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Reforming Further Education –
the changing labour process for college lecturers

Kim Mather, Les Worrall and Roger Seifert

Abstract

Legislative reforms introduced to the English Further Education (FE) sector since the 1990s have radically transformed the sector through the stimulation of competitive pressures that central government believes will improve standards while also securing greater cost effectiveness. This paper discusses the nature and consequences of these reforms for FE lecturers drawing on evidence gathered from three West Midlands colleges. The contention is that, much in line with the effect of reform initiated across the public sector generally, the reforms were framed by an ideological commitment to the principles of the free market and thus a commitment to the basic tenets of capitalism. An overriding preoccupation with providing ‘value for money’ from public services places labour costs and, particularly, the management of these costs, at the heart of politically inspired moves to secure greater efficiency by getting ‘more for less’ from workers. Given this emphasis on ‘intensification’, it is argued that labour process theory and emerging perspectives on ‘the new public management’ provide appropriate theoretical frameworks with which to analyse the changing experiences of FE lecturers.

KEY WORDS: public sector management, labour process theory, work intensification, resistance, Further Education

1. INTRODUCTION

Central government policy since the 1980s towards public services in the UK has been dominated by neo-liberal ideals about the perceived superiority of the free market as a means of providing public services most economically, effectively and efficiently. While some have argued (Ranson and Stewart, 1994) that a ‘public service ethos’ does not sit well with this approach, the contention here is that one of the main outcomes of these changes has been that the labour process in many parts of the public sector has been significantly affected. We argue that this emphasis on the free market as the underpinning mechanism for public service provision is, in effect, a proxy for capital accumulation. Consequently, we argue that labour process theory (Braverman 1974) provides a coherent theoretical framework within which these changes can be analysed. Essentially, our objective is to make explicit links between the political economy and
workplace relations as mediated by changing managerial practices that are often overlooked in orthodox management literature. Political commitment to the free market is linked here to the many ‘value for money’ imperatives and managerialist agendas that have had important consequences for how labour is managed or ‘controlled’ in this highly labour intensive service.

The paper provides an overview of the theoretical context to the post 1980 public service reform agenda to put into context the reforms introduced to the FE sector and it draws attention to the new public management that emerged from the early 1980s. Drawing on evidence gathered from three West Midlands’ FE colleges, there is then a discussion of work intensification and lecturers’ resistance to it. The paper examines these aspects of change to the labour process of FE lecturers as a consequence of politically inspired reforms introduced to the English Further Education (FE) sector in the early 1990s. Finally, we assess the significance of our work in the context of change in the public sector and its management.

2. EXAMINING CHANGES TO THE LABOUR PROCESS OF PUBLIC SERVICE WORKERS: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The labour process in the public sector

After World War II public policy was based on a value system that saw the state as having a central role in the provision of services that would overcome the ‘Five Giants’ - disease, ignorance, squalor, idleness and want (Beveridge 1942). Services were provided within a model of organisation that reflected a belief in bureaucratic rationality, professionalism and, above all, a value system based on ‘equity, reliability, justice and conspicuous probity’ (Dunsire 1999:362). Central to this model was a reliance on the distinctive bodies of knowledge and skills offered by large groups of professionals responsible for front-line service delivery working to ‘professionally defined notions of good service, rather than managerial objectives’ and a commitment to public service or to a ‘public service ethos’ (Ackroyd et al 1989; Clarke and Newman 1997:6). Embodied
within this labour process was the power derived from personalised, largely face-to-face, professional-client relationships (Pollitt 1993): for example between doctor and patient, teacher and pupil, lecturer and student. Though in recent years these terms have been replaced by a different set of terms as ‘client-contractor’ or ‘provider-customer’ that to many would appear to reflect the way in which public services have been commodified. The use of terms such as ‘market testing’ and ‘compulsory competitive tendering’ also reflect the changes in the way that public services are now conceptualised.

Public service workers, like any others, sell their capacity to labour (Cohen 1991; Cooley 1981; Reid 2003), so, ‘both state and private sector workers are subsumed under the authority of employers by virtue of the fact that they sell their labour power and surrender the creative capacity of their labour’ (Cousins 1986:87). Wages represent a cost to employers, so the realisation of labour potentiality, and therefore the generation of surplus value, is an inevitable consequence of the capital accumulation imperative which underpins labour control strategies (Braverman 1974; Marx 1976; Spencer 2000; Tinker 2002). From this perspective, the deskilling of the labour process of workers within capitalist relations of production is a logical consequence of the capital accumulation imperative. This, labour process theory tells us, is achieved through the application of Taylorite labour management strategies as employers seek to cheapen the cost of labour while intensifying work (Braverman 1974). This becomes especially important when managing highly labour intensive public services where labour cost represents a significant part of overall cost incurred.

The research undertaken here acknowledges various criticisms levelled at aspects of Braverman’s analysis (see for example Friedman 1977; Knights 1990; Littler 1982; Penn et al 1994; Salaman 1986; Wood 1987; 1989). Much of this post-Braverman literature is extremely valuable as a means for elaborating upon the particular experiences of groups of workers in different settings but is seen here to marginalise the central tenets of Braverman’s view on the tendential nature of deskilling in the long term while also articulating rather literal notions of deskilling that place ‘far too much emphasis on the extent of deskilling and not enough on the assumed consequences for the nature and
experience of work’ (Spencer 2000; Thompson 1983:11). The objective here is to address these issues by examining how the intensification of work in the FE sector has materially affected worker’s experiences and their perceptions.

The approach here is to apply labour process theory as a means for understanding control over the labour process (that is who controls the job, how it is performed and the circumstances under which it is performed). Braverman himself stated that deskillling may be seen to occur through ‘technical division of labour and hierarchical control over execution by means of a firm grasp on the links of conception’ (Braverman 1974:408).

Examination of alleged changes to the FE lecturer labour process has been conceptualised in this research within this context of controlling the job and how it is performed, whereby professional autonomy (i.e. being left alone to get on with the job of applying one’s skill in the classroom – see Hoyle 2001) has been attacked through work intensification and more oppressive management controls and interventionist strategies (see Mather and Seifert 2003; Mather 2003).

The post-Braverman debate also raises additional lines of enquiry in contemporary labour process research that we will also address. For example, workers’ resistance to their own deskillling is argued to have been overlooked by Braverman (Lee 1980; Thompson 1983): this issue is pursued in this research by commenting on how workers in the FE sector try to mitigate the effects of oppressive management regimes in the short term. Likewise, while some contributions (Knights and Wilmott, 1986; Wood and Kelly, 1982) contend that Braverman over-emphasises Taylorism as the preferred management strategy, the view here, echoing Thompson (1983; 1990), is that there has been a reliance in the UK public services on scientific management applications as a means for securing efficiency gains, with work intensification as a logical consequence.

Within this conceptual framework, the central concern under capitalism is about finding ways to make workers work harder (Burawoy 1979; Hyman 1989), or to achieve efficiencies and improve productivity in the rhetoric of contemporary public sector management. Assumptions about how best to secure this vary according to the dominant
perspective taken, so that a broad political consensus around pluralism as the best means for securing this provided the dominant model of job regulation for public service workers during the post World War II period (Kessler and Bayliss 1998). The problem with this type of pluralist analysis and subsequent prescription of job controls lies in its focus on internal order. This tends to ignore broader questions of political economy and the asymmetry of power in the employment relationship, in what amounts to an uncritical discourse on labour management practice (Blyton and Turnbull 2004). The preferred managerial view of labour control rests on unitary assumptions about shared interests and the irrationality of conflict between managers and workers (Fox 1966). This perspective was given political expression in the post 1979 Conservative Government policies for how best to manage employment, trade unions, labour markets and public services. Such an approach reasserts the managerial prerogative (Storey 1983), prioritising managerial control over labour process matters, while at the same time divorcing the nature of capitalism, or ‘value for money’ as a state proxy for this, from the functions of management.

**Reforming public services**

The early 1980s onwards have been characterised by widespread reform of public service organisations, the rethinking and conceptual reframing of public sector management and the redesign of service delivery mechanisms (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Ferlie et al, 1996; Pollitt, 1993; Bach 2002; Corby and White 1999). These changes have been legitimised by influential arguments such as the ‘crowding out thesis’ (Bacon and Eltis 1978) where public borrowing is held to ‘crowd out’ private borrowing thus pointing to the restriction of the public sector and the increased ‘marketisation’ of service delivery. Ironside and Seifert (2000) summarise the theoretical underpinning to this reform process as being based on neo-liberalist assumptions, so that public policy decisions around how best to organise and manage public services have rested on an ideological commitment to the tenets of free markets. Underlying this approach, they argue, is the view that public sector is inherently bad, whereby, drawing on public choice theories (Dunleavy 1991; Niskanen 1971; Rowley 1993), public service officials are seen to be self-serving and
inhernently inefficient, lacking the motivation to secure efficient service provision. From this perspective, a preferable model of public service organisation relies on incentivising those who manage services, much in line with perceived best practice private sector management, through the application of competitive pressures and managerial tactics such as performance-related pay to force managers to manage (Chomsky 1999) while providing value for money to taxpayers (Clarke and Newman 1997). This is evidenced by the growth of the New Public Management (NPM) (Dunsire 1999; Pollitt 1993; Walsh 1995; Ferlie et al 1996) with its emphasis on the three Es of efficiency, effectiveness and economy. Thus, the application of public choice ideals to public service provision establishes a link between business (private sector) values around public service organisation and delivery and the view that ‘better’ (and more) public services’ management secures a more efficient, effective and economic welfare state.

The underlying basis of public service reform has relied then on the stimulation of market-type pressures, operationalised through legislative, financial and structural reforms designed to trigger competitive pressures and thus better, more effective management (Boyne 2002; Pollitt 1993; Pollitt 2000). This general approach was initially accentuated by downward pressure on public spending designed to secure more for less from the public services (Brown and Rowthorn 1990; Kessler and Bayliss 1998; Sinclair, Ironside and Seifert 1995). Competitive pressures have triggered ‘significant changes in labour management arrangements’ (Gospel 1992:6) and this has been particularly pronounced in highly labour intensive services where labour cost, and performance against cost, have become managerial preoccupations in securing ‘value for money’. In this sense, reforming the ways in which labour is organised and managed are central to, rather than a by-product of, these reforms. Applying the logic of labour process theory, we might expect to see the application of Taylorite management techniques designed to secure an increase in the rate of surplus value from labour employed with work intensification, deskilling and the alienation of labour as inevitable consequences (Braverman 1974; Marx 1976).
Recent studies lend general support to this thesis, providing evidence of significant shifts in both job regulation and aspects of public service labour processes as a direct consequence of the politically inspired reforms - for example local government workers (Gill et al 2003), social workers (Harris 1998; Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd 2003), nurses (Bolton 2004), university lecturers (Barry, Chandler and Clark 2001; Bryson 2004; Dearlove 1997; Miller 1995; Parker and Jary 1995; Wilson 1991) and schoolteachers (Apple 1988; Ball 1993; Ironside and Seifert 1995; Ozga 1988; Reid 2003; Sinclair, Ironside and Seifert 1996). The broad thrust of this work suggests a general tendency towards both work intensification and a relocation of job controls in managers’, rather than workers’ hands, illustrating how the application of the free-market logic to public service delivery may be explicitly linked with Braverman’s thesis of work intensification, deskilling and ‘deprofessionalisation’ as a consequence of the capital accumulation imperative.

3. THE RESEARCH: A STUDY OF FE LECTURERS IN THREE WEST MIDLANDS COLLEGES

Having established our theoretical position, the central research question here then is, to assess the extent to which the FE lecturer labour process been deskilled as a consequence of the injection of a state proxy for capital accumulation? It is acknowledged here that in responding to this question, deskilling is a multi-dimensional concept that may be usefully explored along the lines of several, often overlapping themes. Debates for example around role and task fragmentation, decreasing job autonomy and task standardisation all contribute to our understanding of the nature and extent of deskilling. Some of these various aspects to expected changes are examined within a broader piece of research (see Mather and Seifert 2003; Mather 2003) but for the purposes of this paper the themes of work intensification and lecturers’ resistance to this are discussed. The fieldwork was conducted in three case study colleges in the English West Midlands in 2002: all were of similar size and were operating within similar socio-economic circumstances. Thirty-two semi-structured interviews with managers and lecturing staff were undertaken in two of the three colleges with access to interviews being denied in the
third college. Issues that emerged from the interviews were used to generate questions for a detailed survey of all lecturing staff employed in the three colleges with response rates varying from 27% to 46% across the three colleges. A total 473 respondents was achieved. An open-ended question at the end of the questionnaire generated a wealth of qualitative data that proved particularly valuable in illuminating core labour process matters.

**Further Education Reformed**

Following the passage of the Further and Higher Education Act (1992), effective from 1st April 1993, over three hundred institutions in the sector were removed from the jurisdiction of their respective local education authorities to create ‘free-standing, autonomous institutions, entirely responsible for their own academic, financial and other affairs’ (FEFC 92/02:1). Significantly, college governing bodies were reconstituted in order to draw the majority of their members from the business community with a view to making the colleges more ‘business-like’, more close to business and to facilitate the transfer of ‘good management practice’ from the private sector (Gleeson and Shain 1999). The government-appointed Funding Education Council (FEFC), (the Learning Skills Council (LSC) since April 2001) assumed responsibility for resource allocation and for the assessment of quality of service provision. The funding allocation mechanism operationalised ‘the marketisation process’ within which college managers, cut loose from the relative stability of local authority control, were immediately put under pressure to secure challenging year-on-year growth targets through the application of a rigorous and often punitive funding regime (FEFC Circulars 92/02 1992; 92/03 1992; Maclure 2000). This occurred during a period of downward pressure on funding the aim being to deliver politically-inspired efficiency gains (Brook 1993; Burchill 2001; Gleeson and Shain 1999). Year-on-year funding cuts during the period 1993–1998 left over half of all colleges financially weak (LRD 1998; Maclure 2000) with the continual redesign of the funding methodology from 1996 onwards further exacerbating the financial squeeze on individual college resources (McClure 2000). While additional funding has been forthcoming under New Labour since 2002, this has been provided on the basis of further
modernisation, or ‘something for something’ (DfEE 2001:4, Gibson 2001:11; NATFHE 2003). While college managers are encouraged to stimulate a plurality of funding streams, the fact remains that the funding body remains the monopoly-funding provider (Smithers and Robinson 2000).

The highly labour intensive nature of this sector has placed labour cost and performance and productivity at the centre of the unfolding reform process whereby sustained ambitious government policy on sector expansion has relied on significant labour productivity gains. Testament to this is the reported growth in student numbers of over 15% (Smithers and Robinson 2000:3), sector-wide job losses of over one third between 1993 and 1998 (LRD 1998; Lucas 2000; Williams 2003) and a 1.4% reduction in funding in real terms during the same period (Maclure 2000:57). Little been written on the impact of this for the FE lecturer labour process, although Elliot (1996), Longhurst (1996) and Randle and Brady (1997 (a); 1997 (b)), all provide evidence of work intensification and a reduction in the scope and degree of lecturers’ job autonomy as direct consequences of the reforms. Longhurst suggests that there has been a commodification of FE provision and, as a result, a degradation of the lecturer labour process, with reports of increased homogeneity of service provision and thus increasing homogeneity and standardisation of the lecturer’s job (Reeves 1995). There is clear evidence of conflictual industrial relations in battles over pay and contracts (Burchill 2001; Williams 2003), a strengthening of the college management function across the sector (Alexiadou 2001; Gleeson 2001; Gleeson and Shain 1999;), casualisation of the FE lecturer labour force (Elliot 1996; Hodge 1998; Spours and Lucas 2002) and reports of absenteeism, morale problems and high levels of labour turnover (Burchill 2001; Taubman 2000; Tebbutt and Marchington 1997). An analysis of data from the three colleges in this study is supportive of these general findings (Mather and Seifert 2003; Mather 2003). The analysis reveals evidence of both work intensification and lecturer resistance: these issues are further explored below.

Work intensification
Work intensification is seen by Braverman (1974) as an inevitable consequence of the capital accumulation imperative with employers seeking out ways of increasing both the absolute and relative surplus value generated from labour (Marx 1976). Applying this logic to developments in FE, we might expect to see first an increase in absolute value generated through a lengthening of the working day/week (this has been termed ‘extensification’) and then an intensification of the work undertaken within this time (that is, an increase in labour productivity or ‘more for less’ from lecturing staff). In this sense, an objective measure of work intensification (and extensification) may be established.

Immediately following incorporation, college managers, under pressure from the funding council, implemented new contractual arrangements for lecturing staff that immediately increased annual and weekly lecturing hours thus dismantling the so called jointly determined ‘silver book’ contract and increasing the rate of absolute value in Marx’s terms. Lecturers in the three colleges in this study are now required to undertake twenty three hours teaching per week with provision for an increase in this limit to meet staff shortages, student demand and so on. This has increased the time that lecturers spend in the classroom and, additionally, their preparation time outside of class thus intensifying their workload. Complex managerially-defined formulae around what constitutes ‘teaching’ and ‘non-teaching time’ are applied to maximise time spent in the classroom so that expensive staff may be used more intensively. Increases in teaching hours need to be considered alongside both increases in student numbers and reductions in the number of full-time lecturing staff over the period 1993 to 2002. Mirroring reported sector-wide job losses (Lucas 2000; Williams 2003), there have been reductions from over 600 full time lecturing staff to just over 300 in colleges A and B, and 264 in college C. Senior managers reported that these job reductions had been achieved in a variety of ways including redundancies, early retirement, non-replacement and ‘college restructuring’ exercises. Put simply, there are fewer lecturers delivering to more students thus yielding considerable productivity gains (i.e. the generation of increased ‘surplus value’).

1 Lecturers refusing to sign up to new contractual arrangements have been denied a cost of living pay rise since 1993 and this still affects a small number of staff in two of these three colleges.
The growing casualisation of staff is a sector wide phenomenon with increased use being made of agency and temporary contract staff (Lucas 2000): casualisation has been used extensively in the case study colleges. Skills mix decisions appear to reflect conscious management decisions to keep the overall pay bill down by increasing the use of temporary/agency workers and cheaper ‘demonstrators’ and ‘facilitators’ as substitutes for more expensive lecturing staff. One senior manager commented:

‘We have things called facilitator demonstrators, assessors, technicians, resource-based managers. A lot of these roles have grown like topsy and we’re looking at that now. One of the things we’re actually discussing with unions is clarification of the role of these things called facilitator demonstrators, because NATFHE, from the academic side say they’re less than lecturers, because its slave labour’ (Director of Resources College B).

Lecturers reported feeling constantly under pressure as a result of staff shortages: ‘staffing is cut to the bone – if someone’s off sick you’re in trouble’ (Lecturer College B) and ‘when people leave they’re not replaced which puts a burden on existing staff or VTs, pressurised to do even more’ (Lecturer College A). Lecturers typically commented that they feel under pressure to come into work during time off in lieu periods and when feeling unwell. Many lecturers reported having no time to do the job properly or feeling too tired to do it well: one commented, ‘you just go through the motions really’ (Lecturer College A). They reported working late each evening and over the weekends simply to keep on top of the job. Responses from the questionnaire survey generally supported these views.

TABLE 1 NEAR HERE

Senior managers acknowledged these pressures but tended to view the problem as one of labour (in)flexibility particularly related to contractual limits placed on their freedom to use the lecturing labour force more intensively, and lecturers’ general resistance to change:

‘The contract’s neither one thing nor another – there’s still a lot of inflexibility built into it. There are stupid restrictions like someone can only do so many hours in a
term or whatever. It prevents efficiency and the need to meet students’ needs’ (Vice Principal College A).

Many of the views expressed by senior college managers were remarkably dissonant with the views expressed by workers lower down the organisational hierarchy indicating that the world view at the top of these organisations was not shared by those lower down at ‘the chalk face’ (Worrall et al, 2004). Interviews with senior managers and the perusal of college documents revealed an overriding preoccupation with securing improved staff utilisation, with reducing staff costs and with achieving greater labour flexibility. All of the factors were expressed in year-on-year improvement targets that seemed to be underpinned by Tayloristic principles of securing ‘more for less’ from lecturers:

‘The average number of hours per staff in this college is x, the average for the sector is y, the average for colleges of a similar make up to this one is z, so we get a feel for where we stand compared to the rest of the sector. Obviously the major part of our expenditure goes on staffing, so we’ve got to try and get as much out of it as we can … we’re not making subjective judgements. These are the facts’ (Director of Resources College B).

To reflect Burchell et al (2002), it was considered helpful here to rely on self-reporting as a means for examining work intensification and we argue that eliciting workers’ subjective responses of their own perceptions about work intensification (and extensification) is important. Interviews with lecturers highlighted work intensification as a key issue though this tended to be articulated in terms of pressure on time, lack of time to prepare, lack of time to think about new courses or new teaching materials and having to teach courses outside their own subject specialisms simply to meet contractual teaching hours. They reported that contact hours allocated to delivery in many curriculum areas had been reduced, a finding supported by the analysis of timetabling documents. This placed lecturers under pressure either to provide additional materials and support outside the classroom or to squeeze out some course content altogether. Reduced hours on one course meant that lecturers were ‘freed up ‘to teach on another course that was sometimes outside their subject specialism. As one lecturer put it in terms redolent of Fordism, ‘incorporation has produced a factory production mentality’ (Lecturer College B) and another noted that ‘it’s getting more and more like McDonalds’ (Lecturer College
C). All of those interviewed reported working much harder than they used to. The survey responses provide support for these comments.

**TABLE 2: NEAR HERE**

The findings reflect those of Randle and Brady (1997(a) and 1997(b)). Smithers and Robinson (2000) also noted that work intensification had been endemic to lecturers’ work across the sector since incorporation. The point here is that Braverman’s thesis of the gradual deskill and degradation of labour offers a useful mode of enquiry for examining these developments where work intensification is seen as a logical consequence of the application of market-type pressures to the sector. As already noted, some of the post-Braverman literature posits that worker resistance denies managers a free hand in implementing their chosen strategies thus limiting trends in work intensification and deskill of the labour process. We discuss below how worker resistance has manifested itself in relation to this apparent trend in work intensification. In so doing, the intention here is simply to raise some aspects of these worker’s responses, as a means for introducing important debates that are to be examined in a future paper.

**Lecturers’ responses – resistance, demoralisation and dispossession**

A major criticism of Braverman’s thesis is the relative lack of attention he gives to how workers resist both deskill and work intensification (see Friedman 1977; Knights 1990; Penn 1985; Thompson 1983; Wood 1982). Lee (1980) and Penn (1985), for example, emphasise the link between internal and external labour market conditions and worker power: where workers are able to mobilise collectively they may resist attempts to deskill their labour process. Where workers are able to claim special knowledge or skill content in a job then this strengthens their workgroup power (Yarrow 1979). Trade union presence is then a manifestation of collective worker resistance acting to impose limits on managerial unilateralism (Burawoy 1979). Resistance may take a variety of forms with full-blown collective consciousness being less commonplace than gossip, moaning and ‘oppositional rhetoric’ (Salaman 1986:92). Public service workers may also
resist changes on public interest grounds advancing arguments that link their own worsening experiences to those of society at large (Krause 1971 in Salaman 1986). This is linked to the embodiment of the public service ethos and proximity of the public service worker to his/her public already outlined earlier in this paper. There are clearly complex dimensions to the issue of control in the workplace such that ‘the task of labour process theory becomes that of understanding the combinations of control structures in the context of the specific economic location of the company or industry’ (Thompson 1983:152). A fuller discussion of precisely how the reforms have transformed well-established collective bargaining arrangements is provided elsewhere (see Burchill 2001; Mather 2003; Williams 2003). Of interest here is the extent to which collective and individual resistance mitigate the general work intensification trend already highlighted.

All three-college management teams recognise NATFHE, the main trade union for lecturers in the sector, although the degree to which this recognition amounts to meaningful negotiation is both variable and debatable. Union membership has remained relatively high ranging from over 60% in colleges B and C to over 80% in college A. Collective resistance, as evidenced in organised industrial action, has been a feature of developments in all three colleges with protracted action during the so-called ‘Silver Book Dispute’. The lecturers’ contracts theoretically represent then not the outcome of unilateral management action but rather a brokered arrangement that reflects the relative power balance of college managers and local union organisation at the time of the dispute. Analysis of the contracts in each college, while revealing little variability between the colleges, did illustrate the tenacity with which senior managers drove through desired contractual changes buttressed by political support and a stronger local bargaining position. In this sense, collective resistance was unable to prevent contractual changes that have intensified the work of lecturers in both an absolute and relative sense.

Developments in these colleges subsequent to the contract dispute suggest some variation in the degree to which union voice plays a part in management decisions to introduce changes to aspects of the lecturer’s job. This seems to reflect both college managers’ willingness to negotiate and the differential ability of NATFHE representatives in each
college to galvanise membership support. Some lecturers commented that they valued the collective voice articulated via NATFHE, typically commenting that ‘I think we need a strong union now’ (Lecturer College A) and ‘we’d have nothing without NATFHE’ (Lecturer College C). Responses to the questionnaire survey suggested a degree of variation in how lecturers regarded the role of collectivism and in particular its ability to protect conditions of service.

TABLE 3: NEAR HERE

Lecturers suggested both in interviews and in their responses to the survey that they looked increasingly to NATFHE for individual protection on matters such as discipline, bullying and redundancy. Of interest here is the way in which in these colleges NATFHE has become increasingly involved in actions to limit perceived managerial incursions around classic lecturer labour process issues such as observations of teaching, quality review mechanisms and audit procedures that represent direct attempts by managers to redefine and control aspects of the labour process. As an example, in College A, while teaching observations already formed an important part of the quality regime, there were attempts to introduce more rigorous, unannounced observations as part of a drive to improve central government-driven quality initiatives. Many lecturers perceived this to be an excessive intrusion into the classroom and thus a challenge to their control over classroom practice. As one lecturer put it, ‘faults will be found because this is a blame culture anyway’ (Lecturer College A). Likewise, the NATFHE branch chair (College A) commented that ‘this is a low trust environment so it’s hardly surprising they’re worried’. NATFHE representatives instructed members not to cooperate by leaving the classroom immediately that an observer entered. While this move was subsequently abandoned, college managers acknowledged the need to ‘have NATFHE on our side, so lecturers could see their views had been considered’ (Director of HR, College A). Thus collective resistance is seen here to form an important part of the dialectical nature of control in these colleges. While such action has not prevented new initiatives it

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2 Non-union members were asked not to answer this section of the questionnaire
nevertheless slows the process and appears to mitigate some of the worst effects for the lecturers in the short term.

Responses here are also indicative of individual attempts to resist challenges to the control of their own labour process. On the issue of work intensification, some commented that they took short cuts in lesson preparation and had started to guard their non-work time more closely:

‘I don’t prepare like I used to. There isn’t time, so I either use last year’s materials or I think of something student-centred, you know, get them to do the work and get the pressure off me a bit’ (Lecturer College C).

‘I’ve stopped worrying now about lesson prep. I just get by as best I can. There’s no preparation time when you’re teaching 24 hours a week’ (Lecturer College C).

‘I make a point of not taking work home – they get enough out of me here so I keep my weekends free. This is my time – you know you need to do things yourself that are nothing to do with work’ (Lecturer College B).

‘As far as I’m concerned, home comes first, so some things just don’t get done. I get by with old notes if I have to’ (Lecturer College C).

From Table 1 it can be seen that over 90% of those surveyed worked beyond their contracted hours to get the job done suggesting that the majority do not actively resist this intensification of their workload and the extensification of their working week. As was highlighted earlier in this paper, the embodiment of public service ethos within the labour process is a defining feature of much public service work and these lecturers appear to be no exception. They do the work because as one commented, ‘it’s me standing in front of the students and I want them to do well. That’s what it’s all about’ (Lecturer College A).

This commitment to students is exemplified in the survey responses and perhaps explains why the job is now perceived to be stressful.

TABLE 4: NEAR HERE

Another indication of individual worker resistance is manifested in absenteeism levels. Levels were running at between five and seven per cent in the three colleges and were
perceived by managers to be at such levels that they had come under close management scrutiny through the application of stricter absence control regimes. Survey responses also indicated that between 50% and 56% of those surveyed would leave the job if they could while less than one third felt that their job was secure. Storey (1983: 160) reminds us that ‘the rich diversity and complexity of work life arises because people do not respond to the farrago of control devices in the fashion of automatons’ but analysis of lecturers’ responses to labour management practices designed to intensify their work, while also controlling key aspects of their labour process (see Mather and Seifert 2003; Randle and Brady 1997(a) and 1997(b)) reveal a remarkably similar pattern of responses, pointing to a degree of demoralisation beyond the level of the individual:

‘I just wish I could do something else. There are so many people who have become ill through stress. Uncertainty, lack of acknowledgment of the work we do and persistent criticism of us leads to us feeling ground down’ (Lecturer College C).

‘Incorporation was the worst possible scenario. Giving ‘power’ to managers and governors to do what they like with us has led to the wearing down of all staff’ (Lecturer College A)

‘After twenty six years my only concern is how can I be made redundant’ (Lecturer College B)

‘I would guess that something like nine out of ten teaching staff I talk to here would leave the job if they could. It has become just a job … all the staff here are keen fans of the lottery – it’s seen as the only escape’ (Lecturer College A)

‘I had a breakdown just over a year ago, due to being bullied and being constantly asked to teach new subjects. I would leave today if I could’ (Lecturer College C)

‘Staff are at their wits end. Stress is rife, tears are common. Everyone wants to go or reduce their workload. The demands are impossible’ (Lecturer College B).

These responses capture the essence of the majority of comments to emerge from both interview and survey data pointing to deep-seated frustrations rooted in the daily experiences of these lecturers. Given the severity of these responses the question becomes: Why is there not more resistance? Some lecturers appeared to have drawn on informal support mechanisms among their own colleagues while also subverting official
work requirements and reporting mechanisms that they perceived to be onerous and pointless by the manipulation of so called ‘in-attendance time’, lesson planning and quality assurance documentation. These actions, along with the other expressions of resistance already alluded to here suggest that control over the labour process is at least contested. They are also symptomatic of Braverman’s conceptualisation of alienated labour under capitalist relations of production. While these responses may be debated from a range of perspectives, the view here is that as the logic of the reform process has unfolded, so the application of particular labour management practices designed to secure an intensification of work effort has produced alienated, demoralised workers, much in line with the central tenets of Braverman’s thesis.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The application of market-based reforms in the FE sector, as in other parts of the public sector, has resulted in the intensification and extensification of work effort for lecturers on the front line. There are fewer lecturers who are working harder, working for longer and teaching more students: we have shown that they are struggling to cope with these increased workload demands. Our view is that this is a direct consequence of the particular nature of and, particularly, the ideological underpinning to the reform process that has sought to stimulate a state proxy for the capital accumulation imperative, through the introduction of competitive and market pressures in FE provision. Applying Braverman’s logic in a highly labour intensive sector such as FE, we might expect to see labour management strategies designed to secure more for less from lecturing staff. Evidence of work intensification is clearly apparent in the three colleges we have examined and this echoes the findings drawn from research undertaken elsewhere in the FE sector and the public sector more generally.

Workers’ responses suggest that there is resistance both at individual and collective level to these downward pressures though resistance does not seem to have been sufficiently strong to prevent the reported changes from occurring. Braverman (1974) was clear that under capitalism, work intensification increases the rate of exploitation of workers. He was also explicit about the long-term tendential nature of deskilling and the degradation
of labour suggesting that short-term acts of resistance will be ineffective over the longer term. Lecturers in these colleges have been dispossessed of key job controls, which, when allied to trends in work intensification reported here, points to a degree of transformation in aspects of their labour process that may be directly linked to broader developments in the political economy of the Further Education sector specifically and the public sector more generally.

The research has revealed a number of key points all of which are consistent with Braverman’s thesis. There is clear evidence that the public sector in the UK has changed dramatically with managerialist and consumerist notions having assumed ascendancy over those of the professions. The rise of a new managerial class in the public sector with its own rhetoric of performance management, targets, indicators, value for money, quality, productivity and flexibility has also been shown to have a world-view that has little in common with workers at the chalk face. We have provided clear evidence of deskilling in the form of the replacement of less flexible and more expensive full-time staff with more flexible and less expensive ‘things’ (as one senior manager called them) and the increasing casualisation of working conditions. We have also provided clear evidence of the redesign of work practices that have moved the lecturing profession away from a craft system of production where lecturers, as subject specialists, had more autonomy over what was taught, towards a factory system of production where standardisation in the form of modularisation has taken place and subject specialists are expected to teach outside their specialism simply to fill up their timetables in order to keep costs down. This we see as evidence that cost reduction criteria assume ascendancy over quality criteria despite the rhetoric of quality that currently pervades academic institutions in the UK. We argue that labour process theory has provided a powerful framework for the analysis of recent changes in the public sector as characterised by the growth of managerialism and the rise of the ‘new public management’. Despite the rhetoric of much contemporary management practice (‘our employees are our greatest asset), Taylorism and Fordism would seem to be ‘alive and well’ in the UK public sector. It is unfortunate that many of the workers in the sector are not in a similar state of ‘good physical and psychological health’.
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Table 1: Lecturers’ responses to questions about being ‘under pressure’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In relation to your job, to what extent do you agree that you feel under pressure to come to work when you feel unwell?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College A</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College B</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College C</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In relation to your job, to what extent do you agree that you are sometimes too tired to teach as well as you would like?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College A</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College B</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College C</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In relation to your job, to what extent do you agree that you have sufficient time to prepare for your classes?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College A</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College B</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College C</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In relation to your job, to what extent do you agree that you work more than your contracted hours to keep on top of your job?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College A</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College B</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College C</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Lecturers’ responses to questions about ‘working harder’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In relation to your job, to what extent do you agree that you are working harder?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College A</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College B</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College C</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In relation to your job, to what extent do you agree that you are given sufficient time to develop new courses?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College A</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College B</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College C</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In relation to your job, to what extent do you agree that you are expected to teach new subjects each year?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College A</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College B</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College C</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Lecturers’ view about collective resistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College A</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College B</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College C</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In relation to the NATFHE branch at your college, to what extent do you agree that the union is there to negotiate change instead of having it imposed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College A</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College B</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College C</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In relation to the NATFHE branch at your college, to what extent do you agree that teachers in this college need a strong union to protect them?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College A</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College B</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College C</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Lecturers’ views about the public service ethos and increased pressure

In relation to your job, to what extent do you agree that contact with the students is the most satisfying part of the job?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College A</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College B</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College C</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In relation to your job, to what extent do you agree that you find the job increasingly stressful?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College A</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College B</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College C</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>