasianism’s influence in Turkey has been examined. The first version of Russian Eurasianism, called Classic Eurasianism had no influence in Turkey during the 1920s as relations between Russia and Turkey (the Ottoman Empire) were mostly strained and even antagonistic due to power struggle between both parties. Turkey’s first meet with the Eurasianism ideology was around the 1990s when new Turkic states emerged as a result of the collapse of the USSR and the rapprochement in Turkish-Russian relations in the late 1990s. Since then, Neo-Eurasianism has found a proper environment to flourish in Turkey, in particular firstly among left-wing environment and then right-wing nationalists, centrists, some religious circles.

While Neo-Eurasianism has influenced these circles, they did not embrace the ideology as it is in Russia. It has been transformed into Turkish Eurasianism with various discourses which will be detailed in Chapter V. Yet, this chapter compared Russian Eurasianism and Turkish Eurasianism in general sense and identified five points in
which both concepts differ from each other such as geopolitical approach, leadership, foreign policy understanding, historical and theoretical roots, and supporters.
CHAPTER IV

GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
SINCE THE LATE OTTOMAN ERA

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T. Judt

4.1. Introduction

Turkey is a successor state to the Ottoman Empire, one of the largest and longest Empires in history. Yet, the Empire was never accepted as equal to the Western powers even though it was part of the Concert of Europe. From cultural and political perspectives, the Ottoman Empire was perceived by some of the European powers as a danger to the community of Europe and was not sharing certain values and norms such as Christianity and Europeanness. It might be said that present-day Turkey has also been experiencing similar identity problems. This is one of the main impetuses which

274 Ottoman Empire was created by Turkish tribes in Anatolia. One of the most powerful states in the world during the 15th and 16th centuries, it spanned more than 600 years and came to an end only in 1922, when it was replaced by the Turkish Republic and various successor states in southeastern Europe and the Middle East. At its height the empire included most of southeastern Europe to the gates of Vienna, including modern Hungary, Serbia, Bosnia, Romania, Greece, and Ukraine; Iraq, Syria, Israel and Egypt; North Africa as far west as Algeria; and most of the Arabian Peninsula. The term Ottoman is a dynastic appellation derived from Osman, the nomadic Turkmen chief who founded both the dynasty and the empire. For more on the Ottoman Empire see Britannica Online Encyclopaedia, Available from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/434996/Ottoman-Empire>, [Accessed on 31/08/2013]. B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); H. Inalcık, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973); S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey, 2 Volumes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976 - 1977).
leads Turkey to strive to become one of the regional powers in order to cope with those problems and to become an indispensable ally to the Western countries, especially the United States of America (USA). Although Turkey stands at the crossroads of Asia and Europe and this geographical positioning highlights its desire to become one of the regional powers, since the late Ottoman era Turkey has not been able to turn into a genuine world power. It is put forward that one of the reasons is that Turkey has not had an independent Grand Strategy.

Since the late Ottoman Era, Turkey has turned its face toward the West\textsuperscript{275} as it has been perceived as the source of modernity. Over time, a number of fundamental and strategic changes within the international political system necessitated this turn, such as Italian fascism, Nazism, Cold War, etc. However, in the words of the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the principal aim for this turn was to catch up with the modernity of the West. Even though to some extent, Turkey has managed to modernise itself and caught up with the West, it remained a small power until the end of the 1990s. In 1999, Turkey’s accession to the G-20, whose membership consists of systematically important advanced and emerging economies representing all regions of the globe, was a significant development to being among the top twenty important states. Along with the AKP’s active Foreign Policy Course after 2002, it might be alleged that Turkey has become considered one of the middle powers. There once was a “barrier” around Turkey with Soviet Communism and then it became a “bridge” between Europe and the Middle East, even Central Asia.\textsuperscript{276} Recently, Turkey has been often cited as an exemplary model for Muslim countries.\textsuperscript{277} In this context, it is

\textsuperscript{275} From Turkey’s perception, it is safe to say that the West was Western Europe, mainly Great Britain and France, until World War II and after that it stands for the United States rather than Western Europe.


unequivocal that Turkish Foreign Policy has experienced a major change since 2002. While some scholars have welcomed this process and called it “Multi-Dimensional Foreign Policy”\textsuperscript{278}, others have criticised and labelled it “Neo-Ottomanist Foreign Policy” - the revival of Turkey’s Ottoman grandeur.\textsuperscript{279}

From the Turkish Foreign Policy perspective, the year 2002 is a milestone. Although Former Foreign Minister İsmail Cem made great efforts to improve the relations with the neighbouring countries such as Greece, Turkey was largely isolated in its neighbourhood and had highly limited power nor a role to play before 2002. However, after 2002, Turkey’s Foreign Policy understanding and implementation have gradually changed with the then Chief Adviser to the Prime Minister and Ambassador at large Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbours” policy. Since that time, Turkey has, time to time, shown some eagerness to play a significant role to mediate conflicts in the neighbourhood as well. What is more, the Turkish Foreign Policy horizon has been broadened by plans to open 15 new embassies in Africa, almost doubling its diplomatic presence in the continent, and two in Latin America. It would not be wrong to claim that Turkey has to a large extent, realised its potential since 2002. Even though the ‘zero problems with neighbours’ policy has not met with much concrete success in the name of developing good relations with all the neighbouring


countries, it might be claimed that Turkey has aimed to transform into a state which contributes to stability and peace and takes initiatives to mediate long-standing conflicts in its neighbouring area. Turkey’s endeavours to set up a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) after the Russo-Georgian Conflict might be given as an example for its transformation.280

In this chapter, Turkey’s foreign policy course will be analysed in the light of the historical background. In this regard, the Turkish Foreign Policy course and changes will be examined over three different time periods. In the first period, Turkish foreign policy during the first decades of the Turkish Republic will be handled. While in the second period the Cold War era’s effects on Turkish foreign policy are presented; the third period will first discuss ‘New World Order’ and the tenets of Turkish foreign policy during the post-Cold War era. And then, it will analyse the AKP era after 2002 and investigate whether it really has a Neo-Ottomanist way of thinking or just pursues a pro-activist foreign policy course.

4.2. New Republic's Foreign Policy: Peace at home, peace in the world

The great European powers – France, Britain, Russia, Germany, and Austria – dominated the 19th century. These powers were unrivalled in building a hegemonic position across the World. Yet, their own hegemonic position depended on the balance of power among them. Any action from one of the powers would lead to an act of retaliation. Towards 1914, the rivalry and the relationship between the great powers got worse. Besides, this rivalry created the emergence of alliances among the powers and paved the way for World War I in 1914. The cataclysm gave rise to the destruction of the balance of power system and the development of a bipolar system. Along with the

rise of Nazi Germany the international political system transformed into a quasi-bipolar system, similar to that of 1890–1914.\textsuperscript{281} A while later the international system was reshaped by another cataclysm, World War II, which cost millions of lives.

While the international system was experiencing such turmoil, Turkey emerged as a successor state to the Ottoman Empire in the early 1920s. Despite the Ottoman Empire being divided when it was defeated in World War I, Turkey managed to win its national liberation war and was established on 29 October 1923. The founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and his colleagues struggled to establish a nation-state on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire as they learnt from the experiences of the former Sultans and rulers of the Empire. These experiences and ideological prejudices led Atatürk to separate the New Republic from Middle Eastern affairs and focus on European affairs. According to Atatürk, it was compelling to do so because of Turkey’s unique inter-continental geography between East and West. In his mind, while the West represented modernity, the East was identified with backwardness. In this sense, three tenets of the new Republic’s foreign policy can be identified; Non-alignment/Non-involvement, Peace at Home, Peace in the World, and Westernisation/Modernization.

During the Atatürk era, Turkey’s foreign policy course was based on non-alignment/non-involvement. Atatürk believed that Turkey was a war-torn country which was in need of building territorial integrity and political independence.\textsuperscript{282} That is why Atatürk avoided any interference with the neighbouring countries. A good example of this was the new Republic’s approach toward the upheavals in Morocco between 1924 and 1925, during which Turkey ignored the Moroccan independence movement in order to sustain good relations with France and Spain, although there were some resemblances with Turkey’s own independence movement.\textsuperscript{283} Indeed, this non-alignment/non-involvement can be considered as status quo-ism. On this basis, the newly founded Republic aimed to maintain national borders and structural values (progressivism and

\textsuperscript{281} W. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), p. 3.
\textsuperscript{283} B. Crisis, “Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East”,...
secularism). In this regard, this foreign policy understanding was in need of another rhetoric, the internal and external threat construction. The stereotypes derived from this construction, for instance, generated a belief that Turkey was encircled by enemies (Greece, Syria, Bulgaria, and Russia -USSR-) willing to break the country apart. This alleged menace was perhaps due to internal disunity and clashes mainly in terms of the ethnicity and religion/secularism. Keeping relations with the Muslim countries to a minimum level was in line with this as well and aimed not to let Islamism sneak into the country.\footnote{For the non-involvement in religious meetings/ties principle of Kemalism see S. Laçiner, From Kemalism to Özalism, the Ideological Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy, Unpublished PhD thesis, (London: King’s College University of London, 2001), p. 305.}

Another tenet of Turkish foreign policy in the Atatürk era was the principlePeace at Home, Peace in the World. Atatürk was entirely attached to this principle by following a peaceful foreign policy during his Presidency. He strived to create a fertile environment to establishPeace at Home by initiating his reform programme in order to modernise the Republic and sustain sovereignty and independence. When it comes to Peace in the World, it is safe to say that Atatürk avoided adventurist policies toward the neighbouring regions.\footnote{O. Sander, ‘Nationalism and Peace, The Significance of Atatürk’s Movement’, Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol. XX, 1980-1981, pp. 245-263 (259).} At the same time, Atatürk was seeking alliances in order to secure a space for the new Republic to dwell on internal reconstruction and reforms.\footnote{O. Sander, ‘Nationalism and Peace…’, p. 259.}

In this sense, the Balkan Entente\footnote{Balkan Entente was a mutual-defense agreement between Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Romania, intended to guarantee the signatories’ territorial integrity and political independence against attack by another Balkan state such as Bulgaria or Albania. For more information see: R. J. Kerner and H. N. Howard, The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente 1930-1935: A Study in the Recent History of the Balkan and Near Eastern Peoples, (Montana: Kessinger Publishing, 2010); B. Jelavich, History of Balkans: Twentieth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)} of 1934 and the Saadabad Pact\footnote{Saadabad Pact was a treaty signed by Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq on July 8, 1937, in the Saadabad Palace, outside Tehran. Under the pact, the parties pledged themselves to respect the inviolability of their common borders, to refrain from acts of aggression, not to interfere in one another’s internal affairs. For more information on Saadabad Pact, see: İ. Soysal, “1937 Sadabad Pact”, Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations Annual, Vol. 3, 1988, pp. 131-157.} of 1937 were signed. Besides, the same reason forced the Republic to participate in the Kellogg-
Briand Pact\(^{289}\) of 1928 attempting to eliminate war as an instrument of national policy. By this Pact and the membership of League of Nations\(^{290}\), Turkey was aiming to secure its relationships with the neighbouring countries and trying to prevent any aggressive attitude toward itself.

This policy continued to be applied for Turkey’s foreign affairs after Atatürk’s death in 1938. A good example of that policy was Turkey’s Second World War experience. Although Turkey had signed a tripartite alliance with Britain and France in October 1939, it remained a de facto neutral throughout the war. Turkey’s stance during the Second World War is held up as an example of how a relatively small and militarily backward country could follow an independent path at a time of global struggle.\(^{291}\) This policy was a natural outcome of Atatürk’s legacy as well as the leaders of Turkey’s direct experiences of World War I. However, along with the end of World War II, Turkey experienced a shift in its foreign policy course as there was no multi-polar global system. From now on, the USA and the USSR were the superpowers and Turkey had to choose its side.

\(^{289}\) Kellogg-Briand Pact, also called Pact of Paris, signed on 27 August 1928, was a multilateral agreement attempting to eliminate war as an instrument of national policy. It was the most grandiose of a series of peacekeeping efforts after World War I. As a result of the secretary of state, Frank B. Kellogg’s proposal, nearly all the nations of the world eventually subscribed to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, agreeing to renounce war as an instrument of national policy and to settle all international disputes by peaceful means. For further information on Kellogg-Briand Pact, see: Britannica Online Encyclopaedia, Available from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/314413/Kellogg-Briand-Pact>, [Accessed on 31/08/2013]; P. S., Key Themes of the Twentieth Century, (Celtenham: Stanley Thornes, 1996), p. 43.

\(^{290}\) League of Nations was an organization for international cooperation established at the initiative of the victorious Allied Powers at the end of World War I. During the war influential groups in the USA and Britain had urged the creation of such a body, and the President of USA Woodrow Wilson strongly favoured the idea as a means of preventing another destructive world conflict. A league covenant, embodying the principles of collective security (joint action by League members against an aggressor), arbitration of international disputes, reduction of armaments, and open diplomacy, was formulated and subscribed to by the Allies at the Paris Peace Conference (1919). The League ceased its activities during World War II. In 1946 it was replaced by the United Nations (UN), which inherited many of its purposes and methods and much of its structure. For further information on the League of Nations, see: Britannica Online Encyclopaedia, Available from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/405820/League-of-Nations>, [Accessed on 31/08/2013]; P. Sauvain, Key Themes of the…, p. 40.

\(^{291}\) W. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy…*, p. 56.
4.3. Turkish Foreign Policy during the Cold War

The period of the Cold War, between 1945 and the late 1980s, had a bipolar global system. By and large, the struggle between the USA and the USSR dominated this era. It is safe to say that in this struggle Turkey chose the USA’s side. In this sense, Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War can be identified primarily by its relationship with the USA.

The beginning of the Cold War was the starting of a new era concerning the relationships between Turkey and the USA. This era resulted in the expansion of American-Turkish military cooperation against the Soviet Union threat along with the booming of financial aid. It is possible to call the 1950s and the early 1960s a golden age regarding relations between the two states. In this regard, Turkey got the first substantial aid as part of the Marshall Plan292 which was signed by Harry S. Truman, 33rd President of the United States to help the recovery of the European countries in January 1947.

Turkey was one of the states which the USA needed in order to accomplish the containment of the Soviet Union. That is why Turkey was in the frontline of America’s battle against communist expansion in this era and that necessitated Turkey and the USA to share a central interest in this battle. This interest also gave rise to Turkey’s integration into NATO on February 18th, 1952. Also, Turkey became a full member of the Council of Europe on August 9, 1949. To some extent, Turkey’s participation in the Korean War and support for America with 4,500 soldiers as a mark of goodwill was a game changer regarding Turkey’s stance towards America.293

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292 Marshall Plan (April 1948 - December 1951) was a USA-sponsored program designed to rehabilitate the economies of the European countries in order to create stable conditions in which democratic institutions could survive. It would help them recover from the damage war had done to their economies. For further information on Marshall Plan, see: Britannica Online Encyclopaedia, Available from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/405820/League-of-Nation>, [Accessed on 31/08/2013]; P. Sauvain, Key Themes of the..., p. 147; N. Mills, Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and America’s Coming of Age As a Superpower, (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2008).
As a matter of fact, since the establishment in 1923 up until 1945, Turkey had had friendly relationships with the Soviet Union just like the relationships with France, Great Britain, and Germany. However, 1945 was a turning point and after that the Soviets were perceived as the principal threat toward Turkey in the Turkish public opinion until the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. During this era, several crises left their mark on the Turkish foreign policy making process. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was one of them. In this crisis, the USA withdrew Jupiter missiles from Turkey; in return the Soviet Union got its missiles out of Cuba. Although these two super powers saved the world from a nuclear war by the withdrawal of the missiles, this crisis also caused a wave of indignation in Turkey, who accused the USA of selling out one of its allies to serve its own interests.

Another crisis was the Cyprus dispute. It had two phases; 1964 and 1974. While Turkey was on the verge of intervening in Cyprus due to the Greek Cypriots’ violence against the Turkish Cypriots\(^{294}\), on 6 June 1964 the then Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü received a letter from the then President of the USA Lyndon Johnson.\(^{295}\) It was a kind of humiliating letter in which Johnson warned Turkey not to use weapons bought from the USA in case of any intervention attempt toward the island; if the Soviet Union supports the Greek Cypriots as a consequence of this intervention, Turkey would not have the USA’s backing.

From the Turkish perspective, this crisis was highly significant as Cyprus was of value to Turkey due to its cultural ties and the island’s strategic location. Bearing this importance in mind, the Greek Cypriots’ vicious violence against the Turkish Cypriots, who constituted 18 percent of the island’s population, also aroused public indignation.\(^{296}\) This incident has never been forgotten by the Turkish people.

\(^{294}\) In the island the Greek Cypriots demanded enosis (union) with Greece and the Turkish Cypriots demanded taksim (partition).


While Turkey was experiencing such a crisis, ‘the Johnson Letter’ was one of the breaking points in Turkish Foreign Policy.\textsuperscript{297} Since then, Turkey has preferred to pursue a multilateral foreign policy instead of unilateral action with the USA. The first indication of this policy course was the then Prime Minister İsmet İnönü’s reaction to the letter: ‘If conditions change and events make a new order necessary, Turkey will certainly find its place in this new global order’.\textsuperscript{298} It might be said that this policy course was invigorated by the 1974 Cyprus crisis. The situation in the island was deteriorating because of the Greek Cypriots’ rising anger towards the Turkish Cypriots. This is why Turkey intervened in the island two times on 20 July 1974 and on 14 August 1974 in order to ensure the security of the Turkish Cypriots. From Turkey’s and the Turkish Cypriots’ perspective, it was a ‘peace operation’ in conformity with the Treaty of Guarantee.\textsuperscript{299} On the other hand, from Greece’s and the Greek Cypriots’ perspective, Turkey illegally invaded the island and violated the Treaty. Following the intervention, on 13 February 1975, the Turkish Cypriot Leaders announced the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{300}

Seemingly, the intervention soothed the violence on the island. However, more serious problems were on the horizon for Turkey. This unapproved intervention gave rise to an arms embargo which was imposed by the USA against Turkey from 1975 to 1978. Although the Turkish-American alliance and Turkey’s American driven foreign policy in this era remained robust, these 1964 and 1974 crises fostered Turkish sentiments of betrayal and abandonment. Yet, Turkish decision-makers and the Turkish public have always had major reservations and suspicions about the USA’s intentions and interests in Turkey and its neighbourhood.

\textsuperscript{299} It was signed at Nicosia on August 16, 1960 between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, United Kingdom of Britain and Northern Ireland. For further information see: D. Brinkley, ‘The Cyprus Question:…’, 1989, pp. 5-18.
\textsuperscript{300} H. Tuncer, ‘The Cyprus Issue: Recent Developments’, \textit{Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs}, 7 (3), 1-17 (7).
During this era, Turkey’s application to the European Union has been another significant foreign policy development. Turkey’s relations with European countries, such as Great Britain, France, and Germany, date back before the 19th century. Although Turkey’s Europeanisation and Modernisation processes started in the late 19th century, official relations with the European Union were established with Turkey’s application for associate membership of the European Economic Community in September 1959. There were also several agreements signed by Turkey in order to fulfil Turkey’s rapprochements with the West, such as the Council of Europe (Turkey joined on 9 August 1949), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Turkey joined in 1952), and Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (Turkey is one of the founding members).

After Turkey’s application in 1959, four years later on 12 September 1963 Turkey and the European Economic Community signed the Ankara Agreement creating an association between the sides and it came into effect on 1 December 1964. The Ankara agreement foresees an eventual membership once the conditions for membership have been met.\(^\text{301}\) Therefore, Turkey and the EU have continued talks approximately for half a century. Despite having such deep-rooted relations, many Europeans do not see Turkey as a European state. From their perspective, Turkey has had different cultural and religious traditions, and a different way of thinking; namely, Turkey is an important ‘Other’\(^\text{302}\) for the majority of Europeans. Under these conditions, as they have remained sceptical about Turkey’s membership, this identity crisis and several unfulfilled conditions have kept Turkey at the European Union’s doorstep for such a long time. And this uncompleted membership process prevented Turkey from pursuing a fully independent foreign policy.

In this environment, in a general manner Turkey has benefitted from being at the crossroads of West and East. The existence of the Soviet threat towards the West put

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\(^{301}\) F. S. Larrabee and I. O. Lesser, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy in…, p. 46.

forward Turkey as an indispensable ally for the USA. As Turkey chose a place in the western world, it had to orient its foreign policy unconditionally to the USA despite the ups and downs that come with any relationship. However, the dissolution of the USSR badly affected Turkey’s role as an ally for the USA and launched a new era, called ‘New World Order’.

4.4. New World Order' and Turkish Foreign Policy

The bipolar global system ended with the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. Since this time the USA has been the world’s sole superpower. Nonetheless, it was hard to define the new order as simply unipolar. Although economically the USA was still the world’s most powerful state, fast-growing economies in Asia were shifting the main locus of global economic power.303 Politically, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and being seen as the sole superpower bolstered American self-confidence and caused the disastrous invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. While it was highlighting the powerhouse image of the USA, at the same time it caused an obvious hatred toward the USA in the third world, especially in some Muslim countries. Although culturally the image of the USA has experienced some similarities with its political image, it is safe to say that it has been robust across the world during the post-Cold War era.

While the elimination of the communist threat was bolstering the USA’s image, some of the middle powers, like Turkey, benefited from this environment in a limited way with their roles being questioned. For Turkey, the start of accession negotiations with the European Union was priority. However, it highlighted the application of democratic norms neglected during the Cold War era when the USA needed Turkey for the containment of the Soviet Union. Turkey still faced many problems as in previous eras, even if its character had changed.304

303 William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*..., p. 4.
304 W. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*..., p. 5.
During the post-Cold war era, Turkey’s relations with the states in Central Asia and Middle East were the main determinants of its relations with the USA, the EU, and Russia. Since 1945, Turkey has been one of the reliable and strategic allies of the USA, although the contradictions with the USA appear blatant during this time period. The Soviet Union and the communist threat were the main reasons for this alliance. When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, it became obvious that Turkey’s role had been terminated. However, the 1990-1991 Gulf War revolutionised the relationship between Turkey and the USA. During the war, Turkey opted to give its full support to the USA. In this context, Turkey shut off Iraqi oil exports from Kirkuk to Yumurtalık, opened its military bases for use by coalition forces, and Turkish forces were placed on the border to oppose an Iraqi ground attack.\(^{305}\) It is widely acknowledged that by this cooperation, Turkey consolidated its partnership with the USA even if there have been several ups and downs.

Despite Turkey getting its relations with the USA back on track, the conflicts in the Balkans offered an opportunity for Turkey to prove itself regarding making independent foreign policy. In this sense, Turkey’s stance during the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo can be perceived as an important phase. The conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) and Kosovo (1998-1999) were based on ethnicity. The international public opinion was that these conflicts had to be halted before getting worse and spreading to neighbouring regions. But the main question was who should fulfil this duty? During the conflicts, the EU was poorly equipped and did not have the ability to intervene in the conflicts and end them. Instead, NATO and the USA emerged as the peacemakers. Throughout both wars, Turkey put a lot of effort in encouraging the Western world to take necessary measures in order to end the bloodshed. In addition, Turkey played an active role to make the international community aware of what was happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.\(^{306}\) Turkey dealt with the conflicts in the Balkans intimately because of its historical, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic ties with

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the local community. In fact, Turkey has had confidence to build strong relations with the kinship states after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emerging five Turkic states in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The late 1980s and the early 1990s deeply changed the power relations of the international system. As a result of this change, Turkic states in Central Asia and the Caucasus came into prominence as an area of interest for Turkey since it has ethnic, linguistic, and cultural ties with Turkic States of Central Asia and the Caucasus. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has developed a discourse “The Great Turkish World – from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China”. By this discourse the aim was to create a new sphere of influence in Central Asia and establish road, energy and communications links with the former Soviet Central Asian Republics. Turkey’s initial attempt was to play a big brother role for the newly independent Turkic states and this attempt was also supported by the USA to fill the power vacuum with the “Turkish Model” instead of radical Islam. On the other hand, there were two obstacles before Turkey’s aim. The first one was that other regional powers such as Russia and Iran were not keen to see the USA in Central Asia and the Caucasus through Turkey. The second obstacle was that the post-Soviet Turkic states had just explored the multipolarity within the international system and did not want to be dependent upon any single regional power. 307 Under these conditions, Turkey managed to establish only limited relationships with the Turkic states in the 1990s and this failure forced Turkey to enhance its relations with the EU. However, it was a long-lasting painful process, admittedly.

Whereas Turkey broadened its own foreign policy horizons in this era, it faced some democratisation problems on the road to becoming a member of the EU. Yet, when it is compared to its own neighbours in the region such as Iraq, Syria and Iran, Turkey had a working democracy even if in need of improvement. Turkey was aware of being a part of the European Union was indispensable as it needed to maintain its strong westward orientation and continue its internal modernisation in order to become a regional power

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while building functioning ties with its neighbours.\textsuperscript{308} In this sense, despite the fact that the global political system has changed, Turkey has tried to keep its foreign policy course on track. In this bipolar system, it would not be logical to expect Turkey to develop policies in contrast to the USA’s demands. That is why although Turkey developed relatively independent foreign policies towards Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East, it can be claimed that the framework was drawn by the USA.

In addition to this change in the international system, the domestic changes in Turkey were another cause which triggered the transformation of Turkish foreign policy and it started during the Turgut Özal era. The internal dimension of neo-Ottomanism\textsuperscript{309} of Turgut Özal was envisioning a comprehensive transformation of the self-conception and self-perception of Turkish society, while the external dimension was foreseeing to redefine the regional and international place of Turkey. Turkey as a secular and Muslim populated country was envisaged to be exemplifying the successful integration of Islamic and Western cultures; thus this was thought to be a promising character for the possible integration of Turkey within Europe (the West). Turkey’s membership application to the European Union (it was the European Community at that time) in 1987 can be considered as a step to put into words this possibility. During the Cold War Turkey was the wing country of the Western Block and Turkey’s reaction to the Gulf War right after the Cold War did not deviate from this standing. Now Turkey commenced with structuring its relations with the USA within the conceptual frame of strategic partnership. The Kemalist status quoism came into being in Turkey’s relations with the Muslim world, the former Ottoman territories, and Turkic states. Re-instituting relations with Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Libya which had long been neglected and participating in the 1984 Casablanca Islamic Summit were turning points from the non-involvement in religious ties and principles of Kemalism\textsuperscript{310}.\textsuperscript{311} The formation of a more


\textsuperscript{309} The term was first articulated by Cengiz Çandar, journalist and special adviser to the then Turkish President Turgut Özal between 1991 and 1993.

\textsuperscript{310} Kemalism was formulated as a state ideology in the 1930s. It was a set of ideas and reforms which were applied to Turkish society during the establishment of the new Republic by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
active and multi-dimensional foreign policy towards Central Asia and the Balkans was concomitantly stimulated by Özal. This foreign policy understanding will be widely presented in the following chapter.

In 1996, Turgut Özal’s neo-Ottomanist activism was replaced by the Islamic activism of Necmettin Erbakan. It might be considered as again an era in which the leader defines the rhetoric. Erbakan’s foreign policy motivation – similar to neo-Ottomanism – was ascribing Turkey a leading position among Muslim countries. Erbakan was in favour of alternating dependency to the West via establishing institutions similar to those in the West in order to provide the Muslim countries with relevant instruments for development and advancement. Erbakan was proposing Islamic versions of the United Nations, NATO, and Customs Union.\textsuperscript{312} The establishment of Developing-8 (D-8)\textsuperscript{313} was an attempt to fulfil these ideals.\textsuperscript{314} At first glance there seems a deviation from Kemalist foreign policy tradition\textsuperscript{315}, however, as Robins argues Erbakan’s policies were

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\textsuperscript{311} S. Laçiner, From Kemalism to Özalism..., p. 305.
\textsuperscript{312} H. D. Bilgin, Foreign Policy Orientation of Turkey’s Pro-Islamist Parties, Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2008), pp. 407-421.
\textsuperscript{314} Erbakan’s Islamist foreign policy understanding will be widely presented in the following chapter.
\textsuperscript{315} H. D. Bilgin, Foreign Policy Orientation..., p. 417.
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on “opening to the Islamic world” rather than a striving to reorient Turkish foreign policy.\textsuperscript{316} In fact, Turkey’s relations with Israel and the USA were at a peak in terms of trade and the military during Erbakan’s rule. Moreover, Turkey maintained commitment to the customs union with the European Union during this period. These reveal Erbakan’s adherence to the traditional Republican foreign policy\textsuperscript{317} with an opening towards the Islamic world.

\textbf{4.5. A New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy}

As mentioned before, the New Republic led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, embraced the Western life and reforms. However, it cannot be claimed that the transformation ended up a complete success. During this transformation, Turkey was mainly affected by France style governance reforms and cultural life. The most crucial thing was the elimination of Islam as Turkey’s state religion from the constitution and the adoption of laïcité.\textsuperscript{318} The reason to say that laïcité was a turning point for Turkey’s domestic and foreign affairs is that after this point Turkey, in a manner, declared that it no longer had strong ties with the Islamic countries and its face had been turned toward the West. To some extent, in the first two decades of the Republic, this situation’s inconvenient outcomes (closure of the Progressive Republican Party\textsuperscript{319} and the Liberal Republican Party\textsuperscript{320}, and a plot to assassinate\textsuperscript{321} Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) were handled somehow.

\textsuperscript{316} P. Robins, Turkish Foreign Policy..., p. 83.
\textsuperscript{317} P. Robins, Turkish Foreign Policy..., p. 84-87.

\textsuperscript{319} The Progressive Republican Party was found in 17 November 1924 by Mustafa Kemal’s original companions in the War of Independence: Karabekir, Ali Fuat, Rauf, Refet, Adnan, and Bekir Sami Kunduh. It was banned on 5 June 1925. For further information see: A. Mango, Atatürk: The Biography of the founder of Modern Turkey, (London: John Murray, 1999).
\textsuperscript{320} The Liberal Republican Party was found in 12 August 1930 and closed on 17 November 1930. The Leader of the party was Ali Fethi Okyar. For further information see: A. Mango, Atatürk: The Biography..., 1999.
However, since the death of Atatürk there have been three coups\textsuperscript{322} and one post-modern coup\textsuperscript{323} based on the debates of ‘secularism’ and ‘Islam’, in a general sense.

On this basis, and as will be argued in the following chapter, there have been several ideologies in competition with each other to dominate Turkish political life since late 1800s. In this new era, the former chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister and now the minister of foreign affairs, and an international relations student, Ahmet Davutoğlu is known for being the intellectual originator of the new\textsuperscript{324} Turkish foreign policy. He formulates a new foreign policy understanding by getting inspired of Neo-Ottomanism, Pan-Turkism, and other ideologies which offer potential new foreign policy tracks to conduct. In his seminal book, \textit{Stratejik Derinlik} (The Strategic Depth\textsuperscript{325}, 2001), Davutoğlu underscores the legacies and continuities cognitively present in the

\textsuperscript{321} In the summer of 1926, a plot to assassinate the President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was uncovered. This failed plot was used to eliminate all potential rivals of Atatürk and his party. For further information see: E. J. Zurcher, The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey, (London: IB Tauris, 2010); A. Mango, Atatürk: The Biography..., 1999.

\textsuperscript{322} Three coups have been carried out by Turkish Military. First was a coup d’état staged by a group of Turkish army officers, against the democratically elected government of the Democratic Party on May 27, 1960. This coup was concluded with the execution of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatih Rüştü Zorlu and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan on Imralı Island on September 16, 1961. The second one was the 1971 Turkish coup d’état, carried out on 12 March. Known as the "coup by memorandum", which the military delivered in lieu of sending out tanks, as it had done previously, it came amid worsening domestic strife. Third was the 12 September 1980 Turkish coup d’état, headed by Chief of the General Staff General Kenan Evren. For the next three years the Turkish Armed Forces ruled the country through the National Security Council, before democracy was restored.

\textsuperscript{323} This postmodern coup was the 1997 military memorandum in Turkey which led to the stepping down of the coalition government led by Necmettin Erbakan of the Welfare Party on February 28, 1997. Instead of dissolving the parliament or withdrawing the constitution, the Turkish Military pressured Erbakan to step down. For this reason, the events were labelled a "postmodern coup".

\textsuperscript{324} Some scholars do not believe that his approaches (also AKP’s foreign policy) are new at all except the rhetoric and contour. See N. B. Criss, Parameters of Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Governments, UNSI Discussion Papers, No. 23 (2010), p. 10.

social and psychological fabric of Turkish society and of communities in the neighbouring zones of Turkey. To him Turkey needs a multi-dimensional transformation and in this sense the society should be equipped with a deep knowledge and awareness of history; with re-remembrance of historical memories, and with re-imagination of the past civilisation of the country. To him, Turkey must remember, re-interpret, and re-imagine its history and geography in order to see the depth that strategically provides Turkey with relevant instruments to shape the future of its civilisation and to accomplish its historical responsibility towards the former elements of its civilisation. By this means, he re-describes and pinpoints the geo-cultural and geo-political position of Turkey within the new international conjuncture; and reconciles the historical depth and geographical depth of Turkey with the Turkish state identity which were dissolved by the Kemalist etatism.

According to Davutoğlu, Turkey is geographically located in the centre of many geopolitical areas of influence and of responsibility while it is historically located “at the epicentre of [historical] events”. At this juncture, the origins of the idea of having influence on and responsibility towards the surrounding regions lie in the historical depth of Turkey (This is the first pillar of the strategic depth doctrine). As opposed to Eurocentric post-nation interventionism (or neo-colonialism) and Western new world order expansionism (or neo-imperialism), Davutoğlu calls for Turkey-centric regional and international activism which is a search for a legitimate ground to perform the so-called responsibility. In the geographical depth pillar of the strategic depth doctrine, Davutoğlu draws attention to geographical continuity which is a re-interpretation of geography that generates an understanding to re-integrate Turkey with the neighbouring zone through the historical legacies of the cities. In this scope,

326 A. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik…, p. 63.
327 A. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik…, p. 65.
328 A. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik…, pp. 8-10.
329 A. Davutoğlu, Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision:…’, 2008, p. 78.
reintegration with neighbouring counties requires re-integrating Batumi (Georgia) and Trabzon, Mosul (Iraq) and DIYarbakır, Arbil (Iraq) and Mardin, Aleppo (Syria) and Gaziantep, Skopje (Macedonia) or Salonika (Greece) and Edirne. This is because these cities were never alienated and segregated from each other in their history thus the borders were drawn against the geographical continuity within the region. That is why some of those cities lost their historical hinterlands and their cultural and economic prevailing positions after the foundation of independent states; Edirne the former capital city of the Ottoman Empire is a good example of this as it is only a small town in contemporary Turkey. Politically speaking, Davutoğlu’s move from strict high politics to societal and cultural politics heralds alternative reconciliations; such as Turkey’s use of Batumi airport as a domestic airport.

In a geopolitical sense, on the other hand, discovering Turkey’s historical and geographical depth altogether represents a shift in the consideration of Turkey’s place in international conjuncture. This is more a self-designated consideration, where well-built evidence of the multi-dimensional and pro-active diplomacy capability of Turkey is discussed. With this, Turkey is no longer a wing country or a bridge between the East and the West. Turkey, as a central country, enjoys a broad area of influence and has the capability to simultaneously manoeuvre in several regions. To Davutoğlu, Turkey plays a central country role through its ambition to develop a universal vision and through its participation into or initiation of regional and universal crisis-management, peace building, mediation, and pre-emptive action activities. This, to sum up, means that Davutoğlu assumes the ‘availability’ of the immediate environs (at least) for “Turkey’s

334 Many people who are living in Artvin province of Turkey which is located in the North-eastern of Turkey use the Batumi Airport as the nearest Turkish airport is approximately 250 km away. In contrast, Artvin to Batumi is around 100 km.
336 Here Davutoğlu alters his strategic depth paradigm and broadens its scope beyond Turkey’s surrounding regions. B. Aras, Davutoğlu Era in Turkish…, (2009a), p. 5.
involvement through the instruments of remembering past relations, unfolding cultural and civilizational affinities, and the exploring of opportunities”.

The new Turkish Foreign Policy’s re-imagination of history and geography has been crowned with the introduction of new principles and instruments/mechanisms. Turkey’s conduct of and involvement in multi-dimensional foreign policy became possible only through those tools. These are delineated in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Principles and Mechanisms of the new Turkish Foreign Policy

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<td>2. Zero problems with neighbours</td>
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<td>4. Multi-dimensional foreign policy</td>
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*Democracy* is the first principle of the new Turkish foreign policy since Davutoğlu has stated many times that “Turkey’s most important soft power is its democracy”. In accordance with the AKP’s primary aim of enhancing the democracy and democratic culture at home, consolidating stability and democracy abroad is regarded by Davutoğlu as the sole cohesive methodological approach to world politics. In line with the democratic enhancement, Turkey’s threat considerations at home and abroad have been

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339 The concept of *soft power* was first presented by Joseph Nye during the 1980s. According to Nye, *soft power* is the ability of getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them. In other words, attraction and persuasion are the main means for getting what you want. For further information see: J. S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
341 A. Davutoğlu, Turkey’s Zero- Problems…. (2010b).
revised; a more self-confident Turkey has emerged as the Sèvres Syndrome\textsuperscript{342} has been cured as argued by Davutoğlu. Thus, old designations of ‘historical enemies’ have altered: Syria, Greece, or Armenia have been politically re-identified (and designated to be future friends) in the scope of the principle of zero-problems with neighbours.\textsuperscript{343} To stimulate this, economic relations have strived to be established and maintained in the scope of economic interdependency and integration. Furthermore, free trade agreements, visa-free travelling, or use of Batumi airport as a domestic port demonstrates how the zero-problem principle operates and tunes the diplomacy.\textsuperscript{344} Through the new rhetoric and assertive style Turkey envisions more effective use of soft power, a foreign policy operating on the ground, new roles in the international arena like mediating, and involvement beyond the immediate environs. Turkish diplomatic missions in the Arab spring or the Turkish involvements in Africa exemplify this vision.\textsuperscript{345} The multi-dimensional foreign policy principle denotes Turkey’s close relations and partnership with great powers such as the USA or the European Union along with its intense involvement in regional politics. This supposedly gives Turkey a simultaneous international and multi-regional identity. Finally, the rhythmic diplomacy refers to Turkey’s active involvement in international organizations and in international initiations. Turkey plays an active role in NATO (Afghanistan and Kosovo missions), the UN (non-permanent member in Security Council), OSCE (Minsk Group), Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC was chaired by a Turkish Diplomat between 2004 and 2014) and is a member of the G20. When we consider that due to the recent global financial crisis the importance of the G20 increased, Turkey’s importance did so too. Additionally, Turkey maintains observer status in the African Union, is in strategic dialogue with the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council, is one of the dialogue partners of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and has had close relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).\textsuperscript{346}

\textsuperscript{342} The perception of being surrounded by enemies willing to break Turkey apart.

\textsuperscript{343} A. Davutoğlu’s Speech, December 23, 2011.

\textsuperscript{344} A. Davutoğlu, Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision:…, 2008, p. 80.

\textsuperscript{345} A. Davutoğlu’s Speech, December 23, 2011.

\textsuperscript{346} A. Davutoğlu, Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision:…, 2008, p. 82 and A. Davutoğlu, Turkey’s Zero-Problems…, (2010b).
The instruments and mechanisms Turkey utilizes to pursue aforementioned new foreign policy principles start with an integrated foreign policy approach. Through this mechanism Turkey disregards mono-dimensional and static priority based foreign policy and rather employs an integrated foreign policy that brings various issues to the same scene allowing Turkey to deal with all of them simultaneously.\textsuperscript{347} The second mechanism is pro-active diplomacy through which the rhythmic diplomacy, zero-problem, or assertive style principles can be utilized. In this mechanism Turkey uses all possible international tools and contacts every single actor on an issue. Turkey forms both bilateral and multilateral relations to deal with an issue in order to secure maximum cooperation.\textsuperscript{348} In the third mechanism, Turkey always has presence on the ground which means if there is a dispute or conflict Turkey closely monitors the crisis, later on gets involved in the process and tries to mediate parties. Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives towards Libya during the revolution or its initiation during the Georgia-Russia War\textsuperscript{349} (2008) were upheld under this mechanism as independent activities. In fact we can include the Trilateral Balkan Summit held in Istanbul in 2011 to reconcile Serbia and Bosnia as part of this mechanism. The fourth mechanism is all-inclusive-equidistance policy whereby to settle a dispute Turkey should be at equal distance to all parties to assure the parties on the constructive intention of Turkey.\textsuperscript{350} Indeed, this mechanism seems the least fulfilled and has mostly failed as seen in the Iran-Israel relations. The final mechanism is total performance. Along with the having presence on the ground mechanism, the total performance highlights the need for public diplomacy measures. Through the coherent use of soft power and of other relevant actors such as NGOs, business communities, think-tank organizations, and state institutions, Turkey aims to permanently settle disputes, to maximize cooperation at a societal and economic level, and to mobilize target society for the cause of Turkey. Through this mechanism

\textsuperscript{349} An armed conflict in August 2008 between Georgia and Russia. The war began with an operation by Georgia, which hoped to seize territory that had been outside its control since the early 1990s. Initially successful, one day later Russia deployed units of the Russian 58th Army and launched airstrikes against Georgian forces in South Ossetia. Moreover, Russia’s army retook the area and pushed deeper into Georgian territory, stopping just short of the capital, Tbilisi. A preliminary ceasefire agreement was signed on 15 August by Georgia and by Russia on 16 August.
“business organizations, civil society, intellectuals, think-tanks, and other actors now provide input into the foreign policymaking process”. 

Since the foreign policy making was strictly confined to statecraft and political elite before, particularly the security policies, this novel degree of involvement makes the foreign policy an extension of domestic politics.

In this sense, it is clear that there has been a change or shift in Turkish foreign policy making process since 2002. However, it cannot be claimed that it is solely because of the mind-sets of the incumbent AKP government leaders. There have been a number of developments since the Özal era. Some of them are the decline of USA’s soft power compared to the 1990s, the rise of the EU, Russia and China, Arab-Israeli rapprochement in the early 1990s, 9/11 and the rise of international terrorism. These developments have deeply affected the Turkish foreign policy course in order to devote more attention to regional relations at the expense of American interests. This change generated a great deal of concern among intellectuals and politicians and made them ask “who is losing Turkey?” As a matter of fact, Turkey’s alliance with the USA during the Cold War was left behind. The collapse of the USSR had changed the power politics and Turkey needed to rely on the new power politics. This way of thinking was adopted and applied to Turkish foreign policy first by Turgut Özal and then former foreign

Minister İsmail Cem and now the incumbent Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. All of them have emphasised the need that Turkey should not carry on by rejecting its Ottoman past. In contrast to Özal and Cem, Davutoğlu transformed this way of thinking into “the Strategic Depth” understanding and aimed to lead the AKP Government to improve its relations not only with the Islamist countries but also non-Islamist countries regardless of whether they were the former territories of the Ottoman Empire. In this sense, it is safe to say that Turkey is trying to balance its strategic relationships rather than prioritize relations with the USA and NATO in the AKP era. That is why it is clear that the AKP’s foreign policy cannot solely be identified with Neo-Ottomanism. It is much broader than that in many ways.

The transformation of Turkey as a Western-oriented state has a long history and has been challenging. Although Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe on 9 August 1949 and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) on 18 February 1952 and since then has struggled to prove that it belongs to the Western world and display its Europeanness, several ideologies such as Neo-Ottomanism, Neo-Islamism, and Neo-Eurasianism have gradually been produced by rightist/leftist parties and activists in Turkey behind the scenes.

4.6. Conclusion

Throughout the Republic of Turkey’s history, its position in the international order has been questioned, frequently. In particular, its relationships with the West have been a significant issue. For instance, many commentators in the West have asked the question of “who lost Turkey?” By doing so, they assumed that Turkey has always belonged to America or the West. However, that discourse was erroneous. While it was a fact during

356 Nicholas Danforth paraphrases Turkey’s NATO membership as ‘After centuries of being seen as “barbarians at the gates”, the Turkish army took on the role of “gatekeeper”, defending Europe’s southeastern flank.’ N. Danforth, ‘Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy… p.87.
357 For further information on the evolution of the ideology from Ottomanism to Neo-Ottomanism see section 5.2.1. “Neo-Ottomanism: Endless Passion”.
358 For further information on Islamism’s evolution from “Pan” to “Neo” please see the section 5.2.2. “Islamism “Pan” and “Neo””.
359 For further information on Neo-Eurasianism please see the section 3.3. “Neo-Eurasianism”.

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the Atatürk era when Turkey chose to favour non-involvement and impartiality, it was also an issue during the post-Cold War era when Turkey was in search of new alliances after the dissolution of the USSR. It might be claimed that the incumbent AKP Government has carried on this pragmatism in the Turkish foreign policy making process.

In this context, regarding the AKP’s foreign policy understanding, it might be considered that Davutoğlu’s ‘zero problems with neighbours’ rhetoric has been dominated by a highly securitised approach. As a matter of fact, this rhetoric demonstrates continuity with Atatürk’s non-alignment in order to create a fertile environment to secure a space for the continuation of Turkey’s development as Turkey has been a state under threat from other powers and internal ethnic rebellions during the 19th and 20th centuries.360

As for the AKP era, the new activism in Turkish foreign policy making itself might be considered as the main threat, as it requires getting involved in several issues in the region, such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, Iran nuclear crisis, internal conflict in Syria, etc. This activism and comprehensiveness have, to some extent, been new in Turkish foreign policy. However, it cannot be claimed that this activism and comprehensiveness have succeeded completely, in terms of becoming an influential external actor in the neighbouring regions and having ‘zero problems with neighbours’.

360 W. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy...*, p. 249.
CHAPTER V

DIVERSE DISCOURSES OF EURASIANISM IN TURKEY

5.1. Introduction

Turkey has always had a fertile environment and circles for debates of ‘secularism’ and ‘Islam’; ‘Pan-Turkism’ and ‘Pan/Neo Ottomanism’, etc. These debates and confrontations can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire. In spite of the fact that the newly established Turkish Republic’s main official direction was toward the West, these debates still exist today. For instance, while the Democratic Party (1946-1960) to Justice Party (1961-1980) line and National Salvation Party (1972-1980) to Welfare Party (1983-1998) line had pro-Ottomanist and pro-Islamist approaches respectively, centre-left Republican People’s Party (CHP), by and large, embraced a Western-oriented approach after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey until the early 2000s, even if it seems that CHP (the main opposition party) has recently lost its enthusiasm toward the Western world and radiated mixed signals on whether it will continue to support Turkey’s Westernist foreign policy discourse.

As a consequence of these debates and confrontations, it should be mentioned that Russian Eurasianism has had some reflections in Turkish society. In particular, the conditions of the post-Cold War era and the recent activism in Turkish foreign policy have brought the Eurasianism debates back on the agenda. Nowadays, various perceptions of this thought can be observed in contemporary Turkish politics. In this context, this chapter provides a detailed analysis of the discourses of Turkish Eurasianism. Specifically, the first part of this chapter focuses on four of the main ideologies which have been dominant in Turkey regarding shaping the discourses of Turkish Eurasianism since the late 1980s: Neo-Ottomanism, Islamism, Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanianism. It is significant to analyse these ideologies as they are four of the main determinants of Turkish domestic and foreign policy courses. Besides, these ideologies have played a vital role during the penetration attempts of Aleksandr Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism into Turkey as his initial Eurasianist thinking was anti-Turkish and it
was these ideologies which moulded and added perspectives to the discourses of Turkish Eurasianism. In this sense, the latter part of the chapter will present an overview of the discourses of Eurasianism in contemporary Turkish politics.

5.2. Roots of Diversity of Eurasianism in Turkey

5.2.1. Neo-Ottomanism: Endless Passion

The Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) was one of the largest and longest lasting Empires in history. Soon after its establishment, it emerged as the major power in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Empire reached its height under Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566). During this era, 15 million people were living in the Empire from Algeria in the West to Azerbaijan in the East; from Ukraine in the North to Yemen in the South. However, the Ottomans gradually started to lose their strength with the Karlowitz Treaty (1699). This event marked the beginning of the long decline of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, it took more than two hundred years to replace the Ottoman Empire with the Republic of Turkey.

During these 200 years, Ottoman politicians and intellectuals relentlessly endeavoured to save the Empire by coming up with potential solutions. Many argued that one of the reasons why the Empire was in decline was the failure of adopting the technical developments of the West. Therefore, adopting new military technologies, reforming Ottoman diplomacy, education and the judicial system would get the Empire back in the race. Therefore, during the reigns of Selim III (1761-1808) and Mahmut II (1785-1839), many legal, military, and educational reforms were implemented in order to catch up with Western powers. Nevertheless, these reforms did not halt the decline of the Empire and they “destroyed the traditional order, but never replaced them with a new and workable one”.

361 Karlowitz Treaty was signed on 26 January 1699 in order to conclude the Austro-Ottoman War (1683-1697) in which the Ottoman side had been defeated at the Battle of Zenta.
362 Y. Demirağ, ‘Pan-ideologies in the Ottoman Empire against the West: From Pan-Ottomanism to Pan-Turkism’, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, XXXVI, 2006.
Another reason for the decline was the idea of nationalism that the French revolution spread. As the Ottoman Empire was a multicultural empire, all communities needed to live in coherence. To sustain it, the Ottoman Empire developed a unique system called millet. The main feature of this system was the division of the communities “according to their religion and a system based on the relationship between members within such communities, as well as other religious groups and with the state”. In this sense, local religious leaders were responsible for the civil behaviour of their own communities. The millet system had given a great deal of power to communities; such as setting their own laws and collecting and distributing their own taxes. While this system was one of the reasons for almost five centuries of Ottoman reign, it also paved the way for its decline.

The effects of nationalist ideas easily permeated through the Empire with the help of the millet system. The first effect of the French Revolution on the Ottoman Empire was the 1821 Greek rebellion. Also, Balkan nationalism, which was fostered in the churches, led to further fragmentation. Among other “national” churches a Bulgarian exarchate (1864) emerged, distinct from the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate.

Under these conditions, Ottoman intelligentsia produced several ideologies to save the Empire and to help shape the political orientation of it. Ottomanism was one of those ideologies. It first appeared during the First Constitutional Era of the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the 1800s. According to the Ottoman elite, the Empire needs a panacea in order to counter the nationalist feelings awakening in its own borders. By Ottomanism, they aimed to give an overall identity to the communities which formed the Ottoman Empire. Ottomanism was an “attempt by the Ottoman government to use one single citizenship as a common political identity in order to achieve equality

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366 Y. Demirağ, ‘Pan-ideologies in the Ottoman Empire…’, p. 145.
and unity among all Ottoman subjects and supersede differences of faith, ethnicity, and language.”

In other words, the motive was to create an “Ottoman nation” and make all communities perceive themselves as Ottoman; in one sense forming a melting-pot. By this, the Empire would sustain Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, Armenian, and Albanian separatists’ loyalties. However, these expectations did not come true and the ideology of Ottomanism was replaced by the rising Turkish nationalist ideas at the beginning of the 1900s.

After a long time, first neo-Ottomanist traces were seen during the Turgut Özal era. By and large, Özal’s Ottomanism referred to a multicultural state which embraces ‘the relative tolerance of Ottoman Islam as sources of pluralism and openness for domestic social and political life’. As a matter of fact, in some way Özal’s Neo-Ottomanism was a counteraction to Kemalist foreign policy understanding. By that time, although Kemalist discourse had abandoned the Ottoman legacy, Özal initiated a new era to take the Ottoman Empire as an example. In Taşpinar’s words;

Özal’s approach was to have Turkey rediscover its imperial legacy and seek a new national consensus where the multiple identities of Turkey can coexist. It reminds Turks that they once had a great multinational empire that ruled the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans and parts of Central Europe. Such emphasis on the Ottoman legacy is not part of a plan to Islamize Turkey and Turkish foreign policy. Rather, it is an attempt to balance and broaden the horizons of Kemalism and its over-obsession with Turkey’s Western identity and trajectory.

This Neo-Ottomanist approach was dominant during the Özl era in order to open up a new foreign policy understanding for Turkey. As it is not possible to implement a policy in spite of society’s sensitivities, Özl did not pursue such an ideology and put it into practice against the mainstream ideology of the Republic of Turkey, “Kemalism”. That is why since Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism have commonalities even though they are differentiated in some contexts, Özl wisely emphasised those commonalities which were appreciated by the majority of the Turkish society - such as relations with the Western world. Yet, in contrast to Kemalism’s isolationist foreign policy, Neo-Ottomanism or in Laçiner’s words Özalism concentrates on an active foreign policy based on not only former Ottoman territories, but also other territories in the world. Although Neo-Ottomanism was subject to much discussion and criticism, by this emphasis on the relations with the West it was welcomed in general. Moreover, it paved the way for Turkey’s bridge role. His vision was of using the economy to remember the historical or cultural ties employed here through common market proposals.\footnote{S. Laçiner, \textit{From Kemalism to Özalism}..., p. 308.} Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in the Caucasus and Central Asia and later with Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania in the Balkans were reconstituted through this vision. Indeed this was a mutually constituted relationship as the relations were not held solely with Turkey’s initiation; those countries were seeking assistance from Turkey as well.\footnote{S. Laçiner, \textit{From Kemalism to Özalism}..., pp. 308-9.} Despite the expansion, Turgut Özl’s foreign policy did not deviate from the traditional Kemalist approach since his conduct was loyal to Western orientation.\footnote{S. Laçiner, \textit{From Kemalism to Özalism}..., p. 332.} In this sense, it is safe to say that Neo-Ottomanism got its strength from the relations with the West as well. That is why Özl attached great importance to the relations with the European Union and the USA.\footnote{For further discussion about Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism see: F. Loğoğlu, ‘Neo-Ottomanism: a Stratagem’; Available from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=neo-ottomanism-a-strategem-2008-09-27>; [Accessed on 01/07/2011]; N. Fisher, ‘Neo-Ottomanism, Historical Legacies and Turkish Foreign Policy’, EDAM Discussion Paper Series 2009/03; Y. Çolak, ‘Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective…., pp. 587-602.}
On the one hand, in line with Özal’s neo-Ottomanism approach, in spite of not officially being proclaimed, there is an inclination among some experts in Turkey to call the AKP’s foreign policy a “neo-Ottoman strategy”\(^{376}\). On the other hand, there are some experts who criticise this denomination as well. For instance, Soner Çağaptay objects to the naming of this strategy as ‘Neo-Ottomanism’, as according to him, a closer look reveals that during the AKP era, Turkey was asserting itself exclusively in the Muslim Middle East, while ignoring other areas of the Ottoman realm.\(^{377}\) In spite of these criticisms, what is plain is that the AKP’s foreign policy has been built on the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s thoughts which are called mainly ‘strategic depth’ which was presented in the previous chapter. In addition, his way of thinking’s relations with Eurasianism will be scrutinised in the following sections of this chapter.

When it comes to Neo-Ottomanism’s comparison to Eurasianism, to some extent Neo-Ottomanism -similar to Eurasianism- reflects the Westernists and Pan-Islamists approaches at the same time. Taspinar accentuates this point further;

Neo-Ottomanism embraces a grand, geostrategic vision of Turkey as an effective and engaged regional actor, trying to solve regional and global problems. Since the concept of neo-Ottomanism may evoke an imperial agenda, one important point needs clarification: Turkey, in this neo-Ottoman paradigm, does not pursue a neo-imperialist policy aimed at resurrecting the Ottoman Empire. Instead of imperial nostalgia, neo-Ottomanism is essentially about projecting Turkey’s “soft power”—a bridge between East and West, a Muslim nation, a secular state, a democratic political system, and a capitalistic economic force. Like French Gaullism, it seeks Turkish “grandeur” and influence in foreign policy.\(^{378}\)

On the other hand, Eurasianism is identified with the East and its underdeveloped institutions are despised by opponents\(^{379}\); although Neo-Ottomanism is praised in some

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\(^{378}\) O. Taspinar, ‘Turkey’s Middle…’, p. 3.
\(^{379}\) A. Bilici, ‘Ergenekoncu Hayale Rus Darbesi’ (Russian Sabotage the Ergenekonist Fantasy)…; I. Dağı, ‘Competing Strategies for Turkey: Eurasianism or Europeanism?’…
circles in Turkey because of pursuing aims related to the East. To clarify, the West is associated with democracy and development in the minds of many people in Turkey, while the East is associated with backwardness and underdevelopment. In addition, the division between Eurasianism and Neo-Ottomanism stems from the perception of those ideologies among Turkish society. Hence, whereas Neo-Ottomanism is accepted as a rightful quest, Eurasianism is considered a shift from the traditional Turkish foreign policy. As a matter of fact some believe that while a Neo-Ottomanist Turkey can bring democracy and prosperity to the Ottoman Empire’s former territories and can play a leadership role, in any kind of Eurasianist dream Turkey would stay in the shadow of Russia.

5.2.2. Islamism “Pan” and “Neo”

Although Pan-Islamism in the sense of a union of all Muslims is in fact as old as Islam itself, as an ideology it came out in the late 1800s. One of the champions of it was Jamaaluddin Afghani (Sayyid Jamal al-Din Muhammad b. Safdar al-Afghani, 1838-1897) in order to unite all Muslims under an Islamic state to withstand Western encroachments. According to Afghani, Muslim societies were weak due to corrupted rulers and various divided sects. And this weakness was the main reason why Western civilisation had become superior. That is why Muslim solidarity was essential in order to challenge the Western imperialism and maintain the freedom of Muslims in Afghani’s way of thinking. In this form, Pan-Islamism is a counter-hegemonic vision like Asian and African nationalism but it is different from Pan-Arabism, Pan-Turkism, etc. as it excludes ethnicity as an essential condition towards founding an Islamic state.

381 A. Özcan, Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924), (Leiden: Brill, 1997). p. 23.
In the Ottoman Empire, Abdulhamid II was the first and the last sultan to adopt Pan-Islamism during his reign between 1876 and 1909 against Western intervention in Ottoman affairs. The first constitution of the Ottoman Empire was enacted after Abdulhamid’s accession to the throne and clearly reflects a Pan-Islamic tendency. According to the constitution: “The Ottoman Sultanate, as the exalted Caliphs of Islam, belongs to the eldest member of the house of Osman… His Excellency the Padişah as Caliph, is the protector of the religion of Islam…”

Abdulhamid’s Pan-Islamist approach might be regarded as an effort to save the Ottoman Empire and its societal unity while some experts argue that it was adopted to sustain unification of all Muslims all over the world. As a matter of fact, both arguments can be taken as the core elements of Abdulhamid’s Pan-Islamist approach as he believed that “It was Islam that kept the different groups of the Empire like the members of one family…because the social structure and the politics of our Empire is based upon religion”. Moreover, he was a fervent supporter of the unification of Muslims all around the world and through Abdulhamid’s own words:

“…as long as the union of Islam continues, England, France, Russia, and Holland can be counted on my fingertips, because in the Muslim lands now under their domination even one word of the Caliph would be enough for starting a jihad against them which would be a catastrophe for the Christians.”

In addition to this debate, it was a fact that the European colonial advancement (such as occupation of Tunisia and Egypt) during the late 1800s and emergence of Pan nationalist thoughts (such as Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism) posed a threat toward the territorial unity of the Ottoman Empire as the Empire was a multinational state and the idea of Nationalism was one of the powerful motives behind the nationalist

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383 Quoted in A. Özcan, Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims..., p. 40.
384 For this debate see: M. Türköne, İslamcığun Doğaşı, Ankara: Lotus Yayınları, 2003; S. Mardin, ‘19. yy’da Düşünce Akımları ve Osmanlı Devleti: Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985); N. Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002); Y. Demirağ, ‘Pan-ideologies in the Ottoman Empire…’.
385 Quoted in A. Özcan, Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims..., p. 47.
386 Quoted in A. Özcan, Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims..., p. 50.
uprisings against the Ottoman Empire - such as the 1821 Greek uprising, 1876 Bulgarian uprising, etc. On the other hand, since the European colonial advancement and the decline of the Ottoman Empire occurred at the same time, the Empire lost a majority of its territories. It might be said that in this climate, adopting Pan-Islamism as an official ideology and applying that into the Empire’s political life to prevent further separation is a more rational choice instead of pursuing idealistic purposes for the unification of all Muslims. However, Abdulhamid preferred to adopt both perspectives together in order to save the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim World against, as Landau stated, “the foreign attacks”.

On the other hand, although Pan-Islamism is a counter-hegemonic ideology, Pan-Islamists had accepted that the West had technical superiority and during the revival of the Muslim world that technological advancement could be adopted. The main discourse was that the Western technology must be adopted but the imitation of the West was out of question. In this context, many intellectuals made explicit statements. One of them was Mehmet Akif Ersoy (1873-1936), a well-known figure at the time. He expressed his approach on this matter as follows: "By imitating the religion, by imitating the customary practices, the clothes, by imitating the way people greet each other, in short by imitating every single thing, a real social community cannot emerge and live."

Despite fruitless efforts, the Ottoman Empire collapsed without managing to unite Muslim people under an Islamic state. Owing to Kemalist secularist understanding, the Islamism and Ottomanism thoughts were mainly kept in the background until the Turgut Özal era. Pro-Ottomanist and pro-Islamist approaches mainly gained momentum and started to be influential in Turkey during the Özal era.

Özal’s Neo-Ottomanist approach was a synthesis of Turkism, Nationalism, and Islamism. In this context, Özal’s main contribution was his attempt to integrate Turkish-

389 Quoted in Y. Demirağ, ‘Pan-ideologies in the Ottoman Empire…’, p. 148.
Islamic Synthesis into the official state discourse. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was a strategy produced by a group of intellectuals, called Aydınlar Ocağı (Intellectuals’ Hearth) and adopted by the military after the September 12, 1980 coup. By this synthesis, the main aim was to integrate Islamists and Nationalists against radical leftist ideologies in order to reduce their appeal and get rid of the influence of non-Turkish strands of Islamic thinking. By this, the integrity of the Turkish nation-state would be provided and counter revolutionary sentiments would be eliminated.

Although Özal was a pious Muslim, he generally eschewed secularist aspects of the state. While he supported the Turkish version of Islam, Özal emphasised the differences of it from the Iranian version of Islam and Wahhabism, the dominant form of Islam in Saudi Arabia. The reason for this emphasis was that the Turkish version of Islam is more tolerant and liberal than the other versions. From the perspective of Özal, that is the prerequisite to establish a link between Muslims and the rest of the world.

I have, I hope, demonstrated that Turkey has never abandoned secularism. In this context one can refer to Ghazâlî's distinction between faith and reason. The Turk is aware that faith, in itself, does not affect secularism, nor does it prevent him from being rational, provided that their respective realms are not encroached. In life today there is no difference in this respect between the Christian European and the Muslim Turk. Thus a synthesis has been achieved between the West and Islam, a synthesis which has put an

end to the identity crisis of the Turk… French and Germans have separate cultures, but both constitute Western civilization, so would Turks while stressing and vitalizing their Turkish nationalism… the universal humanism created by secularized Islam, together with the concept of the brotherhood of mankind, a product of Turkish Sufism.393

The next revival of Islamism occurred during the late 1990s when Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) won 21.4 percent of the vote. The December 1995 elections saw that RP was the biggest party while ANAP (Motherland Party) and DYP (True Path Party) were the opposition parties. However, that percentage was not enough to form the Government. That is why ANAP and DYP formed a coalition, though it lasted only 3 months. After that, RP and DYP agreed to form a government on 28 June 1996. Thus, Necmettin Erbakan, who was the leader of RP, became the first Islamist prime minister of Turkey. During the RP and DYP coalition, Islamist discourse was dominant in Turkey’s foreign policy. Once Erbakan became Prime Minister, he started to visit many Muslim states such as Pakistan, Iran, and Indonesia etc. In particular, the first official visit to Iran instead of the USA was a clear message of how the new Turkish foreign policy was going to be formalised. During almost two years in office Erbakan did not conduct an official visit to any Western country.394 Moreover, Erbakan’s salient distrust towards the European Union, the USA, and Israel discouraged the government from embarking on high level relations. The distrust was mutual; the USA also was suspicious about the ‘fundamentalism’ of Erbakan and considered Erbakan’s rule as a threat to their interests.395 The next step was establishing an Islamic organisation which could be an alternative to the EU. For that reason, on 15 June 1997 in Istanbul, Developing Eight (D-8) was formed by Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey. D-8’s objectives are sequenced as follows: ‘improve member states’ position in the global economy, diversify and create new opportunities in trade relations, enhance participation in decision-making at international level, and

improve standards of living.” This initiative is still functioning but it lacks some essential aspects in order to become an alternative organisation to the EU, with problems that include geographical disparity and differences in political priorities.

The RP’s counter discourse on Turkish foreign policy was not long-lasting. The then coalition resigned because of the “February 28 Post-modern coup”. On 28 February 1997 during the National Security Council meeting Turkish Military Leadership gave a memorandum and forced the then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to sign that memorandum consisting of several decisions to protect secularism against ‘reactionaryism’. Although Erbakan signed that memorandum, he was forced to resign. Since there was no dissolving of the parliament and with brutal action against Turkey’s political institutions and figures, such an intervention by the Turkish military leadership was called a “Post-modern coup”. Even though the Islamist discourse lost its influence after the RP era, it is still effective in Turkey as the offshoot of RP, and the AKP (Justice and Development Party) has become stronger than ever but with more modest discourses.

In this sense, Islamism and Ottomanism have been two of the most significant ideologies which shape the political and social life in Turkey along with Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanianism. It is safe to say that while all these ideologies underpin the Eurasianist discourses in Turkey.

5.2.3. Pan-Turkism: Red Apple

Pan-Turkism emerged in the late 19th century among the Turks in the Russian empire and it was a sample of diaspora nationalism. It had the reflective motive towards the aggressive politics of the Russian government, like Russification and Christianisation.


policies. Pan-Turkism aims to unite all people of Turkic origin on an ethnic basis. At the end of the 19th century, more than 13 million Turkic people (consisting of 11 percent of the whole population of the empire) were living in the Russian Empire. And 85 percent of this Turkic population were Muslim. By Pan-Turkism, it is intended that this 11 percent would be separated from the Russian Empire after destroying it. Then, a solid Turkic union would be established by means of merging with the Ottoman Turks on a vast land which includes the territory of the Russian Empire and the majority of the territory of the Ottoman Empire. For all of these reasons, this school of thought can be considered as one of the irredentist movements.

In a manner, the word “pan-Turkism” is used in the sense of pan-Turanianism, and vice versa during the early 20th century. To clarify the difference between these two thoughts, it is meaningful to say that whereas pan-Turkism aspired to unite all Turkic peoples, pan-Turanianism was aimed at the unification of Turkic peoples with the Finno-Ugric peoples. The eminent theorists of the movement were the Crimean Tatar Ismail Gasprinsky (1851-1914), the Tatar intellectual Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935), the Azeri Turk Ahmet Agayev (1869-1939), the Azeri Ali Hüseyinzade (1864-1941), and Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924).

Ismail Gasprinsky was disseminating his ideas through his newspaper Tercüman and advocating the idea of “unity in language, ideas, and deeds”. Although Ismail Gasprinsky synthesised Turkism and Islam, he was a fervent advocator of Westernisation. This was a precaution to prevent being left behind the developed West. Another prominent figure, Yusuf Akçura, is known for his work “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset” (Three Kinds of Policies) which was published in the Cairo-based journal ‘Turk’. In this paper, Akçura examines Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. And it was

398 S. Wiederkehr, ‘Eurasianism as a reaction to Pan-Turkism’, in Russia between East and West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism, ed. by D. Shlapentokh, (Leiden: Brill, 2007b);
400 S. Wiederkehr, ‘Eurasianism as a reaction...’; J. M. Landau, Pan-Turkism....
the Pan-Turkism which is supported at the expense of Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism by Yusuf Akçura as he believed that “Turkism was the sole concept capable of sustaining the Türk millet (Turkish Nation).”\textsuperscript{402} This way of understanding gained acceptance and Akçura’s work has been regarded as the manifesto of the pan-Turkists.\textsuperscript{403} As for Ziya Gökalp, he was in favour of Turkish nationalism with his articles in the journal ‘Türk Yurdu’. He also supported the vision that the Ottomans should pursue more open foreign policy and not be imprisoned in their territory. The developed Western world’s science and technology would guide the Ottomans to reach the level of contemporary civilisations.

The most important criticism which is directed against pan-Turkism is related to the racist specification of its main justification. Landau, Finkel and Sirman emphasise that the supporters of pan-Turkism have headed toward the use of racist undertones since World War II.\textsuperscript{404} For instance, the cover of Bozkurt\textsuperscript{405} might be an obvious example of this. In this specific cover, the claimed extent of the Turkic ethnic homeland is shown and the meaning of the slogan at the top is ‘Turkish race is above all others’, while the bozkurt, i.e. the steppe wolf, is symbolised below the title.\textsuperscript{406}


\textsuperscript{403} T. Atabaki, ‘Recasting Oneself, Rejecting the Other...’, 2001, p. 69.


\textsuperscript{405} Bozkurt was a Pan-Turk journal which was published between 1939 and 1942.

\textsuperscript{406} J. M. Landau, Pan-Turkism:..., 1995, p. 3.
Pan-Turkism can be counted as one of the long-lived nationalist movements. During the late Ottoman era, the early Turkish Republican era, the 1960s, and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, pan-Turkism was at the peak of its power. In particular, the Turkic world witnessed a significant revival of Pan-Turkism during the disintegration of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union, the most powerful multinational state of the 20th century collapsed, five new Turkic-Central Asian states emerged: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic. The population of these states was more than 50 million. Along with Turkey, these Turkic states have been called “1 nation with 6 states” ever since. It is also often argued that Turkey is the backbone of these states. Admittedly, Turkey is the most powerful
and best established Turkic-nation in the world. What is more, Turkey is the core state of Pan-Turkic movements in the post-1990s. For instance, Mahir Yağcılar’s statement, Leader of Kosovo Turkish Democratic Party and former Minister of Environment for Kosovo, has a confirmatory attribute regarding this issue. On October 2010, Yağcılar stated that “The main target of the forum is to improve our values, expand our national values and make them international... The Turkish Republic is the mainland for us” at the World Turkic Forum in Istanbul.407

Since the dissolution, a myriad of activity to bring Turkic-speaking countries together has been organised at both state and individual level in the Turkic world; this includes the annual Friendship, Brotherhood, and Cooperation Congress of the Turkic States and Communities, the annual Eurasian Economic Summit, the World Turkic Forum, the Summit of Turkish-speaking countries’ leaders, Turkish-speaking countries Parliamentary Assembly (TurkPA). While some of them have been held since 1993 such as the Friendship, Brotherhood, and Cooperation Congress of the Turkic States and Communities, some have started as recently as 2008 such as the Turkic-speaking countries Parliamentary Assembly (TurkPA). However, all these initiatives are consequences of endeavours to rediscover their linguistic and cultural affinities. Through these initiatives activists are in search of promoting closer cultural, economic, and political ties between Turkic-speaking countries.

Although Turkey takes the initiative, there are several obstacles toward accomplishing such a comprehensive aim. First of all, despite the fact that some of the Turkic countries have a vast amount of proven oil reserves, it cannot be claimed that they are economically powerful states, yet. Having said that, it does not mean that Turkey does not have economic relations with these states. Apart from enhancing the cultural ties, Turkey places a lot of importance on economic relations with the Turkic states. Since the 1990s Turkey has provided 1.2 billion dollars credit to these countries in order to

make them attractive investment areas for Turkish businessmen. The volume of Turkey’s trade with Turkic states was approximately 1 billion dollars during the 1990s. However, the volume has increased since 2002 when AKP came to power in Turkey. As seen in figure 5.2, there is a steep increase in the trade volume between 2002 and 2010, compared to the 1990s. Until recently, the trade balance was in favour of Turkey. However, with the start of importing natural gas and oil from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan the balance has changed in favour of the Turkic states. After all these developments, unless there is at least an economically powerful state among the Turkic states, it is highly unlikely the ideals of Pan-Turkism will be accomplished.

Figure 5.2 Turkey – Turkic States Foreign Trade (US $ millions)

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The second reason is that some of these states are not even close to sustaining their internal security. For instance, Kyrgyzstan is one of the states that has not managed to strengthen its own internal and external security. Religious extremism and illegal drug trafficking are still strong drawbacks for Kyrgyzstan.\footnote{For further information about the security issue of Kyrgyzstan see K. Santhanam (Ed.), \textit{Eurasian Security Matters}, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 2010); H. Peimani, \textit{Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus}, (California: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009); S. J. Blank (Ed.), \textit{Central Asian Security Trends: Views from Europe and Russia}, Available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1063.pdf> [Accessed on 18/02/2014].} The final reason is the leadership issue among these Turkic-countries. This issue has come to prominence since Turkey tried to play a ‘Big Brother’ role instead of Russia following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it is well-known that this role was not welcomed by the post-Soviet Turkic states. In this regard, in the case of forming a Union and being a leader state, there are several candidates apart from Turkey such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.\footnote{John C. K. Daly, \textit{The Rebirth of Pan-Turkism?} Available from <http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33286>, [Accessed on 29/10/2010].} These three drawbacks are the answers to why Pan-Turkism is a distant goal and as long as these drawbacks remain, it seems this aim will stay unrealised.

As for a brief comparison of Eurasianism and Pan-Turkism, there are certain differences between them. First of all, it is true that one of the motives of the founders of Eurasianism was to build a counter view against Pan-Turkism. It was a timely opportunity for Russian emigrants to build an ideology against separatist thoughts of Pan-Turkism. Another disparity between Eurasianism and Pan-Turkism is the ‘open-closed nationalism’ dichotomy. Similar to Pan-Slavism, Pan-Turkism is ‘closed’ nationalism while Eurasianism is unequivocally ‘open’ nationalism.

Concerning the characterisation of a potential Union, Pan-Turkists pay ethnic roots a lot of importance. As can be understood from the name of it, there is no alternative to establish a Turkic Union which is composed of only Turkic origin people. Whereas Turkists intellectuals emphasise the one-sided link between the Turkic origin people,
Eurasianists are more comprehensive. And in a potential Eurasian Union, people’s common culture and historical destiny are deterministic instead of ethnic.

The last comparison is on the philosophy of territory. So far, the territory of a potential Eurasian Union has been clarified. However, the territory of the potential Turkic Union is composed of lands where Turkish speaking people live. On the one hand, this is a vast area to unite. On the other hand, lands of Turkic speaking people are spread from the Balkans to Siberia and not all of these lands have a land border with each other.

5.2.4. Pan-Turanianism: An Ideology from the Balkans to the Yellow Sea

Pan-Turanianism can be understood as a movement for the political unification of all speakers of Turanian Languages. The term is often used in the same way as Pan-Turkism, but it is a more comprehensive nationalist movement compared to Pan-Turkism. Pan-Turanianism aims at not merely the unity of all Turkic peoples, but also the unification of the Ural-Altaic Race. According to Arnakis, this race embraces; “the Ottoman Turks of Istanbul and Anatolia, the Turcoman peoples of Central Asia and Persia, the Tatars of South Russia and Transcaucasia, the Magyars of Hungary, the Finns of Finland the Baltic provinces, the aboriginal tribes of Siberia and even the distant Mongols and Manchus”.  

As for the word Turan, adequate information can be gathered from Ferdowsi’s  

Shahnameh. This epic gives information about the word Turan which was the name given to northeast Iran. According to this epic, King Fereydun had three sons, Silim, Tur, and Irij. The King divided the world up for his sons. Asia Minor was given to Silim, Iran to Irij, and the eastern part of the world (Turan) to Tur. However, in the contemporary world, the word Turan is used for Central Asia.

413 An Iranian poet, who lived between 940 – 1020.
414 An epic poem written by Ferdowsi between 977-1010.
415 O. G. Özgüdenli, Ortaçağ Türk-Iran Tarihi Araştırmaları (The Research of History of Turk-Iran in Middle Age), (İstanbul; Kaknus Yayınları, 2006).
Pan-Turanianism is an ambiguous concept so much so that everyone interprets it in different ways. For example, Ladis K. D. Kristof evaluates the movement as anti-Slav. According to Kristof “Its immediate purpose was to check and counter-balance Pan-Slav expansionism in the Balkans by forging an alliance with the Pan-Turkic movement and establishing ties with all the Finno-Ugric peoples of the north from the Baltic to the Urals. Thus the Slavs were to be ‘taken from behind’ and hemmed in”.

Another interpretation is made by Kaveh Farrokh. From his perspective, it was a racist, anti-Slav movement and aimed to establish a Turkic super state, but for the benefit of Britain. In this context, Farrokh points out that;

“Simply put, pan-Turanianism is an ideology that aims at creating a Turkic super state stretching from the Balkans in Europe, eastwards across Turkey, Iran (Persia), the Caucasus, Central Asia up to and including northwest China...Pan-Turanianism perhaps one of the last racist movements that first began in the nineteenth century”.

To sum up, pan-Turanianism is an idea to unite all speakers of Turanian languages under the Turan state. But, it might be considered as a utopia. Even comparing other pan-nationalisms, it is unequivocal that all of them might be more promising than pan-Turanianism. Yet, several activities have been held in alleged Turanian lands (see figure 5.2) in order to gather Turanian people. One of the biggest events, is held in Hungary since 2008, is the Turanian Convention. It is a tribal convention and attracts more than 100,000 people every year. By doing so, conveners aim to raise awareness and keep their own traditions alive. People from Turkey also show great interest in this Convention while they undertake other initiatives, such as an institution ‘Turanian Research Association’ and a journal called ‘Turan’.

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418 For more information see, http://kurultaj.hu/english/
When it comes to the outcomes of the brief comparison of Pan-Turanianism with Eurasianism are similar to the outcomes which can be obtained from the comparison of Pan-Turkism with Eurasianism. The first variable is a theoretical approach. From this perspective, it could be alleged that Pan-Turanianism is also an ideology that emerged to balance the Pan-Slavist vision. The second variable is the open-closed nationalism dichotomy. Pan-Turanianism is a ‘closed’ nationalism, while Eurasianism is an ‘open’ nationalism. Pan-Turanianism emphasises the Turanid race that included the Uralic and Altaic speaking peoples more generally. However, Eurasianism does not address any specific race, and what is more, common culture and history are highlighted.

**Figure 5.3. Alleged Turanian Lands**

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Concerning the characterisation of a potential Turan State/Union, it is clear who are entitled to be its citizens - speakers of Ural-Altaic languages. Again, regarding the characterisation it is not possible to claim that there is a constraint in the Eurasianist vision. The fourth and final comparison is on the philosophy of territory. The territory of a potential Turanian State/Union is composed of lands where speakers of Ural-Altaic languages live. Pan-Turanianism shares the same trait with Pan-Turkism on this issue.

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5.3. Discourses of Turkish Eurasianism

As noted earlier, Eurasianism was a way of thinking, an ideology or geopolitical thought to save the Russian Empire from collapse and create a propitious sphere in order to include all Eurasian nations. This version of Russian Eurasianism or Classical Eurasianism had various discourses and having those discourses was one of the reasons why Russian Eurasianism faded away around the 1930s. Having many participants and eminent founders who were dwelling in different countries of Europe and various discourses caused the disappearance of Eurasianism until Gumilev’s efforts to put together Neo-Eurasianism. As explored in Chapter 3, Gumilev’s followers A. Panarin and A. Dugin made an enormous contribution to Neo-Eurasianism during the 1990s. However, Panarin’s death gave rise to a loss of influence and left A. Dugin as the sole ideologist of Neo-Eurasianism.

Whereas Classical Eurasianism could not penetrate into Turkish society, Neo-Eurasianism has been perceived in various different ways in Turkish intelligentsia. It might be considered that there are two reasons for why Neo-Eurasianism has found a better acceptance than Classical Eurasianism. The first one is that Turkey has been a convenient sphere for ideologies as it is believed that Turkey has had a glorious history regarding the Turkic ethnic roots and its facilitative role for new and stimulating ideologies. Besides, Turkey has started to embrace a new way of understanding throughout this glorious history. That has been one of the catalysts which has created an appropriate environment for eastern-oriented ideologies. The second reason is that the effect of the perception “The only friend of a Turk is a Turk” on the Turkish identity-building process generated a tendency among some nationalist circles to become conscious against any threat by anyone seen as an enemy of Turkey. That is why these circles are in support of sustaining the “balance of power” rhetoric, especially against the Western world by promoting ideologies such as Neo-Eurasianism.

Three aspects, Islam, Ottoman history, and Turkishness have played key roles and moulded the Turkish identity despite the efforts on exalting Turkishness (the ancientness of the Turkish language, history and race; the Turks’ contributions to
western Civilization\textsuperscript{420}) and degrading the Islam and Ottoman history during the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. That is why in contemporary Turkey, Islamism, Pan-Turkism and Neo-Ottomanism are popular ideologies for building, in their own capacity, a new Turkey which can be influential in the international arena, even a regional power.

In terms of the Turkish intelligentsia meeting with Russian Eurasianism, it occurred through Gumilev and Dugin’s works. In particular, Dugin’s initial thoughts which aim to exclude Turkey from a prospective Eurasian Union were not welcomed in Turkey and caused Turkish intellectual circles to perceive Russian Eurasianism as a Russian imperialist ideology even if Dugin revised his approach to Turkey later. Most of the discourses of Eurasianism, therefore, are built on the aforementioned ideologies, such as Islamism, Turkism, etc. In the light of this information, in a general manner, the discourses of Turkish Eurasianism can be classified into three separate divisions\textsuperscript{421}: Nationalist Eurasianism, Multiculturalist Eurasianism, and Westernist Eurasianism.


\textsuperscript{421} For the illustration of the discourses please see Table 5.1.
### Table 5.1 Typology of the Discourses of Turkish Eurasianism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TURKISH EURASIANISM</th>
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<th>Multiculturalist Eurasianism</th>
<th>Westernist Eurasianism</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Anıl Çeçen (Professor)</td>
<td>Attila İlhan (Author, Poet)</td>
<td>Erel Tellal (Professor)</td>
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<td>Şener Üşümezsoy</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Professor)</td>
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<td>Sami Güçlü (Former Minister)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Professor)</td>
<td>(Dr. – jailed for a while in the Ergenekon trial)</td>
<td>Nabi Avcı (Incumbent Minister of National Education, MP)</td>
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<td>Akkan Süver (President of the Marmara Groups Strategic and Social Research Foundation)</td>
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<td>(Former Minister)</td>
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<td>Ali Külebi (Acting President of National Security Strategies Research Centre)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arslan Bulut (Author, Columnist, Researcher)</td>
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</table>
5.3.1. Nationalist Eurasianism

The first discourse is Nationalist Eurasianism which is in favour of turning Turkey’s face to the East and making alliances with countries such as Iran, India, Pakistan, Syria, Russia, and so on. It is worth mentioning that according to the Nationalist Eurasianists, the alliances with those countries should not be at the level of establishing a union with all of them. A prospective union can be founded only with Turkic states and Iran since the Nationalist Eurasianists perceive that Iran is a Turkic state.

As can be understood through the name of this division, intellectuals who are classified within this group have nationalist ideals, thoughts, and approaches based on pan-Turkism, pan-Turanianism, Islamism, and Ottomanism ideologies. Besides, they have some untraditional recommendations regarding Turkey’s foreign policy. What the supporters of this discourse share is that they all have high expectations from the alliances with Eurasian states such as Iran, Kazakhstan, etc. While they face towards Eurasia, they perceive Eurasianism on the basis of Turkish identity. The main driving force behind this approach is to exalt anti-imperialism and establish a Eurasian Union with or without Russia’s participation in order to halt the USA’s imperialism. In an interview with an academic who did not want to reveal her identity, this issue has been argued as follows: “Eurasianism is the only way out for Turkey against the Western Imperialism. But I am not claiming that everything is from the West is bad. Their technology can be transformed but I am against the imperialism.”

Another bureaucrat shares similar thoughts and state that “Turkey is destined to lose its identity as long as building strategic partnership with the Western world. Eurasia is Turkey’s faith.”

According to supporters of this discourse, especially for Anıl Çeçen, in the region first and foremost Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Syria should establish a Union; he names this Union ‘Ön Asya Birliği’ (Western Asia Union). After that, this Union can be expanded toward Central Asia. Although having expansionist ideas in the direction of inner Asia in a peaceful way, Çeçen avoids any kind of Union with Russia. The reason

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422 Personal interview with an anonymous interviewee, 20 March 2010, Ankara, Turkey.
423 Personal interview with an anonymous interviewee, 18 February 2014, Ankara, Turkey.
is that Russia has been an imperialist state throughout the whole of world history. Hence, he alleges that it should be borne in mind that this Union ought to be established without Russia or any other imperialist state. Herein, to prevent the emergence of any doubt, concerning Turkish, Iranian and Syrian identities, Çeçen claims that both Iran and Syria are Turkish-origin states. Due to this, a ‘Western Asia Union’ between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Syria can be initiated with ease.\footnote{Roundtable Discussion Report, “Eurasia and Eurasianism in New World Order”, 27th October 2004, www.aysam.gen.tr; A. Çeçen, Türkiye ve Avrasya (Turkey and Eurasia), (Fark Yayınları: Ankara, 2006); A. Çeçen, Türkiye’nin B Planı: Merkezi Devletler Birliği (Turkey’s Second Plan: Central States Union), (Fark Yayınları: Ankara, 2007).}

As previously mentioned, this division’s chief argument is that Turkish Eurasianism should be perceived and improved without any imperialist power and all Eurasian Union projects, which Turkey will be included in, should be constituted without any interference from Russia, the USA, or the EU. On this, Üşümezsoy is in favour of establishing a Eurasian Union between Turkey, Iran and the Central Asian countries. This Union should not identify any differences between Tajiks, Turks, Kurds or Tatars.\(^{428}\)

While some of them are claiming that a prospective union should be without Russia’s participation, others who have ambition to develop a partnership with Russia are Arslan Bulut (columnist in Daily Yeniçağ, author, and researcher), Professor Özcan Yeniçeri, Professor Ümit Özdağ, Namık Kemal Zeybek (author, former Minister, and the Leader of the Democratic Party), Ali Külebi (Acting President of National Security Strategies Research Centre), Suat İlhan (Retired Lieutenant General), and Assistant Professor İhsan Çomak.

Arslan Bulut is known as a fervent Kemalist-Nationalist and he lays bare his thoughts in his column in the Daily Yeniçağ. Regarding Russia’s role in a prospective Union, Bulut has some doubts.\(^{429}\) According to him, there are two different Eurasianist ideologies within the present international relations realm. One of them is American Eurasianism and the other is Russian Eurasianism. On the one hand, American Eurasianism was first mentioned in Brzezinski’s book ‘The Grand Chessboard’ and has been extended and endured through The Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI).\(^{430}\) On the other hand,
Russian Eurasianism is represented by Alexandr Dugin and this sect is backed by mystic Russian Governance and its historical background.

Bulut is one of the proponents of a Turkish Union to prevent Turkey becoming a puppet between American and Russian Eurasianism. From his perspective, Turkey should first have a vision for a Turkish Union, and then the existence of Turkish Eurasianism can be considered. However, in any case, to do this, while Russia shows utter respect to this Union, Turkey should also be respected in a prospective Slavic Union.

In this sense, former minister Namik Kemal Zeybek sets forth two different institutions regarding the Eurasian Union. The first type of Union will be the Eurasian Union and will encompass all Turkic states, even Tajikistan. This should be founded on the basis of Turkish identity. Second will be a Eurasian Partnership and in this respect, Russia should be an ally within this Partnership. Moreover, this Partnership should reach and embrace the deepest parts of Asia. Likewise, Özcan Yeniçeri makes a statement that the concept of Eurasia should embrace all nations, cultures and religions in the region and generate opportunities for these cultures, nations and religions to collaborate. This depends on promoting the relationship between Turkey and Russia. Although Turkey and Russia have prejudices and misunderstandings with each other, they both have significant potential in the region by being a superpower or hegemon. Yeniçeri backs a Eurasian Union which can be shaped by Eurasian states like Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Turkic States except Russia. He believes that first and foremost, Russia should eliminate its ambitions which are against the interests of Turkey.
Another intellectual, Ali Külebi, claims that before establishing a Union, Turkey should integrate with Azerbaijan. Then, this Union can be a centre of attraction for Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Persians, and Turkmens. To reach this aim, Külebi puts forward that Turkey should develop the ECO (Economic Cooperation Organisation) which was created in 1985 by Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. Although Edmund Herzig calls this organisation to some extent, ‘useless’⁴³⁴, Külebi champions that the ECO can sustain an integration regarding cultural, economic, educational, and industrial relationships between the members.⁴³⁵

While Külebi points out that Turkish Eurasianism is an alternative regionalism idea which may plan Turkey’s future foreign policy direction, Çomak emphasises the content of Turkish Eurasianism which has brought together anti-EU groups and he adds that it cannot be imagined that these groups would coexist under normal conditions.⁴³⁶ This Eurasianist ideology has been promoted as an option for Turkish foreign policy by these anti-EU groups as it is considered historical fact and a geopolitical necessity by them.

5.3.2. Multiculturalist Eurasianism

The second discourse is Multiculturalist Eurasianism. This discourse’s understanding of Eurasianism is more extensive compared to other discourses. The basic impetus of Multiculturalist Eurasianism’s advocates is to assemble all people who live in Eurasian space under the same roof. Besides, there is a clear propensity among them to establish a Eurasian Union between Russia, Turkey, Turkic States, Iran, and even India as an alternative to the West (the EU, the USA). Some of the most important representatives of Multiculturalist Eurasianism are author and poet, Attila İlhan; Leader of the Turkish

Workers’ Party, Doğu Perinçek, and historian and political scientist, Dr. Mehmet Perinçek.

Attila İlhan (1925-2005) was, according to some,437 ‘Progenitor of Turkish Eurasianism’ and his articles and books have sparked considerable discussions about the concept from the far-leftists to the far-rightists. His stance has been confirmed by the interviewees that I met during the field study. One of the questions was “who do you think can be named a genuine Eurasianist in Turkey?” Without exception all the interviewees gave Attila İlhan’s name as the genuine Eurasianist in Turkey. İlhan was a socialist, Kemalist, and anti-imperialist writer, columnist, and poet. All these sides of him can be found in his writings. Concerning Turkish Eurasianism, his main opinion was to establish a Eurasian Union between Russia, Turkey, and Iran. The reason for doing this is to become independent from the USA.438

From his anti-imperialist thoughts, during the last two centuries Western Imperialism’s biggest aim has been to prevent a unification of the three biggest nations in Asia: Turks, Slavs, Arabs in order to colonise their lands and impose the culture on indigenous people.439 According to İlhan, Turkey has significant geopolitical importance and can play an efficient role in Eurasia and take measures against the Western Imperialism. In addition to this role, as Turkey’s historical background and dynamic economic system suffice, many states which are located in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia have nowadays turned their attention to Turkey. Moreover, he claims that when BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) and ECO are taken into account, Turkey’s rise in the 21st century can be seen from the horizon.440 Briefly, İlhan, by his Eurasianist discourse, argues that a Eurasian Union which is unified by Eurasian countries has great potential

437 Ş. Aktürk in his paper ‘Counter-Hegemonic....’, 2004, 207-238 (p. 212) names Attila İlhan as a Progenitor of Turkish Eurasianism.
to prevent all bad desires of the USA, the EU and Eastern Tigers\textsuperscript{441} in terms of capturing the Region’s vast oil and natural gas resources. And this Union may emerge as one of the biggest in the world.

Doğu Perinçek, the leader of the Turkish Workers’ Party and a member of the Supreme Council of Eurasian Movement, and his son, Mehmet Perinçek, are devout supporters of Multiculturalist Eurasianism and its great strategic supremacy. Doğu Perinçek’s counter-American thoughts are uncompromising. He perceives the USA as a state which has a great aspiration to expand its imperialism across the world and to establish a unipolar world system. In this regard, Perinçek argues that although there are many states in Eurasia, Turkey, Russia, Iran, India, and China are the main powerhouses in the continent. And he follows that whereas these states have their own lesser motherland, at the same time they have their bigger motherland, called Eurasia. By Turkish Eurasianism, awareness of this bigger motherland discourse can be promoted in order to unite and defend their lesser and bigger motherlands against the USA.\textsuperscript{442}

Perinçek’s son, Mehmet Perinçek, follows his father’s steps concerning Turkish Eurasianism. According to him, Eurasianism defends a multipolar world system instead of a unipolar system. Eurasian strategy is a civilisation programme against the falling of the civilisation of the Atlantic. In this sense, Eurasia is the sole choice for Turkey regarding its foreign policy direction.\textsuperscript{443} In an interview conducted with Mehmet

\textsuperscript{441} It is a term used in reference to the highly developed economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. Until mid-1997, the rapid growth of the East Asian economies was widely regarded as a miracle. This growth had propelled Asia to such heightened importance in the world economy that the next millennium was already anointed “The Pacific Century” by some. For further information on Eastern Tigers, see: T. Young, Re-Assessing the Health of the Asian Tigers, \textit{Graziadio Business Review}; Available from <http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/2010/08/re-assessing-the-health-of-the-asian-tigers/>, [Accessed on 02/04/2010]; The downward spiral of the Asian tigers, Available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1998/AsianEconomicCrisis/72222.stm>, [Accessed on 02/04/2010]; Tigers adrift, Available from <http://www.economist.com/node/114999>, [Accessed on 02/04/2010].


Perinçek before he went to jail, he drew the borders of the prospective Eurasian Union more clearly and claimed that every country in the world apart from the USA might be a member of the Union. According to him, a prospective Union must be built in order to eliminate the imperialism of USA. Therefore, he, geographically, sees Latin America as the left door of the Eurasian Union and North Africa as the south door of the Union. In his thinking, this Union is the only way to save Turkey against the attacks of the USA. That is why he thinks that the Union is not an alternative to Turkish foreign policy understanding. Turkey has to be in this Union without a doubt.444

5.3.3. Westernist Eurasianism

The third discourse is Western Eurasianism which supports Turkey’s current foreign policy course and along with it, agrees on increasing the relationships with countries of the Eurasian continent. As a third division, the Westernist Eurasianism and thinkers, under this group, have a tendency to strengthen the on-going relationships with Russia along with the USA and the EU. Eurasianism and any kind of Eurasianist organisation are perceived as a complimentary geopolitical strategy, not as an alternative. Some of the supporters of this perception are Akkan Süver (President of the Marmara Groups Strategic and Social Research Foundation), Prof. Erel Tellal, Prof. Nabi Avcı (MP and incumbent Minister of National Education), Sami Güçlü (Former Minister), Hakan Fidan (incumbent Undersecretary of the National Intelligence Organization/MİT).

Erel Tellal, in a personal interview, stated that he is in favour of enduring the relationships with both the West and the East and in a geographical sense, the term Eurasia means for him both the west and the east of the Urals, namely it subsumes Europe and Asia. In this respect, Turkey cannot have any Eurasian alternative against the West, because the West and the East are located in the Eurasian region. As long as Turkey has a relationship with the West, it should have a relationship with the East. These policies cannot be separated.445

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444 Personal interview with Mehmet Perinçek, 11 March 2010, İstanbul, Turkey.
445 E. Tellal, ‘Türk Dış Politikası’nda Avrasya Seçeneği’ (Eurasian Alternative in Turkish Foreign Policy), in Türkiye’nin Avrasya Macerası 1989-2006 – Avrasya Üçlemesi II (Turkey’s Eurasia Venture,
Concerning Eurasia and Eurasianism, Süver’s perception is that Eurasia also includes both Europe and Asia and thus, it generates the biggest region of the world. Eurasia could reach a ‘brighter future’, and all discriminations between the nations and people who are settled in this region should be abolished.\textsuperscript{446} He explains his aims related to Turkish Eurasianism in three phases. First of all, the wealth, the welfare, and the development should be shared between the states which are located in the region. The second phase states, where Turkish is the spoken language, should be united. And thus, shared culture and thoughts can be transferred to the future generations. The third phase is that Turkey’s accession process to the EU is successful and then Turkey can be a synthesizer between Europe and Asia.\textsuperscript{447}

As it is going to be seen in the following chapter, this discourse has been widely accepted by the decision-makers since it is the softest version of Eurasianism comparing to others, Nationalist and Multiculturalist Eurasianism discourses. It is highly believed by Turkish public opinion that this discourse is the one which might enable Turkey to formulate its own independent foreign policy course.

\textbf{5.4. Conclusion}

All in all, it can be said that Islam, the Ottoman heritage, and Nationalism are three of the main impetuses which are influential to Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy. In this sense, in Turkey exogenous thoughts are analysed and perceived in the light of those aforementioned impetuses. Therefore, they need to be examined closely in order to determine the discourses of Turkish Eurasianism. In this respect, theoretically, as Islam dismisses culture, language, ethnicity, geographical proximity etc. among its followers, it has the potential to build a sense of shared identity. Since Ottoman times Islam has, therefore, been perceived as a vital common denominator between the subjects such as Turks, Kurds, etc. For that reason, Islam is influential in Turkish

\textsuperscript{446} A. Süver, \textit{Gelecek Avrasyadır (The Future is Eurasia)}, (İstanbul: Yeni Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2008), p. 17.

\textsuperscript{447} A. Süver, \textit{Gelecek Avrasyadır}, p. 7.
domestic and foreign policy courses. On the other hand, Ottomanist discourses can be found in the majority of Turkish citizens, despite disparaging Kemalist discourses towards the Ottoman history. Along with Islamist and Ottomanist discourses, Turkish nationalism has also a dominant effect on Turkish society. In particular, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the tendency for unification with the Turkic states which emerged in the Caucasus and Central Asia has always been kept alive by the rightist parties. That is why ultra-right parties in Turkey have been in favour of forming Turkic-nationalist discourse for a long time. In addition, despite the fact pan-Turanianism’s targets are highly unlikely, it has been a leverage to think/embrace of much wider area similar to Eurasianism.

On the other hand, in the light of this knowledge, it might be said that there are three main discourses of Turkish Eurasianism: Nationalist, Multiculturalist and Westernist. The following table summarises the features of the three Eurasianist discourses. In line with the discussion, this summary draws attention to the overlapping expectations of the discourses despite the fact that they differ from each other regarding the meaning of Eurasia and the sources of the discourses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nationalist</th>
<th>Multiculturalist</th>
<th>Westernist</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eurasia</strong></td>
<td>Turkic States (if necessary Russia)</td>
<td>All Eurasian States (except Western States)</td>
<td>All Eurasian States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey’s Place</strong></td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Leadership with Russia</td>
<td>Significant Player</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sources</strong></td>
<td>Turkishness, Anti-Imperialism, Patriotism, Pan-Turkism, Islamism, Ottomanism</td>
<td>Cultural Dialogue, Anti-Westernism, Anti-Imperialism, Pan-Turanianism</td>
<td>Turkishness, Westernness, Ottomanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expectations</strong></td>
<td>A Eurasian Power for a better future</td>
<td>A Eurasian Power for a better future</td>
<td>A Eurasian Power for a better future Democratic State</td>
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These three discourses have similar perspectives regarding Turkey’s role and importance in the region. They all focus on the Turkic states’ facilitator role in order to create an environment for Turkey to promote Turkish Eurasianism as it derives from these kin states’ presence. However, when it comes to the content of the prospective Eurasian Union, they have separate visions. That is based on their reservations about Russia and the Western states. While some of the nationalists claim that Russia might be one of the members of the Union (if necessary), some of the multiculturalists carry the same reservation about the western world (except the USA).

Regarding Turkey’s place in this Union, they all have different arguments. The most ambitious one comes from the Nationalists as they see Turkey as the leader of the Union. While the Multiculturalists argue that Turkey and Russia share the leadership, the Westernists propose that Turkey might be one of the significant players through the Union. Besides, there are several different sources in order to prepare the ground for a prospective Union. Nationalists embrace many features contrary to Multiculturalist and Westernist discourses such as Turkishness, Anti-imperialism, Patriotism, Pan-Turkism, Islamism, and Ottomanism. Lastly, their expectations are generally considered to be the same as they all claim such a Union for a better future for the benefit of Turkey. In addition, only the Westernist discourse emphasises democracy while it argues that the Eurasian continent is one of the most important regions for Turkey and it must be taken into account along with the Western world.
CHAPTER VI

THREE PERIODS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
AND THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE DISCOURSES

6.1. Introduction

The preceding chapters have presented an overview of Turkey’s foreign policy course since the late Ottoman era. On this account, there is a wide consensus among the students of international relations that Turkish foreign policy between 1923 and the beginnings of 2000s may be roughly divided into four periods: an inter-war period (1923-1945), Cold War era (1945-1980s), a period of new world order (1990s) and AK Party era (2000s)448. These periods differ from each other. Generally speaking, until the 1980s, Kemalism had the upper hand and an ability to permeate and shape every level of society; and it was publicly unchallenged. In political life, this resulted in the emergence of a Kemalist civilian-military bureaucratic structure which did not allow elected governments to fully implement their own foreign policy programmes.449 However, Turgut Özal’s rise changed this course and challenged Kemalism, as had not been seen before. That was a turning point in terms of devising a new state ideology. Since then, Turkey has been in a struggle and Eurasianism has been one of the notions affecting the devising of this process.

In this regard, Özal era comes into prominence as one of the periods of this chapter. The next one is Cem era. He was the one who emphasised Turkey’s Ottoman past and its unique traits such as culture and geography and also tried to formulate a new foreign policy understanding upon this mind-set. After Özal era, it is the first time a multi-dimensional foreign policy approach was observed in his period. In this era, Turkey earned candidate status to the EU, expanded its influence in Central Asia through joint

security cooperation, improved its relations with Greece, Syria and Iran.\textsuperscript{450} This pro-activism is the reason why the Cem era has been chosen as the second period of this chapter.

The last period of this chapter is Davutoğlu era as he is the incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey, who has raised pro-activism to higher levels in his term. Similar to Özal and Cem, Davutoğlu and AK Party foreign policy understanding was multi-dimensional. While Özal was stressing on building economic relations with the countries in the Middle East, the Balkans and Central Asia and Cem was pointing out that Turkey overlooked the importance of historical and cultural elements in foreign policy making, Davutoğlu has put efforts on both approaches to broaden Turkey’s foreign policy horizon and to integrate cultural and historical dimensions to Turkish foreign policy making process.\textsuperscript{451} For instance, it is the first time in the history Turkey has had embassies/consulates in almost every country in the world during the AK Party era. In this context, while these three periods differ from each other at the same time they differ from other periods of Turkish foreign policy since 1923. This is the rationale behind why these three periods have been chosen for this chapter.

Therefore, this chapter first examines the causes of such a dramatic change of power balance and related factors such as Özal’s personality and Turkey’s economic opening programmes. In the main part of this chapter, foreign policy approaches of the then Prime Minister and President Turgut Özal, the then Foreign Minister İsmail Cem, and the incumbent Foreign Minister Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu will be investigated. A special emphasis will be put on whether the discourses of Eurasianism have been applied or performed during these three periods of Turkish foreign policy. In doing so, a number of indicators, which have been determined and chosen after in-depth analyses of Özal, Cem, and Davutoğlu’s speeches, mind-sets, and initiatives, will be used in order to examine whether these three periods present any Eurasianist approaches explicitly or implicitly. In this regard, this chapter will reveal the impact of Eurasianist ideology in the Turkish foreign policy making on these three periods.

\textsuperscript{450} T. Küçükekeles, Understanding Turkish Foreign Policy…
\textsuperscript{451} T. Küçükekeles, Understanding Turkish Foreign Policy…
6.2. Özlal Era: Westernist Eurasianism by using Nationalist and Religious Appeals

During the 1970s, because of the American arms embargo as a result of the Cyprus Crisis, Turkey had partly been isolated from the international system. It had no solid and reliable relations with the European Community (EC) and the USA. Besides, due to the bipolarity of the international system and Turkey’s NATO membership Turkey did not aim to build proper relations with the communist bloc states either.

While Turkey was experiencing such isolation, the 1980 military coup was carried out by the Turkish military in the name of suppressing terrorism and anarchy which had deteriorated badly and deepened the socio-political and economic crises faced by the country. Although the American arms embargo was lifted on 26 September 1978, Turkey’s ordeal had not ended. The EC’s reaction to the coup created another embargo and the European Parliament suspended financial aid to Turkey on January 1982. In addition, the Western leaders kept harshly criticising the Generals who performed the coup. And all these developments caused Turkey’s isolation to last for a bit longer.

Bearing in mind these circumstances, Turkey had to make a choice in order to create a viable environment. Thus, the Generals explored the Arab world as a new ally for overcoming the political isolation and economic difficulties. Turkey’s axis shift yielded its result and its total exports to the Muslim world doubled in 1983. Furthermore, Turkey’s exports to the Western countries decreased significantly in the same period.

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All in all, Turgut Özal came to power amid such an isolated and economically struggling condition. Özal was a successful bureaucrat and manager and also was a fervent supporter of democracy, liberalism, and freedom of rights. He was an open-minded figure who believed that all people have something to say and they can articulate that freely. Özal’s way of thinking was in a way a legacy of his years in the USA for his postgraduate studies. Regarding Özal’s time in the USA, Laçiner points out that Özal was an admirer of the United States. In his view, the United States owed its success to its liberalism. Özal further argued that the United States and the Ottoman Empire were similar political structures: Both allowed different cultures and gave people freedom to exercise their religion, nationality, and economic preferences. From this perspective, Turkey had to desert its authoritarian official understanding, namely the Kemalist state ideology.455

Özal’s likeable personality in the eyes of the Turkish public and his rivals’ (Demirel, Ecevit, Türkeş, and Erbakan) elimination from politics by the coup led him to become the Prime Minister of Turkey by the 1983 elections. In a short time, he managed to transform Turkey into a “young tiger” dubbed by Andrew Mango.456 This economic success brought activism in foreign policy as well. Foreign policy was one of the issues to which Özal attached much importance. It is known that he even used to take actions without consulting his Ministers of Foreign Affairs from time to time.457

In addition to the isolation of Turkey in the international arena, the change in the international balance of power had underscored Turkey’s deteriorating conditions

455 S. Laçiner, “From Kemalism to Özalism...”, p. 289
during the 1980s. Over the following years, the USA was one of the few allies of Turkey despite the embargo crisis. Yet, Turkey was also losing its stand because of Gorbachev’s Presidency and the gradual thaw in the USA-Soviet Union relations. All these developments undermined Turkey’s position as a ‘frontier state’. Yet, Özal did not lose his faith in the West and carried out policies in order to integrate with it.

In this regard, three main dynamics have been chosen in order to analyse Özal’s foreign policy implementations, as they had caused a remarkable change in the economic and social structures of Turkey.

- *Ethnic groups*

Turkey is called a mosaic of different identities including various religious, ethnic, and linguistic groups. But among these minorities, it can be put forward that only ethnic groups have a significant effect on the Turkish foreign policy making process. Alevis, Greeks, Jews, Armenians, Assyrians are among the biggest religious minority communities of Turkey. The size of the Armenians is between 50,000 and 93,000, while Greeks comprise around 3,500. Also, one of the biggest religious groups Assyrians consist of 25,000 people. When it comes to ethnic minorities, Kurds are the biggest minority in Turkey. Although the size of the Kurdish community is controversial, it is estimated that the Kurdish community numbers about 13 million or around 20 per cent of Turkey’s population. Another big minority group is Balkan immigrants. While some allege that the number of immigrants between 1923 and 1995 was over 1,600,000, others put the number of immigrants between 1876 and 1996 at 750,000.

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459 N. Karimova and E. Deverell, Minorities in Turkey..., p. 8-12.
460 N. Karimova and E. Deverell, Minorities in Turkey..., p. 13.
462 N. Karimova and E. Deverell, Minorities in Turkey..., p. 15.
During the Özal era, Turkey experienced a relatively more democratic period. Such a restoration of democracy made ethnic groups self-confident and led them to partly join the democratic system. The role of these ethnic groups was significant as there were hundreds of thousands of them, thanks to the Ottoman Empire, as after its demise Anatolia witnessed an incredible immigrant flow from the Balkans, Caucasus and Russia. However, until Özal those ethnic groups’ integration with the Turkish polity had not taken place. Özal’s liberal reforms launched a renaissance for democratic rights. Within this framework, ethnic groups have preferred to integrate with the system voluntarily and they ruled out their own ethnic identities in the country’s political scene. This was not that painful for those groups since when Turkey granted those people with citizenship they felt indebted to the regime and that led to their integration without their ethnic identities. Along with the integration of ethnic groups, their influence over the foreign policy started to grow rapidly. As a result of this, a new awareness was raised in the Turkish foreign policy towards those countries from which the country’s migrated ethnic groups originally came. For instance, during the Bosnian War, the effect of Bosnian Turks was unprecedented. During the War, there was huge pressure on the government, led by the then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, for taking unilateral action or participating in peacekeeping missions. The pressure was not only from the opposition but also from the Balkan immigrants. On the opposition side, Necmettin Erbakan of the prominent Islamists was blaming Demirel for not getting involved in the war and expressed “Süleyman Demirel is a fake Süleyman, if he had been Süleyman the Magnificent, he would have forcibly gone to Bosnia-Herzegovina by now.”\footnote{Quoted in İ. Bal (Ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era, (Florida: BrownWalker Press, 2004), p. 203.} On the immigrants’ side, their pressure on the government was another motive for taking action against the aggressors. They were constantly criticising the government’s foreign policy and pushing the government to embrace a pro-active foreign policy towards the Balkans.\footnote{İ. Bal (Ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy…, 2004, p. 203.} In addition to Turkey’s participation in peacekeeping missions in the
Balkans, some immigrant associations provided aid to Bosnians fighting against the Serbian paramilitaries.465

Another ethnic minority group influencing Turkish foreign policy is the Kurds, who constitute 20 per cent of Turkey’s population. Without getting involved in the Kurdish question of Turkey, it must be mentioned that the Kurdish ethnic group has been one of the main determinants of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the southern neighbours, such as Syria, Iran, and Iraq. In particular Turkey’s involvement in the Gulf War of 1990-91 and support for the allied coalition, the failure in ousting Saddam Hussein, the unsuccessful Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq, and the influx of tens of thousands of Kurdish refugees into Turkey during March and April 1991 made the situation much more complicated; the existence of a Kurdish ethnic group and the PKK466 in Turkey is still affecting the foreign policy making process.467 For instance, according to Turkey, Syria was the main provider of logistical and training support to the PKK. This issue was used as a threat towards Turkey by Syria in balancing Turkey’s use of water from the Euphrates River. Syria was aiming to halt Turkey's plans to divert water from the Euphrates for its massive irrigation development scheme called the Great Anatolian Project, or GAP.468 In this sense, it is logical to claim that Turkey’s foreign policy course towards Syria, Iraq, and Iran has been highly influenced by Turkey’s Kurdish minorities, especially with the existence of the PKK terrorist organisation.

466 The PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan – Kurdistan Workers’ Party) has waged a guerrilla campaign since 1984 to carve out an independent Kurdish state from Turkey.
As mentioned, Özal was a premier who focused on economic developments more than any other leader since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey. Turkey’s economic conditions were deteriorating when Özal came to power. Eralp, Tünay, and Yeşilada allege that during the 1970s Turkey experienced the worst political and socioeconomic crises of its republican history. And as it was pointed out, the coup Generals turned their face towards the Muslim world due to the isolation by western states in order to overcome economic difficulties. Yet, this exit strategy from crises was used as an opportunity by Özal in order to create a more viable economic environment. Due to Özal’s Westernist approach, in a short time the EC became the most important export area for Turkish goods once again. However, Özal-led economic restructuring also benefited from global and regional changes in this era such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, opening of the China’s economy, Islamic revolution in Iran, and etc.

The collapse of the Soviet Union came as a result of the rivalry with the USA. The economic performance of the Soviet Union was surpassing the United States in the late 1970s. Both were massively building up their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. But toward the end of the war, the Soviet Union’s nuclear stockpile surpassed the USA. In addition to economic and nuclear growth, the USSR was also building new military bases around the world. However, all these developments came with costs and soon it was revealed that the growth was not sustainable. Besides, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan deteriorated the economic conditions of the Union. However, this rivalry

*Globalisation of Turkish Economy*

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470 S. Laçiner, “From Kemalism to Özalism…”, p. 294.

meant the end of “era of détente” and helped in the Turkish-American rapprochement along with the following events.

As a response to the abovementioned problems, Mikhail Gorbachev’s solution was to liberalise the Soviet Union through glasnost (openness) and perestroika (reform) policies. However, it was witnessed that the response was not good enough to prevent the disintegration of the Soviet Union. While the disintegration created a power and ideological vacuum in the international system, it has indirect impact on Turkey through successor states of the Soviet Union. Turkey has been keen to establish solid relations with the post-USSR states. In particular, the relations with the Turkic states have always had significant importance for Turkey due to sharing ethnic and linguistic ties with them. However, Turkey was in no position to seize the opportunity, neither economically nor politically.

During this frame of time, opening of the China’s economy was one of the significant global changes. China, the second-most powerful Communist state, was also experiencing similar problems with the Soviet Union. Necessary measures were taken at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP in December 1978 when Deng Xiaoping had emerged as the pre-eminent leader. In this process, consumption and light manufacturing were supported, market reforms were extended to urban areas, agriculture was decollectivized and foreign capital and goods were allowed to enter China. While it was preserving the Communist system, private sector in China was as large as its public sector around the 1990s. Although Turkey did not have

472 An era between the late 1960s and late 1970s. It is characterised by a relative easing of the political tensions between the USA and the USSR.
woven relationships with China during these days, the opening of Chinese economy had effects on Turkish economy as it had impact on the international system and global world economy.

In addition to these two global significant changes, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 changed the regional equations. Turkey has had longstanding relations with Iran and those relations might be characterised by highs and lows. Mutual suspicion and rivalry have been two main features of the relations, so far. Economic, demographic, geopolitical, and cultural conditions of both states can be put forward for these rivalry and suspicion.477

In 1979, revolutionary powers overthrew Iran’s monarchy, Pahlavi dynasty and established the Islamic Republic of Iran under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Although Pahlavi dynasty had established strong ties with the Western world and pursued pro-American foreign policy, the revolution was no longer enthusiastic to continue its relationships with the Western countries. In this sense, Khomeini was calling the USA as a nation with selfish motives.478 According to Khomeini “All the problems of the East stem from those foreigners from the west, and from America at the moment. All our problems come from America”.479 This change of Iran foreign policy course and the Iran-Iraq war, which was sparked by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran to take advantage of the revolutionary chaos, caused an economic downturn. However, these economic and political changes suited Turkey’s interests as the USA not only challenged Iran on various issues in the region, it also supported Turkey and the "Turkish model" as a secular, modern Muslim country against the Islamic regime.480

Under these conditions in the global and regional context, Turkey was aiming to transform its economy through Özal’s endeavours. Turkey’s deep integration into the world economy was one of the main drivers of Özal’s policy. He saw Turkey’s neighbours as markets for Turkish goods in the first place. In addition to his economic benefit-centred foreign policy, Özal was a supporter of enhancing political ties with the neighbours too so that it would be much easier to consolidate an economic relationship.\textsuperscript{481} Besides, as it is mentioned above, the global and regional changes also helped Turkey to sustain its close relationships with the USA. Thus, Turkey managed to get funds from international lending agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the OECD to sustain its economic restructuring process.\textsuperscript{482}

Bearing this in mind, Özal also aimed to introduce a multi-directional foreign policy understanding. During his Premiership and Presidency, he managed to build good relations with Turkey’s neighbours as well as with the USA. The European Union became one of Turkey’s indispensable economic partners. Özal also played a significant role in the creation of the BSEC which came into existence as a promising model of a multilateral economic initiative on 25 June 1992. This economic boom and Özal’s way of thinking widened Turkey’s horizons and opened the doors for Turkey to become a regional power.\textsuperscript{483}

All in all, the 1980s were an era Turkey initiated a number of economic reforms, embraced liberal market-based approach, achieved impressive economic expansion, and to some extent got integrated into the world market under the leadership of the then Prime Minister Turgut Özal. In this era, Turkish economy grew at an annual rate over 5\% and the Turkish export volume increased from 2.910 million dollars in 1980 to 20 billion dollars in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{484}

\textsuperscript{481} N. Danforth, “Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy:….., p. 89.
\textsuperscript{482} A. Eralp, M. Tünay, and B. Yeşilada, \textit{Political and Socioeconomic…..}, 1993, p. 3.
• Özal’s Ideological Approach and Discourses of Eurasianism

Özal was an open-minded leader who applied radical reforms in order to catch up with the Western world during his era. In addition, he promised economic and social innovation as he believed that the reason for Turkish backwardness was the lack of liberalism and scientific thinking. Özal promoted and created this way of thinking at the expense of Kemalism.

Özal was also against the traditional nationalist and statist way of leadership. As he came from a conservative and religious family as well as from the periphery of the Turkish society and spent his years in the USA, he was equipped with a unique set of advantages to put together an effective ideology called “Özalism” consisting of Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism. And this Özalism was described as “an economy-oriented, pragmatic, multi-dimensional, pro-active foreign policy understanding”. In this sense, to clarify Özal’s way of thinking and its relation to Eurasianism a set of indicators will be compiled based on existing information in our discussions here.

Indicator 1

First of all, regarding the discourses of Eurasianism, it is safe to say that Özal’s Turkism can be named “Westernist Eurasianism”. One of the results of the Soviet Union’s disintegration was the political independence of the five Turkic republics. Their emergence created an expectation in Turkey and the West that all these Turcophone states would build a union of Turkic states in which Turkey would play a “big brother” role. And Özal wanted to take this opportunity. According to him, it was a historic opportunity to become a regional power and also “this chance cannot be thrown away as

it presented itself for the first time in 400 years”. This view was also promoted by the USA and the European Communities. In those days, Turkey was presented as a model for Turcophone states in order to keep these newly independent republics away from the influence of Russia and Iran.

Apart from the West and Turkey, the leaders of those republics were also excited about the new process and the “Turkish model” idea, as they were looking for political and economic support in order to survive after a long lasting Soviet reign. However, in a short time all sides realised that not only did Turkey have limited financial resources to take Russia’s place but also the newly independent republics were bound to Moscow in more ways than initially envisaged. All in all, Turkey’s opening towards Central Asia and Transcaucasia ended in major disappointment. Although Turkey’s “fanciful notions of ethnic solidarity” policy had to be terminated, Turkey imagined building “a more explicit notion of self-interest” policy. Yet, expanding its political, economic, social and cultural ties with Turkic republics has remained Turkey’s long-range goal.

In short, while Özlal claimed that there is a clear need to have Turcophone states getting involved in founding a political structure of the union, he pointed out that this should have been within the framework of integration and development. His Turkism was based on cultural and economic unification rather than solely ethnic criteria. That is why it can be alleged that his Turkism may be named Westernist Eurasianism as it aimed to bring together this new entity and the West. This way of thinking is similar to the rationale behind the establishment of the International Organisation of La Francophonie (IOF). This organisation has been built on the French language in order to create a linguistic zone whose members share a common language and humanist

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490 The International Organisation of La Francophonie was created in 1970. Its mission is to embody the active solidarity between its 77 member states and governments (57 members and 20 observers), which together represent over one-third of the United Nations’ member states and account for a population of over 890 million people, including 220 million French speakers. For further information see http://www.francophonie.org.
values. However, interestingly it does not merely include French-speaking countries. It has also members whose official language is not French, such as Greece, Bulgaria, Armenia, and Romania. In particular, Greece’s participation in this organisation is worth examining. While Greece had been an associate member since 2004, it became a full member on 28-29 November 2006 during the 11th IOF Summit Meeting in Bucharest. This membership has been seen as a move to reinforce the plurality of languages within the EU. Besides, according to an official from the Greek Permanent Representation in Brussels, “Greece safeguarded its own language by making room for more languages to be spoken”.491 Yet, the reason for participation is presented in the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hellenic Republic as follows:

Greece’s decision to join La Francophonie was made following the assessment of the prospect of access to a significant forum based on a common language (French) and an area of common principles and solidarity, which is mainly aimed at promoting democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, peace and security, as well as the protection of cultural heritage and support for cultural and linguistic diversity. It is on the preservation of these principles that the survival of nations and their cultures is more or less dependent. Finally, the local cooperation of representatives of IOF member states in various parts of the world is deemed very useful.492

This usefulness is the key point of Özal’s way of thinking about creating a union which is based on cultural and economic integration. Turkishness might be one of the pillars but it is not compulsory for being a member of this union. As long as each member makes a contribution, it might be a member of the union. According to Özal, it is one of the best ways of having the upper hand over the relations with the Western World.

Indicator 2

Having said that, Özal’s Turkism was an ideology that was neither irredentist nor isolationist. His main aim was to expand Turkey’s influence in a new field to enhance

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Turkey’s strategic importance to the West and also to maintain the regional stability.\textsuperscript{493} In this regard, even if it was not directly involved with the Turkic states, the BSEC was a project which could present Turkey as a model for the ex-Soviet states and newly independent republics. Besides, while this initiative could restore a peaceful co-existence in the region by increasing trade and economic cooperation, \"Ozal’s\" aim with BSEC was that Turkey would consolidate its status as a regional leader.\textsuperscript{494}

In this regard, Ozal led the creation of the Council of Turkic Speaking States in 1992. He attached great importance to these summits of Heads of Turkic Speaking states in order to create a viable environment of free movement of people, goods, and services. And also he believed that Turkic states could strengthen cooperation and coordination with the EC by increasing the capacities of railway, road and air transportation in order to transport natural resources of the Turkic states through the territory of Turkey.

Another initiative which Ozal played a leading role in was the creation of TURKSOY (The International Organization of Turkic Culture). TURKSOY was founded on 12 July 1993 immediately after \"Ozal’s\’\" death on 17 April 1993. In Alma-Ata, the Ministers of Culture of five Turkic republics, namely, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan together with Turkey signed the agreement on the Principles of Activities and Establishment of TURKSOY which is a cultural initiative among Turkic speaking states similar to UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation).

Turkey’s relations with the newly independent republics kept developing increasingly during the post-Soviet era. As Turkey met the Central Asian republics during the \"Ozal’s\’\" term, a number of initiatives were launched and this first led communities to think that a new era started regarding creating a Union among the Turkic republics despite the fact that after a while that turned into disappointment. Nevertheless, Turkey’s opening

\textsuperscript{493} F. S. Larrabee and I. O. Lesser, \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy in...}, p. 99.
towards the Turkic Republics might be considered as a success because of managing to raise awareness of Turkishness, presence of Turkic Republics and a different foreign policy course. This point is often raised by a number of intellectuals. For instance, Arslan Bulut and Gamze Güngörmüş Kona495 mentioned it during the interviews. According to Bulut, “while it was a great opportunity to build a Turkic Union, having missed that was not the end of the world as the Turkic world has gained awareness.”496 Kona makes a similar emphasis on Turkey’s opening but she adds that “the Central Asian Republics needs to push themselves further in order to improve their own economies, democracies, and etc. so that the prospective union would be worth creating.”497

Herein, Özlal’s way of thinking, which might be called Westernist Eurasianism, was not merely to create such a Union as an alternative to the West. In contrast, firstly it was supported by the West itself. Secondly, it aimed to bring the East and the West together so that Turkey would benefit from that. In this regard, apart from embarking upon new initiatives that promote economic, cultural, social, and political cooperation, Turkey also provided great diplomatic support for these republics. For instance, Turkey managed to facilitate their entry into the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later renamed OSCE), the North Atlantic Coordination Council (NACC), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).498

Özlal approached the ideology of ‘Turkism’ as a means to build cooperation among the Turkic speaking states in order to help them to develop and overcome their economic, social, and political problems. In sum, while he was trying to integrate all the Turkic states with the world economy, Özlal also aimed to widen Turkey’s foreign policy horizon by establishing new organisations in not only Turcophone states but also all regional states. This approach also strengthens the previous allegations that Özlal’s way

495 Associate Professor of International Relations.
496 A personal interview with Arslan Bulut, 10 March 2010, İstanbul, Turkey.
497 A personal interview with Assoc. Prof. Gamze Güngörmüş Kona, 12 March 2010, İstanbul, Turkey.
of understanding might be called ‘Westernist Eurasianism’ which stressing on regional cooperation in Eurasia while putting a special emphasis on Turkishness.

**Indicator 3**

Through Özal’s free market economy understanding, this third indicator would argue that in a way Özal tried to diversify the country’s trade options. In this sense, his approach could be described as “Westernist Eurasianism”. Özal’s worldview promoted Turkey’s neighbourhood as a new hinterland for the state. That is why; several steps had been taken in order to enhance Turkey’s relations with the neighbourhood countries during the 1980s and the 1990s. Özal expanded commercial and economic relations with the Arab world. At the same time, the relations with Greece were on the upswing, while Turkey initiated a rapprochement with Israel, Iran, and the European States. For instance, long-lasting strained relations with Greece experienced an interim period during the Özal era. One of the most important developments occurred in 1988. The then Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal and the then Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou met in Davos and the two leaders agreed to establish a hotline, to meet at least once a year, and to visit each other’s country. They also called for an intensification of contact.\(^{499}\) As for the relations (economic) with the EU, Turkey’s embracement of an outward-oriented strategy on its relations with the European states and the liberalisation of the Turkish economy yielded results. Turkey has achieved an impressive transformation as seen in Figure 6.1.

Another result of this outward-oriented strategy was improving relations with the Arab world. The relations with Gulf States, as well as Libya, Iraq, and Iran were enhanced during this era. In addition, while Turkey was attracting Arab capital, powerful holding companies of Turkey were involving in commercial trade in the Middle East and North Africa. In particular, Turkey’s large-scale construction contracts in Libya, until Gaddafi’s death in 2011, and elsewhere date from this period.\footnote{\textit{F. S. Larrabee and I. O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in..., p. 128.}}

Özal’s main motivation was not only being a candidate country to the EU by scaling up its economic engagement with its neighbourhood, but also it was a strategy to diversify Turkey’s relations. In this context, his statement clarifies this important point: “Turkey cannot put all its opportunities in one basket... If we commit all the burden of our trade to Europe, it will mean surrendering a great deal of our ability to control events to them. We need to diversify”.\footnote{\textit{Turgut Özal, Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal'ın dış politika ve ekonomi açılarından "Türkiye'nin stratejik öncelikleri" adlı ulusalara sempozyumun açılışında yaptıkları konuşma, 5 Kasım 1991, cited in J. Walker, “Shadows of Empire: How Post-Imperial Successor States Shape Memories”, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2012, p.145-146.}} Within this framework, through his initiatives and mind-set, it
is obvious that Özal’s way of thinking was overlapping with the Westernist Eurasianism discourse. That is why, it would be logical to claim that the Westernist Eurasianism discourse was one of the main determinants of Turkish foreign policy making process in Özal era. The reason for that is that the logic of that era can not be merely explained by Neo-Ottomanism or Turkism. It is the only logical explanation for that is the Westernist Eurasianism discourse even if Özal did not declare that, explicitly.

Indicator 4
It has been already underlined that Özal viewed foreign policy ‘as a branch of international trade relations’.\(^{503}\) In this sense, apart from establishing organisations in order to enhance regional states’ economic and political cooperation, the agreements which were signed by Özal himself are other indicators of his approach towards the enhancement of regional stability and national influence.

During the Özal era, a number of agreements were signed with neighbouring countries. For instance, the Agreement on Exchange Commodities, the Convertible Currency Protocol, and the Long-term Program: Economic, Trade, Scientific and Technological Cooperation were signed with the Soviet Union between 1986 and 1990. As a result of these agreements, the trade between Turkey and the Soviet Union was tripled from $411 million in 1985 to $1.5 billion in 1990.\(^{504}\) Another agreement, signed with Russia, was the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Following that treaty, Turkey opened its consulate in Baku, and the Soviet Union opened a consulate in Trabzon as well.\(^{505}\) Besides, it is worth saying that during the Özal leadership more international agreements than any other leader in Turkish history were signed.\(^{506}\) While these agreements were aiming to provide high level of economic relations (as pointed out in indicator three), they were also aiming to provide cultural and political relations with the mentioned states. In addition, all these agreements, to some extent, prove that Özal was purely neither pan-Turkist nor neo-Ottomanist. Yet, it was clear that his thinking

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505 P. Manoli, The Dynamics of Black Sea Subregionalism”, p. 60.
506 P. Manoli, The Dynamics of Black Sea Subregionalism”, p. 60.
was inspired by an Ottomanist and Turkist way of thinking. In addition, he was emphasising Islam’s importance adding that:

As a post-imperial country and society, we have been able to create a cultural and political identity that transcends ethnic differences. I believe that the most important element in the formation of this identity today, just as it was in the imperial period, is Islam... Islam has been the cement unifying the diverse ethnic groups belonging to this religion.507

... The sources of our national culture attained a complete synthesis in Anatolia with the Seljuks and especially with the Ottomans. A mature synthesis about as Islamic and Turkish components of the people’s culture complemented and strengthened each other. This synthesis strengthened the spirit of the Ottoman Empire which was one of the largest and most powerful empires in the civilized world.508

All these notions, Ottomanism, Turkism, and Islamism can only be overarched by Eurasianism; in Özal’s case by Westernist-Eurasianism. He was giving weight to the Eurasian continent and believing that the cooperation of the states of the Eurasian continent was significant not only for Turkey itself but also the regional states.

All in all, Özal’s way of foreign policy thinking can be defined by Eurasianism and its ideological principles. He was aiming to enhance the relations among the neighbouring states regardless of religion, sects, races, etc. He believed that this was the only way to make Turkey a valuable asset for the Western world and also to create a “Lebensraum” for Turkey. In addition, enhancing the relations of the regional states with each other was also another necessity for building stability in Eurasia and the world. This mind-set could be explained by only the ideology of Eurasianism, in particular Westernist Eurasianism.

507 Quoted from M. H. Yavuz "Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism" *Critique*, 12 (Spring 1998), pp. 19-41 (23).
6.3. Cem Era: Westernist Eurasianism

İsmail Cem served as a Turkish Foreign Minister between 1997 and 2002. He was one of Turkey’s longest-serving foreign ministers. Cem was born into a rich Ottoman family in 1940. His roots go back to Salonika (Greece), where Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was born. Cem’s family fled to Istanbul at the beginning of the 1900s. He was educated at one of Turkey’s top schools, Robert College; studied Law in Lausanne and politics in Paris. And he became the youngest director of Turkish radio and television at the age of 34.509

İsmail Cem was a relatively prolific author too. It is a well-known fact that serving foreign ministers do not often publish books. In contrast to the tradition, İsmail Cem wrote essays and books in order to explain his conduct of the business of diplomacy.510 These publications have made it possible to analyse his term and his way of understanding well and it could be argued that some notions of Eurasianism do exist in İsmail Cem’s thinking. To prove that some indicators are presented below:

Indicator 1

İsmail Cem believed that Turkey’s traditional foreign policy had disregarded the country’s cultural roots. Thus, Turkey had been alienated from its Ottoman past. According to Cem, “the first clear break with the ‘traditional’ [policy] took place in 1974 when Bülent Ecevit did the inconceivable and came to the rescue of the Turkish community in Cyprus… His decision to do so was of the utmost importance. After years of passivity, Turkey for the first time courageously rose above the positions and role that had been assigned to her”.511 In addition, the late Turgut Özal and Süleyman

Demirel “cultivated the friendship of both the newly forming countries in the region and of those which were regaining their independence”.512

Cem believed that these developments were significant in order to add a historical and cultural dimension to Turkish foreign policy. It was a clear fact that Turkey succeeded the Ottoman Empire but at the same time it disregarded the cultural and political inheritance of the Empire. From Cem’s perspective, if Turkey wants to be a regional power, it should embrace the Empire and base its foreign policy understanding on the Ottoman Empire’s multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-confessional experience. By doing so it would be possible to widen the horizon of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East, Asia, and Europe altogether. It was therefore a clear indication that Cem wanted Turkey to front its own Asian identity and blend in its Europeanness.

At first glance, it might be considered that Cem was neo-Ottomanist as he was mentioning of embracing the Ottoman Empire. However, his emphasis was on the Empire’s multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism. Unlike the mainstream approach, he was not aiming to resuscitate the Ottoman Empire. Instead, he was offering a theoretical approach to the practice of Turkish foreign policy. In this sense, it was significant for him to formulate a foreign policy understanding which promotes pro-activism while realising its own unique identity, culture, and geography. By doing so, Turkey’s Asian and European identities would be blended so as to broaden the horizon of Turkish foreign policy. This way of understanding is utterly overlapped with the Westernist Eurasianism discourse. In this vein, it might be alleged that Cem’s this way of thinking is based on Eurasianism, especially Westernist Eurasianism.

**Indicator 2**

Cem was against the dichotomies West-East, Islam-secularism, etc. He called these dichotomies ‘forced alternatives’ and considered them exaggerated contradictions.513

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According to him, “Turkey is already European and has been for centuries. She is European, as well as being Asian: this is her privilege and her asset.”

In İsmail Cem’s thinking, enhancing regional dialogue was necessary in order to pave the way for long-term resolution of political problems. In the name of enhancing regional dialogue, Turkey undertook several initiatives such as the creation of Multinational Peacekeeping Force for the Balkans, a Naval Task Force for the Black Sea, Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone, and contribution to International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. In addition, the Joint Forum, held in Istanbul between the European Union and the Organisation of Islamic Conference on 12-13 February 2002 was a significant move to deepen dialogue and reinforce understanding between the nations of Eurasia and Africa.

This way of thinking shows how Cem attached great importance to regional cohesion and Turkey’s geographical stance. He kept pointing out that not only can Turkey’s European and Asian identity not be separated, but also Turkey should act together with the regional states as it is one of the core and inseparable elements of this region. Cem explains his thinking as follows:

“It is worth noting that there are twenty-six countries with which we have shared a common history, a common state and a common fate for centuries. This background provides for strong economic relationships and a unique platform for political cooperation. In this vast socio-political geography, Turkey has the optimal conditions and the required assets to become a provider of peace, stability and welfare, and to enjoy the opportunities presented by the new “Eurasian Order.” By virtue of her historical and cultural attributes and her privileged identity, European as well as Asian, Turkey is firmly positioned to become the strategic ‘centre’ of Eurasia.”

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515 İ. Cem, “Turkish Foreign Policy: Opening New Horizons for Turkey at the Beginning of a Millennium”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 1 (1), p. 3.
517 İ. Cem, “Turkish Foreign Policy…”, p. 4-5.
This point of view also stresses Cem’s Eurasianist inclinations. As it has been already discussed in the previous chapter, while the Westernist Eurasianism discourse promotes increasing the relations with countries of the Eurasian continent, according to the discourse any Eurasianist organisation are perceived as a complimentary geopolitical strategy. In this sense, Cem sees Turkey as the strategic centre of Eurasia as it shares a common history, a common state and a common fate for centuries with 26 countries. From his point of view, it is this trait from which Turkey benefits by providing peace, stability and welfare in Eurasia. What might be confusing in this indicator is the emphasis on the 26 countries that Turkey shares commonalities. Yet, it must be kept in mind that the stress was not made for bringing the Ottoman Empire back. In contrast, it is made to remind that Turkey has had such an inheritance which would make possible for Turkey to formulate a foreign policy understanding in order to bring Asia and Europe together and broaden Turkey’s horizon.

**Indicator 3**

As mentioned, Cem was complaining about Turkey’s alienation from its own historical and cultural roots, especially from its Ottoman past. In addition, he believed that in the aftermath of the Cold War Turkey should have pursued an active foreign policy as the circumstances had changed. In this sense, Ismail Cem put forward his foreign policy vision as follows:

There are two major objectives that drive our vision for the future. The first goal is to make Turkey an integral part of the European integration process. Historically, geographically and economically, Turkey is already a European country. It is therefore quite natural that she should become a full member of the European Union, sooner rather than later.

... The second, but equally important goal is to transform Turkey into a pivotal and prosperous country at the centre of the vast geography we call Eurasia. Turkey already enjoys the most diversified industrial base, has the best-trained and equipped army and is one of the few deep-rooted democracies between the Balkans and Central Asia. The political, economic and security initiatives Turkey has launched, which encompass diverse regions, will also be instrumental in attaining this target. A much
stronger Turkey capable of creating a constantly growing zone of stability and welfare around her is certainly in everyone’s best interest.\(^{518}\)

While giving weight to Turkey’s European identity Cem was thinking that “when Turkey becomes a member, the Union will be transformed into a truly multicultural and multi-religious geography”.\(^{519}\) Cem’s way of understanding was towards keeping the different identities of Turkey together. Thus, he believed that Turkey would be an asset for the Western World. This statement emphasises how much importance he was attaching to the enhancement of mutual understanding and Turkey’s geostrategic location in the Eurasian continent. By doing so, similar to Russian Eurasianists, Cem was viewing Eurasia as a separate continent and giving weight to the necessity for cooperation between the states of Eurasia.

On the one hand, contrary to Nationalist Eurasianism, in his way of thinking the European identity of Turkey was given and irrevocable. On the other hand, while multiculturalist Eurasianism sees Eurasianist foreign policy understanding as an alternative to Turkey’s Westernist approach, Cem kept pointing out that Turkey would be an asset for the Western world as long as saving its own Asian identity and building close relations with the countries in Asia. This point is significant as Cem kept bringing forward that neo-Ottomanism or pan-Turkism would not be panacea for Turkey to transform into a regional power. In his view, Turkey should not reformulate new foreign policy course as an alternative to the EU as he clearly explained that becoming a full member of the EU is one of the main objectives of Turkey. Yet, according to him the creation of a stable Eurasia was crucial for the security of Europe and Turkey has the necessary assets to make it possible.\(^{520}\) This expression puts obviously forth that he was against any adventures for creating other unions through the ideas of neo-Ottomanism and pan-Turkism.

\(^{518}\) İ. Cem, “Turkish Foreign Policy:...”, p. 4.
\(^{519}\) İ. Cem, “Turkish Foreign Policy:...”, p. 4.
**Indicator 4**

In Cem’s way of thinking, the future will be the states of Eurasia. He, therefore, kept emphasising its significance in his several speeches. One of the speeches in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey stresses that “the international system keeps changing and this change also puts forward Eurasia. Experts write books and make research on Eurasia and they claim that the 21st century will be created in Eurasia. This will be happening in the continent extending from the Atlantic to the Western border of China.”521

In another publication, Cem expresses similar ideas on the Eurasian reality and its evolution and adds as follows:

> The central stage of this millennium, many observers agree, will be Eurasia, broadly defined as the geography stretching from Western Europe to Western China. Given the trends in production, communication and information technologies, Europe and Asia will form an integrated whole, interlinked and interdependent. Both will gain substantially by being part of the same entity. Furthermore, much of this millennium’s economic development will take place in Asia. The advent of new energy resources and communication corridors bears witness to this emerging reality.522

In this statement, Cem first defines Eurasia as an entity and claims that Europe and Asia both are part of the same entity. This way of thinking exactly overlaps with the Classical Eurasianist ideology which claims that Eurasia represents an integral whole, both geographically and anthropologically and also that Eurasia is a separate continent in contrast to Europe and Asia. Secondly, Cem defines geographical borders of Eurasia from his own point of view.

Cem always wanted Turkey to be confident on its foreign policy making process. According to him, foreign policy was “a mathematical equation of a country’s

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522 İ. Cem, “Turkish Foreign Policy….”, p. 4-5.
interests”. On this basis, it would not be logical to talk about permanent friends or enemies of states. And it is this logic which leads states to enhance mutual understanding, respect and cooperation between each other. In doing so, Turkey would be a ‘world state’ and this feature would present Turkey as a model for the regional states. Besides, this policy would also liberate Turkey from the ‘bridge’ notion. Cem argued that the ‘bridge’ notion was “a thing of the past in the 2000s: she is moving away from being simply a ‘transit corridor’ or a ‘bridge over which Asia and Europe trade with one another and move their goods’. Instead, Turkey in the 2000s will increasingly become a ‘terminus’ and a ‘destination’ country. In other words, Turkey's basic function ceases to be that of transporting or delivering energy, raw materials, and goods after receiving them from East and West”.

To sum up, Cem presented his inclination on Eurasia more explicitly compared to Özal. And, he believed that Turkey should embrace its own Ottoman past and its multi-ethnic, multi-culturalist, multi-confessional experience. In doing so, Turkey would pursue a more Eurasianist foreign policy course, placing significant importance on regional cohesion. Also, it was necessary for Turkey to become an asset to the Western World in particular the European Union. In this regard, Cem could be perceived as the one who considered Eurasia as the indispensable option for Turkey to become a significant power. Therefore, Cem was one of the Eurasianists. His way of thinking can be named ‘Westernist Eurasianism’ but in his thinking Eurasia was more emphasised compared to Özal’s mind-set.

6.4. Davutoğlu Era: A Blend of Westernist and Multiculturalist Eurasianism

Following the November 2002 elections, Davutoğlu was appointed as Chief Adviser to the Prime Minister and Ambassador at large by the 58th Government of the Republic of Turkey. He continued to serve in the 59th and 60th Governments. On 1 May 2009 he was

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525 İ. Cem, “Turkish Foreign Policy…”, p. 5.
appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 60th Government of the Republic of Turkey.\footnote{\textsuperscript{526}}

Ahmet Davutoğlu owes his reputation to his book “Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position”. Some allege that Davutoğlu’s book is one of the works that has inspired the masses, and influenced small but powerful elites, and their mind-sets.\footnote{\textsuperscript{527}} In his book Davutoğlu claims that the consolidation of political and economic stability would enable Turkey to play a peace-promoting role in neighbouring regions. His \textit{strategic depth} concept in order to help Turkey transition from being a peripheral actor in world politics to a central one features two elements: geopolitical and historical-cultural inheritance. These are the main components that differentiate Turkey from its neighbours.\footnote{\textsuperscript{528}}

Davutoğlu conceptualizes his \textit{strategic depth} doctrine through four principles: “A secure neighborhood based on a common understanding of security, pro-active, high-level political dialogue with all neighbors, fostering regional economic interdependence and finally, promoting “multi-cultural, multi-sectarian peace and harmony”.\footnote{\textsuperscript{529}}

In the light of this way of thinking, Davutoğlu has been repeatedly criticized for being Neo-Ottomanist or Eurasianist, even if he has rejected the claims at every turn. Yet the


\footnote{\textsuperscript{529}} A. Davutoğlu, Keynote Speech: \textit{Turkey’s Foreign Policy in...}, 2010a, p. 9.
signs of Eurasianism can be identified in his discourses and actions. In order to prove this claim, five indicators are presented below:

**Indicator 1**
On 24 November 2009, Davutoğlu stated that

“Former US President Bill Clinton asked me why Turkey is actively dealing with the regional problems; I answered, ‘Draw a circle with a diameter of 1000 km around Turkey and 20 states will fall into it. Then draw one with a diameter of 3000 km and 70 states will fall within. If we draw a similar circle around the US, how many states would fall into that? In this sense, of course Turkey will continue dealing with the problems of our neighbors.’”

This discourse explicitly reflects Eurasianist thinking. From Panarin’s perspective, ethnic nationalism should be condemned as it is a product of Europe’s pagan sentiment. In this regard, states in Eurasia should deal with each other’s problems regardless of religion, race, colour, creed, nationality, social status etc. From this perspective, the effects of this way of understanding can be observed during the AK Party era. For instance, since 2002, Turkey’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) and humanitarian assistance have grown substantially. According to Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013, ODA from Turkey has almost doubled between 2011 and 2012. This increase made Turkey the 15th largest government donor in 2012 (see figure 6.1). Furthermore, the increase of official humanitarian assistance to $1 billion in 2012 made Turkey the 4th largest donor in 2012 (see figure 6.2). It is worth mentioning that unlike the previous periods, in this era Turkey’s assistance has not solely concentrated on the surrounding area. While Turkey has been continuing its assistance towards Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries, the significant amount of assistance to certain countries in Africa and South Asia has been given, as well (see figure 6.3).

Figure 6.2. Top 20 Government Contributors of International humanitarian Assistance, 2003–2012 (US $ billions)

Figure 6.3. ODA from Turkey, 2000-2012 (US $ billions)
In line with the ideology of Eurasianism, in Davutoğlu era Turkey has been seeking to expand its sphere of influence through public diplomacy. The governmental institutions, which conduct the public diplomacy, are the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (the principal body for administering aid), the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) and Turkey’s Disaster and Emergency Management Office (bodies for humanitarian aid). These institutions provide, organise and distribute humanitarian aid as an aspect of public diplomacy. It would not be wrong to claim that they have become much more functional during the Davutoğlu era. As it is seen in the figures above, the amount of humanitarian aid during the Davutoğlu era has been increasing steadily. This might be considered as an extension of Eurasianism or as it is quoted from Davutoğlu “Turkey will continue dealing with the problems of our neighbours”.

Figure 6.4. Top 10 Recipient of Turkey’s Official Humanitarian Assistance, 2007-2011 (US $ millions)
In this sense, at first glance, Davutoğlu’s and Panarin’s approaches overlap. Condemnation of ethnic nationalism and dealing with each other’s problems regardless of religion, race, colour, creed, nationality, social status etc. are two of the main deductions of Davutoğlu and Panarin’s way of understandings. Although this indicator reveals whether Davutoğlu pursues a Eurasianist foreign policy, there must be more indicators as it is not solely sufficient.

**Indicator 2**

Yet, there are other factors that indicate that Davutoğlu has embraced an element of Eurasianist thinking. For instance, Davutoğlu alleges that Turkey is a “central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character.”

That is why “in terms of its area of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country”.

In this regard, Turkey is economically and politically relatively stable, making it a viable international actor in the regions. In this context, while the incumbent Government wants to exert political, economic, and cultural influence within the former Ottoman lands, it also strives to open up a new horizon by improving its relations with the states from the Yellow Sea to Latin America. An obvious example of this strive is the transformation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Davutoğlu era. As an extension of his understanding, which considers that Turkey is a central country with multiple identities, Turkey has opened new representations worldwide. While Turkey had 39 missions abroad in 1924, in these days is represented by 222 missions worldwide. Besides, the Turkish Foreign Service is consisting of 2183 diplomats at the Ministry and its missions abroad despite the criticism about having such excessive cadres. This criticism was raised by one of the anonymous interviewees during the field research. She harshly criticised Davutoğlu and AK Party’s foreign policy and

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533 A. Davutoğlu, ‘Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision:…’, 2008, p. 79.
accused them of wasting public money by recruiting unnecessary personnel. “We are not like the USA. Turkey does not need to have representations in every country in the world.”

Yet, Turkey’s broadening relations with the countries worldwide is a sign of Eurasianist way of thinking. On this account, Turkey’s this opening needs to be more clarified by informative figures about Turkey and neighbouring countries’ representations abroad (see figure 6.4). According to the figure 6.4, Turkey has one of the largest global networks of diplomatic missions when it is compared to similar size economies, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel etc.

**Figure 6.5. Diplomatic Missions of Selected Countries Abroad**

![Diplomatic Missions of Selected Countries Abroad](image)

It is a fact that having more than 200 representations abroad requires a decent economy. Turkey is known as the 17th biggest economy in the world. However, most of the similar size economies do not have missions abroad as much as Turkey does. For

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535 Personal interview with an anonymous interviewee, 19 February 2014, Ankara, Turkey.
instance, while Brazil is the 8th biggest economy, it has 194 missions abroad.\textsuperscript{537} Furthermore, while India is the 4th biggest economy in the world, it has 164 missions abroad.\textsuperscript{538} These figures explicitly show that as it is mentioned before, Turkey has distinctive foreign policy understanding which is based on Turkey’s geopolitical centrality, having an enormous cultural and historical heritage and belongingness to Eurasia that makes Turkey itself responsible for the whole region in Davutoğlu’s way of thinking.

These kinds of goals and policies seem like a small-scale Eurasianist vision, especially building relationships with both the Western and the Eastern world. In addition, it even may be alleged that AKP’s foreign policy stance in the post-2005 era represents the transition from Western-oriented to Eastern-oriented, or as Ziya Öniş’s calls it, “soft Euro-Asianism”.\textsuperscript{539} Having said that, Öniş defines his soft Euro-Asianism approach as “foreign policy activism pursued with respect to all neighboring regions but with no firm EU axis as was previously the case”.\textsuperscript{540}

In this sense, this indicator substantiates that Turkey’s axis is not shifting, it is just getting wider. It would not be, therefore, logical to claim that Turkey is pursuing an Eastern-oriented foreign policy, nowadays. As Öniş repeats, Turkey is striving to build relations with all the neighbours around itself. Herein, it should be emphasised that the new vision considers that it is Turkey’s fate to deal with its neighbours’ problems as Turkey is a central country. Therefore, from time to time Davutoğlu is accused of embracing an Eastern-oriented foreign policy, but it seems that it is not true because the horizon has only been widened and the relations with the EU or the West cover just a part of it not all of it as it used to be.

\textsuperscript{538} Indian Missions abroad, Available from <http://www.mea.gov.in/indian-missions-abroad.htm>, [Accessed on 10/05/2014].
**Indicator 3**

While Eurasianists attribute importance to the geopolitical location of Russia, Davutoğlu also puts forward the uniqueness of Turkey and its position. According to N. S. Trubetskoy, “The territory of Russia ... constitutes a separate continent ... which in contrast to Europe and Asia can be called Eurasia ... Eurasia represents an integral whole, both geographically and anthropologically”. This separate continent was a self-contained geographical entity whose boundaries coincided roughly with those of the Russian Empire in 1914.

Similarly, by alleging that Turkey cannot be “explained” geographically or culturally by associating it with a single region, Davutoğlu seeks to emphasize the geographical significance of Turkey:

> Turkey’s geography gives it a specific central country status, which differs from other central countries. For example, Germany is a central country in Central Europe, which is far from Asia and Africa. Russia is another central country in the lands of Europe and Asia, which is far from Africa. Iran is a central country in Asia, which is far from Europe and Africa. Taking a broader, global view, Turkey holds an optimal place in the sense that it is both an Asian and European country and is also close to Africa through the Eastern Mediterranean. A central country with such an optimal geographic location cannot define itself in a defensive manner. It should be seen neither as a bridge country which only connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed as an ordinary country, which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or the West.

 Obviously, this is a Turkish interpretation of Eurasianism, with a clear emphasis on Turkey’s centrality. In this framework, Davutoğlu argues that Turkey is the glue which brings together Europe and Asia just like Russia in the mind-set of Classical Eurasianism during the 1920s and the 1930s. Therefore, Turkey is destined to play a significant role in this region instead of pursuing a passive foreign policy course. As was explained in previous chapters, this way of thinking influenced the current foreign

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policy course of Turkey and pro-activism is one of the names used to describe the Davutoğlu era.

Davutoğlu’s approach reveals itself in the recent developments, such as the relations with Africa and initiatives the Southern Asia. By this indicator, it has been trying to clarify that Davutoğlu stresses Turkey’s centrality again with a clear emphasis on Turkey’s responsibilities and identities derive from its distinctive geographical, cultural, historical, and anthropological features. The recent developments are clear samples of this way of understanding. For instance, Turkey’s Africa opening can be considered as a significant leverage of this policy. While Turkey have had a member observer status to the African Union (AU) since 2005, the Africa-Turkey partnership was established by signing the Istanbul Declaration and the Framework for Cooperation in 2008. Both parties have aimed a stable, long-term partnership based on mutual interests and equality and to enhance promotion of Africa-Turkey cooperation in specific areas of interests by this partnership. While this opening towards Africa can be considered as an extension of Davutoğlu’s way of interpretation of Eurasianism, Turkey’s presence in Afghanistan by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is another initiative which confirms that Turkish foreign policy course has been formulated to be economically and diplomatically more globally engaged by reaching out of the former Ottoman territories. Regarding the presence in ISAF mission, for Turkey it is beyond a NATO-led mission. It is a duty of being a Eurasian state. Erdoğan’s following statement emphasizes this point “NATO planned to complete its mission in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, but it was not definite. It may happen after 2014. As Turkey, we think of leaving Afghanistan after all countries leave. We would not leave our brothers alone there unless Afghanistan wanted Turkey to.”

It is a fact that the rationale behind these policies can only be explained by Eurasianism, in particular with the Westernist Eurasianism discourse.

**Indicator 4**

In a speech on 4 February 2010, Davutoğlu proclaimed:

“Eurasia is passing a very critical threshold and a new vision is necessary in evaluating the region. The first [step] is that uncertainties should be removed and political dialogue should be heightened. Secondly, Eurasia is the region where international economic politics takes shape; if it is neglected, the EU, Chinese or Indian economic bases cannot interact with one another… Ankara favors activating dialogue channels on the highest level and establishing permanent mechanisms as exemplified by recent Turkish-Russian plans to establish a high-level strategic council… We would like to see more political dialogue and more political cooperation. No country can live isolated. There is a need for more integration and more dialogue when there is a problem. We want to spread our policy of zero problems and maximum cooperation with neighbors to Eurasia… We need to remove the barriers between us. People should move freely. Currently Turkey and Russia are working on lifting visa requirements for each other’s citizens… We want such an approach in Eurasia based on self-confidence, political dialogue and economic interaction. We see the fate of this region as our fate and as the fate of humanity.”\(^{545}\)

This is the basis of what the Classical Eurasianists wanted to establish via a Eurasian Union. According to them, Eurasianism provided a theoretical structure to prevent the collapse of the Russian Empire. In the event of its collapse, the theory sought to build a new nation encompassing the whole Eurasian people under a single Eurasian state. This state would have a unique culture reflecting the characteristics of all the Turanian races (The ‘Turanian’ nations include, according to the Eurasians, the Finno-Ugric nations, Samoyeds, Turks – including Ottoman Turks, various Tatars, Bashkirs, Turkmen, Kirgiz, Yakuts, Chuvash, a few extinct peoples such as Khazars, Polovtsy, Ugrian and, finally, Mongols and Manchurians), instead of the Russian element. In this vein, as Davutoğlu points out, an increase in political dialogue, economic interdependence and cultural interaction would constitute the primary phase of founding the Union.

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“There is a need to embark on a new vision in order to have the Eurasia region regain its historical importance... If peace and welfare do not reign in Eurasia, it is not possible to make peace and welfare reign in the world, either. This region can export peace and welfare to the rest of the world... The western and eastern ends of Eurasia should be reconnected...”\(^{546}\)

The statement above, made by Davutoğlu himself on 5 February 2010, is a call for a Eurasian Union and it is an unquestionable indication of the element of Eurasianism in his thinking, especially the Multiculturalist Eurasianism discourse. This call has been a touchstone in terms of evaluating the dynamics of Turkish foreign policy.

Eventually, it can be seen that during the Davutoğlu era the inclination on Eurasia and influence of Eurasianism are gradually increasing. Unlike Özal and Cem, Davutoğlu takes it forward and claims, to some extent, the EU and the Western world is obviously necessary for Turkey but the Eastern world is much more important. In his thinking, Turkey needs the EU but not as much as the EU needs Turkey. Furthermore, if Turkey becomes a genuine player in Eurasia, it will definitely become an indispensable need for the EU. For this purpose, Turkey should aim to spread cooperation to the Eurasian continent and make peace and welfare reign in it. But, we do not know if it is a viable project yet as the region is full of dictatorships, and undemocratic and underdeveloped states. In addition, we do not know whether they want cooperation and peace in the region.

6.5. Conclusion

Although Eurasianism was an ideology that first appeared in Russia during the 1920s, it has had some reflections on Turkish foreign policy every now and then. While some of those reflections have been clear to observe, some have not been clearly expressed. In this chapter, three periods of Turkish foreign policy have been analysed and the common conclusion is that the Eurasianism discourse in various forms has been widely

applied to the periods. The discourse of Westernist Eurasianism is the one which has been generally embraced by the leaders to shift the Turkish foreign policy course. The reason for that is it is the most moderate and plausible discourse in terms of keeping the relations good with the neighbouring countries.

Apart from the Westernist Eurasianism, other discourses have also been observed although rarely. For instance, during the Özal era, a Nationalist Eurasianism discourse was sporadically used in order to create a viable and stable environment for Turkey among the newly found Turcophone states. Besides, the Multiculturalist Eurasianism was another means to building an economic powerhouse for Turkey. This discourse has been particularly observed during the Ahmet Davutoğlu era when he explicitly proposed that the Eurasian Union should be found if humanity wants peace and welfare to reign in the World. Furthermore, Davutoğlu era presents both - Westernist and Multiculturalist - discourses time to time. Yet, it might be logical to allege that none of the discourses have been promoted as the state ideology during the periods. Instead, all the discourses have been applied when needed. However, this chapter reveals that from the Özal era to the Davutoğlu era how implications of the ideology of Eurasianism on Turkish foreign policy have been evolved. Consequently, it might be observed that during the Davutoğlu era, the application of Eurasianism has reached to the highest level.

To sum up, although there seem to have been a number of changes in the Turkish foreign policy making over the last three decades, by focusing on these three periods – Özal, Cem, Davutoğlu - the discourse analysis shows that there seem to be many strong signs for the Eurasianism to be one of the main informants of Turkish foreign policy making through Nationalist, Multiculturalist, and Westernist discourses.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

7.1. Introduction

At the beginning of this thesis, three hypotheses were drawn on the Turkish foreign policy making process as reasons for carrying out this research. These hypotheses were:

1. Recent developments have shown that Turkey has been experiencing foreign policy activism since the 1990s. First the then Prime Minister and President of the Republic of Turkey Turgut Özal, after that the then Foreign Minister İsmail Cem and then the incumbent Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu were the main drivers behind this activism. In contrast to the early times of the Republic of Turkey, during the last three decades, Turkey has attempted to build close relationships with its neighbouring states and to get involved in every controversial issue in the region.

2. Considering this activism, it has been claimed that Turkey’s foreign policy understanding has been influenced by diverse ideologies, which are alternatives for Turkey’s Western-oriented foreign policy course. In that case, the Eurasianism ideology, which is one of them, is worth analysing in detail.

3. Along with the activism in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey has launched an opening towards the East, including Iran, Russia, Turkic States, etc. Moreover, Turkey has broadened its foreign policy horizon and opened new embassies in Africa and Latin America, as well. It is believed that the Eurasianist mind-set might be effective in pursuing such a foreign policy.

Through the review of the literature and the investigation and analysis of the last three decades of Turkish foreign policy, it became apparent that there are three different versions of Eurasianism in Turkey and they have, to some extent, an impact on foreign policy making. In this regard, the findings from the research will be presented in this
chapter in the form of a classification of the discourses of Eurasianism and their impact on the Turkish foreign policy making by reviewing discourse interpretation in different political periods since the end of the Cold War.

To achieve this aim, this chapter is divided into four sections. Following the introduction, the next section summarises the previous six chapters, highlighting general areas and the essential points from discourses explored in this thesis and their impact in the contemporary Turkish foreign policy making. The third section of this chapter will identify the realities of Turkish foreign policy and present a list of recommendations for future foreign policy making in Turkey. The final section of this chapter will identify a list of future research suggestions which can build upon the findings of this thesis.

### 7.2. General Summary and Conclusions

There is a close woven relationship between the Eurasianism ideology and Geopolitical thinking of the 19th century. Therefore, the first conceptualisation chapter investigated this relationship in the light of the main geopolitical concepts of this period. First, the concept of Lebensraum was analysed in order to show the importance of space and territory in the history of nations by focusing on Turkey’s own Lebensraum which consisted of the immediate land basin – the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus –, immediate maritime basin – the Black, Eastern Mediterranean and Caspian seas and the Gulf of Basra –, and immediate continental basin – Europe, Western Asia, North-eastern Africa. The second concept was the Heartland thesis which is perceived as one of the most influential geopolitical concepts that has been embraced by a number of states throughout history such as Germany, Britain, the USA, etc. From Turkey’s perspective, the significance of the concept is that it presented Turkey as a ‘central state’ and emphasised Turkey’s role in world politics. The last concept in this chapter is the Rimland thesis, which focused on the role that the Rimland states play in order to control the heartland and attached importance to sea and land power. In doing so, Spykman replaced Turkey’s geostrategic stance. According to him, Turkey was in the Rimland area instead of being in the Pivot area (Heartland). This chapter ended by proposing that Eurasianists were influenced by this geopolitical climate in the world
politics of the 19th century. In particular, the Heartland thesis since it presented the Pivot area as the core of Eurasia was the main rationale behind the Eurasianist ideology which seeks the establishment of a Eurasian Union.

Having explored the context of the relationship between the Eurasianism ideology and Geopolitical thinking of the 19th century, the following conceptualisation chapter investigated the Eurasianism ideology theoretically and compared it with Pan-Slavism in two categories. In the first category, the Eurasianism ideology and its forefathers were examined. In this part, the chapter presented that the Eurasianism ideology emerged in a cataclysmic era as a conclusion to seeking a historical, geopolitical, and cultural identity along with other nationalist movements. The events of the early days of the 1900s, such as World War I, the Revolution of 1905 and the Revolution of February 1917 were the main rationales behind the ideology. In this climate, the ideologists of Eurasianism constructed a theory to build a new nation which covers all the Eurasian people under a Eurasian state. Moreover, the chapter identified that Neo-Eurasianism, which came out in the later times of the Soviet Union, is a slightly differentiated version of Classical Eurasianism. Again the society of the Soviet Union was experiencing disastrous times and the ideologists of the Neo-Eurasianism were attempting to save the Union.

The second part of the Chapter compared the coeval ideology of Eurasianism, Pan-Slavism as it is one of the most similar ideologies to Eurasianism regarding space, territories, and societies. From this comparison, the chapter outlined two main differences: (1) race and religion are not determinants of the Eurasianism ideology in contrast to Pan-Slavism; (2) Eurasianism is more likely to be interpreted in different ways by intellectuals and scholars than the ideology of Pan-Slavism.

Having analysed the emergence of the Eurasianism ideology in the Russian Empire and the USSR respectively, the following chapter focused on a general framework of Turkish foreign policy making since the late Ottoman era in order to familiarise the reader with how Turkey’s foreign policy course has been determined and influenced by internal and external developments. The foreign policy course is analysed in four
different periods in this chapter: New Republic’s Foreign Policy: Peace at home, peace in the world (late Ottoman era - 1945), Turkish Foreign Policy during the Cold War (1945 - 1990), ‘New World Order’ and Turkish foreign policy (1990 - 2002), A New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy (2002 and onwards). It was necessary to present the main rationale behind foreign policy making in Turkey, especially during the last three decades in this chapter. In this sense, the chapter provided a historical background to analyse Turkish foreign policy understanding.

The first analysis chapter classified the discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey. In the first part of the chapter, the ideologies, which have been influential and have been perceived as alternatives to Turkey’s western identity since the Ottoman era, were examined. In this regard, Neo-Ottomanism, Islamism, Pan-Turkism, and Pan-Turanianism are the four ideologies which were dealt with. These four ideologies have been more dominant among Turkey’s intellectuals. While neo-Ottomanists have been anticipating a multicultural state which embraces ‘the relative tolerance of Ottoman Islam as sources of pluralism and openness for domestic social and political life’, Islamists have aimed at uniting all Muslims under an Islamic state or a Union to withstand Western encroachments. Furthermore, whereas pan-Turkism aspired to unite all Turkic peoples, pan-Turanianism was aimed at the unification of Turkic peoples with the Finno-Ugric peoples. This part of the chapter claimed that since these four ideologies have been dominant during the last three decades of Turkey, they have had significant importance as the roots of diversity in Eurasianism in Turkey. In this sense, a number of discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey have been identified in this era. That is why the second part of the chapter classified the discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey in three different categories: Nationalist, Multiculturalist, and Westernist Eurasianism. In fact, this part proves that whereas Classical Eurasianism could not penetrate into Turkish society in the early days of the 20th century, Neo-Eurasianism has been embraced by some intellectual circles in different versions during the post-Cold war era. In this sense, the nationalist discourse favours turning Turkey’s face to the East and making alliances with countries such as Iran, India, Pakistan, Syria, Russia, and so on. However, it emphasises that a prospective Union should only be built by Turkic States. On the other hand, while the multiculturalist discourse proposes a Union for all people of the
Eurasian continent, the Westernist discourse claims that Turkey is strong and perceived as a strategic ally by the Western states as long as it has woven relationships with the countries of Eurasia. Having explored the discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey, this chapter makes a solid contribution to the literature in terms of classifying the discourses through up-to-date documents.

After explaining which discourses have been effective during the post-Cold war era, the final analysis chapter focussed on the three periods of Turkish foreign policy and the scope of application of the three Eurasianism discourses. This chapter covered the three periods of Turkish foreign policy – Özal, Cem, and Davutoğlu – as during their tenures Turkey has experienced a significant amount of activism. The then President of the Republic of Turkey, Turgut Özal was an influential figure regarding opening Turkey’s economy to the world and pursuing an active foreign policy during the crucial events in its neighbouring area such as the Gulf War between 1990 and 1991. He was against Turkey’s isolation in the international arena and emphasised that Turkey should seize the opportunity while the international balance of power was changing. Similar to Özal, the then Foreign Minister İsmail Cem was also attaching importance to the openness and building interaction with the neighbouring states. Furthermore, he was against Turkey’s alienation from its Ottoman past. In this regard, Cem was a fervent supporter of Turkey’s attempts to build woven relationships with its neighbours. For instance, it would not be wrong to claim that Turkey owes him for the good relationship with Greece. Similar to Özal and Cem, Davutoğlu also claims that Turkey should benefit from its historical-cultural inheritance from the Ottoman Empire to become a central state in world politics. Davutoğlu’s main contribution to Turkish foreign policy making is his strategic depth doctrine which promotes “A secure neighborhood based on a common understanding of security, pro-active, high-level political dialogue with all neighbors, fostering regional economic interdependence and finally, promoting “multi-cultural, multi-sectarian peace and harmony.” 547 Based on this understanding, this chapter claimed that a whiff of Eurasianism can be observed in Davutoğlu’s speeches and actions by lining up five indicators.

547 A. Davutoğlu, Keynote Speech: Turkey’s Foreign Policy in..., 2010a, p. 9.
To sum up briefly, some of the most important contributions of this thesis are as follows:

- A vast amount of Turkish literature on [Turkish] Eurasianism has been contributed to English literature.
- For the first time, an analytically holistic academic research on Turkish Eurasianism has been carried out.
- The categorisation of the discourses has made easier to understand Turkish Eurasianism. In doing so, the perception of Turkish Eurasianism has been based on accurate and timely knowledge.
- Comparison of Turkish Eurasianism with Pan-Turkism, Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism is likely to remove the conceptual confusion.

7.3. Realities and Recommendations for Future Foreign Policy Making in Turkey

Turkey stands at the crossroads of Asia, Europe, the Black Sea Basin, the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Middle East, and even North Africa through the Mediterranean Sea. Besides, Turkey has had a historical-cultural inheritance from the Ottoman Empire, which burdens Turkey with becoming a leading state in its own sphere of interest and sphere of influence.

The geopolitical stand and perception makes Turkish society assume that Turkey is at the centre of world politics and most of the developments in the region occur either because of Turkey’s influence or against Turkey. Although this mind-set is widespread among other nations across the world, it has been one of the main rationales behind the discourse of Turkish expansionism of creating a Turkish Union or Eurasian Union.

This expansionist approach overlaps with the Nationalist Eurasianism discourse. Sanctifying the Turkishness and being at the centre of world politics are two of the main features of this discourse. Moreover, the assumption that Turks are superior to the other nations is another drive behind this expansionist approach. The expansionist
understanding and the assumption that “the Turk’s only friend is another Turk” are not beneficial regarding Turkish foreign policy making so this rhetoric only works for isolating Turkey in its neighbouring area. Assuming that all the countries in the region are against Turkey prevents it from building woven relationships with the neighbouring states. Moreover, the discourse of Nationalist Eurasianism favours the change in Turkish foreign policy understanding since from this discourse’s approach Eurasia is perceived as “Turkistan” and it urges Turkey to realise its strength and put together a new Turkish future for Turkic states. However, as of the Treaty of Lausanne\(^{548}\), it cannot be claimed that Turkey has pursued any irredentist foreign policy course, except the annexation of the province of Hatay\(^{549}\) in 1939 and the Cyprus operation of 1974. That is why, by and large, the dominance of such logic over foreign policy making in Turkey would create an axis shift effect.

The second reality is that despite the benefits of being at the crossroads of Asia and Europe, clashing interests with Russia is the downside of such an important geopolitical stand as both countries, Russia and Turkey, see the same region as their own sphere of influence. The rivalry between the countries dates back to the late 1400s. Their relationships were mostly strained and even antagonistic due to the power struggle between both empires. One of the reasons for the struggle was the inclination of broadening their borders to include European territories as well as Caucasian. And this inclination has created several clashes between the two Empires since the late 1500s.

\(^{548}\) It is the final treaty which concluded World War I. It was signed by representatives of Republic of Turkey on one side and by Britain, Italy, Japan, France, Greece, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) on the other. The treaty was signed at Lausanne, Switzerland, on July 24, 1923, after a seven-month conference. The treaty recognized the boundaries of the modern state of Turkey. Turkey made no claim to its former Arab provinces and recognized British possession of Cyprus and Italian possession of the Dodecanese. For further information see: Britannica Online Encyclopaedia, Available from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/332502/Treaty-of-Lausanne>, [Accessed on 31/08/2013].

\(^{549}\) The Treaty of Ankara that was signed between Turkey and France on October 20, 1921 granted a special status to the Sancak of Iskenderun (Hatay), which was in the Syrian territory under the French mandate. But, the Turks remaining there would still be able to entertain their cultural rights. After 1936 when France decided to give Syria and Lebanon their independence, Turkey’s endeavour to annex Hatay to the mainland on July 23, 1939 through democratic means was successful. For further information see: M. Kibaroğlu and A. Kibaroğlu, Global Security Watch – Turkey: A Reference Handbook, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009).
Over the course of time, the relations transformed as the two Empires transformed as well. Toward the end of the 19th century when Czar Nicholas I of Russia described the Ottoman Empire as “the sick man of Europe”, the power of the Empire started to decline significantly and in 1923, the Republic of Turkey emerged as the successor state of the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, the Russian Empire also transformed into the Russian Provisional Government (1917-1922), then the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922-1991), and the Russian Federation (1991-present), respectively.

Despite the rising volume of economic relationships between the sides, the perception of the other has not changed much in both states. For instance, the 1990s were an era when the sides had difficulties on security issues, while economic relations were improving.550 The concern was the former Soviet States in which both sides had influence. In terms of this concern, Turkey’s approach was based on ethnical, linguistic, and cultural ties with Turkic States of Central Asia and Caucasus. In this context, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused Turkey to develop a discourse “The Great Turkish World – from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China”. Along with this discourse, Turkey envisioned expansive road, energy and communications links with the former Soviet Central Asian Republics.551 Whereas Russia was in favour of the status quo in Central Asia, Turkey was supporting a deep-rooted change in the former Soviet States with the help of the USA. And this confrontation was the principal issue that caused tension between both sides. This hidden rivalry remains intact as one of the sensitive points of Turkish foreign policy up until now even if it has not caused any concrete conflict among Russia and Turkey.

In light of this rivalry, regarding Russia’s perception there are different approaches among the discourses. While nationalist discourse embraces an antagonistic orientation, multiculturalist and Westernist discourses handle the issue in a more pragmatic way. As


mentioned above, the rivalry between Russia and Turkey in their immediate regions seems to be a geopolitical fait accompli. However, the two actors have managed to reconcile the geopolitical rivalry so far. It seems that this reconciliation environment will last as long as Turkey’s new multi-dimensional perspective and Russia’s openness remain. The abandonment of a visa regime between Turkey and Russia as of 16 April 2011 is solid evidence that the two states are in favour of improving the relations as much as they can. If improving the relationship with Russia is for the good of Turkey, then it seems that it is logical to allow the Multiculturalist and Westernist discourses to penetrate into Turkish foreign policy making.

Another reality is Turkey’s confusing identity through the bridge theory. Due to its geopolitical location between Europe and Asia, Turkey is called a bridge state with a mediator role in any dispute or conflict as seen by several analysts and researchers. However, it is a fact that Turkey is not perceived as a state which has the capacity and capabilities to become a mediator between the West and the East since neither side see it as neutral or in their interests. While the majority of Europeans do not think that Turkey belongs to the European continent, the Eastern states do not see Turkey as one of them, either. That is a significant issue when it comes to building woven relationships with all the neighbouring countries.

Turkey is called a bridge state due to its geopolitical position between Europe and Asia and also its historical-cultural inheritance from the Ottoman Empire. In this climate, Turkey has experienced a number of problems when it comes to benefitting from this location and inheritance. Nowadays, it is considered a “model Muslim democracy”, while it has relatively strong relationships with the Western world, especially with European countries. Turkey’s relations with European countries, such as Great Britain, France, and Germany, date back to before the 19th century. Although Turkey’s Europeanisation and Modernisation processes started in the late 19th century, official relations with the European Union were established with Turkey’s application for

associate membership of the European Economic Community in September 1959. There were also several agreements signed by Turkey in order to fulfil Turkey’s rapprochements with the West, such as the Council of Europe (joined on 9 August 1949), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (joined in 1952), and Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (one of the founding members).

After Turkey’s application in 1959, four years later on 12 September 1963 Turkey and the European Economic Community signed the Ankara Agreement creating an association between the sides and it came into effect on 1 December 1964. The Ankara agreement foresaw an eventual membership once the conditions for membership had been met.\textsuperscript{554} Therefore, Turkey and the EU have continued talks approximately for half a century. Despite having such deep-rooted relations, many Europeans do not see Turkey as a European state. From their perspective, Turkey has different cultural and religious traditions, and a different way of thinking. Namely, Turkey is a significant \textit{other}\textsuperscript{555} for the majority of Europeans. That is why they have remained sceptical about Turkey’s membership, so far. For instance Pope Benedict XVI’s statement is obvious evidence for this way of thinking towards Turkey’s otherness:

\begin{quote}
The roots that have formed Europe…are those of Christianity. Turkey has always represented another continent, in permanent contrast to Europe…It would be an error to equate the two continents…Turkey is founded on Islam…Thus the entry of Turkey into the EU would be anti-historical.\textsuperscript{556}
\end{quote}

Although there is such a debate over Turkey’s identity among European countries, it would not be wrong to claim that Turkey is an industrialised and developed country with a stable economy and also better integrated into the world polity compared to other Muslim countries. Moreover, people in Turkey are more secular than those in the rest of the Muslim countries. In this sense, the backwardness among the Muslim countries, believed to be a result of the imperial domination of the European powers, has caused

\textsuperscript{554} F. S. Larrabee and I. O. Lesser, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy in…’, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{555} For more information on identity and otherness, see the extensive analysis provided in I. B. Neumann, \textit{Uses of the other:} ..., 1999; W. Bloom, \textit{Personal Identity}, ..., 1990.
hostility towards Western countries. From this perspective, as long as Turkey embraces western and liberal-democratic values, it drifts apart from the Muslim world. Under these conditions, Turkey should pursue a balanced policy between its relations with the West and its interest in the Muslim countries, especially in the Middle East.

The reality is that the region in which Turkey is located is not stable, secure, or developed. In this sense, those unstable conditions make the region vulnerable regarding making prudential plans. For instance, Turkey has a long border with Iran, one of the rogue states in world politics. Although from time to time Turkey has built good relationships with Iran, it would not be wrong to call them ‘strained relations’. Iran is one of Turkey’s largest neighbours and the border which both states share has not changed since 1639 when the Treaty of Zuhab was signed by the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Persia. Turkey has had longstanding relations with Iran and those relations might be characterised by highs and lows. Mutual suspicion and rivalry have been two main features so far. Economic, demographic, geopolitical, and cultural conditions of both states can be put forward as reasons for this rivalry and suspicion.

At the dawn of the 20th century, both states were underdeveloped and agriculture-based. However, economic, political and cultural reforms were implemented in the course of time by both states for the purpose of progressing towards the level of contemporary civilisations. In Iran, those developments were carried out until the Iran Revolution in 1979. With this event, revolutionary powers overthrew Iran’s monarchy, the Pahlavi dynasty, and established the Islamic Republic of Iran under the leadership of Ayatollah

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559 The Safavid Dynasty was one of the significant ruling dynasties of Iran which ruled Iran between 1501 and 1722. During this era the Ottoman Empire and Safavids confronted several times. The Battle of Chaldiran was one of them, occurring on August 1514 and ending in victory for the Ottoman Empire. This battle was only the beginning. After more than 100 years the confrontation eased to some extent and the Treaty of Zuhab was signed in 1639 in order to terminate the disputes over the border issue.
Ruhollah Khomeini. Although the Pahlavi dynasty had established strong ties with the Western world and pursued a pro-American foreign policy, the revolution was no longer keen to continue its relationships with the Western countries. Iran’s existence as a significant neighbour in the region along with this foreign policy understanding is one of the issues that Turkey should take into consideration.

In this regard, the discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey have different approaches towards Iran. On the one hand, Nationalist Eurasianism claims that Iran is a Turkic state and it must be included in any attempt toward establishing a Eurasian Union. On the other hand, Multiculturalist Eurasianism and Westernist Eurasianism, generally, position in line with the Western countries’ attitude towards Iran. On account of this, any issues related to Iran should be taken into consideration in Turkey regardless of ideological position.

In this part, the last reality of Turkish foreign policy might be Turkey’s attitude towards its kin states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The relations with the Turkic states have always had significant importance for Turkey due to sharing ethnic and linguistic ties with these states. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey has been keen to establish solid relations with the post-USSR states. Turkey’s initial attempt was to play a big brother role for the newly independent Turkic states and this attempt was also supported by the USA in order to fill the power vacuum with the “Turkish Model” instead of radical Islam. On the other hand, there were two obstacles before Turkey’s aim. The first one was that other regional powers such as Russia and Iran were not keen to see the USA in Central Asia and the Caucasus through Turkey. The second obstacle was that the post-Soviet Turkic states had just explored the multipolarity within the international system and did not want to be dependent upon any single regional power.  

Under these conditions, Turkey managed to establish only limited relationships with the Turkic states. In fact, at the end of the 1990s Turkey’s relations with some of the Turkic

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states could be described as “close to breaking point”. Uzbekistan, for instance, broke off its ties with Turkey because of Islamic terrorist attacks on its own land and Turkey was accused of harbouring the terrorists by Uzbek officials.\footnote{561} However, the balance of power changed with the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Since then, in the context of training the Turkic states’ armies in the war against terrorism Turkey has promoted its relations with these sceptical states. Recently, Turkey has signed a number of agreements in order to provide them with necessary equipment, financial assistance and military education. In this sense, after 9/11 Turkey has revised its policy towards these states on the following principles:

- a) Contributing to the consolidation of their state structuring
- b) Preserving political and economic stability and promoting regional cooperation
- c) Encouraging political and economic reforms
- d) Assisting their integration with the international community and Euro-Atlantic structures
- e) Developing bilateral relations in all fields on the basis of equality, mutual interest and respect for sovereignty.
- f) Supporting the transportation of their energy resources to international markets freely and through alternative routes.\footnote{562}

In addition, Turkey has striven to enhance the cultural ties with the Turkic states since they became independent. Many schools and universities have been opened by the Turkish Ministry of National Education and private institutions in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Besides, Turkey initiated annual summits of Turkish speaking countries in the mid-1990s and they are still being held even though these summits have not yielded the expected results.

Apart from enhancing the cultural ties, Turkey pays a lot of importance to economic relations with the Turkic states. Since the 1990s Turkey has provided 1.1 billion dollars in credit to these countries in order to make them attractive investment areas for Turkish businessmen.\footnote{563} The volume of Turkey’s trade with Turkic states was approximately 1

\footnote{561} F. S. Larrabee and I. O. Lesser, \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy..."}, p. 103.


billion dollars during the 1990s. However, the volume has increased since 2002 when AKP came to power in Turkey. There has been a steep increase in the trade volume between 2002 and 2010, compared to the 1990s. Until recently, the trade balance had been in favour of Turkey. However, along with the start of importing natural gas and oil from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan the balance has changed in favour of the Turkic states.

After all, it might be appropriate to say that the relationships with the Turkic states are vital for Turkey. Hence, Turkey was too enthusiastic to enhance these relations during the 1990s. However, Turkey has eventually realised that it may only become possible by establishing solid relations with both Russia and Iran. In this sense, it is necessary for Turkey to approach the Caucasus and Central Asia from a holistic perspective. Herein, Turkey’s new foreign policy course has contributed to this understanding since 2002. Enhancing relations with Russia and Iran and reminding them that Turkey is no longer a barrier but a bridge for them is the current foreign policy course pursued by Turkey in order to access the Turkic states without causing any rivalry. In doing so, emphasising its own democratic and liberal-market values is another policy to win the “hearts and minds” of Turkic people.

As long as Turkey, Russia, and Iran have a similar sphere of influence and sphere of interest the Turkic states in Central Asia and the Caucasus will remain one of the sensitive points of Turkish foreign policy. That is why Turkey should pursue a foreign policy course by bearing that in mind and should eschew applying policies, which create more rivalry in the region. In this context, Multiculturalist Eurasianism and Westernist Eurasianism are more reasonable approaches compared to Nationalist Eurasianism, which embraces a more racial manner.

In the final analysis, during the last decade Turkey has emerged as an active player in the international arena. Before that it had had a limited foreign policy course and horizon. This limitedness had existed since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. Along with the then Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s entrepreneurship, the collapse of the Soviet Union led Turkey to discover its potential and create a sphere of influence from
the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China. Even though this sphere could not be created thoroughly during the 1990s, the early 2000s have brought a rapid revitalisation. However, policies in this sphere should be created delicately since the balance of power is highly important in this region. As of 2002, Turkish Foreign Policy has experienced a major change process or activism. By this activism, on the one hand Turkey keeps improving its relations with the European Union and the USA, though there have been a number of ups and downs. On the other hand, Turkey takes advantage of its geopolitical position and attempts to improve its economic, political and cultural ties with the Middle East, Black Sea, the Caucasus and Central Asia in order to become a middle power. Furthermore, Turkey has endeavoured to open a new page with African and Latin American states. In doing so, the economic relations have been the principal means to establishing bilateral affairs with the aforementioned countries. From this perspective, Turkey’s trade with the EU, the USA, Iran, Russia and the Turkic states is on the increase aside from the global economic crisis in 2009.

All in all Turkey, as a multiregional actor, is in search of transforming into a middle power from a strong small power. That is why while Turkey is prioritising its own relationship with the EU and the USA, it is constructing new relations with its own near-neighbours as it is vital to becoming an indispensable member of the EU. In doing so, the discourses of Eurasianism might be applied to foreign policy making. In this regard, the Westernist discourse is the most reasonable one to bridge the West and the East. However, while the Multiculturalist discourse is used to build and strengthen cultural ties with people and nations of the Eurasian continent, Turkey might benefit from Turkic state support in the international arena through the help of the Nationalist discourse.

7.4. Future Research Suggestions

Based on the findings of this thesis, subsequent follow-up work will need to be pursued since it seems necessary and promising.

- The application of discourses to the relationships with the kin states
Future work could include the applications of discourses for selected cases. For instance, Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Turkic states in the Caucasus and Central Asia deserves particular attention. In this sense, the impact of the discourses on the relationships with the Turkic states would be analysed in depth.

- The application of discourses to Turkey’s failed relationships

While analysing how the discourses helped Turkey to build relationships with the neighbouring countries, at the same time the discourses’ impact on Turkey’s failed attempts to normalize its relations with the countries, such as Armenia, Cyprus, etc. deserve to be examined.

- Widening the scope of the application of discourses

Having explored the application of the discourses in the last three decades of Turkish foreign policy, there is now a need to widen the scope of the application of discourses to the early times of the Republic of Turkey even if classical Eurasianism did not completely penetrate into Turkish intellectual circles until the post-Cold war era.

- Comparing the versions of Eurasianism in different countries

This research categorised the discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey. The research could be continued by initiating a comparison of Turkish Eurasianism with other versions such as Eurasianism in Kazakhstan, Eurasianism in Ukraine, and so on. For instance, Ukrainian intellectual circles show similar characteristics to Turkish ones. Moreover, Ukrainian foreign policy is, to some extent, shaped by both European and Slavic/Eurasian identities, as well. That would help to show the differences between the cases and provide a solid ground for the Eurasianism ideology.
APPENDIX A

REGISTRY RESEARCH UNIT
ETHICS REVIEW FEEDBACK FORM
(Review feedback should be completed within 10 working days)

Name of applicant: Ozgur Tufekci
Faculty/School/Department: [Business, Environment and Society] Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies
Research project title: TURKISH EURASIANISM AND ITS IMPACT ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR TURKEY

Comments by the reviewer

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<td>2. <strong>Evaluation of the participant information sheet and consent form:</strong></td>
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<td>3. <strong>Recommendation:</strong></td>
<td>(Please indicate as appropriate and advise on any conditions. If there any conditions, the applicant will be required to resubmit his/her application and this will be sent to the same reviewer).</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>Approved - no conditions attached</td>
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<td>Approved with minor conditions (no need to re-submit)</td>
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<td>Rejected for the following reason(s) – please use other side if necessary</td>
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Name of reviewer: Anonymous
**ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADD</td>
<td>Kemalist Thought Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSEC</td>
<td>Black Sea Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCP</td>
<td>Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform</td>
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<td>DYP</td>
<td>True Path Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECO</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMEI</td>
<td>the Greater Middle East Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNAT</td>
<td>the Grand National Assembly of Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>the International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOF</td>
<td>the International Organisation of La Francophonie</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACC</td>
<td>the North Atlantic Coordination Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBP</td>
<td>National Bolshevik Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Partiya Kaarkaren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)</td>
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<td>RP</td>
<td>Welfare Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>TURKSOY</td>
<td>the International Organization of Turkic Culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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NOTE ON PRONUNCIATION

In this thesis, indigenous spelling of certain terms and proper names are utilized as they are used in Turkish language. For those who are not familiar with the complexities of the Turkish alphabet, the following pronunciation examples are given:

C is pronounced as j as in journey
Ç is pronounced as ch as in child
G is pronounced as g as in goat
I is pronounced as e as in open
J is pronounced as j as in yell
Ö is pronounced as u as in burn
Ü is pronounced as e as in few
Ş is pronounced as sh as in show
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