Organised Violence; A Manifestation of Elite Political Culture: A Case Study of Boko Haram

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Organised Violence; A Manifestation of Elite Political Culture: A Case Study of Boko Haram

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PhD

May 2016
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Abstract

The thesis examines the phenomenon of organised political violence in Nigeria exploring its root cause(s) and sustaining factor(s), using the extreme terrorist activities of the Boko Haram sect as a case study. The severe negative impact of this sect on the fabric of Nigerian society has led to a burgeoning scholarly literature investigating the sect and the phenomenon of organised political violence which, for the most part, concentrates on the gamut of political, economic and social ills that are held to drive violence in the country. The thesis contends that, whilst these variables are symptoms or outcomes of political violence, it is the tacit political culture adopted by Nigeria’s political elite that is the core cause of recurring periods of political violence and the groups that use violence. Elements of elite political culture such as zero sum politics, political elite manipulation of social cleavages and identity politics, themselves enabled by elite involvement in governance, leads to mis-governance by the elite in power and the concomitant emergence of social movements or groups to convey the grievances of sections of the country’s diverse population. These movements are, in turn, co-opted by individuals within the elite who use the movements’ muscle and influence to coerce the electorate, notably during election periods. This results in the social movements’ transformation into organised political violent groups. When the alliance with the movement ceases to benefit the elite and/or the level of violence becomes counter-productive, as was the case the northern political elite and Boko Haram, the elite reverses its rhetoric, recasting the movement, its creation, as the enemy.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

Organised political violence in Nigeria is a prevalent and continuing aspect of Nigeria’s independent history. This phenomenon manifests itself in diverse forms such as electoral violence, terrorism, religious and ethnic clashes. The pervasiveness of this phenomenon ensures a continuous and expanding discourse on the root causes and dynamics of organised violent activities in Nigeria. These ‘root causes’ identified in the scholarly literature, whilst certainly present or linked to specific manifestations of organised political violence, do not, on the findings of this thesis, essentially capture its core driving force in Nigeria. Instead, the research is focused on the role of elite political culture, and in particular elite political culture’s inter-connection with politics and governance as the fundamental cause and driver of organised political violence in the country. It investigates how elite political culture has produced and sustained organised violent groups in general and more specifically, the Boko Haram sect or movement. The thesis concludes that organised violence in Nigeria is the manifestation of the political elite’s behaviour that adopts violence to achieve political goals.

1.1 Clarification of Key Terminologies

Central to this thesis are the role of the State, the government and political elite as regards using and responding to political violence. Given the ambiguity concerning some of the key terms, it is pertinent to clarify what is meant by these concepts when used in this research.

A) State

There are diverse existing definitions of a State within the context of a country or a polity. As such, each country develops its own understanding of what the State is through its unique historical experiences. Nevertheless these invariably draw in large
part from understandings developed during the emergence of the nation State in the West. Correspondingly, this thesis regards the State exclusively from a political perspective. The characterisation of the State in this research is limited to the State’s relationship with the government, political elite and social movement groups.

C.Wright Mills asserts the relevance of State power, as political power concentrated at the executive level and managed by the political elite and its relational actors in its networks, for all the State’s depiction as a representation of the government and the citizens. However not all agree with Wright Mills that State rulers serve only their interests. Van Creveld highlights the separation of the State from the rulers and the ruled, in as much as a State owes its existence to the presence of a population and a government. Van Creveld argues that the State’s characteristics are limited to its duties to the populace with the aid of formal institutions that are a direct extension of the State. In his view, regardless of the governing authority’s interests, the State’s attention remains consistent with clear duties or tasks – ‘waging war, making peace, enacting laws, dispensing justice, raising revenue, determining currency and providing internal security’ (Van Creveld 1999:421). However, Van Creveld’s definition of a State fails to acknowledge influencing factors or forces such as the representatives of the governing authority and the populace. He presumes that the State interests are separate from the rulers’ interests and excludes the presence of representatives of informal institutions. Yet, Nkurumah’s examination of African States (1970:11-12) argues that the State, contrary to Van Creveld’s characterisation is a tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie to further economic interests through ties with the political elite and government officials. Likewise, Aborisade and Mundt (2001:117) depict the Nigerian State as a political structure that is influenced by the personal interests of the government officials. Therefore, the Nigerian State is not a neutral entity separated from the rulers and the economy as posited by Fukuyama and Dahl, but an avenue for access to political power and wealth by the political elite. This is evident in Ake’s (1981:127) definition of a State in relation to Nigeria as a combination of the political elite and the government, where the political elite are actually the possessors of State power.

Weber’s writing at the beginning of the twentieth century defined the State as a ‘form of human community that lays claim to a monopoly of legitimate physical violence’
includes two key characteristics – the presence of a legitimate government and the government’s monopoly of violence. Weber argues that the primary functionality of the State and the reason for its existence is hinged on its ability to maintain order(s) through the use of force or the threat of force, with the aid of formal institutions. Contrary to Van Creveld’s definition, Weber (2002:47) insists that ‘State and rulership are necessarily bound together and that it is the latter which is the basis of the former’. His definition emphasises the monopoly of legitimate violence, a legitimate government and the government as a reflection or a representation of a State. The insistence of violence as a tool limited to the governing authority highlights the availability of violence as a tool for the representatives of the government and their allies – political elite.

These theorists were seeking to capture the political reality in Europe. It is these realities that were propagated in Nigeria initially through colonialism and afterwards through the influence of the international system of States and their conduct. The Nigerian political class has to a large extent imitated these behaviours and values. It asserts as loudly as any Western State that it alone has the legitimate use of force. Notwithstanding, the State allows the influence of social groups on the governing authority.

Hence when this thesis discusses the State – it refers to the legitimate government within the political territory designated as the Federal Republic of Nigeria tasked with the administration of public affairs through the aid of institutions comprised of the State presumed to be in the interests of the people. In addition ‘state’ in the lower case refers to one of the thirty-six administrative districts and Abuja, designated as states that comprise the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

B) Government

The universal perception of government is interpreted to be the highest level of political appointment such as the offices of the president, governor, prime minister and senate president. Therefore, government is portrayed as a term for the organisation or institution in charge of the administration of State affairs – political,
economic, social, legal and national security. In addition, this thesis refers to government as the management of State affairs by the appointed officials in the interests of the political elite.

C) Political Elite

For the purpose of this thesis, the political elite are identified as persons with the power to influence and make decisions that affect the political environment. They are powerful players who, although they may not belong to the same political network, share the same goals of exercising political power and the economic advantages of exercising power. In the Nigerian context, and for the purposes of this research the political elite includes the president, ministers and other elected federal parliamentarians; state governors, commissioners and other state legislators; local government chairmen; traditional rulers (often also religious leaders in northern Nigeria); certain influential religious leaders; executives of major companies; and senior military officers. It is not the aim of the research to explore the internal dynamics of political elite membership, but rather to investigate the impact of a tacit political elite culture on the incipient means and methods of social movements responding to the governance strategies of the political elite.

D) Political Culture and Elite Political Culture

This thesis interprets political culture as the behaviour, values and interests of political actors that impacts on or influence political behaviour in a State. Elite political culture is defined as the behaviour, values, and beliefs of influential political actors in a State. Further examination is carried out in chapter two.
1.2 Justification of Study

1.2.1 The Main Argument

The main argument of this study is that the development and sustenance of organised violent groups in Nigeria is as a result of the political elite’s behaviours that either provoke violence or adopt violence to achieve political aims (see chapter two for contextual analysis of elite political culture and governance in Nigeria). The dynamics of State governance - intentional activities designed to shape the flow of events is shaped by the political elite desire to maximise State power and wealth. There is a culture of exploiting office for personal gain and denying rivals access to State power, where resistance fails it is a culture that will offer unsatisfactory dialogue. Ultimately it is a culture that where all else fails will resort to violence to achieve their goals. The thesis’ core proposition is that elite political culture, shaped by political elite actions and values generates organised violence for its own ends. However, scholars exploring the phenomenon of organised political violence have isolated alternative rationales.

Since Boko Haram began its campaign of violence, scholars and other commentators have attempted to explain the terrorist group’s brutality citing pervasive unemployment, rampant poverty, government corruption, colonialism, religion in the political environment and global jihad movement. Within the Nigerian public sphere, scholars, commentators and representatives of the State such as security agencies, governors and federal legislators have generally had recourse to the above explanations and have based their responses to Boko Haram on these analytical frameworks.
The thesis will argue that these acceptable causes, whilst relevant to the rise of Boko Haram, ignore the core role of the political elite’s style of governance grounded in a political culture of self-interest that is the primary cause of the persistence of organised violence in Nigeria. The other accepted causes are, in reality, symptoms and or outcomes and not the fundamental rational. The study concedes a relationship between the above mentioned symptoms or outcomes and the emergence and sustenance of organised violent groups in Nigeria. This research argues that the emergence of organised violent groups is attributable to the concentric rings of causative factors, and that these factors are not at the core but form the outer rings, enabling or amplifying organize political violence in Nigeria (indicated in Figure 1).

At the core of the rings is the political elite’s approach regarding governance and access to State power with the resultant violent consequences. It is argued that the predominant mindset of the political elite is one of seeking the attainment of political power not as a means to serve citizens, but as the chief end in itself. The political elite covet the grant of access to the public purse for personal enrichment and the furtherance of preferred ethnic, religious and regional interests. This ‘mindset’ has hardened over the years, and has found expression in a chain of events leading to the incipience and concretization of the identified concentric circles that have
subsequently sustained organised political violent activities in Nigeria. This mindset is identified as selected elements of the prevailing elite political culture – a willingness to use violence, access to State power for financial rewards, and politicization of existing dissention by social groups.

It is pertinent to state that in this thesis elite political culture is depicted to be shaped or influenced by the actions and agendas of the political elite. In essence the emergence of organised violent groups is termed to be a consequence of the actions of the political elite, particularly in their approach to State governance.

The distinctiveness of Boko Haram in relation to previous organised political violent groups in Nigeria is located in its adoption of extreme terrorism, notably suicide attacks, modelled on the tactics used by Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups, notably Al Qaeda and, more recently, Islamic State. That Boko Haram has been chosen as the key case study for this research is a result of that terrorist group being the most recent manifestation of political violence. It is hypothesised that a successful annihilation of Boko Haram will not secure a permanent end to organised political violence in Nigeria. Should the political elite culture remain unaltered then it is predicted that this culture will generate further groups willing to use violence. A pattern of social movements adopting to political violence can be seen over the last decade: the Maitatsine crisis, Kala Kato, Sara Suka, Niger Delta militants, the ‘Bakassi Boys’ vigilante group and Oodua People’s Congress (OPC). To re-iterate, the research does not aim to replace wholesale alternative rationales for the propensity towards organised political violence in Nigeria, but rather to reposition these rationales in relation to the core causative factor, the prevailing elite political culture.

1.3 Research Aim and Objectives

The aim of this research is to test the proposition that the emergence of organised political violent activities – Boko Haram is rooted in elite political culture and their approach to State governance. This aim will be achieved by fulfilling the following objectives:
1. To examine to what extent the political elite’s practice of governance has promoted the emergence and sustenance of organised political violent groups in Nigeria.

2. To critically analyse the political culture of Nigeria’s political elite particularly its co-option of religion in the course of governance.

3. To investigate and analyse how the political elite’s practice of governance have shaped the government’s counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism response to organized groups.

4. To examine to what extent the political elite’s practice of governance has promoted the emergence and sustenance of the Boko Haram sect.

1.3.1 Research Objective 1

Objective one focuses on establishing the extent to which political elite approach to governance promotes the emergence and sustenance of organised political violent groups in Nigeria. This will involve analysing the impact of political elite’s attitude towards governance on the emergence of social movement groups and these groups transition to organised political violent groups. An analysis of the relationship and alliances between complicit political elite and social movement groups and political violent events will be carried out. This will be achieved with the aid of theories such as the power elite theory, Clausewitz’ strategy of violence, network analysis, rational choice theory and global surveillance mode of warfare framework.

1.3.2 Research Objective 2

Objective two concentrates on analyzing the emergence and sustenance of organised political violent groups in direct relation to Nigeria’s political elite approach to governance, elite political culture and the implication of religion. This will be achieved by analyzing Nigeria’s political environment to determine the link between governance, elements of elite political culture and the development and sustenance of organized political violent groups. In addition this objective also focuses on analysing that aspect of governance and elite political culture that allows and encourages the use
of religion by the political elite in the political sphere and how this has facilitated the emergence and sustenance of organised political violent groups. This will be achieved by examining the relationship between the state level government and Islamic sects in the northern region of Nigeria. Further analysis will be carried out on the political elite’s response to Islamic religious sects in general and when they turn to organised violent activities as a basis of the elements of elite political culture. Theories applied for this objective includes; threat perception, Clausewitz’ strategy of violence, Islamic radicalization, rational choice theory, network analysis, global surveillance mode of warfare framework, elite theory and religion in the political sphere theory.

1.3.3 Research Objective 3

Objective three examines the government’s response to organised violent groups, with emphasis placed on Boko Haram. Previous counter terrorism and counter insurgency measures adopted by the State were examined in comparison to Boko Haram’s activities from its inception to its transformation to a terrorist organization. This was carried out to examine the link between the government’s response process, elite political culture and the transition of social movement groups to organised political violent groups.

1.3.4 Research Objective 4

Objective four addresses the emergence and transformation of Boko Haram into a terrorist organization in line with elite political culture in Nigeria. The aim is to test the thesis core hypothesis by using a case study - Boko Haram and examining its emergence in line with the noted attributes of governance and elite political culture. Theoretical framework adopted for this objective includes; Clausewitz’ strategy of violence, rational choice, framing theory, anti-social movement theory, greed and grievance theory and network theory.
1.4 Notes on Methodology

This study critically analyses the emergence of Boko Haram as a social movement group and its transformation to a violent terrorist group as a result of Nigeria’s elite political culture and its approach to governance. Given the perceived damage to the fabric of the Nigerian society wrought by Boko Haram, the phenomenon has been widely explored in the academic literature and by the media. However, much of the literature relates to the merits and demerits of the counter-insurgency strategy of Nigerian governments and the international community. The role of the political elite, and of their political culture, is much less visible in the literature. This research aims to fill this vacuum. The figure below is an illustration of the research process.

![Research Process Flow Chart](image)

Figure 2: Research Process Flow Chart
Source: Author (2013)

1.5 Data Collection

In order to empirically respond to the over-arching aim and the subsidiary objectives, both secondary and primary sources were employed. The collection of primary data presented significant challenges to conventional collection methods. For instance, the use of questionnaires was rejected due to the personal risk involved in distributing the questionnaires in areas where Boko Haram was active. From preliminary telephone
communication with potential respondents it also became clear that it would be prohibitively difficult to obtain authentic data given the fear engendered by Boko Haram. The researcher was equally aware of reports of attacks on civilians suspected of informing on, or conversing about, Boko Haram activities.

There was also a strong likelihood that if they did participate in the study, respondents would self-censor the responses. Therefore, focus groups were also rejected as there was a probability that the participants would not be willing to express their actual views in a group setting. Hence, data collection was limited to face-to-face semi-structured interviews, telephone interviews, and the collection of transcripts of debates from the State’s House of Representatives and Senate. Information was also sourced from media interviews of respondents who were unavailable for face-to-face or telephone interviews, statements released on YouTube by Boko Haram and the collection of relevant articles from local newspapers from the northern states where Boko Haram is active, many unavailable electronically via the Internet and only available as hard copies. These were obtained from the national library in the federal capital, Abuja.

Figure 3: Data Collection Sources
Source: Author (2014)
1.5.1 In-Depth Semi-Structured Exploratory Interviews and Telephone Interviews

As indicated earlier, many of those contacted as potential respondents were initially reluctant to be interviewed. The researcher became reliant on the snowball sampling technique to gather respondents whilst in the field. Having gained the trust of five influential respondents willing to ask colleagues to participate in the study, the snowballing technique proved successful. For ethical reasons, and to allay the concerns of potential respondents anonymity was guaranteed and assurance was given in the form of written and signed consent documentation.

As is usual with the semi-structured interview technique a set of core questions were asked at each interview and the opportunity given for the interviewee to expand into other areas he/she felt germane (see Appendix One). The researcher was also at liberty to follow-up these unforeseen areas for research. This allowed the interviews to be conducted on the interviewees’ terms rather than the interviews following a preconceived direction (Fontana and Frey 1998: 52). Whilst this prolonged the interviews and meant that irrelevant and tangential data was collected, it ensured that
areas relevant to this research could be pursued without the interviewer having to ask leading questions. Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 1 hour 45 minutes.

A total of 40 interviews were conducted, out of the 50 initially proposed (see Appendix Two). Respondents were approached based on their area of expertise and evidence of engagement with the Boko Haram phenomenon and/or other organised political violent activities in Nigeria. Interviews were conducted with respondents from the academic field. This was based on journal articles and analytical reports published. Respondents sourced from the security sector included senior and junior officers, who had interrogated or engaged with Boko Haram and similar groups. More senior officers were interviewed than junior officers. Junior officers required clearance from senior officers on what should be termed confidential. However, information regarding the operational activities of Boko Haram, as well as supporting documents, were accessed by the researcher in the course of the interviews.

The security agencies interviewed included the State Security Service (Lagos, Abuja, Borno, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Rivers, Kano and Plateau states), Joint task force in Plateau and Borno states, Nigerian Police force in Abuja and the Counter Terrorist Unit in Abuja. The decision to interview journalists was premised on the publication and interaction with Boko Haram members. Other respondents included one undergraduate student from the University of Maiduguri in Borno state, residents in northern Nigeria and Civil servants. The aim was to get the perspective of respondents who are involved in researching, countering and analysing the Boko Haram movement as well as other organised violent groups in Nigeria. Boko Haram members were not interviewed for risk and ethical reasons. Direct Boko Haram contributions to the research were limited to audio statements released by the group. The audio recordings proved relevant as they had not been made public, and gave an insight to the motivation, recruitment and operational activities of Boko Haram.

The interview process raised ethical issues related to confidentiality. Respondents were asked to confirm that they understood the research questions and were not coerced. Consent forms were made available. Permission was also sought prior to the audio-recording of conversations. When declined, permission was sought to take notes. Anonymity was requested by almost all the respondents from the security and
government agencies. Academics were the only group content to waive anonymity (see Appendix Two). For the purpose of identifying anonymous sources, rank, organisation and geographical area of posting is used. For example, ‘senior officer from the Counter-Terrorism Unit in Abuja’. In the case of civil servants, identification by name of government ministry is used.

1.5.2 Local Newspapers from the Northern Region

The local newspapers selected were the Daily Trust and Leadership newspapers. These newspapers devote more journalistic time and space in their editions to Boko Haram than other national or regional newspapers. Selection of these newspapers was predicated on their availability from the National Library in Abuja, but also their wide area of coverage across the northern states of Nigeria and reputation for diligent journalism and objectivity. Both papers are circulated widely across 16 states in the northern region, as well as Abuja. Daily Trust has more influence within the northern region a result of its wider coverage of events in rural areas and its publication in Hausa and Arabic. Readership of these papers is not limited to the professional class. This is reflected in the wide spectrum of topics covered: international news, national news, local news, sports, arts, entertainment, politics, travel, religion, and business, although emphasis is placed on news from the northern region. Furthermore, columns for public notices, opinions and letters give evidence to its diverse readership.

Image 1: Images of Selected Newspapers
Both papers are privately owned and claim to be independent of the State; this was demonstrated by the arrest of the general manager of *Leadership* following the publication of an article critiquing the ruling party, the People’s Democratic Party (*Leadership* 2007). The accuracy of the newspapers reports concerning Boko Haram activities was cross-checked against reports from other media sources and the other core sources – interviews, transcripts of parliamentary debates and the scholarly literature. Another crucial attribute of these papers is that they cover extensively issues regarding Boko Haram crisis compared to other papers in the State. This proved useful in understanding the impact of the different perceptions of interest groups and State actors in classifying Boko Haram, the response process implemented and the socio-political environment as well as the dynamics of Boko Haram’s transformation to a dangerous terrorist organisation.

The column reserved for opinions and letters, gave voice to the a cross-section of society, albeit largely those able to read and write, including university students, unemployed youths, civil servants, blue collared workers, victims of Boko Haram violence, and religious leaders. Examples include articles published by members of the ruling and opposing parties who used this avenue to defend and reproach each other for being allies of Boko Haram (*Leadership* December 2011 and *Daily Trust* 2011). Articles targeted towards the federal government on the ineffectiveness of counter-terrorism measures by university students and professionals. Furthermore, some articles published interviews with individuals from different social classes and occupations.

1.5.3 Legislative Transcripts

The selection of transcripts of legislative debates was focused on exploring the political elite’s response before and after major violent attacks undertaken by Boko Haram. This provided an understanding the political and security terrain of the State, the idea was to illuminate the intricacies of identified elements of elite political culture in relation to governance and insecurity issues.
The initial plan was to source debate transcripts from the parliaments of northern states. This proved impossible due to the unavailability of soft or hard copies of transcripts. Hence, the study relied on the transcripts of National Assembly and Senate debates. The northern states are vigorously represented in these fora. A total of 30 transcripts was accessed and analysed, and ten were also coded. Relevant areas of counter-terrorism debated include the response process and causes of political violence.

1.5.4 Media Interviews

The decision to transcribe interviews from news reports and TV programmes was as a result of inaccessibility and unavailability of some of the initially proposed respondents. Audio interviews from media sources transcribed included interviews of Wole Soyinka, Nobel Prize author and influential political commentator in Nigeria, Shehu Sani, human rights activist, Senator and president of the civil rights congress, Ahmed Salkida, a journalist from Borno State who has interviewed Boko Haram
members, Jacob Zenn, an American expert on Boko Haram, Senator Zanna of Borno State, former President Olusegun Obasanjo, former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, Yvonne Ndege from Sahara Reporters and Elizabeth Donnelly of Chatham House. These interviews proved invaluable, as topics discussed bordered directly on research questions designed for this research.

1.5.5 YouTube Statements released by Boko Haram

A total of ten public statements released by Boko Haram were examined and this was based on availability, as a result of a ban by the Nigerian government of the group’s audio and written publications. Excerpts of Boko Haram statements recorded in journal and newspaper articles were also analysed. Examination of these statements helped to ascertain the group’s motivations and choice of tactics. Some these statements required translating from Hausa and/or Arabic. All the statements were cross-checked with the other sources used in the study.

1.5.6 Other Data Sources

The size and impact of Boko Haram has led to a growing interest in the phenomenon in both the Nigerian and international scholarly literature and the media. Both were extensively sifted as part of the initial literature review, and the large volume of material that was published up to the commencement of the writing-up process was also incorporated into the study. Much of this data and argumentation is repetitive and a particular strength of this study, are the primary data and insights provided by respondents. For this reason, evidence, data and argumentation sourced from the interviews conducted with respondents is used extensively throughout the thesis, including the contextual chapters, rather than being restricted to the substantive later chapters where the overarching argument is defended and justified.

1.6 Reviewing Methodologies for Choice of Analytical Tools

Key scholars and commentators to have addressed the Boko Haram phenomenon include Nathaniel Danjibo, Onuoha Freedom, Jacob Zenn, Abimbola Adesoji, James Forest, and John Campbell. Very little data come directly from members of Boko Haram (Onuoha 2012, Sahara Reporters 2012 and Salkida 2009).
Key analytical tools employed by these scholars include content analysis, thematic and discourse analysis. Content and discourse analytical techniques are extensively in terrorism and political violence studies, as well as in examining the emergence, causes and ideological perspectives of Boko Haram (Brinkel and Ait-Hilda 2012, Chinwokwu 2014, Idowu 2012, Omotola 2013 and Zenn 2012).

Kumar (2011: 278) stresses the importance of content analysis for examining a text and the application of this analytical tool helps to highlight the main themes and patterns that emerges from a text. Moreover, researchers in the fields of terrorism and political violence studies have applied this form of analysis to identifying the operational tactics of terrorist groups prior to an attack (Agbedo 2012), to the study of the political and ideological bases of a group (Cook 2011), and to analyse the State’s response (Crelinsten 2002, Forest 2012, Onuoha 2012 and Zenn 2012).

Jackson (2005:31) uses discourse analysis to examine the dynamics of phrases and words used to identify terrorists. In Jackson’s case this involved analysis of the US government’s counter-terrorism discourse. Similarly, in the Nigerian context, Osumah (2013), in ‘Responses of the Nigerian Defence and Intelligence Establishments to the Challenge of Boko Haram’, analyses official documents, as well as statements made by the Nigerian government. His arguments are framed using discourse analysis to explore the setbacks faced by the security forces. Likewise, Agbedo (2012) analyses the statements released by Boko Haram. In this research, a combination of discourse and content analysis was used to identify and develop patterns which ‘can assist in the identification of extremists believers in their murky domains of operations prior to the attacks’. Hardy, Harley and Philips (2004) note that using this combination of analytical tools is quite rare; there are benefits to using these tools in tandem. Both analytical tools identify meanings and relate them to the context. They examine the stability and change of issues relating to the context as well as identify and set the limits of arguments and create the limitations for probable action. This is demonstrated in research reports completed by Forest (2012) and Gourley (2012). The latter focused on the use of secondary data sources in examining Boko Haram as a strategic economic threat and the possibility of the group becoming a franchise of al-Qaeda while recommending and effective strategy to counter the group.
In addition to findings regarding the emergence of the group, its violent attacks, ideologies, leadership styles, possible links with other similar groups beyond State borders and criticism of the counter terrorism measures implemented, the research on Boko Haram is still relatively immature, yet growing given the highly negative impact of its activities on Nigerian society. The focus, to date, of research and comment has been on the cause and effect of the group’s activities, its international links and the role of external partners, notably the US, in mounting an effective counter-strategy. This study moves beyond this limited study of the character of Boko Haram, and the counter-terror strategy to explore the deeper rationales behind the rise of the movement and how its activities are sustained by the political elite and its inherent culture.

1.7 Data Analysis

![Data Analysis Process Diagram]

Figure 5: Data Analysis Process
Source: Author (2015)

As indicated in the previous section, data has been analysed using thematic, discourse and content analysis, guided by the research objectives. Discourse analysis defined by Bryman (2008) is the process of focusing on the way interrelated texts; phenomena or
events are produced within a context or social reality. This form of analysis reflects on socio-political issues and the underlying meaning behind texts or conversations (Krippendorff 2004). Emphasis is placed on analysing or rather creating an environment or context within which the text or phenomenon is examined (Bryman and Burgess 1994). Yates (2004) further describes discourse analysis as the link between the representation of facts or concepts and the knowledge and/or theories that supports them. Content analysis is focused on the frequent appearance of words, themes and phrases in a text (Richardson 2007: 237). The key trait of content analysis is the use of classifications which are usually sourced from theoretical models and ‘not limited to a certain theoretical background’ (Flick 2002: 192).

For this research discourse and content analysis of the transcribed data from interviews as well as other data sources was undertaken based on the context of Nigeria’s political and social reality. Text sourced from newspapers and other primary sources was identified, grouped and directed towards various subjects investigated. For the newspaper analysis, key categories were selected. This was as a result of these categories’ recurrent relevance to research questions. These categories were grouped into clusters, they include: language and images used to describe Boko Haram, the Nigerian State and the political elite’s response; structural issues (socio-economic, governance and political challenges); and external influences (global jihad movements). The language and images used to identify Boko Haram activities were analysed as rhetoric, which served as a determining factor in the State’s choice of response to Boko Haram. These clusters were cross-examined with selected themes identified from a content analysis of the text. The figure below is a sample of the thematic analysis process of the content of newspapers selected.
Likewise, content, thematic and discourse analysis of data sourced from interviews and legislative debates were analyzed in similar fashion with the exemption of visual analysis that is the exclusion of pictures depicting the debate proceedings. Figure 9 illustrates samples of the coding process. Colors, letters and numbers were used to identify reoccurring themes and categories in order to track the frequency of occurrence and relevance to research objectives and aim.

Figure 6: Sample of Thematic analysis of Newspaper Content
Source: Author
1.8 Triangulation

Olsen (2009) defines triangulation as the ‘mixing of data and methods’ in order to achieve diverse viewpoints or standpoint of a topic investigated. This research as indicated above adopted a combination of data sources and analytical methods. For example in cases were respondents observations were perceived to be bias or lacking in evidence, data sourced was crossreferenced with other data sources such as newspaper reports or other respondents views. Furthermore, answers to research questions were sourced from all data gathered, hence ensuring access to different facets of the same reality or question examined. Yeasmin and Rahman (2012) stress the importance of triangulation process for the purpose of verification and validity. This process ensured that information gathered from the field were subject to a thorough process of cross checking, for instance data sourced from security officers from the State security service was cross referenced with data from the joint task force as well as other security agencies and news reports. This research implementation of triangulation was limited to the mixture of primary and secondary data sources. For
example respondents’ assertions were cross-referenced with existing scholarly empirical findings, public records of events, other respondents’ claims and historical records. The same was done for data sourced from newspapers, legislative transcripts and other secondary data sources.

1.9 Research Limitations

The first set of challenges related to access to Boko Haram members, supporters and fighters. This was not possible for ethical and risk reasons. The direct involvement of Boko Haram spokesmen was restricted to its statements made through videos and audio files uploaded to Internet sites such as You Tube.

The second set of challenges involved access to geographical locations of Boko Haram activities, this was as a result of ethical consideration grounded on security constraints. As such, it was difficult to access respondents’ views in these locations as well as source legislative debates from state parliaments to analyse the northern political elite’s thinking and activities. However this was mitigated by contacting respondents through telephone interviews, although this reduced the number of contactable respondents.

The third set of challenges included limited availability of respondents from the political elite. This was mitigated by access to, and the examination of newspaper, articles and TV interviews of statements, actions and debates of individual members of the elite relevant to the research aim and objectives.

The fourth set of challenges included the sensitivity of the Boko Haram case study and the investigation of Boko Haram activities by the security agencies and government officials. There was limited data regarding the organization’s operations and the response process of the government and security agencies. This posed two problems: standardized or general answers given by security officials and the difficulty in accessing the accuracy of information sourced. To address this challenge, the ethical credential of the research needed to be emphasises and water-tight in terms of the anonymity and confidentiality processes. In addition all data gathered was subject to rigorous cross-checking against other source material gathered.
In addition to these limitations, the expanding violent activities of Boko Haram during the period of research ensured a more published scholarly and media material. Whilst this might be regarded as a positive development, these sources proved inconsistent, speculative and usually repetitive.

The fifth set of challenges involved the relative reliance on the responses of the interviewees. This was again mitigated by cross-checking against the combination of data sources – legislative transcripts, semi-structured interviews, newspaper analysis and media interviews all addressing the same questions simultaneously. Although this was time consuming, it proved effective and ensured the reliability and validity of findings.

1.10 Thesis Structure

This first chapter fulfils the functions of an introduction stating the over-arching aim and the subsidiary objectives; clarifying and defining key terms; providing an overview of the argument and the chapter structure. It also details the methodology used for the research process, explaining how the evidence and data analysed in the later chapters was collected. Chapters two and three are broadly contextual, and combined also fulfill the role of a literature review. Chapter two explores the bases of the core concept at the heart of the thesis, Nigeria’s political elite and its inherent attitude to governance/government, predicated as a ‘culture’. Chapter three examines overlapping conceptualisations of organized violence, exploring how organised violence in Nigeria, whilst ostensibly driven by religious and/or ethnic factors, is essentially political in nature, as well as the nexus between political violence and terrorism. Chapter three also defends the use of multiple theories as analytical tools used in the analysis of evidence and data in later chapters. Both these chapters also make use of material gathered from primary sources including interviews with respondents, transcripts of legislative debates and statements in northern newspapers, rather than restricting the content to an analysis of the secondary source material.

Chapter four specifically analyses the development of the Nigerian political environment: the political elite’s culture and how this affects its approach to
governance/government, and its concomitant relationship with organised political violence in Nigeria stressing the fundamental role of the leite in generating and sustaining political violence.

Chapter five analyses the influence of religion in Nigerian politics, concentrating in the context of this research, on Islamic religious associations and sects. The aim of chapter five is to analyze the influence of religion as a cover for political violence and as a tool used by the elite to acquire legitimacy.

Chapter six specifically focusses on Boko Haram, analysing how the emergence and evolution of Boko Haram are intrinsically linked with the political culture of the Nigerian elite and its reliance on co-opting violent elements from within social movements, such as the precursors to Boko Haram, in order to coerce the electorate.

Chapter seven analyses the response of the Nigerian political elite in its role as State and/or state government to political violence, notably Boko Haram, exploring the negative impact of the government(s) phased response in terms of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism strategies.

Chapter eight concludes the thesis, drawing the the findings of the subsidiary objectives in order to defend and justify the thesis overarching argument concerning the primacy of elite responsibility for the mergence and substance of Boko Haram.
CHAPTER TWO

CONTEXTUALISING ELITE POLITICAL CULTURE: THE LINK TO ORGANISED VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

2.0 Introduction

The discourse of organised violence in Nigeria is dominated by specific elements such as identity politics, corruption and socio-economic challenges. The transfer of power from one government to another in Nigeria is shadowed by violence. The prevalence of organised political violent activities is not limited to electoral periods, or the period of military rule, but rather is a reflection of the political and social environment in Nigeria. Hence, organised violent activities are a consistent factor in Nigeria’s existence. This thesis argues that there is a direct link between organised political violent, governance and elite political culture in Nigeria.

This chapter serves as the groundwork for the examination of selected elements of governance and elite political culture that facilitates the emergence and sustenance of organised political violent groups in Nigeria. A search amongst current literature yielded little on the nexus between elements of elite political culture, governance and the emergence and sustenance of organised political violent groups in Nigeria.

2.1 Defining Political Elite

Higley (2010) defines elites as ‘persons who by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organisations and movements are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially’. Although Higley’s definition of elites as he stated is indicative of political reflections, notwithstanding classical descriptions of elites depend largely on the political domination, political capacity and skills of these individuals within the society (Pareto 1935, Mosca 1939 and Machiavelli). In addition, current definitions of elites classifies these individuals as a select group who control resources, control large amount of power, make and influence decisions affecting political outcomes without being immediately curbed (Mills 1970, Vergara 2013, Kirfordu 2011, Walker 1966, Khosravi and Fard 2016). As such, elites are not
limited to individuals who are superior in a specific field as indicated by Bottomore (1990), but includes individuals whose decisions and interests shape and influence political outcomes. In essence these individuals are termed as powerful and often times identified as the ruling elite (Higley 2010, Aaron 1991 and Mills 1970).

Francis maintains that ‘all societies no matter their ideology or social structure are in fact ruled by a small group of individuals designated variously as political elite’(2011:10). Zukerman (1977), however, argues that there are complexities involved in the interpretation of the concept of political elite. Zukerman highlights the problem of recognising who the political elite are and the dynamics of their power influence within the political environment. Mills identified top business executives as part of the elite, whose interests are considered in political decisions in exchange for financial resources in political campaigns. Furthermore, a State where religion is an influencing factor in the political environment tends to identify religious leaders with influence as part of the elite (Mueller 2012). This is currently captured in Nigeria’s political environment.

This thesis acknowledges the diversification of political elite and their difference in ideologies in Nigeria (religious leaders, political leaders, traditional leaders, top government officials and military leaders) however this research concentrates on two ideals shared by the aforementioned groups. These are; to access political power and to maintain control of political power.

Addressing Zukerman’s observation on the dynamics of the political elite’s influence within the political environment, Francis’s (2011) identifies the political elite as those who rule society, clearly recognising the impact of political elite on shaping political behaviour in the State. Furthermore, Pareto’s (cited in Delican 2000) definition of the political elite as individuals who are directly connected or linked to the governing authority validates Francis’s identification of the political elite as members of the governing authority, and their networks explaining the influence of this select group of people on political behaviour. This observation highlights the connection between political elite behaviour and its impact or influence in shaping the existing political culture. Francis (2011) asserts that ‘key characteristics of any society – political culture or behaviour are consequences of the characteristics of the political elite.
Hence, the political elite not only have this power but apply this power in the political environment and by so doing shape the political culture. Mosca (cited in Higley 2010) identifies the political elite as members of the ruling class, those with large financial resources and whose influences are recognised by those in power.

Mosca identification of the political elite as members of the ruling class serves as criteria for elite membership; hence individuals identified as political elites are depicted as part of the ruling class. In the same vein, studies by, Mosca (1939) Dahl (1958) and Keller (1991) points to political elite membership dependent on member’s ‘strategic positions’, significantly political positions within a society. As such members of the political elites are composed of individuals within the ruling class - political, religious or traditional rulers as portrayed within the Nigerian political environment. As opposed to Holme (2008) view on the inclusion of professional or experts in specific fields as members of the political elite, applied to the Nigerian context, members of the political elites dating from 1960 till date are limited to civilian and military politicians. Those whom Higley (2010) described as individuals with the ‘organised capacity to make real political trouble without being promptly repressed’. Notwithstanding Kirfordu (2011:27) argues that professionals or experts in specific fields might not be part of political elite composition in Nigeria, however they are classed as useful tools in political elites networks in attaining and maintaining political power in the State. In addition Kirfordu (2011:28) maintains that there is a prevalence of common political elite background in Nigeria. This background is indicative of ‘narrow interests perpetuated through informal networks for retaining political office positions and converting formal institutional roles to particular uses’. This assertion is supported by Baba (2015), Taylor and Williams (2008), they argue that the political elite structure in Nigeria depends on State resources (crude oil revenues) as a means for accessing political power and wealth.

Higley’s definition of the political elite identifies an important element which is the political elite’s ability to orchestrate political events that could lead to cases of organised violence as well as demonstrates the power and influence of this select group of people in the political environment. This thesis identifies the political elite as powerful players who, although they may not belong to the same political network, share the same goals of exercising political power and the economic advantages of
exercising power. In the Nigerian context, and for the purposes of this research the political elite includes the president, ministers and other elected federal parliamentarians; state governors, commissioners and other state legislators; local government chairmen; traditional rulers (often also religious leaders in northern Nigeria); certain influential religious leaders; executives of major companies; and senior military officers. It is not the aim of the research to explore the internal dynamics of political elite membership, but rather to investigate the impact of a tacit political elite culture on the incipient means and methods of social movements responding to the governance strategies of the political elite.

2.2 Elite Political Culture Definition within Context

The broad application of the term culture limits the development of a universal accepted definition of culture across the different fields of study (Tharp n.d). In the fields of anthropology and sociology, culture is applied as a term to define the beliefs, languages, myths, morals, values, religious practices and the daily lives of people in a political environment. Swidler (1986) analyses culture as ‘strategies of actions, persistent ways of ordering actions through time’. If Swidler definition of culture is understood, then the continuous ‘strategic actions’ of individuals over a period of time serves as a process that influences and shapes the culture of these individuals. Hence this thesis maintains that the political culture of political elite in Nigeria is influenced and shaped by the actions of the political elite, as will be demonstrated in succeeding chapters. Likewise Jawondo (2011) stresses that man’s influence on his socio-political and physical environment make up his culture.

Political culture is a broad term and not easy to define (Reisinger 1995). Bove (2002) argues that the presence of similar elements in the concept of political culture does not necessarily explain the behaviours and orientation of individuals and mass of the population towards politics in a society. As such, Rosenbaum (1975:6) and Almond (2006) propose the need to clarify the core components attached to political culture to address the implications of political actors’ behaviours and orientations in the political environment. Likewise, Welch (2013) argues that while political culture does not explain the behaviour of individuals, it however focuses on the political outcomes of
political actors or in the case of this thesis the outcome or consequences of political elite actions and decisions. As such in this research, definitions and interpretation of this concept will be aligned to an examination of political elite actions and impact on the emergence and sustenance of organised political violence in Nigeria.

Welch (2013:2) claims that, despite the diversity of approaches taken by scholars in the area of political culture, there seems to be a broad agreement as to its definition and its impact on a State’s political environment. Reisinger (1995:2) describes political culture as ‘referring to the cross national study of values’ within a State which is ‘a key component of the entire political system’. Political culture depicts the way each aspect of culture, including ethnicity, belief systems and ideology, and significantly the representatives of these sub-cultures can affect or influence political behaviour at all levels of the State. In the same vein, Almond (2006) argues that political culture is the product of a ‘collective history’ of the political system and individuals involved in the political system, rooted in the behaviour, values and interests of the political actors. This thesis agrees with Almond, ultimately finding that political elite values and actions shapes or influences elite political culture which impacts on the approach to governance and the population’s response to governance outcomes. Furthermore, Elazar (1972) stresses that political culture is shaped by an individual that is political elite beliefs and perceptions about governance, in particular how they think and their approach to governance. This view is supported by Baba (2015) who argues that elite political culture is shaped by the values of the political elite. These values according to Omodia (2011) include limited populace political participation, patronage politics, and zero sum politics, further examined in successive chapters.

Jones (1992) and Diamond (1993:8) contend that political culture focuses on elements of behaviour, that is the behaviour of political actors (political elites), behaviour shaped by past events and cultural norms, and that the behaviour of political actors influences governance policies. The Nigerian political environment gives credence to the approach to political culture adopted by Reisinger, Almond and Jones where ethnicity, religion and personal interests of political actors shape and influence the selection and electoral campaigns of political leaders.
Almond and Verba cited in Chilton (1988) defined political culture as ‘a system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situations in which political action takes place’. From Almond and Verba’s definition it is inferred that the political actions of the political elite are inclined towards a consistent pattern of behaviour influenced by the personal interests and values of the elite. This is reflected in Nigeria’s political history, where the behaviour of the political elite is the same in cases of electoral campaigns and in the approach to governance. As such, collective and individual attitudes towards politics are expected to impact on the trends of political culture exhibited in the Nigerian political environment. Therefore, the political elite’s approach to governance is strongly influenced by the values attached to the governance process consequent on the elite’s understanding of access to State power.

Reisinger (1995) stressed the importance of isolating the group whose culture is being examined; in this case the political elite, recognising the presence of multiple cultures within a State. He emphasises the influence of sub-groups cultures on other groups within a society. Matlosa (2003) also contends that the political culture of key political actors has an ‘enormous impact’ on the political system and governance process. More recently, Baba (2015) has also argued that the political culture is the driver behind the approach to governance of the political elite which itself is the main reason for the establishment of social movements. In this thesis, the political elite’s approach to State governance, resulting in misgovernance, and the response of the population to this misgovernance lies at the heart of the overarching argument. It is the wider population’s ‘knowledge and beliefs about politics and feelings with respect to politics’ (Almond 1990:144) that gives rise to the social discontent and the formation of social movements. That section of the population that decides to rely on ethnic, religious, ideological or social ties, by supporting social movements, as a means of communication with the governing authority is a recognisable response exploited by the political elite. This pattern of behaviour is equally reminiscent of the elite’s behaviour in relation to political campaigns and patronage networks. Notably, the political elite’s tacit consent to access and maintain power either through violent or non-violent means is made possible by the support of existing sub-groups within the State. These sub-groups are in possession of different beliefs and values. The
outcome often being the ultimate use of violence and the transformation of social movements into organised political violent groups.

Khosravi and Fard (2016) define elite political culture as the pattern of behaviours, mind sets and values of those who influence political outcomes. Hence elite political culture is shaped by the interests and actions of the political elite. Inglehart (2000) studies on political culture supports this assertion. He maintains that ‘cultural values depend on different value systems’ developed by political actors involved. Furthermore, Camp (2001) posits that the values of political elite in relation to State power and governance are translated into the populace view of State governance and their assessment of political elite performance. This view maintains that political elite actions shape and influences elite political culture and its role in the populace response to political outcomes as a result of political elite values.

2.2.1 Elite Political Culture; the Link to Organised Violence

Since Nigeria gained independence in 1960 the country has suffered a history of political and electoral violence which has persisted during both military and civilian regimes. Two notable phenomena have been the consistent calls for a move towards ‘good governance’ to replace the misgovernance that has prevailed for much of the country’s independent history. This is reflected in the frequent violent campaigns by organised groups in the State and the increased demand for good governance practices. The prevailing political violence is influenced by the decisions and behaviours of the political elite in relation to access to State power. This thesis proposes that the attitude towards governance is based on the elite political cultural elements – zero sum politics, identity politics and politicisation of social cleavages have served as a catalyst for the emergence of organised political violent groups. These elements of the elite’s political culture, shaped by decades of violence, ethnic and religious rivalries, low performance of the governing authority, politicisation of conflicts and the governance processes, have affected the approach to governance by the political elite.
Figure 7: Key Elements of Elite Political Culture
Source: Author (2015)

Anazode, Uchenna and Uche (2010) characterised Nigeria’s history of ineffective governance as a result of the prevailing political culture. Omodia (2011) referred to the negative perception of the government and its governance process by the populace due to the interference of the political elite in governance processes. This research argues that the populace in Nigeria are involved in politics. Baba (2015) and Jawondo (2011) maintains that the populace’ involvement in politics is manifested in the development of social movement groups allied with political parties for political representation. The shortcomings of governance have led to structural and institutional weakness and in response the establishment of social movement groups whose goals have been, at least ostensibly, to leverage change from state and federal government. However, the underlying elite political culture, as well as the elite’s role in government, created an enabling environment that ensured alliances between these groups and interested members of the political elite. Chapter four will further explore this contention using network analysis, rational choice theory and the global surveillance mode of warfare framework.
The political elite’s attitude towards governance, embedded in its political culture, has created space for organised political violence in Nigeria. Gurr asserts that, given prolonged extreme frustration with government, people will eventually resort to violence (Gurr 1970:24). Likewise, Omotola argues that:

If you go through the history of Nigeria, you discover that any strategy outside violence in your engagement with the Nigerian state is like entering into a dialogue with the dead, because over the years successive Nigerian governments have demonstrated their low appreciation for dialogue in resolving issues, until groups resort to violence in their demands, either legitimate or not, they hardly get any government attention and there are so many examples… (Interview, Omotola 2013)

Omotola’s observation is reflected in the case of the Niger Delta crisis, where subsequent calls for socio-economic development through non-violent and administrative channels were ignored by the government. The implementation of violent strategies by Niger Delta social movement groups finally secured the attention of the government. The same was also reflected in the eastern and western parts of Nigeria, although the challenges were limited to insecurity and political inclusion respectively. Another crucial aspect is the impact of the existing culture of violence and zero sum politics element of the elite political culture. Okeke and Chukwuka (2005) assert that the influence of military rule impacts on the political orientation of the elite. This assertion is supported by Mr S, a senior state security officer:

Under the military era there was no active involvement of the people, a lot of governance was done by fiat. There was no participation of the people…and where dissent was expressed it was forcefully put down (Interview, Mr S 2013).

Mr S observation is supported by Siollun’s (2009) findings on the violent culture of the military elite during the military regime. Significantly is the presence of these military elite in the current political system and the impact of their political values on State governance. Hence, despite the advent of civilian rule, elements of the military style of governance persisted. These elements include the dictatorial culture of the elite, access to political power through violence; especially during elections, and a refusal to relinquish power as evidenced by the presence of retired military officers in
key government positions. The above mentioned are interpreted in this thesis as values of the political elites. In particular, the military style of governance is reflected in the pervasive use of violence by the government to achieve stated objectives or as an expression of communication. Key examples include the use of political thugs which is a constant during elections at the different levels of government and the wider the use of violence to suppress dissent. For example, the 1999 Odi massacre during Obasanjo’s civilian government, and the use of violence by social movement groups to influence government decisions. In the same vein, Hayes and McAllister (2005) argue that the dependence on violence by the governing authority ensures the survival of this phenomenon. Nigeria’s history of political violence gives credence to this observation. This assertion is supported by Lafantasie (2011) who argues that, in addition to the historical existence of violence as part of the political culture, the absence of good governance or government misrule are at the root of organised violence in a society. The centrality of violence to elite political culture coupled with a record of unsatisfactory governance creates the perfect scenario for the creation of an enabling environment for the emergence and sustenance of organised violent groups.

Elite political culture is linked to the high concentration of power at the executive level, the strong influence of religion and ethnicity instigated by the political elite in the political sphere and the ideology of financial reward. Nigeria’s political history records a high concentration of power at the executive level. Siollun (2009) and Omodia (2011) maintain that the high concentration of power at the executive level is a deliberate move by the political elite to maintain or control State power and by extension State resources. In addition Siollun and Omodia’s assertions are reflected in the challenges of limited political participation and the recycling of top government officials and leaders in the State. These contentions not only highlight the values of the political elites but also indicates how these values shapes the prevailing elite political culture. Hill (2012:53) identifies this phenomenon as the precursor of conflicts and clashes between social groups. Hill’s observation, while highlighting the dynamics of ethnic and religious conflicts as a result of political competition, draws attention to the negative outcome of Nigeria’s current political system that concentrates power at the executive level meaning that decisions are taken at the executive level, a level wholly dominated by members of the political elite.
Furthermore, the influence of ethnicity and religion in the political sphere is fostered by the political elite recognition of these social groups as tools for political mobilisation and in some cases political legitimacy. A senior state security officer in northern Nigeria in response to the politicisation of religion for political mobilisation by the political elite states:

There is a correlation between religion and politics and that is why we have problems dealing with violent groups…one of the things which has caused this violence is there were certain political forces who were benefiting from these movements mandate (Interview, Mr K 2013)

In the same vein, Mr S shares the same view with Mr K, he maintains that:

…people have always appropriated religious sentiments to further their political interests in this instance too, that was clear in the case of the romance between Borno state governor at that time and elements of Boko Haram (Interview, Mr S 2013)

Likewise, Reisinger (1995) asserts that sub-cultures and social groups within a society influence and impact political behaviour. In effect, Nigeria’s pre- and post-independence period records the entrenching of ethnic and religious divisions as a means to access or garner popular support by the elite. This pattern of political behaviour, whilst evident in other polities, has proven a reliable and egregious source of violence in Nigeria. Examples include the eruption of inter-ethnic clashes in periods leading to elections in the Niger Delta region and religious clashes in northern Nigeria during and shortly after the elections. In essence, the creation of an environment conductive for violence is made possible by the importance of violent coercion to elite political culture.

The ideology of reward-seeking as being synonymous with exercising power is a core element of elite political culture. Various scholars and analysts both domestic and international (Onuoha 2012; Abimbola 2010; Campbell 2012; Forest 2012; and Perouse de Montclos 2014) consistently highlight the predominant trait of corruption and lack of transparency in the governance process, fuelled by patronage networks.
These observations are further validated by reports of missing funds and structural challenges. As such, the political elite’s approach to governance has resulted in a backlash given concrete form by the establishment of social movement groups. This observation is supported by Baba (2015), who asserts that the formation of social movement groups in Nigeria is a direct response to popular frustration. Likewise, the transformation of these social movement groups to organised political violent groups is catalysed by the adoption and manipulation of these groups’ goals by the political elite.

2.3 Governance

The purpose of this section is to highlight that aspect of State governance process that allows political elite interference that leads to unsatisfactory outcomes of governance with violent results. A selection of relevant definitions and interpretations of State governance are examined in an effort to identify and examine the political elite’s interference in State governance. Noteworthy, is this thesis’ interpretation of State governance and the political elite’s practice of governance as interchangeable, due to an overlap of both evidenced in Nigeria.

The word ‘governance’ applies to administrative processes within an organisation and public affairs. Hence, governance as a concept has shifted from the legitimate authority to administer the affairs of a State to a more particular idea relating to perceived ‘goods’ such as transparency, accountability and efficiency. Hence, the ubiquity in policy papers of the phrase ‘good governance’ as an end often cited, but ill-defined and contentious measure of whether these ‘goods’ are actually delivered (Lee 2003 and Fukuyama 2013). The words ‘governance’ and ‘government’ are often used interchangeably (Peters 2011, Mayntz 2001 and Fukuyama 2013). However, Rhodes (1996) cautions that while there are similarities in traits relating to governance and government, it should not be applied interchangeably. This thesis identifies ‘governance’ as the process, and ‘government’ as the individual(s) legitimately authorised to direct that process at federal and state level. Accordingly, the process of governance is subjected to the government or the ruling authority in a State.
Overlapping power relationships between the political elite and government lies at the heart of this thesis.

The recent scholarly and practical preoccupation with the idea of governance has led to an extensive and diverse literature. Peters (2011) contends that governance ‘can be shaped to conform to the intellectual preference of the individual author’. Therefore, the process of State governance varies from State to State. Different governments adopt, adapt and formulate governance approaches suited to their respective needs or in the case of this thesis the needs of the political elite and government officials. As such, the governing authority develops an understanding and representation of governance dependent on its pre-conceived notions or the precedents of its governance processes. This indicates a pattern of governance behaviour subsequent to change dependent on the ruling authority and the political elite’s perception of governance. Rhodes (1996) argues that, while governance is an administrative tool for the government, the process involved is not dependent on the government or ruling authority. He maintains that governance refers to ‘self-organizing, inter-organizational networks’ (Rhodes 1996). The government is not necessarily involved in all aspects of the process but relies on networks, for example as part of the privatisation and contracting of public services. In contrast, studies on governance by Fukuyama (2013), Peters (2011) and Mayntz (2001) identify governance as a tool used by the government for the administration of their affairs and the extension of government to include non-State actors in State management. For the most part the process of governance is not limited to the ruling authority but spans across networks comprising of relational non-State actors whose interests in State affairs coincides with the government. In particular, the governance process in Nigeria is centred on the ruling authority. The inclusion of networks in this process is limited to the discretion of the political elite and their patronage networks.

World Bank defined governance as,

The tradition and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies;
and the respect of citizens and the State institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (World Bank 2007).

Similarly, the United Nations Commission of Global Governance defines governance as,

A continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interest may be accommodated and co-operative actions may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interests.

These definitions focus on the election of governments and the management of the State through the effective administration of institutions by the ruling authority. Stoker (1998) contends that governance in the 21st century, especially in the developed world, involves partnership between the State and non-State actors in the administration of State affairs particularly in infrastructural services and the social environment. Furthermore emphasis is not placed on a distinct political system of governance for States. This observation is supported by Fukuyama (2013) who argues that governance is not dependent on the political system but rather on capacity and autonomy. Governance is a fundamental requirement of any form of government. As such governance is an administrative and managerial process. A process requiring the presence of institutions as indicated by the above definitions to function, regardless of the political system practiced. Nonetheless, the definitions above indicate the departure of governance as a process of managing State resources in favour of the creation, development and inclusion of institutions to facilitate the governance process. This is the case in Nigeria. It is inferred that governance as defined by the UN and World Bank should contain elements for the formulation and implementation of policies that ensures nation-building and national security. Furthermore, these definitions legitimise the use of force as an element of governance in relation to the implementation of policies judged to be in the interest of the State. Another key observation from the definitions above is the allusion to the absence of politics in the governance process. Fukuyama (2013) asserts that autonomy – absence of political interference – should be an element of governance in order to ensure effectiveness in the governance process. On the contrary, in Nigeria political interference in the
governance process is a key component of governance. This argument is further examined in chapter four.

The World Bank definition refers to ‘tradition’ in government selection and the exercise of authority. Tradition may be defined as a pattern of behaviour that is transferred from one generation to another and impacts on reality (Graburn 2001). This thesis argues that, in the Nigerian context, there is a ‘traditional’ relationship between the political elite culture and government. Therefore, tradition is construed to be the principles that govern the political behaviour of a society and by extension its governing officials, in this case, the tradition towards governance by the political elite. The acquisitive approach of the government/political elite influences the outcomes of governance activities. Therefore, the government’s perception of governance might not reflect the universal expectation of governance (Peters 2011). However, the World Bank and UN definitions depict governance as a process concentrated on State development, growth and service provision to the population within a political territory. Rather the expected outcome of governance by the populace, and the interpretation of governance by the ruling authority, are dependent on the existing manifestation and historical representation of governance in the State. Likewise, Rosenau (1992: 21) argues that the concept of governance which includes institutions and informal mechanisms is ‘a system of rules accepted by the majority’. Therefore, the process of governance is influenced by preconceived notions and the motivations of the governing officials.

Stoker (1998) defines governance as ‘ultimately concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action’. Stoker further observes that governance activities are concentrated on the development of institutions by the government and the inclusion of non-State actors in State governance, which is in line with the core premise of the thesis that the nexus between the political elite culture and government impacts governance, which generate violence. For example, the Hisbah, the Islamic police located in the northern majority Muslim states, a quasi-autonomous non-governmental agency, play a contentious role in maintaining Islamic religious laws, but are also accused of provoking violence between the diverse religious communities in the areas in which they operate. Stoker’s depiction of governance identifies a departure from the ruling authority being exclusively
responsible for governance, and the inclusion of the private and non-governmental sectors in governance. However, Finer’s (1970:3-4) definition of governance confines governance to the responsibility of the State; he defines governance as ‘a condition for ordered rule…those people charged with the duty of governing or governors’. Both definitions highlight the element of ‘ordered rule’. It follows that an environment conducive for ordered rule, in essence ‘national security’ is an essential outcome of governance therefore giving consideration to national security. In the same vein, Peters (2011) portrays governance as a tool for collective action in State administration which is the inclusion of State and non-State actors in the management of State affairs. This view is shared by Rhodes (1996), who maintains that modern day States involve the private sector, non-governmental sector and other agencies to achieve policy goals – for example public private partnership. The central government is not supreme, not if they determine the terms and conditions of the delegation and outsourcing. Stoker (1998) argues that State power, despite the blurring of lines between public and private sectors in the business of governance is concentrated within the ruling authority or political elite. This corresponds with C.W Mills’ study on the relationship between ‘sprecial interest groups’, analogous with ‘social movements’ in Nigeria, and government in which he accepts that links exist between the two, but finds that government always maintain primacy in this relationship. Peters and Rhodes definition of governance highlights the development of institutions for collective actions but fail to emphasise these institutions being managed by individuals or networks of individuals whose decisions are influenced and characterised by the behaviour and interests of these individuals. As such, the activities of governance are dependent on the collective interactions of actors within the institutions regardless of the political system of governance practiced by the State.

Fukuyama’s (2013) definition of governance focuses on the additional element of ‘the performance of agents in carrying out the wishes of the principals’. He identifies agents as the governing authority and principals as the citizens or electorates. Fukuyama is not concerned with the political system of governance, but rather concentrates on the outcomes of governance. That is, the quality of services and the process itself. Therefore, Fukuyama argues that governance, with inclusion or exclusion of non-State actors, should be a balance of capacity and autonomy. That is governance process should include professional bureaucratic staff with an expectation
of positive outcomes and its existence should not be dependent on the particular political system practiced by the State, specifically the inclusion of the political elite and their patronage networks as reflected in Nigeria.

The definitions and interpretations of governance cited above captured governance either as State centric or a combination of State and non-State actors in the administration of State affairs. The elements or characteristics of governance include exercise of authority, management of State affairs, leadership selection and interactions between State and non-State actors. Significant is the use of institutions by the governing authority in its operations. Furthermore, the implication of individuals as an important element of governance implies the process of governance and by extension policies being influenced by the interests and behaviour of these individuals. As such the outcome and quality of governance is not limited to the process or operations involved, but rather the competence, or otherwise, and the outlook and interests of the individuals involved, in this case the Nigerian political elite.

Governance applied in this thesis is not focused on the legitimacy of the political system adopted or the merits of the combination of State and non-State actors in governance operations. It is focused on the actual outcomes of the governance process on the emergence and sustenance of organised political violent groups in Nigeria. Emphasis is placed on the government and the political elite-patronage networks influence on governance and the resulting violence.

2.3.1 Political Elite Attitude towards Governance in Nigeria

Recall that this thesis identifies the political elite as persons with the power to influence and make decisions that affect the political environment. In 1999, State governance by the military which had been the norm for much of the country’s independent history was replaced by civilian rule prompting the anticipation of a more effective system of governance and a more substantive role for civil society and non-state actors (Arowolo and Aluko 2012). Good governance became the zeitgeist. This was a vital juncture for the political elite in Nigeria. The political elite, formerly
largely uniformed officers (see Chapter Four), expanded to include, not only former soldiers, but aspirant and proto-elite individuals from other sections of Nigerian society. The key priority at this juncture for would-be members of the elite was to put themselves in a position to exercise authority. Thus, a primary area for the elite involvement was the manipulation of the electoral process. Rhodes (1996) and Arowolo and Aluko (2012) claim a link between zero sum politics, the absence of ‘good governance’ and political violence. This was the case during the period of military rule, when military rulers used violence to access and maintain power, thus creating an environment where violence became a form of communication between the government and the populace. This thesis suggest that the constant use of violence by the political elite and government officials at the local, state and national level for political benefits has not only encouraged violence but created a market, or an industry, for organised political violent activities. In addition this also shaped an elite political culture that depends or capitalises on violence for access to State power. This phenomenon is indicative of the role political thuggery in federal and local elections, itself organised and encouraged by the political elite. Power is concentrated within this set of individuals which tacitly impacts governance (see Chapters Four and Eight). This departs markedly from ‘ordered rule’; a key outcome of governance whereby violence is only justifiable when it is used by the legitimate government for national security in the interest of the populace and not for the elite’s personal interests.

Higley (2010:161) highlights the difficulties in demonstrating the political elite’s complicity in political violence in order to explain the prevalence of political instability and organised violence in States. However he argues that disagreements within the political elite networks can create an opening for violence. The political elite view political power as their right and command, as well as depend, on organised violent groups for support. This is reflected in Nigeria where rivalries between members of the political elite are invariably expressed by violence (see Chapter 3). Political parties, such as the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) have been recorded to have alliances with organised violent groups to secure electoral victories or political objectives (see Chapters Four and Eight). Thus, the members of the political elite discovered that in stirring up popular discontent and social movements against, for example, rampant corruption, their own
malpractice might be turned to their own advantage with violent elements within these social movements co-opted to provide thugs to manipulate the electorate. Mr B, a senior security officer in northern Nigeria argues:

Organised violent groups who use terror acts like Boko Haram are as a result of an agitation against the elite, failure of government to meet the needs of the people…along the line, politicians found these groups as a conduit in fostering their ambitions (Interview, Mr B, 2014).

Mr B’s assertion is reflected in the political violent activities of the Bakassi Boys and Niger Delta Militants. How the elite co-opt specific communities and causes and their respective social movements, established as platforms to protest against elite malpractice, is analysed later in the thesis.

While Higley’s view on the political elite’s overwhelming influence on politics and governance downplays the power of the masses, Walker (1966) maintains that ‘citizens at large’ do understand the governance process. Findings from Afro-barometer (2008, 2009 & 2013) indicate that 80% of the Nigerian population understand the political system and know what they expect from the governance process. Moreover, a large percentage of the population expressed distrust of elected government officials at all levels. Correspondently, these negative conclusions are reflected in the establishment of social movements or groups whose activities are geared towards influencing governance policies to address these many complaints. Mr S observed that:

With the advent of democracy in 1999, there was a feeling of freedom amongst the people who came out to express their dissatisfaction with the government and try to actualise their demand through the formation of social movement groups…it has been convenient for politicians to use those groups (Interview, Mr S, 2013)

Specific examples of these movements include Bakassi, a vigilante group formed in response to widespread criminality, MEND, an umbrella group formed for the socio-economic emancipation of the Niger Delta region and Oodua’s Peoples Congress
formed in response to limited political participation (Examined in Chapters Four and Five).

The political elite perception of governance is grounded on the existing system of political corruption. This is supported by Ikejiaku (2013) who argues that political elite complicity is a result of financial interests. He contends that ‘incompetence’ in State governance ensures high levels of political corruption consequently leading to high levels of poverty and insecurity. Hence supporting Fukuyama’s assertion that governance should be shielded from political interference, and the need to maintain a high level of professionalism. Ikejiaku’s claim is validated by the examination of past regimes in Nigeria. The absence of accountability spurred populace discontent leading to the establishment of social movement groups prone to transmute into violent groups (Ikejiaku 2013). Oche of the Nigerian Institute of International Relations agrees:

...I perceive the Nigerian State that is primarily controlled by an elite that is disconnected from the masses of the people that does not take cognisance of the basic needs of ordinary people...and when groups results to violent activities...it is actually a consequence of contradictions of governance stirred up by the political elite (Interview, Oche, 2013)

2.4 Conclusion

Elite political culture and its interface with governance is at the root of the emergence and sustenance of organised violence in the State. This chapter argues that the negative outcome of the governance process is a function of elite political culture in Nigeria. This was examined in relation to the political behaviour and orientation of the political elite, which highlighted the preference for the use of violence to access and sustain State power, the ideology that access to State power equals pecuniary rewards and the creation of patronage networks. Hence the re-occurring pattern of elite political culture in relation to government selection and the motivation behind access to State power directly impacted on the quality of governance.
As a result of the above, the outcome of governance was below the expectation of the populace. Therefore warranting the development of social movement groups as a requirement to access and advocate for better services from the government. However, as a consequence of the political culture and attitude of the political elite towards governance, these social movement groups through alliances with the political elite amidst other structural factors were subsequently transformed to organised violent groups, the process of this transformation in relation to the key argument of this chapter is analysed in succeeding chapters.
CHAPTER THREE

CONTEXTUALISING ORGANISED VIOLENT ACTIVITIES IN NIGERIA

3.0 Introduction

Whilst Boko Haram’s adoption of the terror tactics employed by other jihadi groups across the globe marks a shift in the extremity of political violence in Nigeria, this thesis argues that the causative and enabling factors remain same. The previous chapter contextualised the concept of governance and the Nigerian elite’s attitude to governance framed as a culture that generates and sustains political violence and the vehicles for this violence, organised political violent groups. This chapter will establish a working definition of organised violence, political violence and terrorism.

The chapter is sub-divided into four sections. Section one will clarify and contextualise the concept of organised violence as it relates to the thesis. Section two examines the different manifestations of organised violence in Nigeria. Section three analyses the traditional rationales on the root cause of organised political violence in Nigeria. Finally, section four will clarify and apply theories of organised violence relevant to the study. This is to set the theoretical and conceptual background of the phenomenon of political violence as it relates to the Nigerian polity.

3.1 Operational Definition of Organised Violence

Organised violence is dynamic in nature and no longer limited to interstate conflicts and civil war (International Peace Institute 2012). Kaldor’s (2007: 2) new war theory, advanced in 1999, focuses on conflicts generated internally, conflicts linked to transnational dynamics and claims to power on the basis of identity, including religion and ethnicity. As such, changing patterns in organised violence are acknowledged and reflected in recent global terrorist activity. Not all scholars share Kaldor’s view, for example Smith (2004) and Kalyvas (2001) argue that the basic causes of ‘new wars’ remain unaltered. Notwithstanding, Snow (1996:109) asserts that contemporary
warfare methods and tactics are different. This observation is reflected in current terror violent activities globally and Nigeria, in particular.

Cockayne (2006) acknowledges changes in organised violence, citing the privatisation of organised violence and the declining monopoly of violence by the State as indicators. This is evident in the growing number of militias and violent groups fighting for, or against, the State. Recent examples of these sustained wars involving militias/terrorist groups include conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali and Nigeria. The diversity of organised violent activities ensures a consistent flow of policy and scholastic definitions. Different subjective and interpretative classifications are given to contextualise organised violence. An understanding of organised violence within the context of this study is dependent on an examination of the definitions of political violence and terrorism. This is a result of the use of the terms ‘political violence’ and ‘terrorism’ interchangeably with ‘organised violence’ in policy papers and the scholarly literature in reference to violent activities and violent groups globally. Although the term ‘organised violence’ is understood to be a broad term for violence perpetrated by a group of people ranging from armed robbery, rape, war and electoral violence to terrorist activities. The identification of political violence and terrorism as variations of organised violence sums up the type of violent activity researched in this study. For example, Shaw (2009) investigates the relationships between different types of violence and indicates the trend of violence being deliberately implemented by a group of people. The underlying attribute is the classification of group-induced violence regardless of motivation under the term organised violence.

The American Association for the Advancement of Science (1996) defines organised violence as a form of violence committed by a group, government or institution against persons or a group of people. This definition identifies the perpetrators of organised violence as a group, and not individuals, although motive is not implied. Intended victims are classified as more than one person or a group, a form of violence is labelled ‘public violence’. The notion that this violence is political in its motivation is implied. This view is shared by Clausewitz who contends that violence perpetrated by a group is the continuation of ‘political intercourse’. Moreover, the element of legitimacy is conspicuously absent, organised violence could either be a criminal offence or legitimate depending on the authority of the actors involved.
Smith’s (2004) study on organised violence which he identified as ‘armed conflict’ is described as ‘open, armed clashes between two or more centrally organised parties, with continuity between the clashes, in disputes about power over government and territory’. Smith considers organised violence to include violence to attain and sustain political power. Likewise, Shaw (2009) equates organised violence to political violence and terrorism, identifying political and social ideological themes as traits of the perpetrators of organised violence. Shaw asserts that terrorism is a form of ‘symbolic politics rather than military coercion’. The element of organised violence in terrorism is a means to produce an expected political outcome. Furthermore, Kaldor (2007: 4) supports this assertion and posits that organised violence is an umbrella term for political violence and terrorism concentrating on the deliberate use of violence by a group against a selected population for political gain. It is construed that organised violence covers a broad range of violent manifestations such as political, criminal and social violence perpetrated by a group.

Cockayne (2006) classifies war and terrorism under the concept of organised violence by alluding to the use of violent tactics and terror tactics by a group of people to enforce change irrespective of a claim to political legitimacy by these groups. Furthermore, McCormack (2010) categorizes terrorism as linked to organised violence. He identifies the presence of adequate justification (in the view of the perpetrators) for the use of violence. The group engaged in organised violence does not perceive itself as a criminal organisation as a result of the inclusion of an ideological goal or legitimate cause. Shaw (2009) highlights the key role organised violence plays in the revolutionary seizure of power, as such defining organised violence as the continuation of politics through violence. This reflects Clausewitz’ treatise on war which interprets war as a form of armed conflict between two actors for political goals. The element of terrorism as a function of war or organised violence applies terror as a tool to coerce political change by targeting civilians or non-combatants.

A distinct clarification of the usage of the term organised violence within the context of this research is required. Organised violence is interpreted to be a form of armed conflict, usually politically, economically, or socially motivated which involves the
premeditated use of violence by an armed group to inflict physical injury or psychological harm, as well as the destruction of property, usually perpetrated against the government or a group of people with similar characteristics, embarked on for the purpose of righting a perceived wrong or achieving an ideological goal. This definition categorises Boko Haram within the context of a socio-political motivated movement. The group’s adoption of terror tactics, such as synchronised suicide attacks, attests to a deliberate decision to employ violence and instil fear within the population. Boko Haram’s attack on the State and its representatives, including security forces and civilian officials emphasises the political nature of the group’s aims. Organised violence in this research is used to describe all forms of terror tactics and violent acts perpetrated by the armed groups relevant to this study.

3.1.1 Terrorism

Terrorism has a long history, but the word was coined during the French revolution (Jackson and Sinclair 2012). The attacks on the US by al Qaeda terrorists on 11th September 2001, propelled terrorism to the top of the list of threats facing the world. The concept of terrorism is notoriously difficult to define. Governments, scholars, journalists and security actors each tailor definitions suited to their perception of terrorism. Shaw (2009) maintains that terrorism is both an instrument of violent resistance to the State, as well as a tool used by States.

Despite the difficulties in formulating universally accepted definition of terrorism, three elements are consistently present in proposed definitions. These are the use of violence; violence aimed at triggering political change; and violence intended to affect a larger audience than its immediate target. Guelke (1998) and Wilkinson (2012) maintain that the term terrorism is often carelessly and inconsistently used to describe any criminal or violent act against the State or a select group of people with similar or shared characteristics. In the same vein, Noam Chomsky commenting on the Charlie Hebdo killings on January 2015 highlights the difficulties or inconsistencies in defining terrorism. Chomsky cites as instances of terrorism the 2004 U.S marine assault on Fallujah, and the death of 50 civilians in December 2014 in a U.S led bombing raid in Syria, described by the US as cases of self-defence.
Hoffman (2006) and Jackson et al (2011:15) identify the difficulties in developing a universal definition of terrorism as a result of the changing names, traits and motivations of terrorist groups. Schmid (2004) supports this assertion and argues that the difficulties in formulating a universally accepted definition lie in the very diverse different types and attributes of terrorist groups across the world. These groups have different motivations and employ different tactics and modes of operation, hence the challenge of classifying them under one label (Victoroff 2005).

Hoffman (2006) and Brown (2007) assert that terrorism is politically motivated and targeted at governments. It is focused on instilling fear as well as creating an illusion of invincibility, thereby fostering insecurity amongst a particular population. Jackson et al (2011:15) perceive terrorism as a strategy of political violence which any actor can employ. Toros (2008) and Schmid (2012) argue that terrorism is a violent act aimed at effecting a political change by targeting a larger audience than its immediate target. However Wilkinson (2012) contends that terrorism is not a synonym for political violence in general, and that to make political motivation the central focus of terrorism is ambiguous, as the term politics is itself broad, especially when related to power.

Terrorism in this research is understood as a premeditated politically, religiously or ideological motivated violent act, targeted against non-combatants, an instrument to coerce the government or a particular group, usually carried out by a clandestine group, intended to terrify in order to achieve a strategic outcome. This definition identifies key elements such as strategic goals, deliberate employment of terrorists acts and political discourse in the form of violence.

3.1.2 Political Violence

Political violence, like organised violence and terrorism is a highly disputed term and lacks a universal accepted definition. Ted Honderich’s definition of political violence is apt for this research. Honderich (1989: 154) defines political violence as ‘a considerable or destroying use of force against persons or things, a use of force
prohibited by law, directed to a change in the policies, personnel or system of government, and hence also directed to changes in the existence of individuals in the society and perhaps other societies’. This definition supports Max Weber’s characterisation of politics as a means of striving to allocate power or manipulate the circulation of power, either among States or among competing socio-political groups within a State. It further emphasises C. Wright Mills’ contention that ‘politics as a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence’. Datta (2005: 428) defines political violence as ‘acts carried out by individuals or groups with an explicit desire of accomplishing a particular political objective directed at the party in power to secure political concessions or compromises that are otherwise not possible’. Cognisant of the implied intersection between politics and the use of violence, political violence is depicted in this study as violence implemented towards achieving a political goal. Consequently, politically violent acts are intentional and not irrational, usually embarked upon in pursuance of present or predicted changes within the external and internal political environment of the State.

Political violence is a violent expression of discontent towards an incumbent government and its representatives and a means of attaining demands. From this perspective, the violence perpetrated by Boko Haram is targeted at federal and state level government officials are understood as political violence.

### 3.2 Concept of Organised Violent Activities in Nigeria

Organised violence has been manifest in diverse forms throughout the history of Nigeria. Political violence was prevalent in the mid-1960s, there was civil war from 1967, and recurring religious, ethnic and electoral violence since. Kaplan (2000) refers to a shift from organised violence to political terrorism in West Africa. The history of Nigeria records violence between non-state actors such as religious and ethnic clashes usually motivated by political interests. However, the present phenomenon of Boko Haram indicates conflicts not limited to non-state actors, but include violence between the State and militias or terror groups.

Kaldor (2006: 96) describes a shift in organised violence, identifying globalisation and the monopoly of violence by the State, amongst other factors, as indicators.
However scholars such as Booth (2007), Schuurman (2010) and Aston (2005) differ, arguing that there is no new form of organised violence but rather recurring traits. Yet the current manifestation of organised violence in Nigeria, Boko Haram, fits better with Kaldor’s model. Although, historical records of Islamic radicalisation in the northern region of Nigeria indicate a sustained war with consistent demands, tactics and the mode of violence have evolved. As such, the recurring traits of religious identity politics have been mixed with terror tactics not employed in past organised violence.

In the context of Nigeria, using Boko Haram as a case study, organised violence is not unavoidable and expected as depicted by Falola (1998: 50) and Abimbola (2010), but a tool employed for the purpose of achieving a strategic goal by members of the groups and a complicit political elite. Nigeria’s independent history reflects an elite political culture willing to use violence as a means of continuing political and social discourse. Organised political violence in Nigeria is a deliberate process. Regardless of any ideological underpinning, violence is used as a means to an end usually political. However, the degree to which organised political violence in the State has increased in the last sixteen years is new. Different armed groups or militias have emerged during this period, each representing a different region, religion, political or social ideals in the State. Central to this violence is the recurring role of the political elite.

3.2.1 Political Violence in Nigeria

Organised political violence in Nigeria is manifested in activities ranging from electoral violence, political assassinations, military coups, riots and terror acts by non-state actors. There has been a notable shift in the perpetration of political violence from independence. This is depicted in the transition from military coups and open demonstrations, to political assassinations (Obadare 1999) and the employment of terror acts by social movement groups. The mid-1960s ushered in an era of political violence which was manifest in military coups, the civil war, ethnic clashes and later reflected in electoral violence across Nigeria’s different regions.
Electoral violence is the principal locus of political violence in Nigeria. Since the change to civilian rule in 1999, there has been an increase in the level of violence before, during and after elections (Adebo, Pitso and Levan 2004 and Human Right Watch 2003). Graph 1 and 2 illustrate the increase in political violent activities between the years 2000 to 2014.

Graph 1: Graph showing incidents of political violence in Nigeria
Source: NGWAV and AOAV (2014)
This occurrence is fuelled by the political elite perception of State power as a means to pecuniary gains. The employment of violence is simply a means to anticipated political benefits. This assertion is validated in chapter four and specifically reflected in recorded electoral victories of political parties involved in violence. Below, graph 3 illustrates political parties’ involvement in violence, specifically political parties successful after elections.
The 2011 pre- and post-presidential elections were recorded as the bloodiest elections in the history of Nigeria (Human Rights Watch 2013 and IFRA Nigeria 2015) due to the magnitude of political violent acts illustrated in graph 2 and 3 perpetrated by members and supporters of opposing political parties (Abdullahi 2013). Violent activities related to government elections involved the deployment by political parties of armed youths commonly, or ‘thugs’, to intimidate and actively engage in armed conflict to ensure political victory (IFRA Nigeria and NSRP 2015). An example of alliances between politicians or political parties and ‘thugs’ include the patronage of the Isongo-Furo and the Isenasawo group, an ethnic youth groups in Bayelsa State, by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) politician Lionel Jonathan, the commissioner for the environment and Chief Timi B.P Barijha-Amange respectively (Human Rights Watch 2003a). This was evident in resulting conflicts between these groups and the destruction of opposing political parties’ campaign offices. This phenomenon is common and attracts little action from the government and its security agencies. Those arrested for political violence are usually low level thugs, whilst their sponsors are ignored (Human Rights Watch 2003).
Further examples of the political parties’ involvement in political violence include conflict between the PDP and its main opposition, the All Nigeria’s People’s Party (ANPP) during the 2003 elections in Edo state resulting in an attack on the Governor’s convoy, the political assassination of the ANPP’s Ekiti state zone leader and the assassination of the ANPP’s Abuja vice-chairman Marshall Harry. The 2003 gubernatorial elections in Kwara, Delta and Rivers states led to a series of violent outbursts between the supporters of the PDP and ANPP leading to murders and destruction of property (Human Rights Watch 2003a&c). Likewise, the 2011 presidential elections led to the death of over 1,000 people as a result of electoral violence and clashes between PDP and the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) in Benue state. The riots that followed the Miss World competition in 2002 lasted for three days degenerating into a religious armed conflict between Christians and Muslims. The initial political targets of these riot acts of violence were the media and the Kaduna state government evident by the attack on Thisday newspaper building and the riots in front of the state government house (Human Rights Watch 2003b).
Another example is the 2008 Jos riots over the result of local government elections involving PDP and ANPP, leading to destruction of government properties, disputed deaths and increased tensions between religious and ethnic groups (Ostien 2009). Other examples include the post 2011 gubernatorial election protest in Kano and Jos recording the death of over 200 people (Fick 2011).

3.2.2 Religious Violence in Nigeria

Inter- and intra- religious conflict is prevalent in the northern region of Nigeria (Alabi 2002) and manifests in armed conflict between Christians and Muslims or armed conflict between competing Muslim sects. In the past, violent clashes between Muslims, Christians and traditional animist worshippers have also been recorded. Conflict between Christians and Muslims remain prevalent (Sampson 2012).

Notwithstanding the religious differences that colour the violence, the underlying motives are political. Violence usually flares during election periods and the drivers of the violence are the alliances forged between the state political elite and local religious social movements (further examined in chapter 5). Another entrenched political motive for violence is political Islam, notably the repeated calls for the full incorporation of Sharia law into the country’s legal code (Ousman 2012). This is currently manifested in the emergence of Islamic Movement in Nigeria, Izala, Boko Haram and Ansaru terrorist organisations.

Lives and properties have been lost and destroyed as a result of violence, ostensibly spurred by religious differences (Dowd 2014). Prior to Boko Haram’s emergence, hundreds were killed during Maitatsine crisis in the 1980s in Kano State. A group whose leader, Mohammed Marwa was shown to have allied the political elite in northwest Nigeria (Kasfelt 1989 and Danjibo 2009). In addition, cyclical clashes between Christians and Muslims in Jos have become commonplace resulting in the
deaths of thousands. A report was released by the federal government in 2004 recorded the deaths of 54,000 people between the years 1999-2004 (Dowd 2014). Inter-religious violence is not based merely on intolerance of other faiths, but rooted in political interests and the struggle for political supremacy between competing groups. The presidential election in April 2011 was followed by intense religious fighting in the northern region (Onapajo 2012). Likewise, the results of a local government election in Jos 2008 resulted in violent inter-religious clashes leading to the death of several hundreds of people.

3.2.3 Social Movements and Ethnic Violent Activities in Nigeria

The end of military rule in 1999 encouraged the formation of social movement groups whose goals were targeted towards change in governance outcomes, specifically the incapacity of federal and state governments to ensure satisfactory public services. These social movements were usually constructed on ethnic lines. Again, ethnic conflict is less about ethnic hatred than political rivalry. Competing ethnic groups resort to violence to ensure political leverage as an avenue for access to resources. Ethnic identity in Nigeria is stronger than loyalty to the State. Inter-ethnic violence can flare rapidly as can the mobilisation of the youth. An example of this phenomenon is the formation of the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) ethnic militia. The OPC was formed to ensure the Yoruba’s political presence in national politics (Akinyele 2001). The formation of this group was a result of the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections after a Yoruba candidate was declared the winner. On the heels of the formation of this group followed violent activities ranging from kidnap, riots, political assassinations, electoral violence, and clashes with the Hausa and Ijaw ethnic groups. In response to the creation of OPC, the Arewa People’s Congress (APC) was formed with the objective for the protection and self-defence for the Muslim Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups. Violent clashes between the OPC and APC were recorded in Kano, Lagos and Ibadan (Olaniyan 2009). Likewise, the Igbo ethnic group also formed an association called the Igbo People’s Congress (IPC) which later evolved into the movement for the actualisation of the sovereign state of Biafra (MASSOB) in 1999. Prior to the formation of OPC, APC and IPC, the Ogoni ethnic group in Rivers State also had a movement called movement for the survival of Ogoni
people (MOSOP). Although MOSOP was not solely focused on political relevance in
the national terrain, the group’s fight for socio-economic emancipation was expressed
in violent operations leading to what was later called the Ogoni genocide in 1993.
Other ethnic inspired movements emerged from the Niger Delta region such as the
Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) and Egbesu Boys of the Niger Delta. Just like MOSOP
they were interested in control and allocation of natural resource revenues, notably
 crude oil.

It is important to note that inter-ethnic conflicts were not limited to the formation of
ethnic social movements. History records violent clashes between ethnic groups
across Nigeria. Examples include the Itsekiri and Ijaw conflict which lasted for seven
years and clashes between the Tiv and Hausa-Fulani. Intra-Ethnic conflicts were also
recorded. Examples include Ife-Modakeke conflict in the west, Tiv-Jukun conflict in
the middle belt and Aguleri-Umuleri conflict in the east.

Social movement groups in Nigeria are another avenue for organised political violent
activities in the polity as a result of alliances with the political elite and failure to
achieve stated goals through non-violent means. Social movements that transformed
into organised political violent groups in the State include the Niger Delta People’s
Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND), and Bakassi Boys. The factors that enabled the transition of non-violent
social movement groups to organised political violent groups are discussed in
succeeding chapters. The most compelling evidence regarding the emergence of these
groups and their transformation to organised political violent entities is the consistent
variable of elite political culture and the elite’s attitude to governance.

3.3 Reviewing the Discourse on Root Cause of Organised Violence

Various arguments and theories have been presented to explain the emergence and
sustenance of organised political violent groups in Nigeria. Elkaim (2012), Forest
(2012) and Harnischfeger (2014) have identified corruption, poverty, unemployment
and illiteracy as the causative factors of organised violence in Nigeria. Although Boko
Haram rhetoric has exploited these social ills to justify its violent strategies and to
recruit (see Chapter Six), it is noteworthy that Boko Haram rhetoric was not initially grounded on socio-economic challenges or the prevalence of corrupt practices, but rather on religious expansion. Omotola for example, contends that poverty and socio-economic injustice is not at the core of Boko Haram’s violence, but grounded on religious ideology:

The reality of the matter is that there is poverty everywhere, in the south, west and east, you can argue that it is higher in the north, but they are people in the north who are poor and have not fallen for Boko Haram strategies, we should be critical of this assertion, I am not saying it is not a contributing factor…I think it is reductionary, Islamic radicalism is at its core… (Interview, Omotola 2013).

In the same vein, Danjibo (2009) and Oftedal (2013) traced the group’s formation and emergence to a long standing the aspiration amongst a pious northern population for a greater role for Islam in political life demonstrated by the widespread implementation of Sharia law and practice of a ‘purer’ form of Islam by northern Muslims. Danjibo an expert on religious conflict in Nigeria argues that:

Boko Haram emergence was purely initially a religious movement; it had nothing to do with anything except that it was a religious movement at the very beginning…however it large following attracted the interference of northern political elite in the guise of Ali Modu Sherif… (Interview, Danjibo 2013).

Danjibo’s assertion is supported by Abimbola (2011) and Cook (2011) whose findings indicates the early emergence of Boko Haram to be grounded on the public propagation of the group’s version of Islamic doctrines. Furthermore, empirical findings of Onuoha (2012) underscore the relationship between Boko Haram and north-eastern political elites between late 1990s and mid-2000s. This thesis argues that Danjibo’s observation highlights the political elite’s alliance with religious groups. Furthermore, Perous de Montclos (2014:2) identified Boko Haram as an ‘indigenous uprising with a religious ideology and a political meaning’. As such, it is significant that the incursion of Islamic religion into the political sphere was at the instance of the regional political elite’s (Ayelabola 2013 and Alao 2013). Islamic religious groups subsequently sought inclusion of their policies and interests within
the Constitution (further discussed in Chapter Five). Alao (2013) emphasises that this strain of political Islam runs deep in religious and political life in northern Nigeria and that it was these demands for the incorporation of Islamic law and practice into the constitution and local state governance procedure that encouraged Boko Haram demand for an Islamic theocratic State (see Chapter Five). These demands are argued to be as a result of political elites agendas regarding their political interests. This consistent and deliberate action by the political elite impacted on shaping an elite political culture that encourages the deliberate manipulation and use of religion – Islam to further political interest. Wole Soyinka commenting on the manipulation of religion for political ends cites the case of former governor of Zamfara state Sani Ahmed Yerima, whose gubernatorial political campaign was known for Sharia law.

…when he was asked why he decided to turn Zamfara state into a theocratic state in a secular dispensation. He said and I dare him to deny it, that it was the only weapon he had to snatch power. He said that the PDP was so strong that he needed something which would appeal to raw emotions to mobilize and get the governorship… (Soyinka 2012; cited in Sahara Reporters).

Soyinka’s assertion is further supported by media reports of the political campaign of Sani Ahmed Yerima. In addition, Alao (2013) and Hill (2010) stressed the use of Sharia law by north-eastern politicians for political campaigns. Such religious demands from self-interested political elite have consistently turned to violent expressions following the breakdown of short-lived alliances between the political elite and these Islamic groups. An example is the political elite’s complicity in the exploitation of religion for political gain is illustrated by the 1999 gubernatorial political campaign in Zamfara state. Here the aspirant governor used calls for Sharia law to secure his electoral victory. This ultimately led to violent clashes between competing religious groups, competing Islamic sects and between Islamic sects and the police. Wole Soyinka links the current resurgence of organised political violence to former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s acquiescence to the implementation of Sharia law in northern Nigeria in exchange for northern electoral support (Sahara Reporters 2012; The Guardian 2014). Furthermore, a security officer from the anti-terrorist unit in Abuja stated:
…the group’s emergence and terror activities was further aided by the northern political elite who were looking for political mercenaries, it is a classic case of greed combined with political violence, using religion as a cover (Interview, Security Officer 3 2013).

Ulph (2013) widens the religious motivation for the rise of organised violent groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria to include the influence of global jihad. Ulph’s view is backed by Tande (2012), who maintains that Boko Haram emergence is a consequence of the violent dynamics in the wider Islamic world of the Middle East and North Africa. A commander of the Nigerian joint task force fighting Boko Haram stresses the influence of global jihad:

It is not political or unemployment…it is rooted in religious ideology, that is the global Salafist movement, the people who believe they need to re-invent civilization, something in line with what Samuel Huntington wrote about the clash of civilization, that is the need to return to the era that suit their agenda and their own beliefs that’s it! (Interview, Commander Joint Task Force 2013).

This view is further supported by Danjibo (2009) who argues about the similarities in Boko Haram ideologies and other Islamic movements in the Middle East and North Africa, evidenced by Boko Haram leadership reference to AQ and AQIM ideological goals. Notwithstanding, this thesis argues that militant Islam is not new to Nigeria. Since the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio in 1804, there have been sporadic violent uprisings in northern Nigeria motivated by extreme interpretations of Islam including, more recently, Maitatsine, Kala Kato and Izala. Militant Islam has always been a strand of Islam in northern Nigeria and as such interactions with Muslim sects in Arab countries cannot be primarily implicated for the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria. It is true that funding, training, and innovations in the use of media and communication emanating from the wider Islamic world add a new dimension. Perhaps the most chilling innovation is the use of suicide terrorism, a tactic previously not employed in Nigeria. These technical and tactical borrowings can be expected in a globalized world. Downplaying the role of religion as a motivator of violence, Ubi Efem, a researcher at the Nigerian International Institute of Foreign Affairs, contends that:
You can divorce religion from it, why I am saying this is because, when you look at the history of Boko Haram it is political, that is their alliance with northern political elite, then they moved to the religious dimension for legitimacy purposes…there are other Islamic religious movements with similar ideology which are not violent… (Interview, Efem 2013).

Efem’s assertion is supported by these research findings regarding the emergence of Boko Haram and its transition to organised violent activities, this assertion is examined in chapter 6. In the same vein, Miss V from the Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN) maintains that the emergence of organised violence, and specifically Boko Haram, is not founded on religion but a function of the political crisis in Nigeria:

I have tended to be mindful of putting religion as the key element, for me it’s a political crisis, and most violent activities, what we have tended to do is to try to fit in religion to balance in, which covers up a lot of things, personally for me, it’s a political group that has taken the shape of religion (Interview, Miss V 2013).

Miss V’s observation is evidenced by Boko Haram association with the north-eastern political elites (Onuoha 2012 and Alao 2013). The goal of radicalised Islam in Nigeria by these groups is the adoption of Islamic practices in the governance processes of the modern State. This goal is an integral aspect of the identity politics instigated by the political elite, which has become a part of elite political culture specifically for political campaigns. This is facilitated by the rivalry between religious or ethnic groups in Nigeria vying for political influence or relevance at the national level. This phenomenon has served as an opportunity for political mobilization hinged on identity politics. The significance of this is the politicization of Islamic movements and religious conflicts as a means to discredit opposition and validate leadership. An example is former Kano state Governor, Ibrahim Shekarau’s support of the Ahl as-sunnah and Izala Islamic sects in Kano state (see Chapter Five). Walker (2012) refers to this phenomenon as a consequence of the complexity of the State’s governance, giving an example of the north-south divide and the subtle exploitation of religion as a campaign tool during the 2011 presidential and gubernatorial election. Likewise, Loimeier (2012) maintains that the prevalence of Islamic radicalization is a result of
the encroachment of Islam in the political sphere, instigated by the political elite. Simeon Alozieuwa, from the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, agrees with Loimeier’s observation that the manipulation of religion by the political elite encourages the interference of groups such as Boko Haram in political campaigns.

Boko Haram was a religious movement, but along the line they played a role in the political system, they were used by some politicians to get power, they had certain understanding, at a point the political actors could not keep to the agreement… (Interview, Alozieuwa 2013)

Alao (2013), Boas (2012) and Chalk (2004) argue that Islamic belief as the key to a utopian State is the root cause of terrorism in Nigeria. The members and supporters of Boko Haram believe that a secular State cannot adapt or be reconciled to their interpretation of Islam. They argue that federal and state government failure to observe Islamic precepts undermines the expansion and practice of pure Islam in Nigeria. Hence, the many socio-economic policy failings of successive governments in areas such as corruption, unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, and inadequate infrastructure are coopted as examples not only of particular governments, but of secular government in general.

Ayodeji Ogunrotifa (2013) argues that the manifest inequality in wealth and living standards between the rich and the poor creates a conducive and enabling climate for political violence. This alienation of sections of the population faced with deep underlying inequality has been also validated by the International Crisis Group (2014). Conversely, whilst Onuoha (2013) establishes socio-economic factors as enablers of political violence, and specifically the emergence of Boko Haram, he does not specifically link this to an elite culture. That said, he states that:

The emergence of Boko Haram is rooted in the nature and character of politics and the economics in Nigeria, particularly in terms of the distribution of resources, how it creates marginalization and deprivation (Interview, Onuoha 2013).

Onuoha’s mention of the nature and character of politics in Nigeria, underlines the influence and values attached to State governance by the political elites and its impact
on the creation of enabling environment for the emergence of social movement groups targeted towards socio-economic emancipation. Recall this thesis argument that the actions of the political elites ensures the creation of social movement groups, who in turn form alliances with the political elite, leading to the transformation of these groups to violent groups (Further examined in chapter 4 and 5). Zenn (2012c) attributes the emergence of Boko Haram to poverty and unemployment in northern Nigeria, aided by porous borders and terrorism activities in the Middle East. However, Efem argues:

It goes beyond poverty; it is a complex mix of factors, which includes poverty, politics and socio-cultural issues... (Interview, Efem 2013).

An additional twist is Zenn’s insistence on Boko Haram’s sponsors being motivated by the ‘return’ of political power to northern Muslim politicians. This assertion is underpinned by the timing of Boko Haram’s terror attacks and the dissent between northern political elite and President Goodluck Jonathan and his supporters. From this viewpoint, Boko Haram is a product of a political environment defined by the political ambitions of the elite and sustained by continued inequality and the failure of government to address persistent poverty and related societal ills.

Public service in Nigeria is largely driven by pecuniary interest, manifested in the execution of violent and corrupt activities towards securing coveted political appointments. This necessarily impedes good governance. Animashaun and Saka (2013), for example, contend that the political elite perceive power only in terms of access to Nigeria’s oil wealth. At the heart of politics is a zero sum political mindset driven by the urge to appropriate the ‘national cake’ (see Chapter Eight). The desperation to secure public office given the access to wealth and power that it offers, and given the very limited alternatives outside of office, often encourages electoral and political violence. During such contests for political power there is a demand for political ‘thugs’ who are used to perpetrate the accompanying acts of violence (see Chapter Four). As Miss V from CLEEN reports:

Members of these groups were used directly or indirectly to facilitate re-elections and from experience in the Niger Delta and Borno state, when you engage these groups
either as political thugs and after the elections you do not keep to the terms negotiated…it changes the appearance of engagement to one that is more violent (Interview, Miss V 2013)

Miss V’s evidence supported by empirical findings from Human Rights Watch (2002, 2003 and 2004) regarding political and electoral violence, specifically the link to organised violent groups is further examined in Chapter Four. The ‘decommissioning’ of these groups of ‘supporters’ such thugs evolve into organised violent groups. Examples include the Bakassi Boys in eastern Nigeria, Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and the Niger Delta Vigilante group in southern Nigeria.

Campbell (2013c:132), a former US Ambassador to Nigeria, identifies terrorism as the latest symptom of the Nigerian ‘problem’ with governance. The challenge of bad governance is intertwined with the values of the political elite regarding the purpose of public office. Cook (2011) argues that as long as the political elite perceive public office as a means to access and misappropriate public funds for personal use, so the ‘messianic fever’ centered on religion, in this case Islam, will stake violence in Nigeria. A statement by Usman Sani, the leader of Boko Haram immediately after the death of Mohammed Yusuf justifies the use of violence:

The aim is to Islamize Nigeria …kill and eliminate irresponsible political leaders of all leanings…quit the followership of the wicked political parties leading the country, the corrupt, irresponsible, criminal, murderous political leadership and join the struggle for an Islamic society that will be corruption free…where security will be guaranteed and there will be peace (Cited in Vanguard, 14th August, Sanni 2009)

Sani was careful to underscore well-worn structural challenges associated by the populace with the political elite to seek legitimisation and justification for Boko Haram’s violence. Yet, Boko Haram’s emergence in 1995 was not explicitly linked with politics and economic injustice, but rather focused on issues of dogma and liturgical interpretation. However it was the group’s relationship with the regional political elite (see Chapters Five and Six) that ensured its transition to an organised group willing to use violence, born out of and sustained by the ambition and mis-
governance of the political elite, which Sani exploited to justify the group’s growing use of violence.

3.4 Clarifying Key Theories of Organised Violence Applied

The complexity of organised violence makes it difficult to examine the occurrence of organised political violence activities within a single theory or framework. An integrated approach of different theories covering the selected aspect of organised political violence in Nigeria is needed. This approach has been implemented successfully by scholars in the field of organised violence such as Mary Kaldor, Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman. Kaldor applies a combination of just war theory, globalisation theory, rational choice theory and Clausewitz’ trinity model of war to explain her new war theory. Furthermore, Marc Sageman employs social networking theory, rational choice theory, theories of radicalisation and religion as a political philosophy of terrorism amidst other theories to examine the evolution of global jihadi movement. This thesis will draw upon elements of four different theories, which will be outlined and synthesised in order to analyse the data gathered as part of this study.

3.4.1 Global Surveillance Mode of Warfare

Martin Shaw proposed this theory as a framework for all kinds of violence, focusing on the changes in warfare as well as the change in relationship between organised violence and social power. Shaw maintains that organised violence is dependent on changes in the national and global political environment as well as the relevant social institutions. Hence, the advent of organised violent events in the State is made possible by the corporation between the actors involved and the benefits or rewards attached to a particular event. As such, this theory aids in identifying the actors involved as well as the dynamics between the actors involved (alliances between political elites and organised violent groups), there by identifying who they are and how they operate. This aids in drawing attention to their motivations, which gives an insight into political elite values. These events could range from electoral events or the passage of a bill. In direct relation to Nigeria as will be discussed in chapters four, five and six, attacks carried out by organised violent groups occurred during periods
of elections and political debates centred on government appointments and passage of legislative bills. This implies that violent activities were implemented as a strategy to secure political interests. It is pertinent to highlight that the decision to use violence as a strategy by the political elite contributes to shaping an elite culture that adopts violence as a political campaign strategy. Recall the thesis proposition that elite political culture is centred on violence and that the outcome of the governing authority attitude towards governance encourages the creation of an environment conducive for the emergence and sustenance of organised violent groups in the State. Therefore the choice to launch an attack or embark on organised violent activities is conditioned on or enabled by the presence of certain factors. These factors, identified by this theory include electoral events, international political surveillance, legal surveillance and by extension key actors in socio-political networks. Furthermore the need for a mass army or direct mass mobilisation is not necessary in embarking on this form of violence. This assertion is supported by Kaldor (1999) and Kalyvas (2001) they identify this form of violence or warfare as a new war contingent on guerrilla warfare, attacks on non-combatant and identity conflicts amongst other factors. This theory is reflected in the current insecurity threat in Nigeria. While Boko Haram in terms of its religious underpinnings is not new, however the transition to guerrilla warfare, attacks on the State’s security agencies to the employment of terror tactics is new. Furthermore the timing of its attacks and hate statements against the incumbent president, Jonathan Goodluck is suspect. Hence the application of this theory in subsequent analysis ensures that, changes in state and federal level socio-political policies are examined to determine the implications of these changes as triggers of organised political violent outbursts in the State, chapter five examined the link between religious policy changes and violent events. In particular these violent events were examined in relation to political elite complicity. Shaw (2009) indicates the event of elections as a possible catalyst for the launching of organised political violent activities. This highlights pertinent changes in the political environment as well as underscores the implication of the deliberate politicisation of socio-political issues or conflicts in the State by the political elite and the resulting outcome of violence (further examined in chapter 4 and 5). Likewise the relevance of mass mobilisation (timing of key political events) for Boko Haram’s warfare is pertinent and crucial to this study. Yet recall the core of this thesis, which is premised on political elite approach to governance and the consequence of violence. In essence the
enabling political environment in Nigeria created by the agenda of the political elite encourages the violent onslaught of organised violent groups like Boko Haram. This enabling factors identified by Shaw’s theory includes the declining monopoly of violence by the State, increase in private militias and the employment of organised violence for the pursuance of politics.

Recall that Shaw identified the presence of other social powers that limits or control the activities of organised violent groups. These social institutions or social actors range from the media, politicians and top government officials, international community; religious and ethnic groups (see chapter four –network analysis for further examination). The influence of these social groups on the events of organised violent activities is interpreted by Shaw to be limited to the decision on the timing of events, the co-opt of these social groups grievances against the State and the acceptance of the organised violent group mandate by these social powers amongst other factors. Hence, Shaw’s theory draws attention to the political elite manipulation or adoption of these grievances for their political interests with emphasis on the timing. As such these grievances has always been in existence (Niger Delta mandates, religious competition and ethnic groups political relevance in national politics), however the decision to ally with these groups and adopt their mandate is subject to the occurrence of certain events such as elections. Although this theory does not fully indicate how an alliance between the political elite and social movement groups leads to violence. However it draws attention to the events leading to an alliance between the actors, thereby indicating a consistent pattern of political elite behaviour as well as indicates the link between key events, political elites and the groups involved. Therefore it is argued that Boko Haram mandates (Sharia law debates and political Islam in national politics), which has been in existence since independence albeit spearheaded by other similar less violence groups was co-opted by the north-eastern political elite for political campaign purposes. This assertion is premised on its religious ideological underpinnings and the call for a Caliphate polity, as well as the Sharia law political campaign in 1999 see chapter 5 for further analysis. As such activities carried out and statements released by Boko Haram as well as the north-eastern politicians during electoral campaigns are justified and adjusted to fit both the mandates of the group and political elite political interests or campaigns (further
examine in chapter 5 and 6). In addition, evidence of diverse reports of Boko Haram’s operational activities and involvement with certain political elite support this theory.

It is pertinent to note that, while Shaw’s global surveillance mode of warfare framework is applicable to examining Boko Haram’s operational activities in relation to the timing of violent events and the impact of the influence of internal and external powers on the group’s activities. This highlights the crucial element of social powers-political elite complicity. However this theory fails to expand on the motivation as well as the root cause behind the group’s emergence, although this research concedes that Shaw’s theory raises the question of how organised violence groups emerge in relation to the political and social environment without necessarily illustrating how this phenomenon occurs. Nonetheless, as earlier indicated other theories will be applied. Furthermore, Shaw’s theory raises the implication of social power – political elite involvement in organised violent events – alliances between these actors, however elements of this theory fails to indicate the link between these social powers and the emergence of these groups.

3.4.2 Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory examines how individuals make decisions and the motivation as well as variables involved in arriving at these decisions. In other words individuals or groups will embark on an action after calculating the costs and rewards involved (Scott 2000 and Lindauer 2012). Crenshaw (1998:11) maintains that the decision to make a choice is also triggered by occurrences which directly or indirectly affect an individual or a group’s immediate environment. Although rational choice theory is popular in the field of economics, however its usefulness in political violence studies is debateable. Ghandi (2005) highlights the ineffectiveness of this theory in explaining questions relating to political behaviour by emphasizing the free rider problem. In response to this problem, Crenshaw (1998:8) asserts that ‘individuals can be collectively rational’ and that people realise that the success of a movement lies in the size of the group. As such the problem of free rider is irrelevant. Crenshaw’s assertion that the benefits of collective participation are psychological as a solution to the free rider is supported by Sandler (2011) who argues that free rider problem is solved
when the group internalises the problem, that is the proponents of desired change makes it personal, closer to home. A specific example is Boko Haram messages insisting that there is an attack on Islam and appealing to the religious sentiments of the Muslims, in addition to linking governance issues to the limited influence of Islam in the State’s constitution. Furthermore, Bray (2009) stresses with the aid of Weber’s theory on religion and belief being adequate motivations for rational decisions. In addition Bray maintains that rational choice theory might limit research on individual behaviour or the choice to use violence, however rational choice theory is accurate for group decision. This is relevant as this research is focused on the organisation and not individuals of organised violent groups.

Lindauer (2012) proposes rational choice theory as a credible framework for examining why groups of people, that is an organisation become involved in violent acts. Lindauer insists that ‘terrorists make informed decision with respect to choosing terrorism’. This assertion proves that the choice or decision to use violence as a strategy to achieve a goal indicates a certainty of success as well as the precedent belief that the application of violent acts is a more effective method (Scott 2007). Lindauer’s observation is evident in the continuous cycle of electoral violence in Nigeria. The rationale behind the regular use of ‘political thugs’ during elections by the politicians is interpreted as a successful strategy for political electoral victory; in addition this theory also highlights the logic behind an alliance between the political elite and social movement groups. As such an application of this theory will not only aid in the examination of Boko Haram motivations in relation to the group’s decisions, but also aid in the analysis of political elite choice of an alliance with the violent or social movement groups. This will draw attention to political elite actions that shapes an elite political culture that thrives on violence as a strategy for access to State power in Nigeria.

In addition to Scott (2000) and Lindauer (2012) assertion of success being an expected outcome, the implication of a process, which is a strategy, is reflected therefore enforcing the presence of rationale in the decision to employ violent acts. This was evident in the July 2004 Madrid bombing, where the motivation was to oust the then incumbent prime minister; subsequently the prime minister lost the elections shortly after the bomb attack. In addition Abrahms (2008) maintains that ‘Terrorists
are political maximizes; people use terrorism when the expected political gains minus the expected costs outweighs the net expected benefits of alternative forms of protest’. Therefore, there are other alternatives to violence or terrorism however the decision to use terrorism is premised on a positive expected outcome for the terrorist organisation, which outweighs or justifies the cost.

Conversely, the use of selective violent tactics by the Niger Delta militants ensured that amnesty and financial settlement was given to them. In essence the decision to implement violence to achieve stated goals or impress on a certain belief is understood to be a rational plan. Clausewitz asserts that the application of organised violence to threaten and kill in other to achieve certain objectives is not so much an indication of chaos and disorder but rather a kind of law, where in the character and composition of the social body turns into decision by arms (Howes 2009). Actors involved in organised violence take into cognizance social situations which the relative cost of violence is smaller than the relative cost of non-violence. Therefore, actors will engage in the organisation of violence, an activity that takes premeditated preparation and investment (Zurcher and Koehler 2001). Bryan (2012) indicated three elements that hangs on the rationale for using violence; achievable objectives, timing for maximum effect and result. Hence the decision to employ terror tactics is a process termed to be rational and hinged on the slightest possibility of success.

Boko Haram’s employment of violence could be attributed to one of the postulates of Boudon (2009) ‘actors are able to distinguish the costs and benefits of alternative lines of actions and that they choose the line of action with the most favourable balance’. In adapting this theory to further examine the group’s use of violence, the group will have to be seen or assumed as a body of rational beings whose belief in a goal and an effective plan to see it through is beneficial to them and the society they represent (see chapter 4:4.3 and six). The rational choice theory expounds on the collective use of violence, in situations where there is ‘a clearly understood grievance and a desire for change’, a possible chance of success, expected success which will make an impact and perceived change in addition to the risk is within the individuals threshold (plant n.d).
In fitting this into Boko Haram’s engagement with organised violence, the group’s need for revenge for the death of their leader Yusuf amidst other enabling factors, which Bray (2009) discusses as a reason why groups participation in organised violence served as a breeding ground for frustrated youths ready for violent exertions; with little or no hardship on the part of the organisers of violence. Furthermore, the rationale behind the use of violence implies a precedent of successful use of violence as a means to an expected end. This is manifested in Nigeria’s political environment as examined in chapters four, five and eight.

3.4.3 Network Theory

The application of network theory in the study of political violence aids in the identification of network actors and the examination of the relationship dynamics between actors in relation to its operational activities. Perliger and Pedahzur (2010) affirm that the application of network analysis in studying organised violent groups indicates alliances between actors and pin points the transformation of non-violent movements to political violent groups. Furthermore network analysis highlights the relationship between actors’ actions and the display of violence by other actors in the network. This observation was supported by identifying and examining the links between actors within the context of this research whose ties varies from religious, finance, mobilisation, military, political, sympathisers to mention but a few. It is hypothesized that the application of network theory aids in the analysis and interdependence of actors and stakeholders in political violence by highlighting the crucial aspects of the organisation’s process (Ward, Stovel and Sacks 2011). Specific examples include the 9/11 and July 2007 terrorist attacks. Hence by highlighting the process involved in forming alliances, the motivating factor behind alliances and the resulting implications of said alliances is extracted.

Although Wellman (2006) maintains that this theory ignores the question of why individuals resort to terror acts and focuses on the patterns and linkages between interest groups. However the application of this theory in this study is focused on examining the relationship and alliance between interest groups such as – the political elite, political parties, social movement groups, religious and the media and its effect
on the sustenance of organised violence in Nigeria (see chapter 4, 5 and 7). A direct application of network theory, aided in examining the impact of actors involved in the alliance and the outcome of violence. For example the case of the alliance between the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force and the Niger Delta Vigilante and PDP governor aspirant Peter Odili was examined using Network analysis. It was discovered that the actions of actors in the networks influences other actors’ decision to perpetrate violent acts. Significantly, network theory as applied in this research was not limited to the identification of actors within a network but rather highlighted and stressed the re-occurring presence and actions of political elite in events of organised violence. The implication of this observation is the actions of the political elite serves as catalyst for the creation of an enabling environment for the emergence of organised political violent groups in Nigeria. Furthermore, network theory applied in chapter 7 aided in the exploration and analysis of political elite use of print media in justifying its relationship with social movement groups, in condoning the violent actions of these groups with impunity and finally its dissociation with these groups and the outcome of violence (further examined in chapter 7).

In order to understand the relationship dynamics between social movement groups, political elite and print media, it is important to focus on the key reasons for identifying network relations between both parties. Maoz et al (2003), maintains that network theory offers a framework for describing relations between different social or political levels. This theoretical framework ensures an examination of consistent or inconsistent actions of agents who define, enable and constrain other agents (Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery 2009). This is done in an attempt to capture the processes by which actors; in particular the political elite further their interests by capitalising on relations forged with other agents. Historically, there has been a relationship between the media and the political elite. Print media was used as a platform to further the cause of independence. Key newspapers used by Obafemi Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikiwe were the West African Pilot, Daily Times and Nigerian Tribune (Okwuchukwu 2014). Shortly after independence, political elite from each geographical region depended on newspapers to propagate their political ideologies, mostly ethno-religious supremacy. The western region created and influenced the publications of Nigerian Tribune and Irorun Yoruba, the eastern region, Eastern Observer and Eastern Sentinel and the northern region, New Nigerian
and *Gaskiya Tafi Kwobo* (Chukwuma, Ekwe and Ngwu 2013). These papers were used to protect the interest of the political elite in these regions and propagate their ethno-religious political ideologies to the populace. The media’s role as the key source of information for the public underscores its relevance to actors keen on mobilising socio-political support (see chapter 1 for justification on the use of print media as a tool for dissemination of information). Hence the content of messages and the manner in which these messages are published are targeted towards influencing the perception and understanding of the political workings in the State (Ekeanyanwu n.d, Okoro and Odomelam 2013).

It is noteworthy that a large portion of media companies, notably print media are owned by the political elites, and as such can influence messages relayed to the public. The ownership of print newspapers by members of the political elites influences the content of information published in these papers, most importantly issues relating to political matters. In addition Ifeduba’s (2013) empirical findings indicated that 25% of print newspapers are owned by the state government and 71.2% are owned by private individuals, which Ifeduba identified as largely belonging to the political and business elites. Information dissemination is influenced by the political views of the government and the political elite. This makes it difficult for opposing political parties at the state level. Example includes the complaint of the opposition party in Benue state APP against the PDP state government for limited coverage of campaign adverts in the state owned print newspaper (Jibo and Okooisi-Simbine 2003). Examples of political elites who own newspapers or large percentages of shares of these papers include the former governor of Lagos state Bola Tinubu and Former governor of Ogun state Otunba Gbenga Daniel. Though ownership of newspapers in Nigeria is shrouded in secrecy, the underlying issue is the influence of newspaper owned by political elites in shaping and publishing information involving political conflicts and electoral campaigns.

There have been recorded cases of print media being used to promote political propaganda. Examples include the use of *The Nation* and *Nigerian Tribune* newspapers as political weapons between two opposing top politicians; Chief Lamide Adedibu and Senator Rashidi Ladoja in Ibadan shortly after the 2003 gubernatorial elections. Due to a disagreement over political appointments by Senator Rashidi after
he became governor of Ibadan, a battle of wills between Governor Rashidi and Chief Adedibu his political godfather was reported by the print media. It was reported that Chief Adedibu had control of *Nigerian Tribune* (ownership status) as such articles published were targeted towards negative reports of Governor Rashidi and vice versa with *The Nation* supported by Governor Rahidi (Ojebuyi and Ekennia 2013). Therefore the ownership factor and the political network of print media ensures the vulnerability of newspapers to manipulation by the political elite. Network relations between the Nigerian government and the media as everywhere else in the world could be described as a case of the media being driven by the political elite agenda. This cuts across different political parties and geographical regions in Nigeria and most importantly the current insecurity crisis. It is argued that media discourses as will be examined in chapter 7, were drafted towards shaping the perception of Boko Haram in line with the political elite self-interests. This was demonstrated in newspaper articles depicting Boko Haram as non-violent by the political elite despite opposing intelligence reports for the purpose of political mobilisation (Daily Trust July 31st 2009:5 and Forest 2012). This resulted in an alliance with the political elite and Boko Haram’s use of violence with impunity. Notwithstanding, the fall out between Boko Haram and the political elite led to the decision by the political elite to use violence, it became imperative that the group be depicted by the media as violent.

Cranmer, Desmarais and Kirkland (n.d) observed that the application of network theory aids in identifying what the implication of actors action on the alliances as well as the behaviour of other actors in the network. This was implemented in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 to examine the implication of the actions of the political elite and the governing authority on the transformation of social movement and interest groups to organised violent groups. Likewise network theory analyses and identifies the traits needed in actors for alliances and the flow of power (see chapter 4 and 5); thereby focusing on the argument that the Nigerian political elite perception or understanding of governance shaped an elite political culture that ensures the emergence and sustenance of organised violent activities.
3.4.4 Elite Theory

The development of elite theory can be attributed to a response to Marxism; accordingly, elite theory maintains that a society will always be politically controlled by a minority, contrasting Marxist view of a classless society. Hence a society according to elite theory is divided into two distinct groups, the ruling authority and the ruled (Mosca and Pareto cited in Zukerman 1977). Therefore, the implication of this observation identifies the elite as individuals who have political and governance authority. Higley and Burton (1989:19) maintains that the elite affect and to a large extent control ‘national outcomes’ in regard to political instability interpreted in this thesis as political violence. Lopez (2013) argues that elite theory aids in examining the connection between elite behaviour and political outcomes. This was analysed in this thesis, evident by political elite actions in relation to the manipulation of religion, ethnicity and socio-economic issues for political interests, which influenced an elite political culture that creates and sustains organised violence, further explored in chapter 4 and 8. Higley and Pakulski (2012) asserts that elite theory examines elite development of networks with representatives of social groups as well as analyses the impact of elite policies or actions on these social groups. This is indicative of the political elite in Nigeria, where notable members of the political elite were allied with social movement groups, examples includes the alliance between successive Governors of Anambra State, Chinwole Mbadinuju and Chris Ngige and the Bakassi boys. The resulting political outcome was these governors political victory and the increased use of violence by the Bakassi boys with impunity. Elite theory assesses elite political behaviour and their interaction with other actors thereby emphasising the implication of political elite behaviour or decision on the development of social movement groups and their transition to organised violent groups.

Conversely, Higley (2010) defined elite as ‘persons with the organised capacity to make real political trouble without being promptly repressed’. Hence elite theory concentrates on the impact of political elite decision in State affairs; specifically its link to political violent activities. However Cammack (1990) contends that this theory does not fully examine the link between elite influence and political violence stressing that there is no clear conceptual definition of elite disunity which Higley and Burton
(1989) identified as the reason for political violence. There is empirical evidence citing cases of elite complicity in political violent acts as well as Higley’s argument that elite do influence and manipulate political institutions and electoral outcomes regardless of political systems practiced through control of military and police force. Furthermore, as will be shown in succeeding chapters, evidence linking alliances between political elite and representatives of key political and social institutions ensure constant and unchallenged interference in governance operations.

Likewise, Walker (1966) asserts that elite theory focuses on the ‘manipulative skills’ of the elite, as such gives insight into elite political culture. In addition Higley and Pakulski (2012) expounds on Walker’s assertion by observing the behaviour of elite in attaining political office. Citing zero sum politics and ‘do-it-alone politics’ which invariable leads to an upsurge of ‘incompetent or inexperience’ members of government’. Arowolo and Aluko (2012) expressed the socio-political and economic challenges in Nigeria as a result of the presence of political elite whose ascent to State power is premised on pecuniary rewards as such show little concern or contribute to socio-economic challenges in Nigeria.

Walker critiques an elite theory that assumes that citizens have little or no influence on political events. On the contrary, Cammack (1990) argues that citizens’ participation in politics is dependent on the political system practiced. That is democratic States encourage the participation of their citizens in political processes. Cammack’s observation is not indicative of the Nigerian political system, which is nominally democratic. Chukwudi (2014) emphasises the limitation of citizen participation in Nigeria’s governance process. C. Wright Mills stresses the control and manipulation of the masses by the political elite. Wright Mills (1970:28-29) argues that the ‘masses are economically and politically exploited, because they are disorganised, the masses are far removed from the democratic public in which voluntary organisations hold the key to power’. Recall Higley’s observation that the political elite build networks or form alliances with representatives of social movement groups in exchange for social or political benefits for these groups. In the same vein, and in the context of mid-twentieth century American politics, right Mills stresses the build-up of networks between the elite and representatives of ‘special interest groups’. Wright Mills indicates that these ‘special interest groups’ are not
necessarily representatives of the masses or have effect on the elite, as the elite ensures no serious challenge to its authority. His theory is a reflection of the contemporary Nigerian political elite’s relationship with the Nigerian equivalent of ‘special interest groups’, social movements/groups.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter explores the idea of organised violence, and notably the types of organised violence found in Nigeria. The notion of organised violence, its causes and dynamics are the subject of academic debate with some scholars arguing that the rationales for a resort to violence have changed in the last several decades with State actors no longer having a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, but rather other sub-State actors including militias and ‘terrorist’ groups claiming legitimacy for a resort to violence in the face of State failure to provide human security for citizens. The chapter also examines the nexus between political violence and terrorism. Nigeria’s history of political violence stretches back to the years immediately after independence and has been marked by clashes between sections of the population, ostensibly impelled by religious or ethnic intolerance. However, the chapter argues that the cause of this violence has always been fundamentally political and linked to a political elite culture predicated on the targeted use of violence to achieve office and access to unearned financial rewards. The recent shift to extreme terror tactics is also explored and the difficulties of defining terrorism recognised. By these lights, Boko Haram’s evolution reflects the emergence, shift to political violence and co-option by the elite of previous organised political movements/groups. The key difference is the extreme methods and tactics used by Boko Haram.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE MAKING OF AN ELITE CULTURE THAT ACCEPTS THE USE OF VIOLENCE

4.0 Introduction

This chapter offers an overview of the historical background of the development of Nigeria’s political environment, and its underpinning by various phases of politically motivated violence. It builds on the proposition that the emergence of organised violent groups in Nigeria is a manifestation of the elite political culture and their approach to governance manifested in the emergence and alliance with social movement groups.

The last two chapters concentrated on contextualising key concepts as well as an examination of the theoretical background of this thesis in addition to a brief analysis of the diverse manifestations of organised violent activities in Nigeria. This enquiry generated the need for an analysis on the trends within Nigeria’s political environment and its implications regarding organised political violent activities. This thesis argues that, this line of enquiry will not only support the proposition, but also achieve the objective of ascertaining what is elite political culture, their practice of governance and their complicity in the prevalence of organised violent activities.

This chapter is divided into two parts, part one focuses on the political development of the Nigerian State. The intention is not to give a descriptive history of the political environment of Nigeria, but to draw attention to the changing trends within the State and how these changes in connection with elite political culture enabled or created an environment conducive for the emergence and sustenance of organised political violent groups. Part two concentrates on that aspect of governance and elite political culture that fostered the development of alliances between the political elite and social movement groups, and the latter’s subsequent adoption of violence. The concentration on the dynamics of these alliances, aids in clarifying the connection between the political elite practice of governance and the development and sustenance of organised violence is ensured.
4.1 The Nigerian Political Environment

The political development of the Nigerian State pre-dates her independence in 1960. The political activities and socio-economic agitations leading to the State’s independence have been extensively researched and recorded by various scholars (Falola 1998, 1999, 2009; Aborisade and Mundt 2002; Graf 1988; Hills 2012; Lewis 1994.; Paden 1973; and Panter-Brick 1970). Hence the focus of this section is on Nigeria’s post-colonial era during which its political foundations were built on constitutional policies made by the British administrators. These policies became the foundation upon which regional, ethnic and religious lines were drawn as a basis for political affiliation and attainment of political office by the political elite.

This thesis views the State’s political environment and the elite political culture that is fostered by zero sum politics as the driving force for the propagation of organised violence by individuals and groups. Studies by Mbaya (2013), Akude (2007), Aniekwe and Kushie (2011), Brown (2013), Geddes (2010), and Abdullahi (2013) argue that the State’s political environment is defined by a culture of violence, hence its sustained presence. This view considers the political elite as the driving force behind the emergence of organised violent groups, therefore portrays these groups as tools in the hands of the political elite. Several analysts, (examined in chapter 3) suggest that there are also other factors that sustained political violence in Nigeria (Isichei 1983:471 and Wright 1998:95). However this thesis insists that elite political culture is the principal cause. As already mentioned, the negative outcome of bad governance by the political elite, such as socio-economic challenges gave rise to the development of social movement groups. It was these that the political elite formed alliances and transformed into organised political violent groups.

A democratic or electoral political system was introduced in 1999 and has since been the system of governance. Between 1966-1979 and 1983-1999 the State was under military regimes. The advent of an electoral system failed to meet the expectations of the electorate. It prompted calls for reforms in the political system that would better manage its eclectic challenges, hence the emergence of diverse movements with
divergent agendas. Commenting on this situation, Doctor Shola Omotola, a researcher and senior lecturer in politics and governance from the Redeemers University observed:

We were thinking that being a democracy as we call it, the situation would have changed, but nothing seems to, look at now, ASSU is on strike…for people to get the attention of the government, what they do is resort to violence (Interview, Omotola 2013).

Omotola’s assertion is reflected in the mandates and statements of non-violent and violent social movement groups, both of whom emerged to tackle perceived socio-economic injustice. Furthermore, the successes of labour strikes attest to the positive results in the view of the perpetrators of these activities. In addition Muzan (2014) and Ukiwo (2003) cite the government’s indifference to the plight of the Niger Delta region, until the emergence of violent expressions of social movement groups seeking socio-economic welfare. Again, it was perceived as an example of the effectiveness of violence. As such, the employment of violence by social movement groups is considered by them as a reaction to the seeming indifference of the government towards their demands.

4.1.1 Political Elite Manipulation of Marginalisation Caused By Specific Federal System Adapted

An analysis of identified trends or significant changes within the political system assists in explaining elite political culture in Nigeria. At independence, a presidential-parliamentary system of governance was adopted, with the three regions administered by premiers representing the major ethnic groups – Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo. Nevertheless, the euphoria over self-governance was not accompanied by a corresponding growth in nationalism. Rather, long-standing ethnic and tribal alliances rapidly undermined nation building (Isichei 1983: 468 and Geddes 2010). Commenting on these historic fracture lines, Doctor Simeon Alozieuwa, from the department of defence and security studies from the institute of peace and conflict resolution Abuja, observed:
The problem that we have today is about the competition that has been there prior to independence, that politics, which led to Awolowo trying to break into the middle belt to destabilise the northern people congress, it is about the competition among Nigerian social ethnic groups (Interview, Alozieuwa 2013).

Alozieuwa’s statement highlights the competition for political supremacy between ethnic groups and how this competition has fuelled the consolidation of regional power and how the emphasis was placed on the defence of ethnicity. By May 1962, the distrust between the three regions was manifested in violent uprisings. This thesis argues that the absence or the lack of political will for negotiation as an alternative was shelved as a result of the internal dynamics of ethno-regional politics. This included the long-standing rivalry between the North and South for political power and the tacit consent of violence as a means to achieve political goals by the Federal government. Nnoli cites the absence of enquiry and prosecution during and after ethnic clashes representing key political parties divided by ethnic and regional lines in 1962 and 1964 as an example (Nnoli 1980:196). Furthermore, the mass recruitment and employment of individuals based on ethnicity in government ministries was embarked upon to consolidate political control in national and regional politics (Wright 1998: 70 and Geddes 2010). Thereby fostering resentment amongst ethnic groups and used as fodder for political campaigns and riots. Likewise, the aftermath of the 1962 census lead to violent clashes between the Southerners and the Northerners, which affected the 1964 elections. This was as a result of the claim by the Southern political elites that the Northern political elites falsified the results in favour of the Northern region, resulting in an increase of Federal seats representing the Northerners in the national assembly. Therefore ensuring the Northern political elites had more political authority at the Federal level than the Western and Southern political elites.

In like manner, Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, former Nigerian military governor of eastern region of Nigeria and leader of the breakaway republic of Biafra, links the structural challenges of Nigeria to elite political behaviour. He speaks of primordial forces; that is, of ethnic rivalry reflected in unhealthy political regional competition during the first republic:
Politicians are stirring up ethnic hatred…the more empty the leadership, the more reliance on primordial forces (Ojukwu; cited in Maier 2000:287).

The very circumstances of Nigeria only permit an idiot to be detribalized…the natural order is a development of your ethnic sovereignty (Ojukwu; cited in Maier 2000:286).

If Ojukwu’s observation is true, the political elite are aware of the advantages of ethnic mobilisation, specifically its ability to overlook the less than noble intentions of these leaders. Focus is shifted to the importance of ethnic supremacy in national politics, as opposed to the qualification or suitability of the political elite. Therefore, by May 1962, the distrust between the three regions was manifested in uprisings of a politically violent nature. This thesis argues that the absence of negotiation or the lack of political will for negotiation as an alternative was shelved as a result of the internal dynamics of ethno-regional politics. This included the long-standing rivalry between the north and south for political power and the tacit consent of violence as a means to achieve political goals by the political elite. Recall, Higley’s (2010) assertion, that when the political elite become ‘disunited’ the political stability of a country is affected. Likewise, when the political elite realise that access to State power could be achieved by inflaming ethnic competition, then political campaigns are grounded on ethnic supremacy. Specific cases include political propaganda by Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, Frederick Fasheun, and Muhammad Buhari amongst others which led to organised political violence in Nigeria. The same point is made by General Ibrahim Babaginda former military president, in his explanation of the timing of military coups:

You see we are very smart people [referring to the political elite]. We don’t intervene when we know the climate is not good for it…we wait until there is frustration in the society…we step in… (Babaginda; cited in Maier 2000:59)

There is a lot that was going on in our favour. So we seized the moment (Babaginda; cited in Maier 2000:61)
The comments of General Babaginda, a key player in national and northern region politics in Nigeria gives an insight into the thinking and behaviour of the political elite. It shows the willingness to manipulate existing problems and dissent in the State for political benefits. It is noteworthy that these problems could be traced to the negative outcome of the political elite governance. Okwudiba Nnoli notes the significant absence of enquiry and prosecution during and after ethnic clashes representing key political parties divided by ethnic and regional lines in 1962 and 1964 (Nnoli 1980:196). On the contrary, Pareto cited in Higley and Pakulski (2012:3) assert that the political elite might not hold meetings to ‘plot common designs…or any devices for reaching common goals’. However political elite’s actions and decisions are to an extent influenced by current events. Mills (1970) speaks of the political elite’s ‘manipulative trait’, as reflected in the existing ethno-regional dissent in Nigeria. Hence, the politicisation of ethno-regional dissent shifts the discussion of causation from government officials’ level of competence, to political mobilisation based on ethnic and regional affiliations fostered by a political system dependent on ethno-political alliance. This assertion is validated by a comment given by Sir Ahmadu Bello, the first premier of northern Nigeria, Sardauna of Sokoto and leader of the Northern People’s Congress party. He insisted that:

> We must ruthlessly prevent a change of power. We must use the minorities in the north as willing tools and the south as a conquered territory and never allow them to rule over us and never allow them to have control over their future (Bello 1960; cited in Thisday 2015).

The mass recruitment and employment of individuals based on ethnicity in government ministries was embarked upon to consolidate political control in national and regional politics and in particular to create patronage networks (Wright 1998:70 and Geddes 2010). This, of course, fostered resentment amongst ethnic groups and was used as fodder for political campaigns. Correspondingly, Sir Ahmadu Bello in response to his ‘northernisation policy' shortly after independence maintained that:

> The policy is a northerner first. If you cannot get a northerner then you get an expatriate and if we cannot get that, then we will employ another Nigerian from the south on contract (Bello 1961; cited in The Nation 2014).
The political tension between the three regions and the violent fallout of the 1964 elections indicated the character of a political system entrenched in patronage politics, with the primal drive of fostering ethnic or personal interests, rather than national consolidation. The employment of violence is considered an expected progression due to the increased tension between ethnic groups. The Statement made below by Major Gideon Orka who staged a short lived violent coup in 1990 against General Ibrahim Babaginda is an example of regional resentments and tensions:

We wish to emphasize that this is not just another coup, but a well-conceived and executed revolution for the marginalised and oppressed people of the middle belt and south… the need to stop the domination of the Nigerian State by a chosen few. Those who think it is their birth right to dominate till eternity the political and economic privileges of this great country to the exclusion of the middle belt and the south (Major Gideon Orka 1990, cited in Hunwick 1992:11).

According to Kifordu (2011:73), the nature of federalism in Nigeria was such that representation of all regions was relegated to the three largest ethnic groups, hence sustaining the perception of marginalisation within other ethnic groups. Likewise, Ozoigbo’s (n.d) empirical findings highlighted the ‘imbalance of federalism’ in the State as the source and sustenance of political violence in the polity. However Ani (2015) and Arowolo (2011), maintain that political violence in Nigeria was not as a result of ‘imbalance of federalism’ per se but rooted in that aspect of federalism that encourages dependence on oil revenues and unfair allocation of resources. Nevertheless, while Ani and Arowolo observation underscores an important element, their observation also raises the question of governance practices in relation to resource allocation. The case of Niger Delta demonstrated political elite’s complicity in management of resource allocation. As such, unfair allocation of resources is identified as an outcome of Nigeria’s ‘imbalance of federalism’.

Ozoigbo’s assertion concerning the imbalance of federalism is reflected in different federal governments’ policies to balkanise the regions into district status. This was ostensibly aimed at solving issues arising from cases of marginalisation either perceived or real. Yet proper representation of minorities at the federal level became a
problem due to the disagreement on the number of states to be created. As a result this led ‘to the violence of a military coup to lead to creation of new states’ when political negotiations proved ineffective (Falola 2009:182).

Aside from this predicament, the resultant federalism as opposed to the theory, which concerns the decentralisation of power, in fact ensured the concentration of power at the Federal or executive level of government (Ozoigbo n.d). This ensured control of State power and in particular Nigeria’s resources – cash crops and crude oil by the political elite (Muhammad 2007). Sub-states were denied autonomy and relied on the Federal government for income generation (national allocation), cabinet appointments and judicial process. This discouraged state level economic development and specifically accountability of state governors towards their constituents. It fed the perception of socio-economic marginalisation and fostered patronage politics. The sustained perception of marginalisation over time served as a catalyst and induced violent conflicts. These conflicts included the Tiv riots arising from political parties’ clashes in 1960 and 1964, the 12 day ‘revolution’ in the Niger Delta in 1966, the call for secession in the east by the Movement for the survival of the Sovereign state of Biafra (MASSOB) which led to the civil war in 1967; Maitatsine uprisings in late 1970s to 1980 (Aghedo and Osumah 2012) and the Ooduwa People’s Congress (OPC) formation in 1995 as a result of the annulment of presidential elections in 1993, acknowledged to have been won by Moshood Abiola from the west, to mention but a few.

Marginalisation often but not always leads to resentment, anger and violence. However the development of political parties divided along ethnic and regional lines manipulated the perception of marginalisation (Geddes 2010). This was reflected in the political parties ‘wars’ between the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) party representing the north and Hausa-Fulani tribe and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon (NCNC) representing the south and the Igbo tribe as well as the Action Group (AG) representing the west and the Yoruba tribe. Doctor Freedom Onuoha, a researcher and lecturer in the National War Defence College Abuja, insisted that:

The nature and character of politics and economies in Nigeria, particularly in terms of the distribution of resources generated feelings of marginalisation, which created room
for extremist tendencies and the promotion of do or die politics [zero sum politics] (Interview, Onuoha 2013).

This assertion is supported by Osinakachukwu, Jawan and Redzuan (2011), whose findings correlate the nature of the State’s Federal system with political violence, human rights violation, corrupt practices and negligence of the rule of law. However the challenges within federalism in Nigeria have also been severally blamed on the prolonged military elite involvement in political leadership. The military foray into the political terrain was believed to be driven by the soldiers’ nationalistic fervour and desire to stop ineffective civilian regimes and the pervasive perception of corruption (Ejioju 2011:169 and Graff 1988). The first military government under Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi was largely and positively received, regardless of the subsequent ill-motive ascribed to the same. Major Ironsi released a statement to justify the coup thus:

Neither myself nor any other lads was in the least interested in governing the country…we are soldiers and not politicians…we were going to make civilians of proven honesty and efficiency who would be thoroughly handpicked to do all the governing (Cited in Geddes 2010).

Although Ironsi’s remarks might be true, Panter-Brick (1970:6), Aborisade and Mundt (2002:15) underscore the implication of ethnicity as a driving force for the first military coup audibly touted by the northern political elite and their supporters. Emphasis was placed on the Igbo ethnic origin of the coup plotters and the execution of military and political leaders of northern origin by the coup plotters notably Sir Ahmadu Bello and Tafawa Belewa. Notwithstanding, General Ibrahim Babaginda and Olusegun Obasanjo contends that, the first coup was not ethnic oriented:

Not an Igbo based thing as far as I could imagine, but the execution of the coup was poorly done and made people to think that it was one sided. I could recall Nzeogwu saying that some chaps in the south had let him down because they had not been able to carry out the instruction the way he wanted them (General Babaginda cited in Siollun 2009:142).
…there was no intention on Chukwuma’s part to collude or conspire with Igbo officers in the army and with Igbo politicians and academics to lead a coup for the purpose of ensuring the political leadership of Nigeria by Igbo (Obasanjo cited in Siollun 2009:142).

As such, northern political elite capitalised on the population of southerners – Igbo among the coup plotters as an opportunity to manipulate existing ethnic rivalry as a justification for a counter-coup. Furthermore, a few months after the coup, the northerners’ fears were heightened following Ironsi’s adoption of the Federal system of governance and co-option of individuals of Igbo ethnicity into key governance and military positions. This perception thrived on longstanding rivalry between the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbo ethnic groups, and secured the plan of a counter coup which produced Yakubu Gowon a northerner as head of State. This was manifested in a series of violent clashes and execution of Igbo military officers and Igbo civilians from July 28th 1966- 1st August 1966. This research identifies the underlying issue as the incursion of elite political culture in relation to ethno-regional politics into the military and State governance.

Gowon’s regime was later impugned over corrupt practices – patronage networks (Oyediran 1979:28). An attempt was made to assuage the minority groups’ fears of marginalisation within the political system, through the addition of twelve states. The implication of this decision was the diffusion of executive power of the central government and distrust from the southern region. The Igbos felt that the balkanization of the southern region was a strategic move to weaken the bonds between the ethnic groups. This move in addition to the northerners attack on Igbo military officers and civilians eventually led to the civil war. Subsequent coups were recorded and though civilian rule was briefly implemented in the year, 1979-1983 this was again terminated by the military. Yet the seed of destruction sowed by political alliances along ethnic and regional divisions thrived and was perceived as marginalisation by representatives of ethnic groups, specifically in the allocation of resources and government appointments.

The prevalent phenomenon of coups shaped an elite political culture that accepted unconstitutional governance and the subordination of the peoples’ rights and welfare
for the sake of personal gain. The elite became desensitized to the use of violence to attain political power and achieve socio-political change rather than use negotiation or other democratic methods. The various military regimes were recorded to have violated human rights and adopted violence as a means to protect political interests and the enforcement of laws and decisions, without due process. This included Nigeria’s membership in the organisation of Islamic countries (OIC) and the structural adjustment program (SAP) during Babangida’s regime, to mention but a few. Falola (2009:181) opines that violence became a political tool, not limited to the military regime, but adopted by civilian regimes.

Further examination of electoral violence, shortly after the military era, illustrates the integration of organised political violence in the State. Wright’s (1998:96) analysis of the military era underscores the military’s influence within the ensuing political system. The advent of civilian leadership did not bring an end to military influence, but rather made politicians out of soldiers. Hence the continuation of a culture of political violence and the furtherance of personal interests at the expense of the State continued. Former vice president Atiku Abubakar validates this observation:

Nigeria has experienced decades of military and authoritarian rule which has left deep imprints in our political culture. Consequently our political culture has become used to the concentration and personalisation of political power (Abubakar 2005, cited in Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006:30).

A key aspect of this transformation was the refinement of elite political culture by the political elite to promote elite’s competition and promise patronage. The attainment of political or key government appointments is facilitated through candidates’ membership of political parties and alliance with the political elite. This phenomenon applies to different countries and research indicates that this creates stable political environments (Okonofua 2013; James 2005; Johnson and Libecap 1994; Dixon 2002 and Huntington 1968:70). However, this thesis contends that the practice of patronage politics and elite’s competition promoted the employment of political violence in Nigeria. This is evident in the occurrence of organised violent activities on the heels of elections and government appointments with politics being such a zero sum affair. There is little room to question the moral or rationale of employing violence to
achieve the desired goal. In contrast to this thesis interpretation, Arriola’s (2009) empirical findings demonstrated that patronage politics ensures a longer term of political appointment and absence of political violence. Arriola maintains that the use of State resources to buy off key political elite and the inclusion of key political elite in cabinet positions eliminates the possibility of violence as a result of disaffection of resource allocation or access to State power. However this research analysis asserts that it promotes violence, a view shared by Diamond and Plattner (1999). They likewise strongly suggest that this patronage system incites rebellion from competing elite and the populace. This could be liken to Obasanjo’s presidential tenure, a network of military and retired military men made up the political elite, they controlled resource allocation, civil service and political appointments (Campbell 2011: 27-28). As a result their personal interests preceded the socio-economic welfare of the populace, hence the violent conflicts within the Niger Delta region. Likewise, Doctor Simeon Alozieuwa a senior research fellow at the institute for peace and conflict resolution maintained that:

The political elite competition is about having an access, seeing politics as a means of providing for yourself and your clients. People must get to the public office at all costs. This is why some of us, believe that the problem that we have today is about the competition. (Interview, Alozieuwa 2013).

For Alozieuwa, the underlying factor is the motivation behind State power, namely an opportunity to gain pecuniary rewards at the expense of the necessary processes needed for nation building. Furthermore, Olusegun Obasanjo former president of Nigeria, in response to zero sum elite competition and patronage politics stated that:

The enormous powers of the executive presidency are the only real bone of contention in national politics. Through the control which the head of State exercises in releasing or withholding statutory allocations, in awarding military and petroleum contracts, in making key appointments and in giving special grants, the president of the Federal republic is the sovereign factor in the Nigerian political economy (Obasanjo; cited in The Vanguard 1994:16).
The same debate is replicated at state and local level government. Van De Walle (2006: 55-67) suggested that the prevailing elite political culture of patronage politics curtails elite’s competition and regulates unfair allocation of resources. This might have been the case during the tenures of Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha (Campbell 2011:28-30). This thesis believes as Adegbami (2013) and Ikeji (2011) that, unfair allocation of resources fanned the embers of political elite’s competition between different regions. It also promoted violent outbursts from social movement groups with the support of local and state level politicians (see section 4.2). The allocation of resources and government appointments to selected individuals based on alliances and patronage network relations might temporarily curtail political elite’s competition but it does not necessarily impact positively on long term governance outcomes. It is when these long term outcomes are negative that social movement groups are formed only to be subsequently manipulated by the competing elite for political benefits, using if necessary violence.

That a distinct culture can arise among the elite of Nigeria is not novel. In their study of the US, Higley and Burton (1989), Zukerman (1977), and Mills (1956) formulated a power elite theory that identified the decision makers and rulers of the State belonging to a small group of the population and refer to them as the power elite. (See chapter 3). In contrast Dahl (1958) contends that elite influence on political decisions is suspect. He maintains that there is no empirical evidence indicating the influence of elite in the political environment. Notwithstanding, Dahl proposes the hypothesis that the elite have political influence if their preferences counter those of any regular group and in most cases these preferences prevail. In essence, Dahl while skeptical of elite in general concurs with this thesis’ contention of their significance in Nigeria since it can be demonstrated that in that country their preferences do run to counter to the majority and normally prevail. Wole Soyinka’s analysis supports Mill contention of elite’s strong political influence:

They may be the minority but they believe that are rightly endowed to rule the country…they are opportunists… it is a minority versus the entirety of the nation (Soyinka, cited in Sahara Reporters 2012).
In Mills analysis, the political elite of the US are nominated and usually bound by the constitution of the State. However, the selection of leaders or the propagation of policies in Nigeria is driven by religious and ethnic alliances. They are demonstrated in the Hausa-Fulani hegemon which is not limited to the northern region of the country but cuts across the different constituencies of the State (Azeez 2009 and Osinakachukwu, Jawan and Redzuan 2011). Mills highlighted the elite’s influence in shaping political decisions regardless of the rightness or wrongness of such decisions in exclusion of the masses. Yet, Walker (1966) maintains that Mills assertion is not indicative of a democratic political system, that electorates are equipped with constitutional power to override unwanted policies of the elite. Although this may be true theoretically in some countries, Nigeria demonstrates otherwise, for example, the decision to execute Ken Saro Wiwa (Maier 2000:109). In addition, the proposed oil subsidy bill and the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections, these all indicate that the electorate in Nigeria is powerless to thwart the elite’s decisions.

The power elite in Mills’ view are not just limited to the political sphere, but encompass the military and economic sectors. In the same vein; the military in Nigeria, contrary to the US system subverts the electoral process and naturally takes power by force. The practice of elections has not diminished the military power, but rather created an avenue for top military officers to hold influential political positions. In the economic sector, 83% of oil wells are owned and controlled by Hausa-Fulani political elite (Josiah 2013 and Utuk 2013). Bola Ige a former governor in Nigeria and former minister of steel and power and Federal minister of justice in response to who controls Nigeria, answered:

> There are not more than 200 Fulani families and they are connected with the conservative emirates and the military (Ige; cited in Maier 2000:155).

In fact, members of the political elite at the national level are not limited to the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group (Odubajo and Alabi 2014). The elite group within the economic sector is founded on an agreement between foreign syndicates and interested political elite, who serve as capitalist managers of these foreign economic interests (Campbell and Harwood 2013). This makes accountability and transparency of the use of State revenues difficult and fuels resentment among the populace, ultimately expressed in
violence. Given the convergence of military and politicians interests, the competition for political power is aggressive. The characteristics of these approaches are encapsulated in the following past leaders’ or presidents interpretation of politics and governance, and their rationalization for actions already taken or intended to remedy perceived ills:

The aim of the revolutionary council is to establish a strong united and prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife; we promise that, you will no more be ashamed to say you are a Nigerian Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu (1966), Italics added.

*The government has not been able to fulfil the legitimate expectations of our people,* the affairs of the State became characterised by lack of consultation, indecision, indiscipline and even neglect Brigadier Murtala Ramat Muhammed (1975), Italics added.

We recognise the bitterness created by the irresponsible excesses of the politicians, the war against indiscipline will continue Major General Ibrahim Babangida (1985), Italics added.

The impact of official corruption is rampant, corruption will be tackled, we must change the ways of governance, ensure progress, justice and rekindle confidence amongst our people Olusegun Obasanjo (1999), Italics added.

To deepen democracy and the rule of law, zero tolerance for corruption, in all its forms and restructure the staff and government to ensure efficiency and good governance. I commit myself to these tasks Umaru’Yar’Adua (2007), Italics added.

The excerpts of these speeches made by past Heads of State underpin the persistent promise to tackle corruption which is seen as a pivotal challenge. Specifically, these excerpts underline the on-going unsatisfactory outcome of governance, which is underscored by the activities of the political elite (italicized above). However, this anti-corruption zeal has not ameliorated corrupt practices in government. Paradoxically, these same personalities as members of the political elite still exert considerable influence within the socio-political environment. An occurrence that
Bellentine and Nitzschke (2005) identify as a case of a combination of grievance and greed. Notwithstanding the greater space for political participation and dissent, this has not resulted in weakening the control of the political elite over State governance. It has been recorded on various occasions that the then ruling party, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) has been adept at replicating the party’s names in order to quell or eliminate the issue of rigged electoral ballot boxes (Omotola 2010 and Azeez 2009). Regarding the freedom of dissent, this has thrived but has taken an unexpected turn with some social movement groups morphing into violent organisations driven by poor governance and enabled the political elite’s manipulation of these groups mandates’. Examples include the Bakassi Vigilante movement as well as the various social pressure groups in the Niger Delta. This phenomenon is examined in the second part of this chapter.

The change from military to civilian regime has had little positive effect on the difficulties related to the political elite approach to governance (Van de Walle 2009; Osinakachukwu, Jawan and Redzuan 2011; Brown 2013 and Bach 2004). However, the role of non-state actors in governance and political activities is increasingly prevalent, despite the government’s unflattering view of these associations as a threat to the hegemony of themselves and the political elite. The first, second and third republic recorded bans on civil societies, political parties and associations that could undermine the interest and activities of the political elite. This was vividly demonstrated in the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa in 1995 (a human rights activist from the Niger Delta), as well as restrictions on news reports and programmes aired by the media. Yet the advent of democracy has brought non-state actors into the limelight, such as the mobilisation of the populace by the Nigerian Labour Congress and other related civil societies to resist the January 1st 2013 oil subsidy reform and the frequent strikes of Academic staff in universities for better facilities and higher wages. Various non-government organisations are given free rein to critique government handling of educational and human rights challenges in the State, which was suppressed before the adoption of democracy.

Furthermore, violent non-state actors transcend security issues to encompass public concerns. A case in point are the OPC (Oodua Peoples Cngress), Bakassi Boys, MEND, Hisbah, IYC (Ijaw youth council), Egbesu Boys of Africa, Onitsha Traders
Association, and Arewa People’s congress (APC) amongst others in the political, social, economic and policing sector. The emergence of these groups occurred when the political elite left a wide service security gap. However, they subsequently resorted to violent acts which are usually detrimental to the security of the populace (Oguyemi, Tella and Venditto 2005 and Tersakian 2004:73). Intrinsically, the role of non-state actors within the political environment is dynamic in nature and has served as a valuable tool to be wielded by the political elite (examined in section 4.2).

Changes in the political system of governance may not be a direct cause of political violence, but they are a platform for the promotion of violence to attain political and individual interests. As Falola (2009) shows, history has recorded the use of violence as a form of communication between the colonial rulers and the Nigerian populace, between the Nigerian government and its citizens and finally between the citizens and the Nigerian government. Alozieuwa maintains that:

> Violence has been used over time, it is a ready tool, once there is any argument at the political level, the next thing is to incite these boys [social movement groups], and overtime it has become a culture (Interview, Alozieuwa 2013).

Likewise, Doctor Omotola, from the Redeemers’ university supported this assertion,

> The government hardly listens to people who are using peaceful methods in advancing their interests until they turn violent (Interview, Omotola 2013).

Alozieuwa and Omotola assertions are evidenced cases of post electoral violence and the Amnesty programme granted to the Niger Delta militants after the implementation of violence. In summary, violence is a characteristic of elite political culture. It is accepted by the political elite as an alternative and effective method of access to State power. Through mobilising the violence of social movement groups, elite seek to gain the attention of the State. Finally, violence is seen by the elite as a tool for communicating with those who threaten their interests.
4.1.2 Elite Manipulation of Long-Standing Ethno-Religious Rivalry for Resources and Supremacy

The pre-colonial era, recorded the geographical regions of Nigeria ruled by religious leaders in the case of the northern region and tribal or ethnic monarchs in the western and eastern region. In addition Nigeria’s socio-cultural background indicated a strong affinity for religious belief and ethnic identity (Isichei 1983:10,182,212; Wright 1998:35; Guichaoua 2006 and Huber 2013). This has found expression in the political and daily activities of the populace. Fearon (2009) affirms that ethnic groups are political in nature owing to a formidable belief of ethnic supremacy within a society. This view is reflected in the Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo ethnic groups’ crisis which lasted intermittently for seven years (1997-2003) in the Niger Delta region. Various accounts traced this crisis to political tensions related to senatorial primaries and local government headquarters location. The general consensus was, a large part of this violence was inflamed by the political representatives of these ethnic groups, capitalising on the history of competition between these three groups (Human Rights Watch 2003; 2004, Ukiwo 2006, Leaton 2006, Ibeanu 2006 and Guichaoua n.d). This assertion is validated by reports of attacks on political campaign offices during the heat of the crisis and the killing of local politicians as well as the timing of violent outburst during and after elections (International Crisis Group 2006). As indicated earlier, shortly after independence, the political terrain was characterised by ethnic tensions resulting from ethnic competition for political relevance. Thus the battle line was set for ethnic and religious tussles for control with violence being co-opted as a tool. Commenting on this trait Chinua Achebe affirmed:

Nigeria was called a mere geographical expression not only by the British who had an interest in keeping it so, but even by our nationalists when it suited them to retreat into tribe to check their more successful rivals from other parts of the country (Achebe 1984:5).

Furthermore, Orji Uzo Kalu a former governor of Abia state and presidential candidate in the 2003 election stated during his political campaign:
All those who are hustling to be campaign manager and running mate to Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba presidential candidates should forget the idea. Do not make any mistake about it, if the Igbo fail to produce the president in 2003, then we will be sentenced to political wilderness for the next 20 years (Kalu 2002, cited in Ojukwu and Nwaorgu 2013:113).

Ethnic dissent was not limited to intolerance but was manipulated as a tool for political mobilisation. Gunther and Diamond (2003) studies on political parties and ethno-regional politics stressed the importance of ethnicity in pursuing the interests of the political elite. It was discovered that ethno-regional alliances were only instrumental as long as political interests of the elite were met. This thesis stresses the State’s implementation of Federalism that involves the allocation of resources to the different regions. Hence, the struggle for what each region or ethnic group terms as ‘its rightful share’ is manifested in various ways. The competition was not limited to economic gains but cuts across the different sectors of the State, in particular the political arena. This is significant, given the general belief that political or government appointments provide access to financial benefits such as the control of crude oil revenue. Consequently, interest groups such as the Arewa Peoples Congress (APC), Igbo Peoples Congress (IPC), OPC, Christian association of Nigeria (CAN), Ansar-ud-deen association of Nigeria, amongst others were created. Although their mandates might not reflect these motives, these groups’ alliance with the political elite and provision of requisite ‘services’ for same is sufficient evidence.

Historically, the formation of political parties in Nigeria was rooted in opposition to colonial rule with emphasis placed on nationalism (Paden 1973 and Falola 1998). However, the division of the State into three regions reinforced the awareness of ethnic differences. The Igbos created NCNC, AG was created for the Yoruba and the NPC represented northern interests. This subsequently became the trend for party formation and political alliances in Nigeria (Ngele 2012 and Human Rights Watch 2003). However, in order to maintain a semblance of nationalism or unity within the political terrain, careful consideration in the selection of political candidates (predetermined winners) is given to the religious and regional affiliations of these individuals. As a result the custom is now established that the president and vice-president should either be a northerner or southerner and a Christian or Muslim. The
arrangement is so that sectarian tensions will be minimised as demonstrated in the then ruling party, PDP informal zoning agreement.

By adopting religious and ethnic considerations as criteria for political party formation, candidate selection and political campaigns, unhealthy rivalry between ethnic and religious groups develops. In addition a crisis of marginalisation necessarily ensues, when the winner is from an ethnic group, which predominately practices a particular religion (Gambari 1987; Akinyele 2001 and, Campbell 2010). This was demonstrated in the 2011 presidential elections. Both candidates Jonathan Goodluck and Muhammad Buhari, represented the south/Christians and north/Muslims respectively. Emphasis was placed on each candidate’s ethno-religious affiliations during the electoral campaign. As a result the focus was not on the qualifications and the mandates of these individuals as future presidents, but on ethno-religious sentiments. The consequence of this was the flagrant use of coercion, intimidation and violence by the political elite to ensure victory. A fall out of this contention of ethno-religious sentiments was the violent riots and protests in Kano and Kaduna states, after the 2011 presidential elections.

Ethnicity is not only a form of identity, but essentially a mobilisation tool for the promotion of political interests (Huber 2013). Hence utilisation of movements along ethnic lines by the political elite was embarked upon to secure and advance economic and political interests (Fearon 2004). The largest ethnic militia group, OPC was formed as a response to the northern (Hausa-Fulani) decision to hold on to State power. In 1979 Obafemi Awolowo was denied the presidency, in 1993 Moshood Abiola was also denied the Presidency. Likewise other Yoruba politicians during the Abacha regime were assassinated or incarcerated (Akinyele 2001 and Guichaoua 2006). Thus ensuring that the Yoruba tribe had a presence in the political arena became a mandate. This consideration was supported by Fredrick Fasehun, the founder of the OPC who stated that:

The richest Yoruba highest politician could not claim his mandate, so I thought it was maybe we were not moving like the northern elite, I mean they had both political and military power. When their political elite are tired, they give it to the military elite and
vice versa, of which we did not like … It was then I decided to gather the youths who are quite able to flex their muscles because, if it was what is required, why not? (Fasehun; cited in Guichaoua 2006).

From Fasehun’s statement, the creation of the OPC was not limited to the defence of the Yoruba ethnic group or rivalry with the Hausa-Fulani, but was a response to the perception that the resort or application of violence was the only means to secure political power for the Yoruba political elite. Furthermore, the call for justice, peace and stability in the State stems from the critique of the government’s poor governance. The market for youths willing to engage in violence is another example of the outcome of political elite’s poor governance. As such, ethnic mobilisation encouraged by political elite manipulation of ethnicity and religion, is deemed pertinent in Fasehun’s rationale as a viable means to compete with the Hausa-Fulani for political power.

In the same vein, religious affiliations and doctrines served as a platform for the advancement of political interests. An example was the clamour for sharia law in the northern region of Nigeria. Although the agitation for sharia law is not a novel development, the 1999 gubernatorial elections in Zamfara state brought it to the fore, when Ahmed Yerima, a gubernatorial candidate made it the cardinal aim of his campaign. Wole Soyinka commenting on this phenomenon stated:

When he was asked why he decided to turn Zamfara into a theocratic state in a secular dispensation. He said and I dare him to deny it, that it was the only weapon he had to snatch power. He needed something which would appeal to raw emotions, to mobilise and get the governorship (Excerpt from Interview transcript with Sahara reporters 2012).

Soyinka’s observation is reflected in the political campaign statements and slogan of Ahmed Yerima and other gubernatorial aspirants in selected northern states in Nigeria during the 1999 elections. Furthermore the dissatisfaction of the electorates who supported this policy with the brand of sharia law implemented attests to the hidden agenda behind the identification with the need for sharia law (Kendhammer 2013). Consequently, the dispensation of sharia law, within the northern states, created
opportunities for movements such as *Hisbah* with similar views to propagate their beliefs, sometimes adopting violence (Tersakian 2004:74). Subsequently, with the increased tensions between Christians and Muslims, riots broke out over contentious issues bordering on social and religious practices such as the proposed Miss World Pageant leading to the death of 250 people in Kaduna. Empirical findings from the Human Rights Watch (2004:38) identified this occurrence as political violence resulting from ‘political tensions between the governor, who is Muslim, and some of his erstwhile supporters who believed he was selling them out to southern and Christian interests’.

### 4.2 A Case of Elite Political Culture Premised on Violence as an Alternative

Nigeria’s dynamic political environment has made it impossible for the State to monopolise the use of violence. This is as a result of the employment of violence as a tool for electoral campaigns by different non-state actors that have a vested interest, either for profit, politics or idealistic goals. The historical background of Nigeria’s political environment records occurrences of politically driven violent activities played out in different forms. Akinyele (2001) and Lewis (2002) describes political violence in the State as dynamic and exhibited in different dimensions including ethnic clashes, sectarian conflicts, ethno-religious clashes, and violence targeted against the government, international companies and criminal violence.

The inception of civilian rule from 1999 till present recorded a significant number of politically related violent activities across different regions of the polity. The 2003 and 2004 elections were distinctive for the high level of violence across the Federal, state and local government levels. More than a 100 people were killed. Members of the PDP and their supporters were reported to be behind this violence (Human Rights Watch 2003:1). The 2007 general elections were no different, reporting violent acts perpetrated by thugs hired by the political elite. Likewise the 2011 elections were characterised by pre and post electoral violence. The sustenance of electoral violence in Nigeria underscores the fact that violence is deemed as a necessary tool for access to State power by the political elite. This implies that the employment of violence for electoral purposes has tacit approval from the government owing to the absence of the
sponsors’ persecution (Human Rights Watch 2008). In addition, excerpts of statements made by members of the political elite give credence to this assertion.

It is going to be rig and roast, we are prepared, not to go to court but to drive you out…for every action, there will be a reaction (Bola Ige 2014, cited in Tell Magazine).

Those who want to take power through the back door will die. They will die! And the PDP will continue (Godswill Akpabio 2014, cited in Thisday).

4.2.1 Alliance between Political Elite and Social Movement Groups- Network Analysis

Manuel Castells’ assertion that ‘power relationships are the foundation of a society’ fits into the Nigerian political terrain, where political appointments are depicted as the apex of power and a source of financial and resource control (Lewis 2006 and Omotola 2010). As such, coalitions are formed with the attainment of political power as the objective. Alliances between the political elite and social movement groups are not unusual. This is illustrated in networks ties between political parties, ethnic groups, the media, religious affiliations to mention but a few (Noel 2012 and Ward, Stovel and Sacks 2011). Alliances are based on common interests and ties are formed to ensure the exchange of services. These coalitions could be formal or informal depending on the nature of alliance (Noel 2012).

In the context of this section, networks are examined based on the impact of actors’ actions on other actors’ and relational actors’ behaviour. As such the underlying issue is the response or changes in behaviour of actors in the network bordering on the perpetration of violence. Actors are identified as the political elite and social movement groups. The proposition is, the political elite ensure access to resources and propagation of social movement groups’ goals in exchange for political mobilisation and access to political office. Wellman (1983) observes that an alliance between these parties will only occur if there is something to gain and is usually fuelled by competition or the presence of grievance.
This form of alliance emerges out of an environment that is conducive for the development of social movement groups susceptible to the machinations of the political elite. These social movement groups’ may have an independent stance from the political elite, nevertheless, as Mincheva and Gurr (2006) and Castells (2011) maintain, the mandates or strategies of the political elite are shaped to reflect the objectives of these groups. Hence opportunities are created for the advancement of the actors goals. Networks are developed to ensure the cooperation of other relational actors and a structure is built to fulfil the interests of both actors.

Figure 9: A Model for Illustration purposes
Source: Author (2014)

The diagram above serves as a loose replication of alliances between the political elite and social movement groups. This thesis maintains that ties are forged with the intention of structuring linkages between the actors and other relational actors which are seen as a means to achieve stated goals. Relational actors linked to the political
elite are identified as the media, judicial and policing institutions and government parastatals that are sympathetic to or in the pockets of the political elite. The relational actors for social movement groups include trade unions, youth associations, and religious groups. The key actors employ the connections and authority of these relational actors to forge the necessary ties as well as implement strategies needed to achieve stated goals. An examination of the establishment of such alliances and the transformation of social movement groups into politically violent groups will be embarked upon next.

4.2.2 Cases of Alliance between the Political Elite and Social Movement Groups

Two cases are examined to validate the argument that, political violence perpetuated within the polity is deeply rooted on alliances between the political elite and interested social movement groups. This is made possible by an environment conducive for such practices as a result of elite political culture and in particular its influence on governance processes.

An examination of these cases will highlight the similarities between these occurrences and Boko Haram’s transformation into a terrorist organisation (further examined in chapter six and seven). The cases underline the assertion that the transformation of these groups into violent organisations is rooted in elite political culture. It is noteworthy that there were difficulties in assessing the necessary information, needed for this analysis. Electoral violent acts and alliances between the political elite and these groups are not properly documented and available for public consumption; due to the clandestine nature of these alliances and the actors involved.

A) Rivers State: Alliance between Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and PDP Governor Aspirant- Peter Odili.

During the 1998-1999 nationwide elections, incidents of organised violent activities with political underpinnings were recorded in Rivers state (Vanguard 2012 and Watts, Okonta and Kemedi 2004). The NDPVF and NDV belong to a large pool of social movement groups in the Niger Delta, whose objectives ranges from environmental
development, non-state policing to cultural rejuvenation (Okonta and Kemedi 2004). Currently these groups are grouped under the umbrella of MEND (Hanson 2007). Prior to the 1999 elections, the NDPVF and NDV were operating on a small scale, with little or no weapons in their arsenal and criminal activities primarily consisted of small scale oil bunkering, robberies and clashes with other social movement groups. Kemedi (2006) maintains that the emergence and criminal activities of these groups were the result of the shortcomings of the government and political elite interference in governance. This is evident by the structural challenges faced in the Niger Delta region, such as high rates of unemployment, unchecked crude oil spillage impacting negatively on the populace source of livelihood and unfair allocation of resources by government officials that affects infrastructural development. Nevertheless, the gubernatorial electoral contest resulted in these groups being equipped with sophisticated weapons by interested political elite in the region and the wherewithal to launch large scale violent operations. Commenting on this occurrence a senior State security service official, who was posted to Rivers state during that period observed that:

These groups and more were already in existence, however their association with the political elite [referring to Peter Odili and his opponents], ensured they were adequately armed and created a violent outlet for their perceived grievances against the government [State] and the international oil companies (Interview, senior security official 1 2014).

Security official 1 assertion is backed by empirical findings from Ukiwo (2007) and Oluwaniyi (2010), they argued that the emergence of these groups were a response to misgovernance and their subsequent alliance with interested political elite ensured the employment of violence by these groups with impunity. In addition, the existence of these groups was proven by cases of oil bunkering and pipeline vandalism. However the increase in attacks and arms proliferation in this region became prominent during and after the 1999 political elections. The alliances between these groups and the interested political elite served as the catalyst for the development and sustenance of the violent tendencies of these groups. The political campaigns in 1999 and 2003 in Rivers state (of the Niger Delta area), pitted the two leading political candidates, Peter Odili (PDP) against Ebenezer Isokariari (All Nigeria Peoples Party-ANPP).
The prevalent elite political culture (zero sum politics) ensured that the NDPVF and NDV caught the attention of the political aspirants. Omeiza (n.d), records an alliance between the NDPVF and political aspirants leading to violent clashes with the opposition. The NDPVF was then led by Asari Dokunbo and the NDV was led by Ateke Tom. The activities of these groups fuelled political violence within the Niger Delta region. Empirical findings from the Human Rights Watch in 2008 supports this assertion. Ateke Tom acknowledged an alliance with Peter Odili, insisting that an alliance with Peter Odili guaranteed employment opportunities and monetary rewards. Ateke Tom’s assertion was validated by an operative of the State security service, who was involved in the investigation and containment of the violent activities of the NDV in Rivers state:

Peter Odili with the aid of the NDV led by Ateke Tom and Soboma George ensured electoral votes were gathered for the presidential elections supporting Obasanjo in 2003. Coercion and violence was adopted (Interview, State security officer 2 2014).

Governor Peter Odili was never prosecuted for electoral rigging and political violence. However the immunity granted to the NDV, despite evidence of violence perpetrated by these groups, gives credibility to this statement. In addition the implication of the political elite’s complicity in electoral and political violence validates the proposition of this thesis.

The NDPVF was recorded as having aided in securing the coronation of the King of Kalabari, (a kingdom in Rivers state) after violent clashes with other groups sponsored by political opponents (Peterside 2007). The aftermath of the 1999 political elections, ensured the militarisation of these groups, in terms of weapons and immunity from judicial prosecution (Peterside 2007; Human Rights Watch 2008:12; Onwudiuwe and Dart 2010). Human Rights Watch (2007) recorded the falling out between both organisations and Peter Odili. Consequently, the post elections era recorded these groups’ transformation to organised political violence in order to get back at the state governor for ‘dumping them’ on completion of agreed political thuggery services.
B) Anambra State: Alliance between PDP Governor Aspirant and the Bakassi Boys

Anambra state is notorious for pre and post electoral violence since the re-emergence of civilian form of governance in 1999. The 2003 and 2007 elections at all levels within Anambra state was characterised by the employment of armed political militias (Onwudiwe and Dart 2010). The Bakassi Boys vigilante group was formed in neighbouring Abia state 1998, primarily targeted at curbing the increased level of armed robberies and other related criminal activities. This was as a result of the ineffectiveness of state policing. They proved effective and were invited to Anambra state to collaborate with the local police in fighting crime and served as security outfits for private organisations. Their success and activities secured the approval of citizens in the eastern part of the country.

Research by Smith (2004) and Oyeniyi (2010) established an alliance between the Bakassi boys and two successive Governors of Anambra State, Chinwole Mbadinuju and Chris Ngige. This indicated that, in exchange for political thuggery services, the Anambra state government provided funding, vehicles and political cover. This assertion is supported by the political assassination of Chief Ezeodumegwu Okonkwo who was a member of the opposing party APP, and the torture of Ifeanyi Ibejbu, also a member of the APP by the Bakassi (CLEEN 2001, Human Rights Watch 2002 and Amnesty 2002). In order to curb the rising public complaints as a result of this alliance, the Bakassi Boys, were renamed the Anambra Vigilante Services (AVS) and they had an office in the state government house. However politically related violent events were reported in relation to the group (Smith 2004, CLEEN 2001, Meaghar 2006, Oyeniyi 2010 and Amnesty 2002).

The AVS like earlier case studies became more violent and difficult to control. In as much as their emergence was induced by insecurity concerns, their subsequent alliance with the political elite promoted and ensured the constant recourse to terror or violence. In the case of the AVS or Bakassi, it is suggested that their method of justice before the alliance bordered on human rights abuse and barbaric. However, reports of political violence and the possession of sophisticated weapons in relation to this group became rampant upon alliance with the political elite (Amnesty 2002 and CLEEN 2001).
4.3 A Theoretical Framework of Alliance between Political Elite and Social Movement Groups

The emergence of social movement groups is usually ascribed to issues bordering on corruption, absence of basic amenities, cases of marginalisation as well as political discontent (Obadare 1999, Dejesus 2011, Ayelabola 2013 and Alao 2013). Popular support for these groups by different constituencies creates an opportunity for political mobilisation, in effect leading to alliances between these groups and interested political elite. This is what is to be expected by rational choice theory (see chapter 3), namely the logical decision of an alliance between social movement groups and the political elite to ensure a profitable outcome as interpreted by both parties. However, this theory is not sufficient to explain the intricacies of this symbiotic alliance such as, current events within the polity as well as the presence of social actors which directly or indirectly influenced the development of this relationship. For that reason Martin Shaw’s framework - global surveillance mode of warfare has been grafted onto rational choice theory to demonstrate the relationship between these armed groups and other social actors. In light of this framework, the decision to form an alliance by both parties is subject to certain events within the political and social environment of the State. These events serve as a launch pad or a platform for the application of violence, thereby ensuring a possible measure of success. Figure 10 below is generated from empirical findings which expound on issues related to the development of a relationship between the political elite and organised violent groups such as Boko Haram. Variables such as the micro environment are used to represent the social actors or social powers which influence the timing of organised political violent activities.
Figure 10: Illustrating Alliance between Political Elite and Boko Haram and Sustaining Factors

Source: Author (2015)
This framework is based on empirical findings from semi-structured interviews built on the foundation of rational choice theory and global surveillance mode of warfare framework. Integrating these two theories ensures that the conventional belief that all organised violent groups in Nigeria were created for the sole purpose of attaining political goals by the political elite is avoided. And emphasis is placed on the proposition that the transition of Boko Haram to a terrorist organisation is centred on an alliance between the political elite and Boko Haram. Nonetheless, the integration of both theories underlined the earlier assertion that the development of social movement groups is as a result of the re-occurring structural challenges in Nigeria rooted in the political elite interference in governance. This assertion is backed by Hazen (2009) and Orji (2011), they argue that the emergence of social movement groups such as NDPVF and Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) is attributed to elite patronage politics and unfair allocation of resources. Hazen (2009) maintains that at the core of federal and state level governance is elite patronage politics with the implication of control of the distribution of power and resources. This view is also supported by Ojakorotu (2006) who stressed the link between the eruption of violence in the Niger Delta and political elite complicity in allocation of resources. Hence, this thesis maintains that the agenda of the political elite regarding access to State power as a means of pecuniary rewards ensured the creation of an elite political culture that leveraged on patronage politics and zero sum politics for political benefits.

Doctor Freedom Onuoha’s analysis is that Boko Haram’s recourse to violence is attributed to the alliance between the political elite in Borno state and Boko Haram. He affirmed during the interview with the researcher that the imminent 2003 general elections prompted top politicians in Maiduguri to exploit Boko Haram for political mobilisation:

There was an informal agreement between Mohammed Yusuf and Ali Modu Sherif, who was a candidate for the Borno state seat of governance, he did win the election and Yusuf and his members were compensated with offices within the state government, the group played a critical role in ensuring that Ali Modu Sherif won the elections (Interview, Onuoha 2013).
Although, Ali Modu Sherif and other notable politicians denied dealings of such with Yusuf. Yusuf’s political appointment in the state ministry of religious affairs as well as the employment of Boko Haram members in Borno state government attested to an arrangement between both parties (Agbiboa 2013 and Babalola 2014). In addition, the constant release of Boko Haram members including Mohammed Yusuf from jail without judicial procedures indicates the group’s alliance with powerful political friends (Alao n.d). Recall that one of the benefits of network alliances indicated earlier included immunity from judicial persecution. Furthermore Yusuf’s vocal support of Ali Modu Sherif during his electoral campaign as well as Sherif’s public support for sharia law (further examined in chapter five and six) which Boko Haram advocated points towards an alliance (Abimbola 2010). Likewise, Doctor Nathaniel Danjibo an expert on religious violence in Nigeria supports Onuoha’s assessment by citing Ali Modu Sherif’s sharia law political campaign as an example of a shared interest with Boko Haram:

When Ali Modu Sherif wanted to wrestle power from Mala Kachala, the presiding governor of Borno state as at that time, he actually used Boko Haram as his support base and promised to give the Boko Haram members what they wanted, which was the proper implementation of sharia law (Interview, Danjibo 2014).

Joshua Bolarinwa, a research fellow with the Nigerian Institute of international affairs backed this assertion by alluding to the case of a senator representing Borno state who was implicated in Boko Haram’s activities:

There was also a serving senator, senator Zanna who liaised with the Boko Haram to attain his political goals (Interview, Bolarinwa 2013).

Furthermore, another respondent who chose to remain anonymous stated:

The movement has also been utilised by the political class to achieve their goals (Interview, political commentator and Journalist 2014).

These statements lend credence to the contention that Boko Haram’s transition to violence was not as a direct result of the power tussle in Maiduguri, but rather an
alliance between interested political elite and an existing religious group or sect. The agreement between both parties is based on the benefits to be derived. In the case of the followers of Mohammed Yusuf, a proper implementation of sharia law and all its implications was at the forefront. Doctor Onuoha recalls a conversation with a security agent, Hussein Mongono, on the alliance between Yusuf and Ali Modu Sherif:

I am going to make sure that, part of your demand, which is strict implementation of sharia law, would hold sway in my administration, I am also going to create an office for commissioner of religious affairs, and I am going to compensate your organisation with that post, he also promised to give them 50 motorcycles (Interview, Statement revealed by Hussein Mongono to Doctor Onuoha Freedom).

Mongono’s observation is reflected in Boko Haram’s earlier statements recording dissatisfaction with the way sharia law was implemented in Borno state, in particular the negative outcomes of governance (Cook 2011). In addition, the creation of a ministry for religious affairs in Borno state and the approval of an Islamic religious police (Hisbah) in which the Boko Haram members were extensively involved underpins an alliance between both parties. Furthermore Boko Haram’s possession of motorcycles during and after the elections is suspect. Reports identify motorcycles as Boko Haram preferred mode of transportation for its operational activities, both violent and non-violent (Agbedo 2012 and Bagagi et al 2012). Ali Modu Sherif did not limit his campaign to religious and material incentives. He insisted that, his contender Mala Kachala did not introduce the right sharia, if he got their support and became the Governor of Borno State he would support Mohammed Yusuf and his followers.

With promises like this made by interested political elite in Maiduguri, Yusuf’s followers became interested in an alliance. They were not only sure of their objectives been achieved, they were guaranteed sponsorship, immunity from the law as well as an awareness for their religious beliefs. This was demonstrated when the followers of Mohammed Yusuf served as campaigners, enforcers and political thugs for Ali Modu Sherif during the gubernatorial elections, consequently ensuring his victory (Abimbola 2010 and Olojo 2013). Had Mohammed Yusuf not accepted an alliance
with the political elite, there is a strong possibility that an alliance would have been sought with other groups by the political elite. Borno state and other neighbouring states are characterised by increasing presence of religious movements each competing for patronage and supremacy, they include Ecomog in Borno, Yankalare in Gombe, Yan Daba in Kano, Sara-suka in Bauchi, to mention but a few. In the case of Boko Haram, an alliance with other groups sharing similar ideologies is a high probability, which is discussed in detail, based on analysis of the group’s statements and operations in chapter five and six.

As indicated earlier, the combination of rational choice theory and Martin Shaw’s framework suggests that the absence of certain events limits or makes it impossible for an alliance between the interested political elite and these social movement groups. A specific case is the electoral event or the sharia law debates in Nigeria, each of which led to the outbreak of violence or riots targeted towards a particular interest. Taking into consideration the prevalence of violent activities in Nigeria, the focus is on political elite actions and its impact in shaping an elite culture that contributes to the creation of an environment conducive for political violence. This not only made the emergence of social movement groups necessary but also encouraged the development of alliances between these groups and interested political elite. This led ultimately to the evolution of such groups into organised political violent organisations. Employing the attributes of rational choice theory, such as cost and reward, elite-social movement alliances demonstrate that in exchange for electorate mobilisation, a social movement group will have its demands or objectives met. This was reflected in Ali Modu Sherif’s electoral victory and the members’ employment in the ministry of religious affairs as well as continuous implementation of sharia law in Borno state. Expanding on this interpretation, the global surveillance mode of warfare framework focuses on events which an alliance between the group and the interested political elite are subject to. In essence, for political violence to be instigated by the political elite there has to be a group willing to be involved, but also the occurrence of certain events which will trigger the timing and serve as constraints towards the confrontation. In the case of Boko Haram, this event (elections, sharia law, populace socio-economic discontent, and public approval of Boko Haram before its adoption of terrorism) cuts across the political, economic and religious sectors of the northern region of Nigeria.
For an alliance with Boko Haram to be proposed by interested political elite, certain factors have to be put in place, amongst which is the right platform or political atmosphere. The first official foray of Boko Haram into political violence was heralded by the 2003 elections. Ali Modu Sherif, as indicated earlier, was able to take advantage of the group’s displeasure on the perceived underperformance of the then presiding governor. In addition Doctor Simeon Aloziuwewa has pointed out:

Socio-economic terrain of Borno state was becoming a focal point of dissatisfaction among the populace (Interview, Aloziuwewa 2013).

Aloziuwewa’s observation is validated by findings from research scholars who attribute Boko Haram’s initial acceptance as a response to the socio-economic challenges in Borno state, such as unemployment and illiteracy (Danjibo 2010, Aloa n.d and Abimbola 2010). Likewise tensions within the PDP members and other parties such as the AD and ANPP served as the perfect platform for interested political elite to capitalise on these issues for an alliance. Moreover the year 2011 recorded increased tensions between northern political elite and southern political elite. Doctor Efem, a research fellow with the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs reflects on statements made by certain political elite in response to Jonathan Goodluck’s intention to run for the Presidency in 2011:

Some elite in the north said they would make Nigeria ungovernable; people are attributing the current Boko Haram crisis to the violence within the political environment (Interview, Efem 2013).

The rhetoric of the south taking political power from the north as well as the implication of a Christian government inadvertently served as an event fuelling the fire of religious and political crisis. The prevailing political tension in Nigeria can be likened to the events Shaw (2009) indicated - an occurrence within a particular time period, that would serve as a catalyst leading to armed conflict. Boko Haram was a ticking time bomb waiting to be detonated. It was a matter of time and locating the trigger. That trigger that was provided by what the political elite did. They observed
the build-up of an event that would further their cause, an act made possible by the prevailing constraints governing the political setting of the State.

4.4 Conclusion

The transition of non-violent social movement groups to organised political violent groups or terrorist organisations is a product of elite political culture in Nigeria. This empirical findings from the field and historical evidence examined support the argument, set out at the beginning, that the political elite’s poor governance created an enabling environment for the emergence of social movement groups and their transformation to organised violent groups. The transition took place in a context of key trends in the State’s political environment. These trends were perceived ethnic or regional marginalisation, ethnic rivalry, elite’s patronage and violence as an alternative method of accessing State power. In this environment there arose discontented social movement groups who allied with the political elite. The alliances between these parties were discovered in most cases to lead to violence and the transition of these groups to organised political violent groups.

The findings of this chapter demonstrate the influence of the prevailing elite political culture on political campaigns and the government's poor governance which ultimately resulted to the development of social movement groups. These groups subsequently served as tools for political mobilisation that all too often were willing to use violence.
CHAPTER FIVE

ELITE USE OF RELIGION AS A TOOL OF POLITICS

If religious considerations are not appropriately balanced with secular ones in matters of coercion, there is a special problem: a clash of gods vying for social control. Such uncompromising absolutes easily lead to destruction and death Robert Audi (2000:103).

5.0 Introduction

The preceding chapter demonstrated how the political elite have used ethnicity to mobilise support and gain power, as such this chapter will establish their use of religion, particularly Islam. Similarly, as the promotion of ethnic divisions has led to violence to secure the resources of political position, so the same is found to be true with the promotion of religious divisions.

Religion is no stranger to Nigeria’s governance operations and the political environment. Prior to the State’s independence, religion played a dominant role in the selection process of would be leaders and the formulation and implementation of State or community laws. This phenomenon was largely depicted in what is now known as the northern and western region of Nigeria. Examples include the Sokoto caliphate and Kanem-Borno Empire in the north, Benin Kingdom in the south and Oyo Kingdom in the west. See map below, illustrating the locations of the old kingdoms.
Despite Nigeria’s independence and its constitutional identification as a secular entity, the influence of institutional religion is prevalent across the different levels of the State governance structure. As such Federal and state government policies are subjected to religious concerns. In particular, sharia debates targeted towards the inclusion of Islamic laws in the country’s constitution, the selections of elected political leaders based on religious affiliation and Nigeria’s membership in the organisation of Islamic conference.

Due to violent clashes between the major religious groups (Christianity and Islam) within the polity, successive governments have acted cautiously in dealing with the demands or spill over effects from both groups. This raises the issue of religion in the political sphere and how elite political culture adjusts to this phenomenon. Recall that chapter four examined Nigeria’s political environment in relation to elite’s political culture. It was discovered that the political ambitions of the elite shaped and influenced governance practices as well as aided in the transition of non-violent social movements to violent organisations. This thesis contends that the exploitation of religion instigated by the political elite in the public sphere has promoted violent tendencies in religious groups. This chapter is focused on the political elite’s
relationship with the identified major religions; most importantly the Islamic religion, before and when it is perceived as a political threat. Emphasis is also placed on the impact of the Federal and state government response and the emergence of violent religious movements. The purpose of analysing the government’s response to religion is to highlight the link to political elite’s governance and the development and sustenance of violent extremist religious groups. In order to achieve these objectives, this chapter will be divided into two sections.

The first section focuses on establishing the dynamics between the State and religion. It examines the State’s interaction with religion in search of consistencies, patterns and differences and its impacts on the formulation and implementation of policies, within the timeframe of independence - October 1960 to October 2014. Analysis will be limited to events connected to political campaigns and the sharia debates. The choices of these events are their relevance to the political elite’s culture. Furthermore as discovered in chapter four, political campaigns and elections are intertwined with organised violent activities in the State. In addition data analysed in chapter four, demonstrated a link between these events, which is the political elite’s relationship with selected religious groups and the development and sustenance of violent activities. Section two will examine the link between the Islamic radicalisation process and the relationship between the political elite and representative movements in particular Islam movements.

5.1 The Nigerian Political Environment and Religion

Scholars have long studied the relationship between Nigeria’s political environment and religious affiliations. Extensive research has been focused on the battle for supremacy between the institutional religions - Christianity and Islam, as well as the use of religion as a tool for political advancement. However, there remains a limited research on the tenuous position faced by the Nigerian government when dealing with the demands of both religions and its impact both on governance and organised violent activities. The extensive discourse on sharia debates gives a clear insight on the State’s struggle to retain its constitutional identity as a secular entity. Yet events, as will be discussed, indicate an informal acknowledgement of religion, particularly
Islam in influencing Nigeria’s politics. This is especially true in the northern region and at the Federal level of governance. Samuel Huntington’s observation of religion as a key player in State politics as opposed to secularization theorists is affirmed in Nigeria’s grappling with religion as a violent tool to challenge or confer political legitimacy. Commenting on the implementation of religion as a tool for political legitimacy, a top Nigerian State security official insisted that:

People have always appropriated religious sentiments to further their political interest…it gives them, a kind of acceptance and approval in the minds of the adherents of that particular faith…so religion and the close interplay with politics is a potent weapon for violence in Nigeria (Interview, Mr S 2013).

This assertion is evidenced by reports of northern states gubernatorial political campaigns where Sharia law was used a tool for political propaganda, significantly in Zamfara state (Kendhammer 2013 and Badamasiuy and Okene 2011). This observation highlights the influence of religion in political affairs. Electorates are faced with a constant battle, instigated by the political elite to ensure the supremacy of their religion through political campaigns. Furthermore, Alhaji Balaraba Musa, the former governor of Kaduna state in response to Islamic religion as a political tool maintained that:

In the face of the new political programme, the ruling class had no foothold or any solid base for political competition as a block with the rest of the country. In view of this political bankruptcy, it became clear that Islam would offer the only alternative for the protection of their class interest. But even this was not an easy card to play…it was clear that to seek to defend it [Islam] would enhance their position. So they held on to the issue of sharia…as their only weapon for mobilisation in the north (Musa; Cited in Sampson 2014:335).

Alhaji Musa’s statement was reflected in the 1999 gubernatorial elections and 2011 general elections, which became a battle ground for followers of the two major religions. The underlying issue is the government’s tacit acceptance of religion as a source of political legitimacy in a secular dispensation. Alhaji Sa’ad Abubakar, Sultan
of Sokoto and Leader of the Islamic community in Nigeria, commenting on this issue insisted that:

Anyone saying Nigeria is a secular nation does not understand the meaning of the word secular. There is nothing secular about the Nigerian nation since whatever we do will always put Islam and Christianity in the forefront (Abubakar 2011, cited in Sampson 2014:325).

By implicitly incorporating religion as a key element of political legitimacy at the Federal and state level, the government is inadvertently laying the foundation for religious interference in governance operations. The success of religion as a political tool is undeniable evidenced in its constant use by the governing authority and the political elite. However the adverse effect of its use is the danger of promoting violent uprising. This was reflected in the aftermath of the 2007 and 2011 presidential elections as well as state level elections in Kano and Plateau state.

Source: Cohen (2015)
Gill (2001) maintains that political legitimacy and mobilisation has been the motivation behind relations between politics and religion. Though Kumar (2014) and Bhargava (2006) contend that there is a separation between religion and politics, basing their argument on secularization theory, Smith (1996) and recently Peter Berger stress the influence of religion in the political sphere. They note that it is not limited to developing countries, but present in developed countries. Specific examples cited include, Christian or Zionist movements in Northern America, Judaism in Israel and Islam in United Arab Emirates, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Regarding the Nigerian political environment, a joint task force commander in northern Nigeria attributes this to heavy reliance on religion as a political campaign tool. He said:

…When there is a lack of the appropriate platform for people to gain dominance and they resort to exploiting religion…this is drummed up by the leaders. Right from independence we have always had leaders who appealed to certain religious or ethnic groups (Interview, Joint Task Force Commander 2013).

Although the joint task force commander assertion is valid, the transition from military to civilian rule ushered in a system of democracy which offers an avenue for access to State power based on the electorate approval. The attraction of religion as a tool for access to political power stems from the possibilities of its manipulation for the pursuance of political interests. Note that this manipulation is due to the political elite’s complicity (further examined in chapter 8:8.2). By stressing religion and ethnicity, elite political culture has left little room for other platforms. In addition, former vice president Namadi Sambo at the height of the 2015 presidential election political campaign declared in a statement targeted at Muslims that:

Buhari has selected a pastor as his running mate; do you know how many churches he has? He has 5000 churches, so based on that don’t vote for them (Sambo cited in Abubakar 2015:1).

Likewise, Fox (1999) argues that religion in the political sphere is driven by the identification of religion as a tool for political legitimacy and socio-political mobilisation. As such, according to Habermas (2006), these functions of religion are designed to suit the political actors and their opponents, irrespective of the secular
nature of the political elite’s interests. The history of Nigeria demonstrates the effectiveness of religion as a socio-political mobilisation tool, hence its’ importance in political campaigns and governance operations. Ayelabola (2013) points out the prevalent culture of ethno-religious politics reflected in Nigeria’s post-colonial, military and civilian politics. He asserts that politics in Nigeria and by extension governance is influenced by the insertion of religion by the political elite. Wole Soyinka a political activist and Nobel Prize winner, commenting on the political elite and their relations with representatives of religious groups, insists that:

Religion became an issue because some power-seeking politicians recognised that just as they used ethnicity to rise to power, religion is also a very obliging tool for ascension to power (Soyinka, cited in New African 2012).

In addition to Ayelabola and Soyinka’s assertion, Morenike and Maren (2015) cited the cases of political parties and political campaigns dating from the 1960s till date influenced by religion. Furthermore they argue that the incursion of religion in the political sphere in Nigeria was at the behest of the political elite. This declaration gives credence to the previous observation portraying relations between the political elite and religious representatives in political terms. This contention is further supported by a staff of CLEEN foundation in Abuja, commenting on the relationship between the Borno state government and the Boko Haram Islamic sect:

For elections, members of the group [Boko Haram] were used directly and indirectly to facilitate re-elections of the governor (Interview, CLEEN Foundation 2013)

Based on the above statements and historical record, relations between the government and religion is restricted to a political nature and has little bearing on spirituality. In addition, the influence of religious ethics is seen in legislative attitudes towards women, educational curriculum and the public behaviour of individuals – corruption, electoral fraud and the use of violence. In other words, religion in the Nigerian society serves as a conscience for individual behaviour and propagates the tenets of honesty and morality. However the presence of religion in the State’s constitution and policies in relation to the social behaviour of citizens can be problematic due to the difference in religious beliefs (Christianity and Islam). An
example is the sharia law debates (to be examined in section 5.1.1), the miss world riots in Kano, and Nigeria’s membership of the Islamic conference amongst others. All these events subsequently led to violent clashes between Christians and Muslims, leading to loss of lives and destruction of properties. It is considered that the permission or inclusion of certain policies that benefits one religion over the other in the State by the governing officials is linked to the use of religion as a tool for political legitimacy or support. This is reflected in the aforementioned alliance between the Borno state political elite and Boko Haram (examined in chapters four and six). Hence, when one religion feels slighted or excluded from the benefits of the State – such as the freedom to hold a religious event and invite a foreign religious personality, this discontent is eventually expressed in violence. An example is the violent crisis in Kano, 1991, which was compared to the Maitatsine riots as a result of the Kano state government approval of the Reinhard Bonnke ‘revival’ a - Christian event. The Muslims in Kano accused the Kano state government of preferential treatment towards Christians, citing the visa application rejection of an African American Muslim cleric the previous year. Government relations with institutional religions are reflected in the numerous religious conflicts and the emergence of opposing religious associations. An example is the creation of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in response to the creation of the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (SCIA) (Adogame 2010 and Edward and Abel 2012). Likewise, the foreign policies of previous Muslim presidents focused on establishing good relations with other Muslim countries. This resulted in the nation’s membership with the organisation of Islamic conference and the severed relationship with Israel in 1973 due to the war between Israel and a number of Arab countries (Onapajo 2012, Hunwick 1992 and Adamolekun 2013).

In the last 55 years of military and civilian regime the country has experienced changes in the relationship between the State and religion. From the State’s perspective, ‘religious matters’ revolves around two distinctive stages; the assertion of being a nation without a State religion and the appearance of objectivity towards religion. The promotion of these policies entailed the State’s impartiality towards religion. Thus the State is constitutionally bound to avoid support or endorsement of any religious demands opposed to other religions (Onapajo 2012). However this does not negate relations between the State and religious associations. Yet the appearance
of impartiality has promoted an upsurge of fundamental and radical demands of religious practices within the social and political environment. Religious leaders keen on promoting and preserving their religious beliefs insisted on its relevance to political events. Noteworthy is the action of the Chief Imam of the central mosque in Sokoto, in response to Jonathan Goodluck’s decision to run for the presidency in 2011. In response to his displeasure with the religious, regional and ethnic background of Jonathan Goodluck, the Chief Imam and his followers were arrested for acts of vandalism against Goodluck’s political campaign properties. He was quoted to have said:

I am not regretting my action at all. I think I have succeeded in passing my message because what I did was to make Nigerians and the world know that we are not supporting his candidature (Chief Imam, cited in Rufai 2011:183).

The aim of this movement is calling for the establishment of an Islamic system and State, no more, no less (Ibrahim Zakzaky cited in Hassan 2015:25).

The statements above were cross-referenced with print media report (Sunday Trust 2011) and Denzer (2015). Nevertheless complete neutrality of the government regarding religious groups proved difficult, due to the historical foundation of heavy reliance on religious beliefs and the potential benefits of religious mobilisation. Imam Abubakar Ikara, the deputy national chairman of the Izala, an Islamic sect in Nigeria, observed the difficulties in maintaining a distant and objective relationship between the government and religious associations:

Our governors, traditional rulers as well as the religious leaders themselves are all sympathetic towards a particular sect or the other and therefore may not be able to deal fairly without any bias (Ikara cited in Daily Trust 2009:5).

Ikara’s observation, evidenced in previous political campaigns linked with religious associations highlights the dynamics between the political elite and religious groups or sects they are partial to. These elite-religious group links parallel the links with social movements and ethnic groups noted in chapter four, recall the analysis on network alliances between the political elite and social movement groups. As such
this thesis maintains that the benefits of an alliance between the political elite and selected social movement groups, in this case a religious sect or association entails the support of the actor’s (religious group) proposal or mandate over others not in the network. Hence, relations between the government and religious groups are tied with sentiments and incentives, making it almost impossible to ignore demands by these groups, contrary to the constitution. Gasda (2015) asserts that the interaction between religion and politics is ‘complex and less defined’. In other words the dividing line between State and religion is often blurred in relation to political operations. Yet, Potz (2013) argues that religion in the political sphere limits cases of violence, recommending elimination of alternative religious goods and firm control of the use of force by the government. While there appears to be precedent for Potz analysis in North America and some parts of Europe, the reality in Nigeria points to different religions competing aggressively for relevance in the social and political sphere. An example is the imposition of sharia law in northern states where Christians and animists reside and the rivalry between the Izala sect and Ahl as-sunnah, the latter under the patronage of the Kano state governor. The statement below exemplify perceived slight received by the Izala from the Kano state government, stated by Mallam Ali, the secretary of Mallam Abdullahi Pakistan the leader of an Izala faction in Kano:

Those of our members in government are very ineffective. For example, one of our members is the deputy commissioner of Hisbah [Islam religious police], but you know that Hisbah is proscribed by ex-president Obasanjo. And even if the Hisbah remained, he is not the head and cannot attend council meetings of the state. So where is the influence? (Ali 2008:41, cited in Nolte, Danjibbo and Oladeji 2009:42).

Another issue of relevance stems from the Islamic teaching, that there is no ‘basic distinction between religion and politics’ (Giannis n.d). This ideology was reflected in political Islam debates by Abubakar Gumi and other Islamic clerics whose vision or ideology is limited to an Islamised Nigerian State. Successive governments developed techniques through legislative, administrative and oftentimes radical measures to curtail religious groups from gaining and maintaining political positions in the public scene. Methods developed include the reduction of regions into smaller states,
emphasis on the State’s Federal character and the suspension of the sharia debates during the military regime.

Inherently, political parties as well as key government positions were expected to reflect the cultural diversity of the State in order to avoid ethnic or religious mobilisation along partisan lines (Suberu 2009 and Obe 2009). The inclusion of this in the Nigerian constitution served as a platform for an informal agreement of power rotation between religion and ethnicity at the national level. However the same is not reflected at the local level. Electoral victories or government appointments were earned on the basis of majority religious or ethnic presence within a community or municipality. Likewise, the presidential elections in 2011 and the subsequent outburst of religious violence contradict the constitution, with ethnicity and most importantly religion serving as a political mobilisation force. Although the required presidential electoral vote of one quarter in two-thirds of states across the country were recorded as having been met (International Crisis Group 2011 and INEC 2011), there was still an outburst of religious violence in the country (Campbell 2012 and Human Rights Watch 2011). This was as a result of the manipulation of people’s religious sentiments as a deciding factor in candidate selection.

The scramble for supremacy by the major religions encouraged the recourse to violence and the formation of political alliances by religious associations in accessing the dividends of political power (Ayayi 2000). This is made possible by the government’s symbiotic relationship with the religious groups and leaders and its version of ‘goodwill’ towards religious programs. Doctor Omotola elaborating on this peculiarity insists that:

> At the federal, state and local government level you see them sponsor people to holy pilgrimage whether in Jerusalem or in Mecca…the government is not supposed to be doing so; they have now turned religion into an avenue for patronage politics (Interview, Omotola 2013).

Omotola’s assertion illustrates the benefits attributed to alliances between the government – political elite and religious associations. However state government’s sponsorship of holy pilgrimages negates the secular dispensation of the State. The
decision to act as a ‘generous donor’ to both religions is interpreted in this thesis as a move to maintain political patronage networks. Regarding political elite’s exploitation of pilgrimages, reports indicate that these events are used as an avenue to reward relational actors in their political networks. Hence non-members of these networks with no political connections are left out. This is another example of political elite’s manipulation of religion to suit political interests. Another example of this is the electoral campaign of Governor Alao Akala of Oyo state, during which he announced that there will be an increase in those selected for pilgrimage to Jerusalem and Mecca if they voted for his party (Cited in Nguvugher 2011:8). The statement below was cross referenced with media reports recording cases of Kano state and Oyo state governments use of pilgrimage sponsorship for political campaigns from Sahara Reporters (2014), The SouthSouth International (2014) and The Nation (2012).

If these 1500 and another 1500 that will be going to Jerusalem bring along 10 each to vote for us, then we will be here again next year to do this kind of program for another set (Governor Alao Akala 2010).

Similarly, former president Jonathan Goodluck in response to his decision to lead 30,000 Christians on holy pilgrimage (International Crisis Group 2014) as well as the decision to attend different churches in Abuja every last Sunday of the month, maintained that he did this:

To show appreciation to Christians for their prayers (Goodluck; cited in The Punch, 2014:1)

Equally important is Goodluck’s relationship with top Christian leaders whose churches boast a large percentage of Christians in Nigeria (International Crisis Group 2014).

Religion in the State is closely associated with ethnic and geographic alliance. As a result the northern region is recognised as the home of Islam and the south as the home of Christians (Nolte, Danjibo and Oladeji 2009, Adogame 2010, Suberu 2009 and Obe 2011). The dominant presence of Christianity in the south encouraged the acceptance of western values and secularisation (Falola 1998:75). Furthermore
southern and western Nigeria was exposed and amendable to western education earlier resulting in higher literacy level than the northern region. The role of Islam in the political environment before independence made it difficult to accept the State’s secular constitution, which was seen as conflicting with sharia law, in northern Nigeria. Hence the public outcry in 1978, 1988 and 1999 for the inclusion of sharia law in the country’s constitution were interpreted by Christians and Muslims as a move towards the creation of an Islamic State. Despite the perceived difference in literacy level amongst adherents of both religions, a large portion of government positions both at state and federal level were allocated to the northern Muslims (recall Sir Ahmadu Bello northernisation policy in chapter four). This was as a result of northern political elite’s preference for Islam in addition to actors in the political patronage network whose affiliation was to Islam. As shown in chapter four, political elite’s religious or ethnic alliances are most likely to be chosen for perceived personal benefit. Consequently, political elite’s competition for State governance positions is reflected as a religious and ethnic contest. However the bargaining power of religious affiliation is dependent on that religion’s relationship with the governing body. For example, the Kano state government has a preference for Islamic personnel and organisations. Government policies in Kano are tailored to meet the needs of the favoured religion, which has been a source of conflict not limited to religious adversaries but extends to religious organisations of the same faith. An example was the conflict between the Izala Muslim organisation and the Emir of Kano. The Emir had used his religious influence (Islam) to ensure the electoral victory of Governor Shekarau. The disagreement between the Emir and the Izala spilled over into the Kano state government, when the Kano state government gave its support for the Emir in a land dispute between the Emir and the Izala. The consequence of this action was violent conflicts between the Izala, supporters of the Emir and the Kano state police (*Daily Trust* 2007:1 and Nolte, Danjibo and Oladeji 2009).

Moreover, Islamic organisations situated in Kano are exempted from taxes and are often recipients of the government’s largess in the form of religious donations and subsidises. The same cannot be said for Christian organisations in Kano, this is as a result of the strong influence of the Mallams who are the driving force (political mobilisation tool) behind the public’s political choices in Kano state (Nolte, Danjibo
and Oladeji 2009). Wole Soyinka expounding on this issue asserts the strong influence of the Mullahs on their followers:

They have only one line of command: their Mullah. If the Mullah says go, they go; come, they come; kill, they kill; beg, they beg. (Soyinka 2012).

Soyinka explains that a large population of the youths in northern Nigeria are part of the Almajiri system (street children and youths). They feel no loyalty towards the government and society. Their beliefs and needs are within a limited and often time prejudiced understanding of the Koran, interpreted by the Mullahs attached to these children. A Senior State Security official in the north validates Soyinka’s observation:

These almajiri are successfully indoctrinated by some Mallams who have looked at the Koran and taken out paragraphs which calls for hate, which call for incitement and manipulate these verses in such a way that there is no room for compromise but violence…these are the results of our investigations these Mallams have a strong hold on these youths (Interview, Mr K 2013).

In addition Mr K insists that the ease at which these Mallams are able to indoctrinate these Almajiris to violence lies at the government’s indifference towards the social welfare of these youths. Furthermore, he asserts that the lack of access to State facilities, such as education and employment, makes it easy for these youths to turn against the State. Hoffmann (2014) records 71.5% of northern Nigeria population living in poverty and unemployment at 40% as well as increased polarization between the rich and poor. This is another example of the outcome of the ruling elite poor governance. Therefore the distance between the government (at the federal and local level) and her citizens in this case the almajiri, coupled with alliances with these Mallams, has created an enabling environment for violence. Where power is given to a select few to stir up violence with impunity, religious manipulation and subsequent violence can be expected, the kalu kato crisis and the Maitasine crisis, mostly occurring during periods of elections are examples of this.

The interdependent relationship between the political elite and religion is further manifested in the government’s approval for the application of sharia law in 12
northern states, despite Nigeria’s formal identity as a secular State. Nonetheless the acceptance of sharia law within the judicial system is widely believed to be tied to political considerations (Alao 2013, Hunwick 1992, Badamasiuy and Okene 2011, Kendhammer 2012, Odeh 2010, Obe 2011 and Laitin 1982). This was widely publicised during the 1999 gubernatorial elections in Zamfara state. Despite what is written in the constitution, in reality Nigeria is not a secular State but a bipolar religious State. By adopting two religions it encourages competition for dominance. This entails lobbying and propaganda, and serves as the building block for organised religious violent activities. Recall the examples of the outcome of sharia law debates, in the late 1970s, where the State refused to include sharia law in the constitution, leading to protest which quickly deteriorated to violent clashes between the Muslims led by the Muslim Students Society and Christians (Agi 1998:158).

5.1.1 Religion in the Public Sphere: Elite’s Politicisation of Religion, Pathways to Violence

As indicated earlier, relations between the political elite and the majority religions are dependent on benefits to both parties. In the case of Christianity, the provision of public goods such as schools and hospitals by the Catholic, Anglican and Baptist churches across different regions in the country most especially in the south, east and west were welcomed by the State. The Muslim community also contributed by sponsoring Islamic studies and the creation of NGOs targeted towards job creation and welfare of the less privileged. This they did in exchange for the maintenance of religious affluence and access to benefits that only the government can provide – tax relief and subsidised land. This quid pro quo relationship varies across the different regions, depending on the majority’s religion or the religious preference of the presiding state governor. Wole Soyinka explains why relations between these religious groups and political elite exist:

It is profitable for many people, especially those who seek power to dominate…it is a very obliging tool for ascension to power (Soyinka, cited in *The Spectator* 18th November 2012).
Likewise another commentator in support of Soyinka asserts:

There are various Islamic sects in the north all vying for sponsorship and financial resources either for welfare or preaching needs, specifically in Kano and Kaduna…these groups who have a large following are deemed attractive or beneficial for the political needs of interested political elite in exchange for religious or political services (Interview, Miss T 2014).

The government’s need to control or manage the activities of religious groups is reflected in military engagements and constitutional debates geared towards limiting religious influence to social and cultural activities in the State. In essence, Higley’s (2010:164) observation of political elite’s effective management or control of social, political and economic associations as well as coercive forces for political benefits is indicative of Nigeria.

On the other hand, advocates for organised political Islam are involved in debates for the inclusion of sharia law in the constitution, as well as the inclusion of Koranic studies, Muslim teachers and Islamic prayers in schools run and owned by Catholic churches. These demands are believed to be instigated as a result of Nigeria’s acceptance of western culture (Hunwick 1992), although Danjibo (2010) argues that these demands are rooted in the competition between Christianity and Islam for religious supremacy in Nigeria encouraged by the interested political elite. Haynes (1998:17) interprets these demands as secularisation by prominent Muslim clerics in Nigeria and believes that it has served as a form of alienation of a people whose identity was linked with religious and traditional values. As a result, amongst other factors, there is an increased call for the inclusion of religion- Islam in political activities as a means for inclusion and participation.

Jurgen Habermas’s interpretation of religion in the public sphere stressed the relevance of religion as long as it satisfies strict conditions, even when the State is secular. In essence the time of exclusion or separation of religion in the world from the State is giving way to one where religion is an institution in the formulation and implementation of governance policies (Berger 1997). Example of such policies in Nigeria includes Islamic banking, sharia law, and the temporary termination of polio
vaccination in Kano state in 2003 as the instigation of some Islamic sects. Religion has always been a part of Nigerian life and therefore of the political terrain. However, the State has been careful to exclude religion in political and governance affairs especially during the military regime, when sharia law debates were banned in 1989 and strict monitoring of religious associations were undertaken (Badamasiuy and Okene 2011 and Hunwick 1992). This move by the Armed forces ruling council, effectively inflamed the distrust and competition between the southern Christians and northern Muslims. Furthermore an open and legal avenue for the propagation of sharia law was closed to the proponents. This ensured the development of increased radical religious views geared towards the creation of a theocratic State and marked the beginning of the encroachment of Islamic interference in national politics.

The sharia debates were premised on the inclusion of sharia law in the constitution and the creation of a federal sharia court of appeal. Naturally this development was opposed by Christians and government officials alike. The inability to reach a decision acceptable by the proponents of sharia law prompted riots across the northern region against the Christians and government parastatals. This was further fuelled by the State membership in the Organisation of Islamic conference (OIC) in 1986. In addition the Iranian revolution in 1979 emboldened the proponents of sharia law and an added demand for the Islamisation of the Nigerian State.
The demand for the implementation of sharia law across the country was fronted by Alhaji Abubakar Gumi, who served as pilgrimage relations officer for the Nigerian State and Saudi Arabia and had close relations with Sir Ahmadu Bello the premier of northern Nigeria (Badamasiyuy and Okene 2011, Hunwick 1992, and Lubeck, Lipschutz and Weeks 2003). Abubakar Gumi’s relationship with Sir Ahmadu Bello aided in the establishment of the Jama’atu Nasri Islam (JNI, group for victory of Islam). The development of this group, paved the way for the formation of other Muslim groups, whose activities bordered on violent conflicts with other Muslim sects, Christians and the government. This was as a result of disagreements over ideologies, low tolerance level and competition between these sects and religions in accessing new members. The prevalent issue of alliances with the political elite served as an avenue for the unification of the northern region in order to secure the position of this region at the Federal level. These alliances between the political elite and these Muslim sects were not for the purpose of fulfilling divine instruction, but politically motivated. As for Abubakar Gumi, his religious motivation was geared towards the interpretation of his Wahhabi doctrine and ultimately the insertion of Islam in the political system. The result of this was the subsequent development of
organised religious violent groups, such as the Izala sect amongst others, when it became obvious that the State intended to remain secular despite its relationship with these groups.

A more recent example of political elite’s relations with groups promoting religion linked to sharia law is the 1999 gubernatorial elections in the northern region of the country. The transition to democracy in 1999 ensured the presidential victory of a southern Christian president, which, as earlier indicated in chapter four, was as a result of political campaign concentrated on religious and ethnic lines. Members of the opposition party, All Peoples Party (APP), mostly from the northern region, felt threaten due to a shift in power from the north to the south (Kendhammer 2013). Ahmed Sani Yerima, with the aid of other northern politicians, in a bid to secure political power promoted the sharia law campaign. He sought to mobilise a religious alliance and lend religious legitimacy to its political ambitions (Alao 2013, Brinkel and Ait-Hilda 2012 and Olaniyi n.d.). This proved successful. Yerima and other politicians secured their positions and ensured re-election for the next term. The process involved in the promotion of sharia law was not void of violent protests (Kendhammer 2013 and Odeh 2010). There were reports of violent clashes between Muslims and Christians in the northern region of the country during and after the State’s acceptance of sharia law.

The promotion of sharia law as a political campaign tool, therefore, involved securing the cooperation of Islamic religious leaders and Muslim sects. The political elite’s relationship with selected Islamic sects in the northern region spilled into local governance, such as the provision of security in the guise of the Hisbah, educational policies promoting Islamic studies in the curriculum of schools and the creation of operational sharia criminal courts (Lubeck 2011). Furthermore, the government ensured the sponsorship of Muslim related activities, the appointment of Muslim officials in government offices and provision of state subsidized materials in exchange for political legitimacy (Adogame 2010, Nolte, Danjibo and Oladeji 2009 and Olaniyi n.d.). This increased the influence of Islam religion on governance affairs as well as aggravated relations between followers of opposing religions in the State. For example, the violent clashes between Muslims and Christians in Kaduna over the Kaduna State government preference for Islam. However the alliance between the
different northern state governments and selected Islamic sects was short lived. Citizens and various Muslim sects who had supported the sharia law and the political elite were disillusioned. This was as a result of the inability of the sharia law practiced to eradicate the identified challenges of governance in the State. Doctor Danjibo, explains the success of the sharia campaign by pointing out the reasons behind the public’s support, as well as highlighting the northern governors’ complicity in the abuse of sharia law in administrative and governance operations:

A lot of Muslims thought that by accepting sharia, sharia was going to bring a transformation in the society, where the gap between the poor and rich will be breached, where there will be good governance, where there will be equal or equitable distribution of resources, After a while they discovered that they were deceived (Interview, Danjibo 2013).

Danjibo’s observation, supported by Maren and Osheowo (2015) emphasized the ineffectiveness of sharia law in fulfilling the expectations of the electorates. Corruption and crime was still rampant, unemployment and poverty still existed and those in power seemed to pay lip service to the tenets of sharia law. Furthermore, clashes between the police force and Hisbah continued in Kano as a result of the Federal government and the 12 sharia states conflict of interest on the proper implementation of sharia law (Badamasiuy and Okene 2011). This unexpected development propelled extremist views amongst Muslim sects, such as advocating a stricter version of sharia law and the transition to theocracy in so doing ensuring the sustenance of violence within the northern region. Islamic associations and dissatisfied Muslims who had supported and granted political legitimacy to the northern political elite became violent in their protest. For example, the Muslim Brother Association, also known as the Islamic Movement of Nigeria led by El-Zakzaky, consistently clashed with the Kano state police.

History records the successful implementation of religious propagandas in political campaigns. Political Islam in post - colonial Nigeria was fuelled by Sheikh Abubakar Gumi’s preoccupation with re-creating the old northern empire (Sokoto Caliphate). The Sokoto Caliphate was once the home of the great Usman Dan Fodio dynasty and served as the seat of authority for Islamic related activities. Before the British
colonisation, the empire encompassed what is now known as Burkina Faso in the West to Cameroon in the East (see image 4). It was a theocratic State, whose constitution, social and political practices was firmly entrenched in sharia law. The historical record speaks of the strong influence of Islam on every aspect of the caliphate activities, including the lives of its citizens and most importantly on political matters. Sheikh Gumi’s teachings influenced the themes developed for political campaigns in the northern region, which impacted the national elections. It was Gumi’s sole desire that gubernatorial and presidential candidates be Muslim. The ‘one north’ slogan became synonymous with the Northern People’s Party (NPP), whose desire for Muslim candidates only was heralded across the northern region (Adelabola 2013). Although the northern region of Nigeria is not exclusively populated by Muslims, yet the preference for Muslims by the Muslim population as part of the governing authority was crucial. Due to the overwhelming influence of religion in candidates’ eligibility and political campaigns, the political terrain became divided along religious lines. The northern political elite saw religion as an opportunity for political mobilisation. Recall Mosca and Pareto’s assertion in chapter three that the elite manipulate and influence changes in social, economic and political sectors for personal advantage. As such, in the case of northern Nigeria, violence became the common language between the opposition forces and the NPP, thereby inciting religious and ethnic clashes in the northern and eastern region.

However relations between Sheikh Gumi, the Izala and the federal government (Ex-Presidents Shehu Shagari and Ibrahim Babaginda) were questioned by the populace, due to the low quality of public services and the resultant socio-economic challenges. In reaction to what was interpreted as the ineffectiveness of religion in securing good governance, the Ahl al-Sunna sect and the Yan tatsine movement emerged. Their objective, ostensibly, was to apply the right form of Islamic doctrine in the management of State affairs. However, studies indicated that there was a relationship between Yan tatsine leader and northern political elite, particularly in Kano state (Danjibo 2009, Hiskett 1987 and Kasfelt 1989). The Yan Tatsine movement just like the Boko Haram was allowed to thrive due to the political elite’s policy of politicising of religious movements. Before the decision to eliminate the Yan Tatsine movement was made, the governor of Kano state, a flag bearer of the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), was in conflict with the Shehu Shagari’s National party of Nigeria (NPN) and
the Emir of Kano. This was reflected in the Federal government’s initial deliberate refusal of military aid in the elimination of the group when they became uncontrollable (Fwatshak n.d and McGregor 2012d). Likewise the arrests and subsequent release of Mohammed Marwa, the leader of Yan Tatsine sect by the local authorities, suggests relations with influential individuals. This is attributed to Marwa’s large following and influence on the young population, whose dislike for the government was made public (Hiskett 1987, Isichei 1987, Kasfelt 1989, Lubeck 1985 and Ojo 1985).

Another important event reflecting the influence of religion in the political sphere and resulting violence is Mohammed Yusuf’s relations with the Borno state government. As indicated earlier, sharia law was used by certain northern governors as a means to access and retain political power. Ali Modu Sherif, the former governor of Borno state, was not an exception. Yusuf advocated the implementation of a strict form of sharia law. He was a compelling preacher and successfully gathered members from different social circles. Naturally the political and religious elite were interested in his movement and alliances were made (see chapter six for further analysis). The salient point is Yusuf’s aid in the political campaign of Ali Modu Sherif and Sherif’s subsequent electoral victory, hence validating the assertion of an alliance.

The Borno state’s government decision to involve Islam in political campaigns and governance, without any consideration to limitations only promoted employment of violence by religious groups. The lack of clarity in the implementation of sharia law and the double standards practiced by the political elite aggravated the religious sects (example Boko Haram) who had aided in the political campaign. As a result Boko Haram transformed into a full-fledged terrorist organisation. In addition the clash between Hisbah and both the state police and non-Muslims, is also an indication of religion influencing governance. The diagram below is a brief illustration of the dynamics of religion in the public sphere and the consequences.
5.2 When Religious Groups becomes a political Threat; A Link to Islamic Radicalisation and Political Elite Response

As indicated in the previous sub-section, relations between the political elite and religious associations are founded on mutual benefits between both actors. However, the perception of shift in power by both parties often leads to a struggle for supremacy which is frequently reflected in violent operations. This raises the question of at what point do the political elite perceive religious groups as a political threat and how does their response to this perceived threat impact on the emergence and sustenance of extremist groups?

Wole Soyinka gives an important insight to this question. He argues that religious groups become a political threat when they are available as an instrument for political
campaign and legitimacy. Soyinka cites the example of Boko Haram’s alliance with interested northern politicians. Furthermore he insisted that the loss of political power to the south instigated a dangerous discontent amongst northern political elite. In addition to the dissatisfaction of political power reverting to the south, the implication of a Christian president instigated religious discontent and was further reflected in violent clashes in the northern region.

That is when they activated the extreme, murderous strain of religion. That is why they began to identify political enemies as religious enemies (Soyinka, cited in Sahara Reporters February 6th 2012).

Soyinka’s observation is in line with Gill (2001) and Habermas argument in highlighting the importance of religion as a tool to access and consolidate political power. Recall the case of sharia law as a political campaign tool and the government sponsorship of pilgrimage to mecca.

5.2.1 Threat Perception

An examination of the historical relationship between the State and religion, particularly Islam, affirms a symbiotic relationship between religious power and political legitimacy. This is true for both the military and civilian era. There is a political power base centred within the northern Islamic leaders and the northern political elite. The interaction between the State and religion, lies in the over reliance of political campaign and participation on religion. For example, the 2011 presidential electoral campaign relied on religious affiliation amongst other factors. Furthermore the State’s willingness to sponsor both Christian and Muslim pilgrimages and the long standing sharia debates are all a function of the deep rooted influence of religion and a manifestation of elite political culture.

It is usually argued that, a key element of democratic politics is negotiation and compromise, yet Islamic tenets leaves little room for compromise. This unwillingness to compromise is exhibited in the emergence of Islamic sects such as the Nigerian Muslim Brotherhood, the Taliban and Islamic Movement in Nigeria all directed towards the revival of political Islam. The presence of a Muslim leader, both at the
state and national level, ought to serve as an answer to the goals of these movements. Nonetheless, as recent events indicate, the presence of these Muslim leaders functioned as a restraining factor to extreme expressions by these Islamic sects. The increasing emergence of these movements and the sustenance of their objectives tilted the balance of religious and political power towards these movements. It became imperative that these movements and the percentage of the constituency which made up ardent followers and supporters of these groups were controlled by and allied with interested political elite. Doctor Onuoha attributes this occurrence to the events leading up to Boko Haram violent uprising. He asserts:

When Mohammed Yusuf became the leader of the sect, he started his charismatic preaching...he inevitably began to gain a large followership...there was the forthcoming 2003 general elections, the top politicians in Maiduguri, particularly Ali Modu Sheriff...saw an opportunity for political mobilisation...this is the real turning point of Boko Haram revolution (Interview, Onuoha 2013).

Onuoha’s assertion is supported by Abimbola (2010) and Gusau (2009) who maintain that the popularity of Yusuf’s movement attracted the northeastern political elite to the movement’s perceived usefulness for political legitimacy. Onuoha’s remarks highlight the attraction of these popular movements which fostered political elite relations with the Islamic traditional leaders and clerics, and ensured that major religious association liaised with the political elite in order to secure incentives and consolidate a power base. However the inability to control these groups led to clashes between the government and the groups. Doctor Danjibo supports this assertion:

When Mohammed Yusuf started critiquing the government of Bala Kachala, the governor started using the police to harass the group (Interview, Danjibo 2013).

Danjibo’s assertion is reflected in reported clashes between the followers of Mohammed Yusuf and Borno state police. Furthermore these clashes occurred during the period of Yusuf’s vocal attacks on Governor Bala Kachala (Cook 2011). It culminated in the fight for supremacy between the state level government and these religious bodies. In the case of Borno state government, Yusuf and his followers demanded a more active role in governance than the state government was willing to
relinquish. Likewise *Hisbah* vigilante group in Kano and the sharia court officials across the northern region demanded a more visible and active role in security and judiciary processes. In addition, events such as the Nigerian State’s proposed sponsorship of the Miss World pageant in 2002, which led to the deaths of over 100 people, is a clear example of the clash of interests between the government and the Islamic religious bodies. However the underlying issue lies in the salient struggle for authority between the Nigerian government and Islam, most especially at the state government level. The statement below is an example of the dissention between the State and Islamic organisations.

We as Muslims, we don’t recognise the authority of the Federal government, state government, local government and any form of authority…we have our own law which is the Koran and Sunna and we execute them under the leadership of mallam Ibrahim El-Zakzarky (Yakubu Yahaya, a Faction leader of the Muslim brothers cited in Mbamalu 2012:6).

The statement above is an excerpt from various statements with similar ideologies released by the Muslim Brother Association. This statement demonstrates the power struggle between Islam in Nigeria and the government.
5.2.2 Islamic Radicalisation and Political Elite Complicity

The sustained campaign for a political Islamic State is a peculiarity of Islamic radicalisation in northern Nigeria. This suggests the existence of well-defined processes, which are understood and acted upon by agents of this phenomenon. These processes discussed earlier, are founded on Islamic beliefs such as nation-wide implementation of sharia law, Muslim governing officials and most importantly the debates for the transition of the Federation to a theocratic State.

It is pertinent to establish an understanding of the term radicalisation within the context of this chapter. Alex. P. Schmid, maintains that the notion of radicalisation is too complex, hence the absence of a universally acceptable definition. For the propose of this section, two definitions will be adopted, the US department of homeland security, office for intelligence and analysis defined radicalisation as ‘the process of
adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect social change’. Two key issues raised by this definition are (a) the assumption that violence was and is the only action considered by the radicals and (b) the proposition that a return to the teachings of the prophet is interpreted as extremist. Those who advocate for the implementation of the prophet’s teaching using violence as a tool are termed as radicalised. Schmid’s definition of radicalisation as ‘the process generally accompanied by an ideological socialisation away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of mobilisation outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognised as appropriate or legitimate’ (Schmid 2013). This alludes to the adoption of violence in response to failure of other less or non-violent options and highlights access to political power as a motivation for the adoption of religious radicalisation.

The declining influence of Islam in political and social related activities in northern Nigeria can be traced back to the colonial era. The result of this was the limitation of sharia law, the breakdown of emirates and subsequent integration of different regions, and the introduction of the Western educational system leading to the unattractiveness of Islamic system of education. Nevertheless, the Islamic leaders (Emirs, Sultan, Sheikhs and Imams) capitalised on the alleged larger population of the northern region and the religious beliefs of the *Umma* to consolidate their power base in addition to the earlier thriving agricultural industry in the northern region. This move ensured close relations with government officials at state and national level, guaranteeing the steady presence and influence of Islam in governance affairs. The emergence of Islamic radicalisation in northern Nigeria has been extensively researched by various scholars and analysts (Alao 2013, Agi 1998, Danjibo 2009, Dickson 2005, Falola 1998, Falola 1998, Fwatshak n.d, Hill 2010, Hunwick 1992, Loimeier 1997, MucGregor 2012, Onuoha 2014, Paden 1973, and Tande 2012). These scholars’ findings have linked this phenomenon to the politicisation of religious dissent by political elite, exposure to Islamic interpretations from Arab nations and the implementation of sharia law in 12 northern states. However studies such as this one linking these events to elite political culture and the resultant prevalent violent activities are limited.
Recall the aforementioned findings indicating the politicisation of Islamic radicalisation as a cause. The late 1970s and early 1980s recorded the violent uprising of the Yan Tasine movement. The early development of this movement excluded violent operations. However messages or doctrines propagated by the leader, Marwa appealed to the social and economic discontent masses. The Kano state’s government response to these messages was the imprisonment and deportation of the sect’s leader from Kano to Cameroon. However Marwa’s later pilgrimage journey to the holy city made him acceptable to religious and political leaders in Kano, despite his large following and critical messages towards the political elite. Yet his movement was recorded to have carried out violent operations against the state police and civilians (Danjibo 2009, Hiskett 1987 and Ojo 1985). Wole Soyinka underscores an important factor of political elite’s response to sects like the Yan Tatsine. The initial response is to form an alliance with these groups in order to further political interests and subsequently deflecting the group’s objective towards political campaigns and thuggery (further analysis in chapter seven).

Governors courted the sponsorship of Maitatsine. I remember a former governor in Kano admitted that at the beginning, he used to go to maitatsine, when elections came close to get support, but he said I stopped doing that when I realised that it’s a very dangerous organisation (Soyinka, cited in Sahara Reporters February 6th 2012).

Soyinka’s comment is validated by the consistent release of Marwa and his followers from prison despite evidence of criminal activities (Hiskett 1987). Furthermore, Marwa’s acceptance back into Kano despite his deportation points to an alliance or aid from the government or the political opposition. The relevant fact of this historical discourse was the recognition and subsequent utilisation of Islamic radicalisation by northern Nigerian political elite. It is important to note that northern cities affected by violent activities of Yan Tatsine movement were described as politically unstable (Ojo 1985). The political climate was such that the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) whose core members were key northern Nigerians had majority political control of states in northern Nigeria with the objective of expanding to other northern states. Evidence from historical records indicates that attacks carried out by the Yan Tatsine were limited to states outside the control of the NPN. Furthermore the Yan Tatsine
sect was patronised by the rich and affluent members of the political and religious class, due to the leader’s strong followership and influence on the masses (Ayelabola 2013 and Liebowitz and Ibrahim 2013). Hence the dynamics of the political elite’s relationship with Islam is limited to the level of cooperation between both parties where there is a convergence of interests.

Though it is true that there is limited evidence to directly link the political elite with the Yan Tatsine violent activities, the ‘blame game’ played by opposing parties during that period indicated key shared interests. In addition it highlighted the case of politicisation of Islamic radicalisation. In the same vein, the Boko Haram crisis reflected same. As the senior security officer said:

At the beginning of the crisis, the political leaders appeared to be ambivalent, and some of them attempted to appropriate it for the arguments as to where power should be…it may have been convenient for them to use this to argue for more political consensus for the north in terms of national leadership (Interview, Mr S 2013).

Mr S’s statement is supported by aforementioned analysis of elite manipulation of religious agendas for political benefits. This line of argument claims that the political elite perceived Boko Haram early movement as a relevant tool for political campaigning. This was characterised by the north south divide and the PDP and APC electoral campaigns. As long as there were violent activities carried out by Boko Haram, opposing political parties had fodder (blame game) for political campaigns. Nevertheless the inability to curtail the excesses of Boko Haram and the resulting reaction of the masses was interpreted by the political elite as a threat to their consolidation of political power. This in turn influenced the response process of the Federal government. The blasé response of the governments at regional and national level to the initial violent activities of Boko Haram showed the perceived usefulness of religion as a means to consolidate political power in the northern region. In addition, the response of then governor of Kano state, Mohammed Rimi, to the sect’s activities prompted violence and was interpreted as a lack of political will (Danjibo 2009 and Zinn 2005:105). This was reflected in Kano state government’s reluctance to lose its Islamic religious constituency, as a slight against the sect could have an adverse effect on other Islamic groups as well as their followers. In addition, the
previous method of dealing with undesirables, such as unlawful imprisonment and extrajudicial killings were becoming unpopular at the national and international level. The uncertainty and slow response served as a catalyst for the gradual radicalisation of low level organised violent groups by inspiring fear for the sect’s existence (Zinn 2005:105).

Kano state government’s involvement with groups such as the Yan Tatsine is not necessarily motivated by the belief in Islam as a tool for spiritual and social development, but rather an expedient means to a political end. Wole Soyinka’s observation links this assertion to Boko Haram’s alliance with the political elite.

…you also encounter a fusion of a credo in northernism and at the same time Islamism…the opportunist face of Islam, Islam is just an instrument…they are willing to go the full length of Islam because it pays them politically [referring to sharia law as political campaign in 1999]…leading to the birth of a movement like Boko Haram (Soyinka, cited in Sahara Reporters February 6th 2012).

Hence the presence of Boko Haram and it religious goals served as an instrument for northern political elite to further their political interests. However the cooperation of both parties in time degenerated to discord and the use of violence by both parties.

5.3 Conclusion

The relationship between the political elite and major institutional religions (Christianity and Islam) insured the continued influence of religion in the political sphere. The State’s political environment is influenced by religious sects or associations as this chapter’s focus on Islamic sects has shown.

The political elite’s response to the presence of these sects was to adopt their objectives as political propaganda. This aided in gaining political legitimacy as well as political mobilisation. Inherently, this policy facilitated the development and competition of Islamic sects with different ideologies and the subsequent transition of these sects to violent organisations.
It has been shown that the political elite’s relationship with religious associations or sects is centred on political interests, hence excluding the moral and spiritual aspects. The absence of clarity of Islam in the political sphere (example in the implementation of sharia law) led to discontent among the Muslim sects and the Muslim electorate who had clamoured for and voted for the implementation of sharia law. It was ascertained that the government’s response at the national and state level to Islamic sects triggered by the perception of threat to its authority, lead first to alliances and then, escalated to violence.

An examination of historical religious clashes revealed that, there is a link between these clashes and political campaigns or electoral periods. The alliances between political elite and Islamic sects, enabled by the government’s poor governance, prompted the transformation of these groups to organised political violent organisations. This was illustrated by the emergence of Yan Tasmine and its activities in Kano state, as well as the emergence of Boko Haram.
CHAPTER SIX

BOKO HARAM’S EMERGENCE AND TRANFORMATION TO TERRORISM

6.0 Introduction

Image 6: Abubakar Shekau flanked by members
Source: BBC (2014)

This chapter focuses on analysing the emergence and the threat of Boko Haram. Chapters four and five examined the role of the elite in subverting ethnicity, social movements and religion for their own ends. This chapter tests to what degree this very same process lies behind the emergence of Boko Haram, its transformation to a terrorist organisation, the nature of its structure and administration. Just as political violence was the product of the elite seeking power at all costs, so in the case of Boko Haram political violence was the product of its alliance with the elite.

The argument of this chapter then is that elite interference for their own ends played a significant part in the development of Boko Haram and its turn to terrorism. It was this prevailing culture among the elite, particularly the political elite that shaped Boko Haram’s emergence.
An in-depth analysis of Boko Haram’s operational activities, strategic focus and goals indicates that the group was enabled by an elite culture that sacrifices good governance for political gain. It is a culture that has been prepared to exploit social and economic grievances and religion in the north even to the point of promoting violence. There would be no Boko Haram but for this prevalent elite culture.

6.1 Emergence, Ideology and Philosophy

The exact date of Boko Haram’s emergence is controversial. Scholars investigating Boko Haram’s activities such as, Forest (2012), Walker (2012), Onuoha (2010), Loimeier (2012), Osumah and Aghedo (2012), differ on the date of the movement’s inception. Analysis of the group’s date of birth is constrained by the significance of the group’s multiple change of names, the change in leadership (Mohammed Yusuf assumption as head of Boko Haram) and the advent of violent tendencies as a basis for ascertaining the date of the group’s formation. However, within the context of this research, the declared date 1995, of Boko Haram’s emergence by the Nigerian Director of Defence information Colonel Mohammed Yerima is accepted. This assessment is evidenced by the presence of student Islamic associations in the University of Maiduguri at that period, amongst which Abubakar Lawan was recorded to have been the founder, a faculty representative or supervisor of one of these groups. Furthermore empirical evidence provided by Onuoha (2010) and Cook (2011) indicated relations between Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Lawan. In addition, early members of Boko Haram were students or drop-outs from the University of Maiduguri at the time when records of students drop out from this University were high (Omotola 2013 and Abimbola 2010).

It is pertinent to highlight the popularity of Islamic associations in universities in the northern region, in particular the political elite’s and the Islamic leaders’ approval and patronage of such groups. Recall in chapters four and five, the analysis of alliances between Islamic religious groups and the resultant influence of Islam in the socio-political sphere, notably in Kano and Borno states, with the offer of violence with impunity. Elite political culture in Nigeria is such that relations between Islamic
associations and interested political elite are encouraged for the purpose of achieving mutual benefits. Lechner (1991) argues that religious associations or institutions have limited or no influence on political events – such as access to State power and control of State resources as such inclusion in politics is on the basis of secular or democratic processes. However, findings from this research in chapters four and five demonstrated the strong influence of religious groups on the success of political campaigns as evidenced in Zamfara, Kano and Borno states amongst others. Furthermore, Smith (1996:5) maintains that the influence of religious associations in political mobilisation ‘should be taken more seriously’; stressing peoples’ attachments to their religious beliefs or doctrines. Smith’s observation is illustrated by the implementation of sharia law in northern Nigeria, despite Nigeria’s identification as a secular State. Doctor Shola Omotola, commenting on relations between political elite and religious movements – such as Boko Haram, stated that:

…they started preaching pure Islam but at some point in their transformation in their metamorphosis the power that be in Borno state [political elite] hijacked them, funded them for political purposes (Interview, Omotola 2013).

Omotola’s observation is supported by Bean (2012) and Hiskett (1987) whose findings highlighted the incursion of Islamic religious groups in the political sphere at the instigation of the political elite; specific cases cited included the maitatsine and Boko Haram groups. As indicated by Omotola, the movement’s emergence was encouraged by a political environment that benefits from alliances between these groups and the political elite. Boko Haram in its early stages was focused on religious beliefs. This was exhibited in the early 2000s when members of the group opted to live apart in a secluded area, choosing to rely on fishing, farming and cattle rearing as a source of sustenance. At this period the movement was not overt in its stand against the Federal and state government. Although indicative of Jurgensmeyer’s (2003) theory on anti-social movements, it could be argued that the decision to live apart and adhere to an Islamic doctrine, contrary to the status quo of the community and the State constitution, could be termed as a subtle stand against the State. However, this phase of Boko Haram’s emergence was focused on the study and propagation of the Wahhabi teachings. Emphasis was placed on the adherence to what was termed as a ‘purist’ form of Islam by members. The establishment of an Islamic State was not
initially part of the group’s objective. Hence the development of this movement garnered little interest from the state and Federal government in relation to national security.

Noteworthy, is the socio-political environment of the north eastern states in Nigeria during the early period of the group’s emergence. It is suggested that misgovernance by the political elite created an enabling environment for the recruitment of young men into the movement. Likewise, a civil servant working in the National Assembly insists that:

Boko Haram is one of the reactions to the collapse of State failure…I mean a State where certain things are not put in place… a government that does not care for its people, not to mention the ever increasing gap between the rich and poor (Interview, Civil Servant 1, 2013).

Likewise, a Boko Haram member, during interrogation revealed that:

I also used to convince them [recruits] by giving them 5,000 naira, 10,000 naira, which they use to buy second hand clothes for business; this was strategies for encouragement (Cited from police audio interrogation Zangina 2013).

Cook (2014) supports these observations by identifying poverty and underdevelopment as factors that ensured the successful emergence and sustenance of the group. Likewise Danjibo (2009) and Loimeier’s (1999 and 2012) analysis is the same. Yet this thesis identifies poor governance not so much as the root cause of Boko Haram, but as an outcome of the elite political culture with its poor governance and interference in ethnic and religious organisations for its own ends (further analysis in chapter two and chapter eight). Furthermore, recall chapter five’s analysis on Islamic religious encroachment in the political sphere and the northernisation policy, as well as Abubakar Gumi’s mission of political Islam with the aid of the political elite. Though the political elite level of involvement was limited to political support, nevertheless, this encouraged the development of groups like Boko Haram.
The emergence of Boko Haram in 1995 and its transition to a terrorist organisation is examined in this chapter using Michel Wieviorka’s (2005) antisocial movement framework. This framework illustrates the descent of social movement groups into anti-social movement groups who employ violent tactics. This framework is not focused exclusively on the causes that led to the creation of these movements, but on the transition process to a terrorist organisation. In essence he argues that organised political violent groups in Nigeria do not emerge as violent groups, but rather graduate into this phenomenon. Wieviorka’s framework establishes three phases which fit into Boko Haram’s emergence and transition into terrorism.

The first phase identified by Wieviorka is when the movement is created as a platform that claims to speak on behalf of a select group of people. In this case the early stage of Boko Haram, then known as the Muslim Youth Organisation, popularly called Shabaab, operating in a mosque at Damboa, Maiduguri (Olojo 2013, Onyebuchi and Chigozie 2013) were depicted as separatists. This was prior to the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf. They believed in a different doctrine of Islam - an Islam not tainted by what was perceived by the movement as the negative manifestation of Western values (corruption and unemployment - outcomes of poor governance as a result of elite interference in governance). Hence their decision to live separately. They were not perceived as violent. However the salient point is elite interference in governance as a reason for their emergence. This new form of doctrine initially had a negative response from the Muslim community in the north-eastern region of Nigeria (Danjibo 2013 and Onuoha 2010). Yet this thesis argues that the movement’s action of separation and practice of its version of Islam which disregards the authority of the government or constitution, created a platform for religious and political mobilisation (sharia law and Hisbah). This created a volatile situation in a country known for religious violence. The gradual growth of this movement expanded into the political and social terrain of Borno state and other northern states. This thesis argues that this growth is rooted in the elite’s precededent use of Islamic religion for access to political positions. The result was the renewed campaign for sharia law, growing membership of the group, increased radical notions and specifically the manipulation of the movement by northern political elite (discussed in chapter five) for the attainment of political power. A commander of a joint task force in northern Nigeria indicated that:
I think it is clear, they saw an opportunity for Islamic propagation in a region that is rife with Islam doctrines and sects…their mission was to use sharia law as a way to re-invent the government (Interview, Commander Joint Task Force 2013).

The second phase Michel Wieviorka identified is when the movement adapts the undefined expectations of individuals, shaping them into oft lauded structural challenges caused by or neglected by the governing authority. This is reflective of socio-economic challenges faced in Nigeria, which was examined in preceding chapters as the outcome of the political elite’s poor governance. This ensures the establishment of a mandate by Boko Haram that falls within their purview, guaranteeing the re-invention of the group’s image within its original goal. This occurred between the time the group was known as the Nigerian Taliban and the Yusufiyya sect, in other words between late 1990s and early 2000s. Mohammed Yusuf was popularly described as a charismatic leader. His strategy was to emphasize the link between the absence of Islam in the socio-political environment and shortcomings of the government. This propaganda echoed the sentiment of a large population, such as the Almajiris, un-employed youths, low income earners, blue collared individuals and the political discontents. By combining religious, socio-economic and political references, Boko Haram re-invented itself and ensured access to a large pool of sympathisers, consequently prolonging its lifecycle. Supporting this assertion, Mr B, a journalist in the middle belt region of Nigeria maintains:

…the government has tilted towards western education and western political structure. The belief of the Boko Haram group is that this has not benefitted the region, having failed to produce the economic and political emancipation of the region. So for that reason they are advocating an alternative, which is sharia legal system (Interview, Mr B 2013).

In addition, Mr A, a senior State security service officer in Borno state, describes Boko Haram emergence:

…as a result of an agitation against the government’s failure to meet the needs of these people…they say, you are corrupt [referring to government officials], you have taken
our resources to develop yourself only…they want Islamic law-Sharia, where everybody is treated equally, justice is encouraged. That is the main thrust of this movement (Interview, Mr A 2013).

From the statements above, it is inferred that the movement was successful in aligning elements of elite’s political culture with its goals. These elements include access to State power for political interests and corrupt practices in governance, amongst others. The success of this policy is evident in Boko Haram’s expansion and increase in members. In addition, the majority Muslim population in northern Nigeria demanded and interpreted sharia law as a solution to political elite’s excesses in the northern region. A staff of CLEEN foundation corroborated this observation:

…I would say the religious undertone; the religious foundation is there, but at different times there are different encounters with the political system that informed other dimensions at some points (Interview, CLEEN Foundation Staff 1).

The third phase according to Michel Wieviorka is the adoption of violence. This occurred as a result of the perceived absence of an alternative means by the group and the impending threat of violence from the Borno state government due to the fallout between Yusuf and Ali Modu Sherif. This is evident in recorded clashes between Boko Haram and Borno state police pre-July 2009 uprising. The characteristics of the government’s response that effected the transformation of Boko Haram into a terrorist organisation are examined in chapter seven. It was construed that Boko Haram’s initial adoption of terror tactics was catalysed by perceived threat from the State’s military and police force, combined with the threat of the decline of the movement’s existence and the extrajudicial killings of its leader and members. However, in line with this thesis’ position, Doctor Adesoji Abimbola insisted that:

Regardless of the extrajudicial killings, Boko Haram would have become violent. It is not enough that the group had disagreements with Ali Modu Sherif; it was just a matter of time. There is a culture of violence and brutality in Nigeria, it is a way of life, and even the security forces are brutal… (Interview, Adesoji 2013).
Adesoji’s argument is supported by the Borno state police reports of arms and light weapons found in Boko Haram enclave days before the July 2009 uprising (Daily Trust 2009). Nonetheless, Wieviorka argues that globalisation is a key element in a movement’s emergence and transition into a terrorist organisation. Campbell (2013) asserts that the Nigerian government insisted that Boko Haram’s ideology had been imported from Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, empirical analysis from this research and supported by findings from Danjibo (2009) and Loimeier (1999) stresses pre-existence of radical Islamic ideology in the northern region of Nigeria pre and post-colonial period. Although, the movement’s public solidarity with AQIM and other Jihad groups outside the borders of Nigeria gives credence to the Nigerian government’s contention, their ideology, albeit more radical, is a replica or an echo of the same ideologies of preceding similar Islamic sects in northern Nigeria and the Wahhabi teachings propagated in Saudi Arabia (Loimeier 1999 and Paden 1973). Another example allegedly supporting the Nigerian government’s assertion and Wieviorka’s argument, is the movement’s adoption of ‘Afghanistan’ as a name for its base shortly after the US response to the 9/11 AQ attacks. This was a bold declaration of the group’s support for the Taliban as well as AQ terrorist activities, although the Nigerian Taliban as it was known then was not notoriously violent. Notwithstanding the Nigerian government and Wieviorka’s insistence on global jihad events, the evidence amounts only to Boko Haram’s adoption of terror tactics and its need for global recognition.

Moreover Mohammed Yusuf’s previous membership and associations with groups such as the Izala and Jama’atu Tajidid (JTI) whose beliefs were influenced by ‘foreign’ Islamic doctrines as a result of relations with Saudi clerics and Iranian revolution did impact on Boko Haram’s objectives. Likewise, Mr E, a senior State security officer in northern Nigeria, links the terroristic development and jihadist ideology of Boko Haram to happenings in Afghanistan and Iran.

Recall that in 2002 [referring to Boko Haram], they were known as the Taliban…that word Taliban is not a Nigerian name, it is as a result of what is happening in Afghanistan. In other words the developments in Afghanistan one way or the other affected and influenced the internal dynamics in Nigeria (Interview, Mr E 2013).
In addition to this assertion, Mr S, a senior State security service officer in western Nigeria insists:

It is very clear that Boko Haram had some links with AQIM and some of them have received training...so Boko Haram has its place within the global jihadist movement. They have taken the ideological direction from them and this is evident in Shekau outbursts...which mirror some of the statements made in the past by Osama Bin Laden (Interview, Mr S 2013).

The above statements made by the security operatives, is in accordance with statements released by Boko Haram declaring allegiance and a shared ideology with AQIM. This is further evident in similar terrorist tools used, such as suicide vest attacks, the use of IEDs and kidnaps for ransom. As such, the ideological underpinnings of Boko Haram reflected in northern Nigeria Islamic history, is manifested in the current violent expressions of this doctrine in the global jihad platform. Yet they were exacerbated by the elite’s poor governance that attracted members of Boko Haram to look for radical solutions to their poverty and marginalisation.

6.1.1 Ideology and Philosophy

Snow and Byrd (2007) emphasized the importance of ideology in the emergence and evolution of a group. The ideology of a group forms the foundation upon which a group’s survival and mandate is built. As such the ideology of a group is tailored to represent the social, political and economic realities of targeted populace as well as potential recruits. Furthermore, the content of the ideology and events leading up to the development of that ideology serves as a rationale for the group’s adoption of actions that is contrary to the norms and values of the society at large.

In defining Boko Haram’s ideology a combination of the influence of the social, political and economic environment is relevant. Likewise, studies carried out by, Benford and Snow (2000), Oliver and Johnston (2000) and Snow and Byrd (2007) illustrate ideology as a combination of process and content. It is not limited to the continuation of the Wahhabi teachings, global jihad movement or the re-establishment
of the Sokoto caliphate, but rather viewed as a movement geared towards establishing a structure or social change perceived to be wanted by a representation of Nigeria’s population. Doctor Nathaniel Danjibo, an expert on religious violence in Nigeria, while expounding on the earlier support of Boko Haram’s ideology, identified the supporters as those who believed that Boko Haram’s message was the key to much needed development.

Muslims in the north thought that by accepting sharia, sharia was going to bring a transformation in the society (Interview, Danjibo 2013).

The truth of the above statement is evident in the popular campaign and support for sharia law during the 1999 elections and subsequent adoption of this law in 12 northern states. This assertion will be analysed using the framing theory, illustrated in the diagram below. Boko Haram’s ideology will be discussed by linking events and examining important statements relevant to the development of the group’s ideology.
From the figure above, Boko Haram’s ideology is shown to have been a process. This process is set within a frame and characterised by events. The first aspect of the group’s ideological development is the identification of the problem. In the case of Boko Haram, its early emergence and philosophy was expressed in terms of a perceived shortfall gap in Islamic practices and the prevalence of socio-economic problems (Brinkel and Ait-Hilda 2012, Cook 2011, Forest 2012, Idowu 2012, Loimeier 2012, Malachy 2013, Onuoha 2012, Ogunrotifa 2013, and Ubhenin 2012). Within this context the bone of contention was depicted to be the political elite’s acceptance of western values and the prevalence of elite corruption. The advent of these phenomena was said to be as a result of the declining power of Islam in the public sphere. Recall the inclusion of Islam in the political sphere was at the instigation of the political elite, examined in chapter five. Abubakar Shekau’s statements allude to this decline in influence:
Everyone knows that democracy and the constitution is paganism and everyone knows there are some things that Allah has forbidden in the Quran that cannot be counted as western education (Cited from Boko Haram Youtube Videos, Shekau 2012).

The Quran teaches that we must shun democracy, we must shun western education, and we must shun the constitution (Cited from Boko Haram Youtube Videos, Shekau 2013).

Shekau draws attention to the belief system premised on the perceived ‘evil’ of western culture identified as Nigeria’s secular constitution. By highlighting the absence of Islamic principles in the State’s constitution, Shekau suggests a threat to Islam. Employing language such as ‘paganism’ and ‘forbidden’ connotes negativity and instinctively brings to mind the consequences of encouraging what is blasphemous. Recall that the Nigerian society is highly religious (examined in chapter five). Shekau’s word play awakens the protective instinct of Islamic religious minded people towards their religion. He paints an image of Islam versus evil, where evil is depicted as democracy and the secularisation of the State, hence the eradication of evil equals defence of Islam and consequently reward in the guise of a better society.

Noteworthy is the identified challenges in Nigeria, such as unemployment, poverty, corruption and ineffective infrastructural facilities, are as a result of the government’s poor governance and the prevailing elite political culture. Collier (1999) in his assessment of grievance theory identified the use of grievances as a tool for political mobilisation. Hence Boko Haram’s attempt to manipulate these structural challenges and subsequent attachment of their existence to the absence of Islam in the socio-political environment is a means to legitimise their mandate. Furthermore, Abu Qaqa the spokesperson for Boko Haram emphasizes Shekau’s message by insisting that the application and acceptance of Islamic teachings as interpreted by Boko Haram will bring about a Utopian State.

It is the secular State that is responsible for the woes we are seeing today…, we have been motivated by the stark injustice in the land…poor people are tired of injustice, people are crying for saviours and they know the messiahs are Boko Haram…when
Islam comes, everyone will be happy (Italic by author, Cited in The Guardian, Qaqa 2012).

Qaqa’s pronouncements underscore the group’s motivation and reason for being, which is injustice, corruption and socio-economic problems. Identified challenges which have become common place amongst the Nigerian populace and outcomes of elite interference in governance. Furthermore, the mention of ‘when Islam comes’ is acknowledged as a means of taking up the common cause with other Islamic sects, such as Yan Izala, in the pursuit of a Nigerian Islamic State. The vision or mission of Boko Haram is clear: the problem has been recognised, the culprits have been identified and a mandate has been set. Mr E, a senior State security officer in northern Nigeria identifies Boko Haram’s ideology as a function of their disbelief in the status quo. He argues that:

Boko Haram do not believe in the Nigerian constitution…they believe that any State we have should be a pure Islamic State and abide by the laws of the Koran…they believe that the absence of Islam in the Nigerian society has paved the way for injustice such as political corruption and poverty (Interview, Mr E 2013).

Mr E’s observation is verified by Boko Haram statements indicative of its stand against a secular State and the call for an Islamic theocratic State. The presence of political elite corruption and poverty served as a platform and a legitimate purpose to consolidate a support base for its activities. It is a case of adapting to changes within the socio-political environment to launch its movement. The influence of religion in the political sphere instigated by the political elite made this phenomenon possible. This validates the assertion that the absence of these ‘legitimate’ structural challenges caused by poor governance limits or nullifies the existence of social movement groups such as Boko Haram. Hence making it difficult for these groups to emerge, access a support base as well as transform to organised political violent groups.

The next stage in the development of the movement’s ideology focuses on the aforementioned structural challenges identified by Boko Haram. This is achieved by insisting on definite solutions and methods of attaining set goals. This was exhibited in the late 1990s when there was a petition for the application of sharia law and
subsequently the demand for the Islamization of the Nigerian State. Note that as examined in chapter five, the success of sharia law was achieved with the aid of northern political elite in exchange for political support. The logic behind Boko Haram’s demands is the belief that a transition to political Islam and the influence of Islamic principles (orthodox Islam or Wahhabi teachings) in the socio-cultural environment will serve as a deterrent to socio-political injustice and promote economic development. In line with this assertion, Doctor Onuoha a faculty member of the Nigerian Defence College says:

His philosophy [Mohammed Yusuf] therefore is, we need to overthrow this unjust and un-Islamic system and enthrone an Islamic system that is based on the principle of sharia, and that is the only way they could begin to realise the good ideals of society (Interview, Onuoha 2013).

Onuoha’s statement is supported by Cook (2011) and Elkaim (2012) analysis of Boko Haram’s motivation, which identified as the introduction of Islamic doctrines to State governance, grounded on political elite misgovernance. Boko Haram’s earlier framing of the socio-economic challenges faced by the State will only be solved by confronting the absence of sharia law, hence advocating a religious solution. It follows that a call to arms and the mobilisation of individuals willing to fight for justice and Islam is ensured. As indicated from figure 23, extreme measures are expected from would-be members. Although the challenge of the free rider problem is anticipated (Ghandi 2005 and Weismuller 2012), see chapter three. Nevertheless, Mohammed Yusuf was able to capitalise on members’ commitment to the protection of Islam as well as the provision of welfare for members and society at large. Likewise Abubakar Shekau focused on the rewards of afterlife and monetary rewards to ensure stronger commitments of members.

Boko Haram’s ideology, while religious in nature, is couched in socio-economic and political issues:

Mohammed Yusuf capitalised on the economic situation, the fact that a lot of Nigerian young people do not have jobs…and here was a young man feeding people freely…who
paid peoples’ rent, so that attracted a lot of people… to his way of thinking (Interview, Danjibo 2013).

Danjibo assertion is supported by Kano state security service earlier reports on Yusuf’s largeness towards his followers. The structural challenge of the society is interpreted by Boko Haram as an outcome of the absence of Islamic religious values in the political sphere. Hence the demand for organised political Islam-Islamized Nigeria as a solution to identified structural challenges.

This thesis’ proposition in preceding chapters examined the emergence of political violence and specifically traced its influence (elite political culture) on the emergence of Boko Haram. Can that influence be traced not just to the use of violence but in the ideology and philosophy of Boko Haram? Yes.

The group’s emergence albeit initially on religious grounds was enabled by an elite political culture that encouraged, manipulated and benefited from the incursion of religion in the public sphere. Boko Haram’s ideology was framed on political elite poor governance. Furthermore, there is a precedent (examined in chapter five) for the use of Islamic religion and Islamic sects for political mobilisation, which in turn encourages the emergence of such groups.

6.2 Strategic focus and Goals

Findings indicate that Boko Haram’s operational strategy has been inconsistent, since its emergence in 1995. The group’s most noteworthy tactic is its uncompromising stance on the current political system, which is reflected in its refusal to negotiate with the State government, to create a political representative platform and its confrontational tactics. Abu Qaqa, the group’s spokesman expressed the militant stance of the movement:

…Absolutely nothing will stop us against waging war on the Nigerian State and its establishments (Cited in AllAfrica November 25th, Qaqa 2011).
The sect will not hesitate to eliminate anyone that chooses to prefer the western culture over sharia (Cited in AllAfrica November 25th, Qaqa 2011).

The statements above are proven by the attacks carried out by the group, such as attacks on police stations, secondary and tertiary institutions as well as public buildings. In addition, the military response by the Nigerian State and the international community’s condemnation did not slow down the violent operations of Boko Haram.

This trait of violence differentiates Boko Haram from other Islamic sects in Nigeria. As indicated in chapter four, sub-section 4.2.2, the movement had initially embarked upon a strategy which entailed working within the current political system and with the political elite to bring about desired change. This involved an alliance with Borno State government under the leadership of Ali Modu Sherif. This approach included an alliance with the secular government, with the plan of establishing an Islamic State, the establishment of sharia law and appointments of Boko Haram members within Borno state cabinet. It was seen as a means to the advancement of the group’s goals. However this strategy evolved from non-violence to extreme violence, further examined in chapter seven. Doctor Danjibo asserts:

When Ali Modu Sherif wanted to wrestle power from Mala Kachala he actually allied with Boko Haram for his support base…and if they [Boko Haram] supported him and he became governor he would make sure that the right sharia was introduced…so they had a say in government. But over a while they starting falling apart and violence was the result (Interview, Danjibo 2013).

When there was a breakdown of relationship…Yusuf put pressure and called for the resignation of his followers from government employ…staged a base in Maiduguri and started critiquing the government (Interview, Onuoha 2013).

The statements above were supported by newspaper reports of Ali Modu Sherif political campaigns and the creation of an Islamic religious commission in Borno state. Furthermore, Yusuf government appointment shortly after Sherif became the governor of Borno state (Onuoha 2012, Abimbola 2011 and Elkaim 2012). Likewise,
Yusuf fallout with Sherif was indicative of his resignation from the ministry of Islamic religious affairs and his verbal criticisms of Sherif. From Onuoha and Danjibo’s assessment, Boko Haram changed its strategy of achieving its goals when the group realised that an alliance with Borno state government was not yielding desired results. It was the failure of the elite in Borno state that directly led to Boko Haram’s turn to violent means. The actions of Boko Haram after its rejection of the government employ and Ali Modu Sherif involved violent campaigns against those seen as symbols of government’s authority. The implication of this strategy change is premised on the belief that, violent acts will incite support from the populace and coerce the government to acknowledge Boko Haram’s demand.

Boko Haram’s change in strategy involving the adoption of terror acts was not just due to elite failure but is also attributed to change in leadership and the socio-political environment. The personalities of Abubakar Lawan, Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau are different. Although not much is documented about Abubakar Lawan, the movement was non-violent under his leadership and evidence indicated that he was not allied with the political elite. Onuoha (2013) describes Mohammed Yusuf as a moderate and a charismatic leader, while Abubakar Shekau is termed as temperamental, aggressive and hard lined in his approach to achieving the movement’s goals. It is argued that the extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf occurred before he adopted terror acts as a means of expressing his views (Abimbola 2010 and Agbiboa 2013). However, the police and the State Security investigations reported the purported plans of the movement’s transformation to religious militancy evidenced by weapons found in Yusuf’s compound. In addition as earlier mentioned by Adesoji (2015) and Daily Trust (2009), a commander of a joint task force in northern Nigeria insisted:

The death of Mohammed Yusuf made no difference, it was time, there was no other way they can achieve their mission without violence, and without the use of terror that is my assessment (Interview, Major General A 2013).

The socio-political environment at the advent of the group’s emergence in 1995 discouraged violent expressions, due to the existence of the military government (see
chapter 4:4.1.1). Furthermore, Major General A’s statement implies Boko Haram’s exhaustion of other avenues and the attraction of terror tactics as a viable means. Recall that the group’s alliance with the northern political elite ensured the use of violence with impunity. In addition the nature of Nigeria's political environment is such that there is precedent for the employment of violence as a feasible strategy, namely the Niger Delta militants. Likewise Mr S, commenting on this phenomenon asserts that:

Under the military era there was no active involvement of the people. A lot of governance was done by fiat. There were no debates and where dissent was expressed, or where opposition was noticed, it was forcefully put down (Interview, Mr S 2013).

Social movement activities were discouraged and ruthlessly suppressed regardless of religious, ethnic or political affiliations. Likewise the government’s retaliation was not constrained by democratic checks, such as human rights considerations and the international community.

Abubakar Lawan’s tutelage of the group was dedicated to the study of and propagation (public preaching) of the Wahhabi teachings. The group’s goals and objectives were not clear and deemed to be non-threatening to the community and State at large. The group was identified as another Islamic religious group by the government at the regional level. However under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, the movement’s objectives and goals expanded into the political terrain as a result of the alliance and the interference of Islam religion in the political sphere. Hence the re-introduction of sharia law in the northern region of Nigeria. Doctor Shola Omotola and Doctor Simeon Alozieuwa’s assessment validates this observation:

Yes Boko Haram has religious undertones but it became the reincarnation of politics by other means…a continuation of politics in Nigeria (Interview, Omotola 2013).

Boko Haram was a religious movement. Along the line they played a role in the political system. They were used by some politicians to get power, and they had an understanding… (Interview, Alozieuwa 2013).
The death of Mohammed Yusuf ushered in the expansion or change of Boko Haram’s prior objective. This included the revenge of Yusuf and other Boko Haram members’ deaths, the release of imprisoned members, the Islamization of Nigeria, and verbal and active support of the global Jihad movement. Nonetheless Boko Haram’s resolve to wage war against the government remained consistent.

Image 7: Map showing Boko Haram geographical violent operations
Source: TRAC (2014)

The expansion of the group’s violent operations as illustrated in image 7 is an example of the evolving trends in the group’s strategy. From the year 2003 to June 2011, the group focused its attacks in the north eastern region of the State. However the suicide bomb attack on the police headquarters in Abuja, June 16th 2011 and the suicide bomb attack in Lagos June 25th 2014 marked its infiltration into other regions in the State. The logic behind Boko Haram’s attacks in the Federal capital territory (FCT) and the employment of suicide bombing is to inflict a high cost on the government and publicise its inability to curb the group’s excesses and guarantee the security of its citizens. Thereby ensuring a loss of confidence by the populace towards the Federal and state government. Nonetheless this strategy could be described as
two-edged. While the group by its operations in the FCT has inspired fear and loss of confidence, it has also led to a large population making a stand against the movement and its terror tactics.

In addition to the group’s expansion into other regions of State, reports indicates violent operations carried out by Boko Haram outside Nigeria’s borders in Cameroon and its alliance operations in Mali. The inclusion of Cameroon in Boko Haram’s attacks is attributed to Cameroon’s alliance with the Nigerian government in combating Boko Haram insurgency. Prior to attacks in Cameroon, the border villages between Nigeria and Cameroon and the Mandara Mountain served as a recruiting pool and training facility, due to the absence of stringent security monitoring. In addition, Cameroon shares similar characteristics with Nigeria, such as Christian south and Muslim north and the prevalence of poverty and economic decline in northern Cameroon (American Foreign Policy Council 2014). Furthermore the choice to lend support (verbal and active-supply of fighters) to Ansar al-din in northern Mali against the Malian army ensured recognition of the group’s activities in the global jihad movement and Islamic terrorism world. In addition, Boko Haram fighters came back equipped in combat skills and weaponry to continue Jihad in Nigeria (Pindiga 2013 and Raghavan 2013).

Another important change in Boko Haram’s strategy is the indiscriminate selection of targets. Prior to the July 2009 uprising and resumption of violent activities by the group in September 2010, the group focused on the police and other agents of security as their targets. Elaborating on the group’s attack on police stations in north eastern Nigeria, Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau asserts:

We have proven our resolve by two recent attacks of police stations in Bauchi State earlier in the week. We may be forced to liberate innocent citizens who are being detained and alleged to be our members, more attacks on the way! (Cited in Daily Trust July 25th, Yusuf 2009).

We never kill ordinary people, rather we protect them… we are not fighting civilians. We only kill soldiers, police and other security agencies (Cited in Reuters January 27th, Shekau 2012).
Yusuf and Shekau’s statements highlight one consistency which is the attacks on the State security operatives for the purpose of releasing imprisoned members and the symbolism of attacking the State. However, attacks carried out by Boko Haram involving the death of civilians undermine the declaration of protecting and not attacking civilians. Shekau’s statement could be attributed to restoring the image of Boko Haram, therefore soliciting support from the public. Nonetheless, incessant attacks on the State’s security forces captured the attention of the Federal government. Still the change by the group to targeting civilians, businesses perceived to be indecent and educational institutions triggered a heavy handed response by the State and attracted the attention of the international community. Furthermore, the addition of Christians to the group’s targets expanded the objective of the movement from the corrupt practices of the secular State to a religious war against Christians.

We are also giving three days ultimatum to the southerners living in the northern part of Nigeria to move away…the president…is the leader of Christians only (Cited in The Vanguard January 2nd, Qaq 2012).

The war we are fighting… is the war against Christians and infidels, (Cited from Boko Haram Youtube Videos Shekau 2014).

This religion of Christianity you are practicing…is paganism…is not religion; we are trying to coerce you to embrace Islam… (Cited in AllAfrica July 31st, Shekau 2012).

From the statements above, Boko Haram’s mention of Christians and subsequent attacks on churches such as the Christmas day suicide bombings changed the dynamic of the group’s goal from political Islam to religious war. It could be argued that to establish an Islamic theocratic State the elimination of a competing religion is relevant. However focusing its attacks on Christians generated increased tension in the north-south divide debate. Recall Abu Qaq mention of the president as a leader of Christians. This allusion was made to create a sense of division amongst the Muslim and Christian population, not just in the social terrain but the political terrain. Furthermore Abubakar Shekau’s mention of alleged attacks or grievance perpetrated
by Nigerian Christians emphasised Islam as the only true religion and ensures support and sympathies from the Muslim population:

…you Christians cheated and killed us to the extent of eating our flesh like cannibals...even without provocation you slaughtered us and took our wives and humiliated us! (Shekau 2012, Cited in AllAfrica July 31st and Sahara Reporters 2012).

Shekau’s focus on Christians and alleged crimes committed by Christians without provocation against Muslims is meant as a catalyst to accelerate violent conflicts between the two religions, which have volatile relations. A religious war between Christians and Muslims will further the group’s cause and subsequently divide the nation between two camps. However this ploy proved futile, despite grievances registered by Christians against Boko Haram for churches attacked. There is no record of mass violent engagements between Christians and Muslims as a result of this statement prior to Boko Haram’s theatre of violence. This could be attributed to the government’s passionate description of Boko Haram’s activities as criminal and political and the adoption of rhetoric targeted at creating an image of us versus them. (See chapter seven for further analysis on the government response and discourses employed).

In addition to the growing collection of indiscriminate targets by Boko Haram, media houses, mosques, market places, bus stops and the political elite were not left out. The statements below illustrate the wide range of Boko Haram targets and target selection trait, which is essentially anyone whom the group identifies as an enemy of Allah and Boko Haram.

Allah has said that we revenge on anyone that attacks us in the measure as we were attacked. So as far as we are concerned, persons like Ali Sheriff, Senator Ndume and Pindar are not in any way different from President Goodluck Jonathan, whom we are targeting to eliminate… (Cited in AllAfrica November 25th, Qaqa 2011 and BBC 2015)
We decided to attack some media houses because that paper was used in dishonouring our prophet Mohammed… and we are hoping to continue these attacks until we drive them out of existence (Cited in Premium Times May 1st, Shekau 2012)

Qaqa and Shekau’s choice of enemies and reasons given implies target strategy based on indiscrimination. The goal is to discourage dissent against Boko Haram by using fear as a means of support. A northern female resident validates this assessment, she insisted that:

Boko Haram has succeeded in creating fear in our minds, none of us will talk about them or say anything against them, the only reason why I am able to talk to you is because I am not in the north now…when I go back I will not say anything (Interview, Anonymous 2014).

This change in target strategy projected an image of invincibility and further discouraged support from citizens for the security agencies. However indiscriminate attacks carried out by the group failed to endear the populace to Boko Haram’s mission despite complaints of heavy handed tactics by the State’s security agents. Furthermore the inclusion of children and non-combatants as victims of Boko Haram’s Jihad sends the message that the group is resilient and willing to inflict more damage to secure the cooperation of the State in meeting its demands. Abu Qaqa supports this assertion, by confirming the group’s willingness to continue fighting despite the public’s disapproval and the State’s response:

We have hundreds of members that are willing to sacrifice their lives in this crusade; the unfortunate incident of Saturday will not discourage us [referring to engagement with security forces, where Boko Haram death record was higher than the State forces]; if anything, it will encourage us to strategize and diversify our techniques because we are not afraid of death (Cited in The Vanguard December 19th, Qaqa 2011)

Qaqa’s statement is evidenced by increased attacks carried out by the group between the years 2011 till date. Furthermore, the assertion that death was welcomed by the fighters indicated a new level of extremism, signifying prolonged and sustained warfare by the group against the State. The statement also indicates the absence of
constraint brought by the government’s retaliation and subsequently the group’s disregard to the cost of violence. This is evident on the preference for military intervention (see chapter seven).

A distinct change in Boko Haram’s strategy is its adoption of suicide bombing and the use of young females in carrying out suicide attacks. The group’s sojourn into violent operations was notable for the employment of cutlasses, bows and arrows, sticks, daggers and guns smuggled or stolen from police stations attacked. The deliberate emulation of terror tactics employed by groups such as AQ is depicted as a strategic move towards intimidating the government and other key stakeholders. Furthermore adoption of these terror tactics ensures national and international publicity or recognition. Examples includes suicide bomb attacks in police headquarters Abuja, Christmas day suicide bomb attacks, and the killing of 69 young male students in Yobe State. These attacks were staged with the aim of projecting the government as weak and unable to protect its citizens. The statement below is an excerpt from an online news website describing the disappointment of the Nigerian populace in fighting Boko Haram:

Many Nigerians have criticized the government for failing to rescue the girls or put a stop to the five-year insurgency by Boko Haram, which says it is trying to establish an Islamic state in northern Nigeria (Voice of Africa 2014).

Boko Haram’s suicide bomb strategy was successful and evidenced by the ‘bring back our girls’ campaign during the kidnap of over 200 hundred girls in Chibok a town in Borno State, leading to the appeal from the international community in curbing the group’s terrorist activities. Additional operational tactics employed by Boko Haram include the release of videos and messages AQ and ISIL style and the use of Arabic language as opposed to the preferred Hausa language by Shekau. Furthermore Boko Haram audio and video messages are now posted on international Jihad websites; these actions are targeted towards portraying an image of sophistication and development within the group.

Although, this thesis proposition explains the emergence of organised political violent groups in Nigeria, however this research has been unable to find conclusive evidence
that elite conduct accounts for all of Boko Haram goals and strategies. Evidence has been found for its shaping of elements of its ideology. But its anti-State, anti-Christian stance seems to rely more on other external factors so does its tactics of indiscriminate killings and suicide bombing.

### 6.3 Recruitment and Membership

Next, the question of whether elite culture impacted recruitment membership is examined. The recruitment strategy adopted by the group is targeted towards the needs or weaknesses of potential members. Key attributes are used as a homing device in membership selection, such as individuals who are driven by a desire for socio-economic advancement and the defence of Islam. Potential members are recruited based on their personal grievances which are capitalised on by the recruiter. Onyebuchi and Chigozie (2013) argue that individuals are forced to become members either by birth, familial ties or kidnap. Commenting on the recruitment strategy adopted by Boko Haram, a commander of a Joint task force in the northern region of Nigeria insisted that the movement is not above using underhanded methods to recruit individuals. He revealed that:

> They use all kinds of methods to recruit people; they look for people that are disgruntled, having the propensity to yield to their guidance…you can get the person to do anything (Interview, Major General A 2013).

This view is shared by Mr S, a senior State security official, who insisted that members of Boko Haram who were interrogated by security operatives revealed that, they were lured by the promise of monthly wages (N5,000.00 = £20).

> It was discovered that, these boys were willing to fight the cause of Boko Haram, not because of the religious ideology or defence of Islam but simply because of financial gains and the absence of purpose (Interview, Mr S 2013).

The statements above illustrate the characteristics of Boko Haram members, as individuals who are not conversant with the ideological goals of the sect but rather focused solely on monetary gains. This is further supported by security reports stating
that captured Boko Haram foot soldiers are ignorant of the purpose, operational activities and knowledge of top leaders or commanders of the movement (Onuoha 2013, Omotola 2013 and Zenn 2013). Recall that Boko Haram members were recorded to have worked as political thugs for northern political elite in exchange for monetary and political gains.

A large percentage of Boko Haram members do not necessarily reflect any pattern or consistencies in terms of social, economic and academic traits. Some are unemployed, educated (western and Islamic), poor, blue or white collared employees and illiterates. Examples of members variations includes, Mohammed Abdullahi Zangina a university drop-out from nursing school, who insisted during a police interrogation that he joined Boko Haram because:

> The teaching of Mohammed Yusuf came up…the teaching and guidance is real, the preaching said that our leaders are not doing the right thing, the way they are ruling us is bad (Cited from audio recording of Police interrogation, Zangina 2013).

From the statement above and the western tertiary education albeit brief of Zangina, it is clear that Zangina was conversant with the political terrain and the expectations of the citizens from the State government which, as implied by the above statement was absent. In effect, Zangina while not a part of the uneducated class became a member of Boko Haram for the purpose of spiritual edification and correction of perceived injustice by the government.

Muhammad Manga, popularly known as the police headquarters suicide bomber, was a prosperous business man who was married with five children and left a will of 4 million naira (£16,000). The contents of Manga’s will and the evidence of steady income describe an individual who was financially secure, which disproves poverty as a motivator for his membership.
Kabir Sokoto was the mastermind behind the UN building suicide attack, recruiter and trainer of members in manufacturing and detonation of IEDs. Sokoto had access to western education and was a laboratory technician before he joined Boko Haram.
Mamman Nur, was a drop out from a government Islamic theological school in Borno state. He was the mastermind behind the UN attacks and Mohammed Abul Barra, a suicide bomber was also a business man. Based on the brief descriptions of the members above, it is understood that the motivation or the driving force behind membership is not limited to financial factors. Furthermore membership is not limited to non-western educated individuals but also to the religious, educated and illiterate Muslim population in the State. Nonetheless Doctor Abimbola Adesoji insists that under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf potential members were encouraged to join through offering shelter, food and a regular source of income. He maintained that the motivation behind the high turnout of Boko Haram followers is not necessarily ideologically driven or religious revolution, but rather economically and identity driven:

There were some mosques in north eastern Nigeria, where young men go to pray and are given 5000 naira [£20] for doing nothing but pray, it was a way of luring youths who were unsuspecting of the movement, this was as a result of the country’s economy (Interview, Adesoji 2013).

Doctor Nathaniel Danjibo and Doctor Freedom Onuoha support this assertion. They affirmed the implication of financial hand-outs given by Mohammed Yusuf towards a target population of un-employed and shiftless individuals. They confirmed that:

Mohammed Yusuf was feeding people freely, giving people money to get married, was paying people’s rent…that attracted a lot of young people who lacked some economic strengths to join that group (Interview, Danjibo 2013).

They recruit from the social destitute, especially those who appear vulnerable…they take them on board and give them start-up funds and they start gradually inculcating you into the system (Interview, Onuoha 2013).

These views shared by these respondents are supported by comments made by a captured Boko Haram member, who maintained that recruits are lured or encouraged to join by the promise of starting up a business. Zangina states:
I used to convince them by giving them 5,000 naira, 10,000 naira etcetera, which they use to buy second hand clothes for business, this was the way we get them to join (Cited from audio recording of police interrogation, Zangina 2013).

Boko Haram offered a means to individual economic development and a sense of purpose to displaced youths and illegal immigrants from Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Consequently, the decision to become a part of this movement or swear fealty to Boko Haram became inevitable.

Another element sourced by recruiters was to tell recruits that the goal of Boko Haram is achievable and worth fighting and dying for. Traits such as aggressiveness and fanaticism were developed so that recruits would have a deep aversion to the current system of governance and would pursue a ‘divine war’ based on religious injustice. This perceived ‘injustice’ serves as the driving force behind the Boko Haram movement. The recruiter emphasises the divine mandate of the movement as a means of giving direction to the lives of individuals with the promise of great reward in paradise. It is suggested that audio recordings and written statements made by Yusuf are provided for recruits to strengthen their resolve. In an excerpt of Yusuf’s sermons to members and potential recruits, he spoke of difficulties ahead as well as expected rewards of following the divine cause:

In this dawah we agreed that we are going to suffer…these are the trials we are awaiting…these are the hurdles we want to cross. Anyone who dies in this process goes to paradise…in the process they will call you names, some of you may even die…and we will just pray may Allah give you paradise…we ought to endure. May Allah give us the will to endure. Allah is watching us, victory is certain. What we lack are the helpers…we are looking for brothers…this dawah cannot be killed. If we really stand by what the prophet says we should stand by, even if we die in the process, this dawah will continue even after a hundred years (Yusuf 2006; Translated and Cited in Mohammed 2014:15).

Potential members are sourced from the mosque, educational institutions, government institutions and street children. Imams are targeted and introduced to the doctrines of Boko Haram (Daily Trust 2009). They are encouraged to propagate the doctrines of
Boko Haram to their followers. In addition, lecturers are targeted as a link to students, with the aim of discouraging association with ‘western values’ and encouraging the ideology for an Islamic State. The indoctrination or infiltration of security agencies are seen as a means of weapons’ supply, access to intelligence, successful planning of operations and an avenue for military or combat training.

Members are not limited to males but include females as well, although evidence illustrating how females are recruited is limited. However various documents (media sources) in addition to respondents’ contributions indicate that females become members by marriage, familial ties and kidnap. In addition female recruits, most especially widows who are mothers and spinsters, are lured with the promise of marriage to male Boko Haram members and financial security (TRAC 2014).

Another important attribute of Boko Haram’s recruitment strategy is forceful conscription of members (International Crisis Group 2014 and Daily Times 2012). This is as a result of heavy handed response and immediate execution of captured Boko Haram members. Individuals are blackmailed, threatened or paid to carry out violent attacks. The exact number of Boko Haram members is not known (Cook 2011 and Onuoha 2013); however, 14 years after the emergence of this group, the movement do not lack members for its operations evident by consistent military engagement with State security forces.

Image 10: Pictures of Arrested Female Boko Haram Members
Source: TRAC (2014)
No evidence has been found of elite political culture and influence on Boko Haram’s recruitment and membership strategy, except the use of members as political thugs and mobilisers. However, circumstances that encourage recruitment such as unemployment are the products of the elite’s poor governance.

6.4 Organisational and Operational Activities

The organisational structure of Boko Haram is difficult to illustrate, due to limited evidence as a result of Boko Haram’s secrecy and the Nigerian security agencies release of limited information (field investigation and secondary sources). However the operational activities and high profile arrests of Boko Haram members indicates that, the structure has evolved considerably from a strict linear organisation into a loose hierarchical group with the consistent feature of having an undisputed leader - Abubakar Shekau.

Abubakar Shekau’s leadership role in Boko Haram and the publicity of similar groups’ activities resulted in increased spread and independence of Boko Haram cells across the northern and central regions of Nigeria. Furthermore Abubakar Shekau established relations with similar groups outside the State’s borders. This ensured Boko Haram’s operatives access to sophisticated weaponry and combat training. The group’s operational and administrative activities have undergone significant changes from its inception. This transformation is evidenced in its style of engagement with the State’s security forces, indiscriminate choice of targets, choice of weaponry, and method of communication with the State and the general public. Although the exact structure and administrative operations of Boko Haram is not clear, it is possible to offer analytic speculations as to the reality of the case. This will be achieved by examining the organisational structure and leadership, training, funding, and modus operandi of the group. The figure below, illustrates Boko Haram operational processes which indicates functional areas of activities.
Figure 14: Illustrating Boko Haram Operational Activities
Source: Author (2014)
6.4.1 Organisational Structure and Leadership

Boko Haram’s organisational structure can be described as decentralised and hierarchal consisting of an advisory council (*Shura*) whose opinions were alleged to be relevant to decisions made and suggested by the head and followers respectively. Ploch (2011) and Stewart (2011) suggests’ that this structure was in place during Mohammed Yusuf and Mamman Nur’s leadership. Yusuf communicated directly with members as opposed to Shekau’s preference for communication through few chosen leaders. As a result a majority of the group’s leaders and members never had an audience or electronic communication with Shekau (Oftedal 2013).

Image 11: Boko Haram leadership structure
Source: TRAC (2014)
Boko Haram is split into several factions, loosely connected to top leaders and carry out operations without necessary supervision from top management (Schachtel 2014). This is validated by the diverse and sporadic attacks carried out by and blamed on Boko Haram across the northern, eastern and middle belt region of the State. Zenn (2014) maintains that Kabir Sokoto, the master mind behind the Christmas day bombings received funding for his operations from a terrorist group based in Algeria. This supports the assertion that cells or factions of Boko Haram share the same ideology and enemies, but that operational activities are at their discretion including source of funding. These factions come together for major attacks such as the kidnap of 200 girls in Chibok (Zenn 2014). Mr S concedes that they are indeed different factions of Boko Haram and each has its own agenda, ranging from religious, political and criminal. He supported this assertion by citing the inconsistencies of killings and choice of weapons by the group:

…the indiscriminate nature of the killings and some of the persons killed, retired custom officers, district heads, politicians and all that…it was apparent that different factions of the group had different targets depending on their objectives and who they perceived to be their enemies, some were going to primary schools to burn them down, some were going after law enforcement officers, others targeted market places, some churches, some mosques… (Interview, Mr S 2013).

Mr S’s assessment is shared by senator Zanna, representing Borno state at the Federal level. He insisted during an interview with Sahara reporters in 2012, that Boko Haram is divided into factions each with a different agenda. Likewise members of Yusufiya sect, who claimed to be a breakaway faction of Boko Haram, claimed disapproval of Boko Haram’s violent operations. However it is yet to be confirmed if there was an actual break away. Nonetheless choice of targets and simultaneous violent operations across the northern region validates this claim.

Upon examination of Boko Haram’s development and operational activities, it is suggested that Boko Haram’s organisational structure is divided into three key departments. These departments include administrative, religious and combatants or military department. This assertion is supported by Oftedal’s (2013) empirical finding
that Boko Haram’s structure includes separate departments managed by trained personnel with specific duties.

The duties of the administrative department involve management of finances, procurement of weaponry, management of internal and external communication, management of public enlightenment and recruitment related activities. Recall that a visible structure of this department is not in evidence or has not been made known to the public due to the secretive and evasive nature of Boko Haram. However recent events, such as confessions of arrested Boko Haram members and violent operations by the group give credence to this assertion. In the case of finance management and female recruitment, an example is the arrest of three female Boko Haram members, Hafsat Usman Bako, Zainab Idris and Aisha Abubakar (Figure 34). Information elicited from these women indicated that they were responsible for the payment of salaries and distribution of funds to Boko Haram fighters, in addition to recruitment of women into the group. Hafsat Usman was given the title of paymaster (Gigova 2014 and TRAC 2014). These women were not involved in combat or religious activities. In accordance with this observation, Boko Haram’s allocation of select duties to key individuals’ pinpoints a semblance of structure in its operations. Furthermore, management of internal and external communication is attributed to the administrative department. This is evidenced by statements released on behalf of the group by Abubakar Shekau and Abu Qaqa alias Abu Zaid, identified as Boko Haram’s spokesman. Recruitment related activities are shared between the administrative and religious department.

The religious department is charged with the responsibility of propagating the teachings of Boko Haram’s doctrines and recruitment process. The services of Imams, Ulama and Mullahs who are in support of Boko Haram’s ideology are engaged with the purpose of securing support in the form of human resource, finance and legitimacy.

In the same vein, the military section, which consists of foot soldiers, spies, assassins and commanders, are charged with direct engagement with the State security agents, planning and execution of violent operations as well as coordination of robberies and
other criminal activities. In addition to the above mentioned duties, members of the military section are also charged with combat training of the fighters.

Image 12: Image of Boko Haram Military
Source: Daily Nigerian Info (2014)

Abubakar Shekau serves as the spiritual leader and military leader of Boko Haram. Although, the spread of Boko Haram’s cells across northern Nigeria and the group’s indiscriminate attacks makes it difficult to attribute all violent operations to Shekau’s direct orders. There is no evidence of a link between Boko Haram’s organisational structure and elite political culture.

6.4.1 Training

Actions and statements made by Boko Haram’s members is a reflection of the type of training undergone by the group. Training undertaken by members can be categorised into two stages: indoctrination and combat. Recruits are taught to accept and have a firm belief in the teachings professed by Boko Haram, although a timeline for training is absent from data accessed and analysed. Nevertheless, when trainees become indoctrinated, those who are suited for combat are trained in weaponry, assassinations, guerrilla warfare, making of IEDs and other violent criminal activities. Members are trained to buy, smuggle or steal weapons, send and intercept
intelligence. This was evident when Boko Haram released a document which recorded personal details of State security service officials (Associated Press 2012).

In addition to combat and religious indoctrination, members are expected to remain loyal to Boko Haram; actions termed as treasonous are punishable by death. Examples include the execution of members who advocated and met with the State representatives for negotiations (International Crisis Group 2014) and the execution of Abu Qaqa II, the second spokesman of Boko Haram, also known as Mohammed Anwal Kontagora who denounced Boko Haram (Oftedal 2013). Hence secrecy and loyalty is top priority of membership training. Furthermore members are trained to rely on face-to-face contact in passing information. The use of mobile phones and emails are at a minimum and monitored in order to avoid counter terrorist officials intercepting messages (Stewart and Wroughton 2014).

The preferred location for combat training is the Sambisa forest and the Mandara Mountain, located at the north eastern borders of Nigeria. Its topographical features make it suitable for training without detection from the custom officers and patrol forces. A report carried out by The Bow Group (2014) indicated that Boko Haram operatives receive training in AQIM and Al-Shabaab camps. This assertion is supported by Pindiga’s (2013) empirical findings, where one of the respondents stated that 200 Boko Haram members trained for 10 months with Malian militants in Timbuktu, further validated by chief of army staff, Lt-General Azubuike Ihejirika. In addition, Mr B, a security operative in northern Nigeria, confirmed the external training of Boko Haram members in Mali:

They have links with other terrorist groups; our report confirms Boko Haram’s training with a terrorist group in northern Mali as a result of their alliance (Interview, Mr B 2013).

Likewise Mr K, a security operative in northern Nigeria agreed with this assertion:

…we discovered that they had a lot of sanctuaries and training centres in Mali which they took seriously, Boko Haram members were trained in guerrilla warfare, IEDs, artillery warfare, pockets of resistance, what have you… (Interview, Mr K 2013).
This assertion was further supported by a document provided by the respondent illustrating a loose mapped out route travelled by Boko Haram members to Zubari training camp, Timbuktu in Mali.

Recall that Abubakar Shekau and Abu Qaqa released statements confirming alliances with these groups. Furthermore, in June 2010, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud the emir of AQIM stated plans to provide Boko Haram fighters with training and support (Feakin 2014). This proved true, evidenced by the group’s presence in northern Mali and increased sophisticated method of fighting and use of IEDs and vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED).
6.4.2 Funding

Training and organisational structure might have little link with the political elite but Boko Haram’s funding indicates a strong link. An essential resource for the survival of an insurgency is capital. The sustenance of Boko Haram campaign is access to money for its operations. The source of Boko Haram’s finance is a fount of speculation. Cook (2011), Onuoha (2012) and Abimbola (2011) maintain that Boko Haram’s source of funds includes donations from politicians as well as daily tax levies from members and bank robberies. In an interview with the commander of a Joint Task force in northern Nigeria, he insisted that funding from the group can be traced to top government officials and influential citizens. He stated:

We know that there are sponsors but none that we can categorically say, as a result of evidence and other reasons [refused to elaborate], these people are in high places, they actually buy into those ideologies they are pursuing, but cannot do it openly but simply by supporting them financially and otherwise, leaving others to do the dirty work (Interview, Major A 2013).
Doctor Danjibo agreed with Major A’s assertion regarding influential citizens involved, but disputes the reasons behind it. He argues that it is those who make up the military elite that are only interested in making more capital, citing that ‘War is Business’:

Funding can come from very interesting channels…and we are compounding the issue, by involving the military, because the military guys are making money out of the Boko Haram crisis and so they will not want it to stop. Where do you think they [Boko Haram] get the weapons from? Who sells it to them? (Interview, Danjibo 2013).

However, Mr S strongly asserts that political leaders and influential citizens who were said to have sponsored Boko Haram, only rendered financial support as a result of being coerced:

They call political leaders for what they call protection money monthly, people have been known to pay 2m, 5m, 10m naira on a monthly bases, all of them pay, house of assembly members, house of national assembly members etcetera, they have been known to pay this money for protection, it’s a case of extortion (Interview, Mr S 2013).

From the statements above, the consistent pattern is one where Boko Haram accesses funds from influential citizens. Onapajo, Uzodike and Whetho (2012) contend that the group no longer relies on ‘taxes’ imposed on its members for the day to day operations, but on donations from charity organisations based in the UK and Saudi Arabia. Al-Muntada trust fund, a charity organisation whose headquarters is in the United Kingdom, was stated to have provided financial assistance to the group, although the organisation denied this allegation (Oftedal 2013 and Agbiboa 2014). The Premium Times (2012), a Nigerian newspaper, disclosed an unidentified Algerian organisation donated the sum of $250,000.00 to Boko Haram. It is suggested that Boko Haram’s source of funding includes all the above. In addition the group has increased its coffers by ransoming hostages, accessing profits of legitimate and illegitimate businesses funded by the group, demanding protection money from privileged citizens and armed robberies.
In most cases, I would tell you emphatically that most of the robberies are done by the Boko Haram and not other criminal gangs, based on our security intelligence. For instance the attack on the bureau de change in Kano 5 months ago, we were able to arrest one of the masterminds, who was a part of Boko Haram (Interview, State Security Office Mr KA 2014).

The kidnap and ransom of hostages both nationals and foreigners proved profitable for the group. The profits from the kidnap of French family in Cameroon amounted to $3.15 million (Stewart and Wroughton 2014). In addition, Boko Haram secured the sum of £1million from the tragic kidnap of B Stablini construction employees, Chris McManus and Franco Lamolinara (Walker 2012).

Based on empirical findings by the International Crisis Group (2014), Aminu Tashen-Ilimi a top commander in the group had received $275,000.00 from Mohammed Yusuf before his death to procure arms. However Aminu, after the death of Yusuf, used the money to establish a car-dealing business in Kaduna, using the proceeds to fund Boko Haram operations. Likewise, Mohammed Abdulahi Zangina (2003), a captured member of Boko Haram, asserts that in a bid to create a steady source of income for the group, employed individuals were recruited and those who were not employed were given money to start business and remit the profits to Boko Haram. Mr E, a security operative respondent in the northern region, corroborated this contention. He insisted that:

The group created some business fronts, some members are into economic ventures whose main duty is to get themselves in international trade involving Dubai, China etcetera, they go as harmless traders, but their main duty is to form a means by which the group is able to sustain internal operations…they are involved in electronic business and any other lucrative venture and they have a portion which they give to the sect (Interview, Mr E 2013).

The political elite link in this section is clear, if not exclusive.
6.4.3 Modus Operandi

In the long tradition of Nigerian political culture, Boko Haram uses violence to promote its own interests though to a more extreme level. Their violent activities are planned and executed with the aim of creating fear and terror. They employ suicide bomb attacks, simultaneous bomb attacks, arson, kidnap, sustained hours of gun fighting and targets helpless civilians.

The group’s target locations for attacks are symbolic and crucial towards their stated goals (making the country ungovernable and an end to western education). For example, is the suicide bomb attack in police headquarters at the State capital 2011, the occupation of police training school 2014, Christmas day suicide bomb attacks 2011, and frequent attacks on secondary and tertiary schools. The selection of these targets and the magnitude of civilian causalities (women and children) demonstrate the group’s indiscriminate victims, and demonstrate that it opposes the State and all those who oppose their beliefs. The fact that these attacks can be carried out with impunity highlights the State’s difficulty in curbing the group’s excesses intimating the inability of the State to protect its citizens.

Boko Haram is known for its brutal and thorough attacks on targets and locations. This is demonstrated by choice of weapons and high causalities incurred. In addition blue prints of attacked organisations or buildings and identity cards of employees were found in possession of captured Boko Haram members. This indicates careful planning on the part of Boko Haram before executing violent operations. Below is a picture taken by the State security operatives of identity cards in possession of Boko Haram members during a raid.
Another trait of the group is the release of public statements where Boko Haram claimed responsibility for terror acts. These statements are released through the medium of emails, interviews with carefully selected journalists and videos posted on Youtube and recently on Jihadist websites. Although an above average percentage of violent operations are not acknowledged by the group, security operatives confirm these attacks as Boko Haram signature attacks, due to the use of explosives, target location, suicide bombs and civilian causalities. The explanation for this occurrence stems from the decentralised structure of the group and the presence of different factions possessing free rein to carry out violent operations. Examples of Boko Haram’s alleged attacks includes, attack in a market in Ngom village on 20th September 2014, attack on the village of Konduga, leading to the death of 23 on February 11th 2014, and the attack on a village market in Kawuri leading to the death of 45 people on January 26th 2014.

Another observation of the group is the preferred choice of military fatigues for violent operations, whether engaged in armed battle with the State security forces or attacks on civilians. Several attacks carried out by Boko Haram and described by eyewitnesses mention Boko Haram members clad in military gear and use of military vehicles. The use of Nigerian military gears by the group ensures immunity and forestalls questioning when carrying out clandestine activities. Furthermore, the possibility of an alliance between disloyal State security operatives and Boko Haram
could be an explanation for the group’s possession of the State armed forces gear apart from the allegation of theft. The outfitting of Boko Haram in military fatigues leads to confusion on the part of eyewitnesses and victims, whose initial thoughts were that the men were the Nigerian military on State business. However during suicide bomb attacks, the suicide bombers were never described as dressed in military uniform.

The group, as indicated earlier, are indiscriminate in choice of targets. Targets include students and teachers of western education both at secondary and tertiary levels, State police and military forces, Christians, politicians, Muslims, the media and domestic businesses (International Crisis Group 2014). In addition to domestic targets, Boko Haram carried out attacks in Cameroon on border villages and the Kidnapped the Cameroon vice-prime minister’s wife and sister in-law plus a senior local religious leader. This shift is attributed to Cameroon’s alliance with the Nigerian government against Boko Haram. The group is notorious for freeing captured members from prison, in the advent of the State refusal of the group’s demand to release its members.

Boko Haram intelligence network is considered low-cost and not so complex in operation. Street kids, hawkers and unemployed local youths are paid small amount of money (£5pds) to spy on and monitor the movement of the State security operatives (Stewart and Wroughton 2014). However Intel on major operations is managed by the commanders and trained Boko Haram operatives. An officer of the anti-terrorism unit in Abuja in response to Boko Haram intelligence network:

> As mentioned earlier, they have members across different sectors in Nigeria, Jonathan Goodluck even confirmed it, they get their information from informants in security agencies, this I know, we have information to back this up (Interview, Security Officer 2, 2014).

In addition, the intelligence network also involves the infiltration of Boko Haram members into local vigilante groups set up for the purpose of tracking and identifying members of Boko Haram. A case in point was the arrest of Babuji Ya’ari a business man and Boko Haram member masquerading as a volunteer in the civilian joint task
force, Maiduguri. He was reported to have been involved directly in the Chibok kidnap in April 2014 and the assassination of the emir of Gwoza, May 2014 (TRAC 2014).

6.6 Conclusion

Boko Haram’s emergence and subsequent transformation to a terrorist organisation is rooted in the political elite’s poor governance and their willingness to promote their own ends through violence. In the light of framing theory, social movement theory, greed and grievance theory, Boko Haram is seen as an organisation that emphasizes and justifies its existence and use of violence on the socio-economic and structural failures of the State.

Yet, in considering the ongoing strategies and tactics of the movement the influence of elite political culture is far less clear. Boko Haram certainly imitates the elite’s practice of buying supporters and its leans heavily on the elite for financial support. In other areas such as links with external jihadists and organisational structure there is no obvious connection with elite political culture. In these areas the thesis concludes that other factors came into prominence. Elite culture may be an over looked factor in the rise and development of Boko Haram but it is not an exclusive factor. Single variables are rarely valid in the social science.
CHAPTER SEVEN

COUNTER TERRORISM RESPONSE PROCESS AND POLITICAL ELITE COMPLICITY

7.0 Introduction

This chapter explores the proposition that the manner in which the Nigerian government has dealt with Boko Haram and other organised violent groups has been shaped by elite political culture and has, in reality, only provoked further violence. Boko Haram and other groups committed to violence is not only the product of elite attitudes and political ambition, but they have been invigorated by a misguided counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy that was itself the outcome of elite interference.

The chapter draws on the past and present processes of CT and COIN strategies, dating from 1970 – 2014. The CT and COIN strategies have produced a vicious cycle of violence perpetrated by the security agencies and Boko Haram. This analysis draws from an examination of newspaper articles and primary data sources, including legislative transcripts and excerpts from the transcripts of the semi-structured interviews conducted for this research. This chapter is sub-divided into phases of formulation and implementation of CT and COIN processes and further analyses the impact of elite political culture on governance for security in Nigeria. Sections one to four examine sequentially each of the four identified phases of the response process adopted by the government. The diagram below illustrates and serves as a guideline for the structure of this chapter.
Figure 16: The State response process to Boko Haram and consequences of response
Source: Author (2014)
7.1 Phase One

The emergence of the Boko Haram movement in 1995, then known as the Sahaba group or ‘the companions’, appears, at the time, to have garnered little interest from the media. During this period, the group’s membership comprised largely of students from the University of Maiduguri situated in Borno State. Not much attention was paid to the group by the newspapers or federal and state government, as will be demonstrated below. There was an absence of published reports about the Sahaba in both local and national newspapers. At this stage, the movement that would become Boko Haram was merely one amongst several similar sects such as the Izala, Islamic Movement in Nigeria, Yan Tauri, Yan Daba, Movement for the Islamic Revival, and Yan Kalo Kato (Forest 2012; Loimeier 2012; Ubhenin 2012).

Danjibo argues that the Borno state government’s lack of interest in the group’s activities at that time stemmed from Mohammed Yusuf’s philanthropic and religious activities. However, during a press briefing in 2009, the Director of Defence Information Colonel Mohammed Yerima insisted that:

The sect has been in existence as far back as 1995…security agencies have over this period been monitoring their activities (Daily Trust July 31st 2009: 3).

This observation is indicative of scholarly literature (Abimbola 2011, Copeland 2013 and Harnischfeger 2014). The group has since 1995 evolved as a movement changing its name from Sahaba to Al Shabab, Nigerian Taliban, the Yusufiyya followers and, most recently, Boko Haram. In addition, Yusuf’s public profile as an Islamic teacher and religious celebrity in Borno state attests to the group’s existence. Furthermore, skirmishes with other Islamic groups or sects. In addition to clashes with the Borno state police, evidence the group’s potential for violence (Cook 2011 and Forest 2012). In 2009, the Director General of the State Security Service (SSS), Afakriya Gadzama supported this assertion by insisting that:

His agency had provided adequate security intelligence, but that the people who should have acted on it failed to do so…for example Borno, the stronghold of the sect from where Mohammed Yusuf comes from, was one state which from our assessment did not do much to really deal with the issue…nobody was taken by surprise, it was something
that was adequately covered; that was adequately reported, but to have the will to take action on this, people felt reluctant and of course a lot of sentiments (Cited in Daily Trust, July 31\textsuperscript{st} 2009:5).

From these statements, it can be concluded that Boko Haram’s activities, despite intelligence reports by the security agencies, were being classified by the federal and state government as ‘non-violent’, owing to its affiliation to Borno state political elite. This is reflected in Boko Haram’s capacity to organise in Borno state with little or no interference from the local security forces, despite its record of violence (Cook 2011).

Adesoji argues that:

While it was reported that the group had its orientation here and there, the Borno state government pretended as if nothing was happening, even when dossier of security reports were written against them, they would say they are not a security threat (Interview, Adesoji 2013).

Likewise, during an interview with a senior security officer in Borno state, the interviewee maintained that Boko Haram was identified as a non-violent religious group until 2009. This remained the case until it began directing sermons against the Borno state government. The government’s deliberate decision to ignore security reports instigated by the political elite, as mentioned in preceding chapters, allowed for a tacit alliance where Boko Haram could engage in violent activities with impunity. This observation is reflected in past responses by the federal State towards groups that use violence. Wole Soyinka maintains that Islamic religious groups with large followings are attractive to interested political elite for the purposes of political mobilisation:

It is because the hard core northerners are embarrassed to admit what really is behind this thing…the politicians are desperate, they are the ones who utilize religion…but then we reach a point where the product of that alliance is destroying us… (Soyinka cited in Sahara Reporters 2012).

A previous example would include the Maitatsine crisis that occurred in Kano in the 1970s. Empirical studies conducted by Hiskett (1987), Isichei (1987), Kastfelt (1989)
and Ojo (1985), highlight a distinctive pattern of the government’s response and elite involvement. The response was the decision to relegate the Maitatsine movement to a purely ‘religious’ movement and label it as non-violent. As a result of this decision the movement became a tool for the pursuance of political interests by the political elite. The same government response applies to Boko Haram. Recall the proposition that alliances between social movement groups and the political elite are premised on *quid pro quo* exchanges of required services from both groups. Adesoji contends that:

Mohammed Marwa [leader of Maitatsine] was able to do what he did for a long time because he was a tool in the hands of the National Party of Nigeria who wanted to take control by all means from the People’s Redemption Party, which was in control of Kano state, so Marwa provided a means for political mobilisation. When the Governor of Kano state Abubakar Rimi called for help from the federal government he was ignored, until the group got out of hand (Interview, Adesoji 2013).

Likewise, Danjibo corroborates Adesoji’s assertion:

The promise of immunity from prosecution in addition to Maitatsine’s increased boldness aided in the expansion of the group as well as violent activities. This guaranteed the development of extremists’ movements within the northern region, such as Yan Banga, Yan Kala Kato and Yan Dauka Amarya (Danjibo 2009).

Both statements, verified by previous analysis in chapter 5, identify Maitatsine’s alliance with the political elite and its use of violence with impunity as the outcome of the government’s response. Again, Maitatsine’s growing radical and extremist belief was noted and reported by the security agencies, as stated by a senior police officer in Kano:

Every effort to get rid of them had proved negative due to political bubble in the state (Cited in Falola 1998:139).

Essentially, the federal and Kano state government disregarded intelligence collected and lacked the political will to put a stop to Maitatsine’s use of violence. The alliance between the northern political elite and Maitatsine served as a constraint to police
intervention. This is further supported by the empirical findings of Agi (1998:71). Agi reports that the federal and Kano state government waited and observed for two years before making a move. Only then was the leader of the group and his followers ordered to leave the city of Kano. When that failed, military force was employed by the federal security forces.

Another example of the government’s response to religious violent groups allied with the political elite regards its handling of the Jama’atu Nasril Islamiyya (JNI), a less extremist Islamic association, who were nonetheless still willing to use violence. In the past they were involved in violent clashes against Christians in the northern region and associated with political violence (Agi 1998: 51; Falola 1998: 106). The Kaduna state government and federal government adopted a ‘wait and see’ stance. In response the JNI shifted towards a more political than religious position, agitating against southern and Christian interest in the federal government. This explains the federal and Kaduna state government’s response towards the movement. It was a decision to remain passive towards the activities of the JNI, as a result of its relevance to northern and Muslim political elite’s interests. Once more the outcome was the group’s use of violence with impunity.

These past events established a pattern of response. There has been a culture of deliberate inaction by the government at the early stages of any social movement group’s development, most especially groups inclined towards violence. This pattern is due to the mutual advantage of an alliance between these social movement groups and the political elite. However, such alliances tend to transform such groups to organised violent groups. Intelligence reports predicting violent activities alerted the federal and state government to the likely outcome of such alliances leading to violence, as had happened in the past. Yet, for the elite, an increase in levels of political violence seems to be a price worth paying for the benefits that accrue in terms of the co-option of the militant elements within these movements for their own coercive purposes.

The case Boko Haram follows this trend. The previous interview statements by Gadzama and Adesoji clearly indicate that the main actors concerned with the potential political, economic and social consequences of a steep rise in political
violence were elements within the security agencies: the SSS and the Borno and Kano state police forces. Some Muslim Clerics, such as Sheikh Abaniyi in Kaduna state claim to have made allegations against the group to the federal and Borno state government authorities. An Islamic cleric in Kaduna state claims:

I personally approached a state governor telling him the magnitude of the problem… I volunteered to intensify my sensitization program on radio in order to debunk the preaching of Mohammed Yusuf but he took the matter with levity… (Sheikh Abaniyi, reported in Daily Trust August 5th 2009: 7).

It is difficult to ascertain the authenticity of this cleric’s claim. However, the follow-up report to the Daily Trust article mentions the condemnation of Boko Haram actions by Muslim and Christian clerics before it became a terrorist organisation. It is inferred that the federal government largely ignored the threat posed by group. Other reports, by the Daily Trust record:

…in spite of the arrest and the prosecution of the sect leader, Mohammed Yusuf, the courts have continued to grant him bail (Daily Trust 31st July 2009:3).

…I [Yusuf] wish to state that the shooting of our 17 brothers is unacceptable…we will retaliate when and how I would not disclose to you (Daily Trust July 19th 2009:3).

Significantly, this verbal threat by Mohammed Yusuf failed to secure his arrest, despite the overwhelming evidence of arms and bomb making materials found by the Borno state police three days before the July 2009 uprising in possession of arrested Boko Haram members:

74 empty homemade bomb shells and bomb heads, 23 bags of gun powder, 11 motor vehicle filters, 4 bottles of methanol explosive acids, 7 rubber of containers of sodium chemical, an implement for measuring chemicals and other components for making bombs ( Daily Trust, July 25th 2009:5).

These items were recovered in Biu local government area, after the police received intelligence report of a planned attack.
Abimbola (2010) and Onuoha (2010) contend that Boko Haram’s large following and its publicized association with the political elite in Borno state is a reason for the Borno state government’s reluctance to curb the group’s excesses. Given the nexus between the political elite and the state government, the adoption of a COIN strategy that actively allows, indeed, tacitly supports, political violence and offers impunity to its perpetrators fits this thesis’ contention that the self-interest that lies at the heart of Nigerian political elite culture is not constrained by the highly damaging and dangerous consequences of its actions.

7.2 Phase Two

The federal government’s decision to mount a military attack on Boko Haram in July 2009 was preceded by a media campaign using specific images and rhetoric designed to distance the elite from its alliance with Boko Haram, and its previous rhetoric that that it was a harmless religious movement. This followed the collapse of the tacit alliance between the government and the political elite. Previously, the elite rhetoric hastily borrowed from the ‘war against terror’ manual using phraseology such as ‘us against them’; ‘extremists’ ‘the enemy’ to now emphasis the isolation of Boko Haram.

…no effort should be spared in identifying, arresting leaders and members of the extremist sects involved in these attacks (Daily Trust, 28th July 2009).

…on-going face-off with the militant Boko Haram sect terrorising some states in the north (Daily Trust, 31st July 2009:5).
Image 15 is an example of the use of phrases (‘more attacks under way – Boko Haram’) and images which enforces the need for heavy handed military intervention. This was a deliberate switch in the language used by the state government. Prior to the onset of the military operation against Boko Haram, there had been only a single recorded use of the word ‘terrorise’ in relation to Boko Haram by the Borno state government. This switch in rhetoric was alluded to in an article in the *Daily Trust* of July 2009, ‘Security Agencies: Boko Haram Exists for 14 Years’.

Image 16: Newspaper Headline
Source: *Leadership* Newspaper 28th December (2011)
The newspaper headline and sub-title in image 16 identified Boko Haram’s insurgency as an attack on the State, this was indicated by the mention of ‘SSS Headquarters’, SSS- State Security Services. Furthermore the headline – ‘…fear of more attacks’ classified Boko Haram’s attacks as an on-going ‘war’. Further examination of phrases and images employed by the media, the federal and Borno state government and other social movement groups and/or religious associations, indicate that these phrases and pictures were not neutral, but targeted towards a proposed response. That is military intervention.

It has been argued that critical discourse analysis of texts highlights the relationship between the use of language and images to formulate, implement and justify CT and COIN measures (Jackson 2005:16 and Richardson 2007:26). It was observed in the selected newspaper articles and the legislative transcript debates, that phrases and images were constructed to categorise Boko Haram as enemies of the State influencing a COIN response based on the perception of identity and not the goals or root causes.

Articles examined exhibited the use of specific words and images in describing and classifying the group. This was interpreted within the context of the subject matter. The images and headlines published in both newspapers, *Daily Trust* and *Leadership*, were provocative. They serve to graphically evidence the reality of organised violent activities in the State. This justified the decision for the military invention on 28th July 2009 against Boko Haram. Critics such as Agbiboa (2013), Onuoha (2010) and Serrano and Pieri (2014) emphasise the government’s initial decision to not respond instigated by the political elite and the decision to employ what was termed as ‘heavy handed’ violent response on the group. They raise the question of the effectiveness of the government’s preferred choice of response in dealing with groups perceived as dangerous consequent to Boko Haram’s development of guerrilla tactics against the State grounded on the happenings of 28th July 2009.

An article published on 19th July 2009, a few days before the offensive refers to members of Boko Haram as ‘military commanders’, furthermore a description of members was given as:
…an assemblage of over 30 youths clad in combat boots, jackets, and backpack who are said to have come from Katsina state (Daily Trust 19th July 2009:3).

The major intent of this report is to militarise Boko Haram. This was expressed in the statement released by the Biu police command in Borno state:

…following intelligence reports the group was preparing to cause trouble in the state (Daily Trust 25th July 2009:5).

The phrase ‘preparing to cause trouble’ implies that Borno state, previously portrayed as a peaceful state, was on the cusp of descending into violence. Furthermore, the Borno state commissioner of police, Christopher Gega, insisted that:

The group doctrine does not recognise government and all its agencies including the security men (Daily Trust July 19th 2009:3).

Now, the previous alliance abandoned, Boko Haram are explicitly depicted by the political elite as ‘enemies of the State’. This was substantiated in a statement made by the Senate president, David Mark:

we are going to give the security agencies enough muscle and power to be on top of the situation, to make sure that they protect the lives and properties of all Nigerians (Daily Trust 29th July 2009:2).

These words were designed to create the ‘us versus them’ scenario. This division was further illustrated in newspaper headlines

Image 17: Newspaper Headline Source: Daily Trust 2nd January 2012

Image 18: Newspaper Headline Source: Daily Trust 22nd January 2012
These headlines, and many more, stressed the message of ‘violence’ ‘threat’ ‘war’ and the group’s new identity as th enemy. The identification of the group as enemies of the State was not limited to rhetoric. The categorising of violent activities into three blocs - religious, political and ethnic - by the elite was demonstrated in statements made during the Senate debate on the 11th January 2012:

The Madalla attack was not only a direct onslaught on a place of worship, but a clear and grave assault on Nigerians of south east origin (Deputy Senate President, Ike Ekweremadu N.A.D, 11th January 2012).

This is the moment of truth, the Igbos have been more Nigerian than others, I do not know why anytime there is a problem the first people attacked are the Igbos (Senator Abdul Ningi N.A.D, 11th January 2012).

These declarations emphasis Boko Haram’s new status, political and overtly dangerous, rather than religious and harmless as in phase one.

The deliberate focus on Boko Haram’s potential for violence and the group’s violent attacks by the newspapers, instigated by the elite, ensured two outcomes. It encouraged the shift from why Boko Haram emerged to its violent activities, thereby ignoring elite complicity and justifying the use of military intervention. And it resulted in Boko Haram’s change in strategy. The group adopted guerrilla tactics against representatives of the State, justifying its own attacks as legitimate self-defence.

7.3 Phase Three

The offensive launched by State security forces on July 28th 2009 preceded the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf and the systematic destruction of identified Boko Haram hideouts. Large scale arrests and extra-judicial killings of suspected Boko Haram members were carried out (Agbiboa 2013, Copeland 2013 and Daily Trust 2009:1). The immediate impact of the military campaign was a temporary return to relative security in the northern state. Indeed, the actions of the military came in for negative publicity from international human rights organisations including Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International (Copeland 2013, Daily Trust 2009, Salkida 2013, Sampson 2013, and Thurston 2011). Despite this, the federal government defended its actions:

I believe that the operation we have launched now will be an operation that will contain them, once and for all (Former President Yar’Adua, Cited in Daily Trust July 29th 2009:5).

The state government has relaxed the curfew imposed on Maiduguri and Jere local government (Daily Trust July 31st 2009:5).

Today we are celebrating that we have been able to see the end of the problem…we preempted them…we struck at the right time, that is why we were able to get them (Governor of Bauchi State, Isa Yuguda, Cited in Tell 2009:39).

These statements were accompanied by pictures of the destruction of Boko Haram’s enclaves to re-enforce the defeat of the group. Yet, the brutality, and extra-legal nature, of the military response prompted a backlash. An attack on Bauchi state prison, led to the escape of 700 suspected members of Boko Haram. The scale and increase in the number of terror attacks by the group encouraged its own logic of reprisals. As with previous COIN operations in Nigeria, such as the campaign against MEND in the Niger Delta, the ferocity of the military response provoked an equally ferocious response from the insurgents (Francis, Lapin and Rossiasco 2011; Obi 2009; and Okafor 2011). Terror tactics used on an increasingly large-scale were unlike those used by previous insurgencies including suicide attacks and indiscriminate attacks on civilians. The seeds sown by alliances forged by the elite in the 1990s with the precursor social movements to Boko Haram were now reaping a terrible whirlwind.

We have hundreds of members that are willing to sacrifice their lives in this crusade; the unfortunate incident of Saturday will not discourage us; if anything, it will encourage us to strategize and diversify our techniques (Leadership Newspaper December 19th 2011).
The statement above was made by the group’s spokesman Abu Qaqa shortly after military engagement between the Joint Task Force (JTF) and Boko Haram in Kano. The message was released via phone call in a press conference (Leadership Newspaper 2011). Yet, now committed to the logic of force, the government continued to ratchet up the military response:

Military force should be used…yes we would flush them out and kill every one of them (Interview, Anonymous Counter Terrorist Unit Officer 2013).

Rather than drawing on a ‘hearts and minds’ doctrine to win over the local population through the provision of human security goods, the strategy remained relentlessly militaristic (Onapajo, Uzodike and Whetho 2012). Yet, Boko Haram proved capable of a flexible and resilient response to the military onslaught.

The emergence of suicide bomb attacks forced the need to expand CT and COIN strategies, hence the solicitation of amnesty, dialogue and negotiation by other interest groups (Ahokegh 2012, Leadership 2012, and Onapajo 2013). The ineffectiveness or the slow pace of military intervention exacerbated the call for alternatives to the military response. This intensified the longstanding debates focused on north-south divide and the ‘blame game’ between political elites from opposing parties:

He created the crisis because he was the chief security officer of the state, he did not manage the crisis well (Senator Ndume referring to Ali Modu Sherif, cited in Daily Trust 15th July 2011).

The killing of Mohammed Yusuf …was culpable murder to cover up some politicians and security officers apparently behind them (Alhaji Abubakar Tsav, cited in Daily Trust 3rd August 2009:2).

The cartoon below is a perfect illustration of opposing views of granting amnesty to elements of the Boko Haram.
Proponents of amnesty insisted inconsistency on the part of the federal government in dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency as opposed to its willingness to negotiate an amnesty with MEND:

The federal government had already set a precedent with its handling of the Niger Delta militants, and should extend same to Boko Haram, (Civil Rights Activist, Shehu Sani, Leadership 22nd June 2011).

…Two laws operating in Nigeria, one for the north and the other for the south; money for Niger Delta militants but summary execution for Boko Haram (Daily Trust 8th August 2009).

The Niger Delta militants have received ‘State pardon’…and would be paid for their crimes against Nigeria, OPC received almost ‘outstanding ovation’ for fighting the police… (Daily Trust 1st August 2009).

The State should adopt the Niger-Delta option which has so far proved to be highly effective (Daily Trust 3rd August 2009).

Opponents of amnesty highlighted the possibility of other groups following in the footsteps of MEND and Boko Haram in order to elicit funds from the State (Aleyomi
Ekanem, Dada and Ejue (2012), strongly assert that the inability of the State’s officials and security agencies to properly diagnose and understand Boko Haram’s objectives and operational activities necessitated the ‘illogical’ decision to consider granting amnesty to Boko Haram. This was premised on the certainty that the State’s move towards amnesty will ‘lead to anarchy in Nigeria’:

There should be no amnesty for them. The idea alone that we are providing amnesty for perpetrators does not add up. It will even encourage another sect to rise up, if the amnesty pulls through (Mr Ayo Akerele, A lawyer, Thisday Newspaper 2013).

However, at the time of writing, the issue of amnesty remains peripheral following Boko Haram’s public rejection of the idea of an amnesty (Houlton 2013 and Onuoha 2014).

In addition to CT measures implemented in dealing with the terrorist activities of Boko Haram, a state of emergency was declared in three states in the north-eastern region where Boko Haram is most active. This move by the president was accepted with misgivings by the northern political elite, who believed that the southern region had plans to reduce the voting power of the northern region in the upcoming 2015 elections:

…Wake-up call to Nigerian leaders to fight this deliberate plan designed to bring the north to its knees. (Ali Rafka, president of a civil organization, Muryar Talaka Houlton 2013:1)

We will never allow them to destroy the north by imposing emergency rule when policemen and soldiers are being killed daily in Bayelsa and other parts of the country without any discussion of emergency in those states of the Niger Delta (Vanguard 14th May, 2013)

We are convinced that there are some people in this government, who deliberately want to destroy the north and then provoke the people to revolt by always talking about imposing emergency rule in the region at the slightest provocation while overlooking
massive killings, kidnapping and oil bunkering in the south-east and south-south
northern Elder (Vanguard 14^{th} May, 2013)

From these statements, it is clear that governance for security in the north-eastern
region of Nigeria highlights intra-elite tensions between northern and southern
political elites rooted in the competition for federal State power and the pecuniary
advantages that accrue. Opponents of the state of emergency in areas targeted by
Boko Haram simply classified this move as one more in the series of ad hoc and knee-
jerk responses implemented by the government (Clottey 2013) in the absence of a
holistic CT and COIN strategy.

7.4 Phase Four

In addition to CT and COIN strategies implemented such as military intervention,
work continued on the drafting of a Terrorism Act that was finally passed in February
2011 and amended on February 2013 to include the death penalty for offenders. The
Act gave the authorities increased powers of search and surveillance in cases of
suspected terrorist activities. Also, the authorities were given increased powers to
seize propaganda materials and block Internet sites. A core element of the Act was a
range of measures to suppress Boko Haram’s sources of funding (N.A.D 2011: 26).
However, to date, there is no record of any frozen bank accounts and only limited
evidence that any sources of Boko Haram’s funding was discovered.

Flaws in the federal judicial system have been apparent throughout the evolution of
Boko Haram from social movement to terrorist group. Recall Mohammed Yusuf’s
regular arrest and subsequent release. This was further supported in an interview with
officers of the anti-terrorist unit in Abuja:

Every time we make an arrest, someone calls and the person is released, so we capture
them and kill them… (Interview, Anti-Terrorist Unit Officer 2013).

Whilst extra-judicial execution is widespread, and considered an acceptable response
to lawlessness by many in Nigerian society (Campbell, Bunche and Harwood 2012
and Ladan 2013), it is a driver of increasingly extreme methods and tactics on the part
of Boko Haram, and an additional factor in the group’s transformation to a terrorist organisation (Forest 2012 and Walker 2012). The heavy-handed response of security forces, subsequent execution of Boko Haram members and family members of the group and the slow response of the judicial system has triggered a violent response by surviving members of the group.

Whenever the Nigerian police are involved in quelling riots it results into incessant human carnage. Unfortunately this has always been the way. (Hon Suleiman Abdulrahman Kawu N.A.D 2010:0532).

The culture of violence with impunity is entrenched in State security and has become an accepted norm. Therefore the inability of the State to stop this activity is constrained by the internal political dynamics in Nigeria. Recall the assertion that certain elite individuals control or interfere in the business of national security. Empirical findings by the CLEEN Foundation (n.d), Vanguard (2012b), Iyang and Abraham (2013) and Baker (2010) evidence the lack of resources available to demoralised State security agencies, but also, and most importantly, the existence of a patronage system which impedes their capacity to function effectively. Senator Nkechi Nwaogu states:

Year in year out, we make big budgets for the police force…and talk about restructuring the security agencies, our security agencies has failed us; not because of their own fault but because of the system, we need to look at the root causes [Boko Haram emergence] and avoid emergency approach [a military approach] (N.A.D 2011:0050)

From the statement above, the issue of extra-judicial executions, insufficient resources and police brutality is identified as the product of mis-governance. The government’s knowledge of this issue and the lack of political will to rectify this problem evidence a disregard for effective internal security provision.

The diagram below illustrates the implications of the CT and COIN strategies adopted. The reliance on a military response to the exclusion of other strategies limits the chances of successfully dislodging, disbanding and eliminating Boko Haram.
Rather it served as a temporary fix as illustrated in the months after the July 2009 offensive action against Boko Haram.

![Cycle illustrating the repetitive implication of the Government’s Response](image)

**Figure 17:** Cycle illustrating the repetitive implication of the Government’s Response

**Source:** Author (2014)

### 7.5 Conclusion

This chapter argues that far from effectively responding to the violence perpetrated by Boko Haram, the State (and states) CT and COIN responses have impelled more, and more extreme, violence of the part of the group accelerating its transformation from a social movement to a movement willing to use violence to a full-blown terrorist group. The chapter explores a step-by-step process response using CT and COIN strategies and tactics implemented in previous and the current Boko Haram insurgencies. This approach, driven by the recourse to violence inherent in political elite culture, differed little from the militarised response to previous episodes of political violence with the principal difference that Boko Haram adopted the extreme methods and tactics of other contemporary jihadi groups beyond Nigeria.
The absence of a holistic CT strategy has sustained Boko Haram. Examining the evolution of the State (and state) CT and COIN strategies as a process, the involvement of the political elite is apparent in each of the four phases. Initially, Boko Haram, or its precursor movements, were presented as harmless organisations in order to facilitate alliances advantageous to local elites. When Boko Haram’s activities became counter-productive to elite ambitions, heavy-handed military response was adopted by federal and state governments that resulted in a switch to guerrilla tactics against the military and police which further transmuted to extreme terrorist tactics such as synchronised suicide attacks and large-scale abductions.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

8.0 Introduction

Various forms of organised violent activities have engulfed the Nigerian State since independence, which are usually manifested in military coups, religious clashes, ethnic clashes, political violence and acts of terror. Graph 5 and 6 illustrates records of organised violent activities in Nigeria and the perpetrators from the year 1997 to 2014, emphasising its continuing presence and the massive spike in recent years.

![Graph 5: Conflict Event by Actor Type, Nigeria January 1997 - March 2013](image)

Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (2013)

Explaining the prevalence of these violent activities, this thesis has argued that they are the symptoms and outcomes of a deeper malaise, namely the political elites’ self-serving culture. It is a culture that is willing to use any means including violence to promote their own interests and one that nurtures poor governance with its associated poverty and corruption. It has also argued that although much has been written on
organised violence in Nigeria, the role of elite political culture has been glossed over. There are good reasons for this. Traditionally, the prevalence of organised violence in Nigeria has been explained by the elite, the media and the academia as being the product of differences between social groups who were thrust together as a single State as a result of the policies of the British administrators. The root causes of violence were therefore the product of competition between these social groups, and for State power, producing poor governance and a democratic deficit.

The programmes of these social movement groups are usually published as seeking religious, ethnic or socio-economic change, hence feeding into the perception of a clash of civilisations, poor governance and the competition between social groups. This thesis acknowledges the relevance of competition between social movements, however, a critical analysis of elite political culture and its link to organised violence shows that the roots go deeper. These conventional perspectives overlook the political elites’ complicity in violence and its dealings with social movement groups. The thesis has found a consistent pattern of elite practices that initiate and sustain organised political violence in Nigeria. It is this elite political culture that is the enabling factor for the sustenance of these groups’.
In this conclusion this thesis highlights three key aspects of the elite political culture that this research has argued has promoted political violence including that of Boko Haram. First, the awareness by elites that Nigerian politics is a zero sum game, meaning that there are very large financial gains to be had by securing political office and few financial gains for those who are frozen outside of office. Second, the identification by the elites that success in political competition arises from mobilising key social groups, such as ethnic and religious movements and political parties. Third, the recognition by the elites of the value of politicising conflicts in the State.

### 8.1 Nigerian Politics is a Zero Sum Game

The high percentage of crude oil revenue and subsequent control of this revenue by State officials at the national, state and local level created the conviction among the elites that attainment of government appointments was the road to accessing this oil
wealth. Centralisation of power at the governance level further fuelled this conviction. As earlier mentioned in chapter four, Obasanjo, a former president of Nigeria noted the relevance of State power for financial benefits:

The enormous powers of the executive presidency are the only real backbone of contention in national politics. Through the control which the head of State exercises in releasing or withholding statutory allocations in awarding petroleum contracts, in making key appointments and in giving special grants…(Obasanjo cited in Sunday Vanguard 1994:16).

Falola (1999:143) and Lewis (2006) identify Nigeria as a rentier State. This is based on evidence recording 80% of the government’s revenue and 95% of export earnings sourced from Crude oil (Nigeria Oil and Gas Report 2014). State revenues are primarily sourced from oil royalties and not dependent on production and taxation. The political elite have control of this revenue and little or no accountability to the populace on how revenue is being spent or allocated. This is evident in reports of top government officials’ involvement in the embezzlement of State funds (Premium Times 2015 and Quartz Africa 2015). It was also evident during the military regime, where the benefits of oil wealth were reflected in the lifestyle of the top ruling military officers and members of their patronage networks. John Campbell an ex-political counsellor and United States ambassador to Nigeria underlined the construction of ‘outsized mansions’, business enterprises and choice real estate locations owned by the top military officials as an example of the excesses of the military leaders (Campbell 2013:27). Campbell’s assertion was based on the existence of patron-client networks, which were created to reward the supporters of the political elite. This was supported by Siollun’s (2009:169) empirical account of the military regime’s complicity in ‘large scale racketeering and looting of State funds’ and forced resignation of the then commissioner for communication Joseph Tarka. The salient point is the equation of State power with the attainment of personal economic rewards.

The wealthiest people in Nigeria are generally people who have acquired wealth through State power: by political corruption, by access to State contracts…which do not usually involve them in direct productive activity…State governance is appropriated to the
service of personal interests by the dominant faction that is the elite (Ake 1996:29, 127).

Ake’s assertion is premised on recorded cases of political corruption. An example is General Ibrahim Babangida’s military government, which embarked on various ineffective State funded projects managed by members of his patronage networks including his wife. Such projects included, Better Life Programme for the Poor, Directorate for Roads and Rural Infrastructures, People’s Bank of Nigeria and Structural Adjustment Programmes (Ikejiaku 2013). Reports indicated that the proposed benefits of these projects were not evident in the socio-economic lives of the populace. This was illustrated in the data that recorded the increase in poverty level from 46% to 66% collected by the Federal Office of Statistics during and after the government of General Ibrahim Babaginda.

The approach to governance by the political elite is tainted by the absence of motivation for public service. In the past social movements groups have been formed and geared towards the social welfare of only selected populations. Such groups include MEND – calling for the development of the Niger Delta, Bakassi – focused on securing selected eastern states against rampant armed robbery and insecurity issues. As long as State governance is understood as a means to further personal interests, relevant Statebuilding indicators such as economic development and good governance will remain absent. This in turn leads to the formation of groups dedicated to fighting and demanding socio-economic development, including groups willing to use violence to attain stated goals. Commenting on this assertion, Nathaniel Danjibo an expert on religious violence in Nigeria maintains that:

So long as we continue to practice this kind of governance, people will continue to provide an excuse for groups to emerge as terrorist groups (Interview, Danjibo 2013).

Danjibo’s observation is rooted in the history of groups formed for the purpose of demanding the positive benefits of governance from political elites. He suggests that the emphasis on State wealth by the political elite aided the emergence and sustenance of violent groups in the State. The mandates of these groups premised on the deficiencies of the government at different levels give credence to Danjibo’s
assertion. Recall figure 24 in Section 6.1.1 in chapter six which analysed Boko Haram’s emergence and ideology on the platform of the prevalent socio-economic deficiencies and the ineffectiveness of the ruling elite in meeting the needs of the populace. Boko Haram’s ideology in line with the aforementioned challenges was framed to justify their existence and ultimately their employment of violent tactics.

Nigerian history records the elimination of violent groups through military intervention as a means to stop their activities. The elimination of these groups such as Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and Maitatsine did not bring an end to organised violent activities. Rather COIN measures implemented ensured the creation of more violent groups such as MEND and Boko Haram echoing the same sentiments and thriving in the same environment as previous eliminated groups. The key re-occurring element in these groups violent existence was elite political culture and their interference in governance. This occurrence is as a result of the presence of the same enabling factors that lead to the establishment of the groups mentioned above. These factors are identified as poverty, unemployment, injustice and corruption (see chapter 3). Recall that these enabling factors are a result of poor governance, which is rooted in elite political culture and impedes State building, subsequently leading to dissatisfaction amongst the electorates. The emergence of organised political violent groups is not limited to the personal interests of the founders of these groups but rather as a result of the structural challenge due to elites’ political culture grounded on personal pecuniary interests (analysed in chapter four and five).

The political process is shaped by the awareness that to win is everything to lose is death. Zero sum politics has promoted the militarization of political campaigns for all levels of elected government appointments (Bratton 2008 and Okeke 2014). This is reflected in the deployment of security forces to election polls and the consistent reports of electoral and political violent activities. Former vice president Atiku Abubakar’s maintains that:

Most elections are rigged before they occur; these include the use of thugs, corrupting party officials to disqualify or annul the nominations of some candidates and other

Abubakar’s assertion is supported by Human Rights wATCH and Amnesty records of electoral violence in Nigeria. As such the employment of thugs or organised groups by political candidates during election period is accepted as the norm and usually expected. This was exhibited in the 2003 gubernatorial election in Rivers state where local youth gangs and local vigilante groups were armed and turned into political thugs by PDP politicians, leading to the death of over 200 people and the displacement of a large population of people in Rivers state (Human Rights Watch 2004 and 2008).

The PDP was not the only political party involved in the employment of thugs. Opposing parties such as the All Nigeria’s Peoples Party (ANPP), and the Alliance for Democracy (AD) were also identified as being complicit (NWGAV and AOAV 2014). Inherently, the thriving industry of political thuggery, demonstrated by the reports of political violent activities illustrated in graph 5 and 6, sends a strong message to potential political candidates that the implementation of violence is an acceptable method for access to State power.

Access to State power through intimidation, rigging and violence negates ‘elected officials’ accountability to the populace. The political elite’s belief is that governance or authority was sourced with limited help from the electorate. Hence the responsibility toward the electorate’s needs is not primary. Aminu Jubril a former Federal minister of Education, Petroleum and Mineral resources, as well as a senator in Adamawa state, emphatically stated that:

…I am sorry to say right now what seems to happen is that so long as the big political baron and baronesses can agree at the top, that’s it. This is what matters (Jubril, cited in AllAfrica 2003 and Agbaje 2006).

Likewise the electorates are sceptical and are not inclined to expect equitable service from the political elite. Findings from Afrobarometer indicate the limitation of voters’ power in demanding equitable service from the State as a result of elections won by
rigging and electoral violence amongst other identified factors (Bratton and Logan 2006).

Political candidates regard access to State power to be assured by the decision to employ violent and other underhanded means. Therefore the vote of the electorates is irrelevant. Legitimacy is usually sourced through the motions of elections and alliances with key interest groups such as religious, ethnic or social movements groups (see Chapter Four). Intrinsically, the quality of governance is inevitably questioned and serves as a catalyst for the development of groups geared towards critiquing the actions of the ruling leaders, usually expressed in violence. An example includes the Niger Delta insurgency, which started in the early 1990s as a platform for the demand for socio-economic emancipation and environmental protection for the Niger Delta region and later morphed into an organised political violent organisation.

Cases of electoral violence were recorded during the 2013 local government elections in Edo state (Fund for Peace 2014), and in the north west region of Nigeria with the aid of gangs such as ECOMOG – an umbrella name for militant groups in Borno state which later evolved and merged into Boko Haram, Yan’Kalare and Sara-Suka (CLEEN Foundation 2013). Other examples include the 2007 presidential elections, where supporters of Yar Adua Umaru (Olusegun Obasanjo) and his opponents (Atiku Abubakar) where embroiled in the electoral race. The 2007 election was specifically noted for political violence. An assassination attempt was targeted at the running mate of Yar Adua Umaru days before the election. Moreover records of violence and the presence of political thugs at the election sites were reported. Reports indicated the killing of over 300 people related to electoral violence in 2007. Specific cases include the death of three people in Ondo state during violent clashes between PDP and the ruling Labour party (LP) on the day of the 2011 gubernatorial elections and the death of eleven youth corps members in Bauchi during the 2011 elections, amongst other cases.

Elections in the State are best described as a theatre of violence (Bratton 2008). This is reflected in the involvement in electoral violence by interested politicians and elected rulers with impunity. It is evident in recorded cases of political parties’ complicity in political and electoral violence. Examples of such cases include the case
of the All Congress of Nigeria (ACN) party hiring thugs to attack supporters and members of the PDP in Akwa Ibom state during the 2011 presidential elections rally. Buildings and properties of the PDP members were destroyed, in addition to the death of an unspecified number of people. It was reported that 51 youths were arrested and identified as hired thugs of the ACN however there was no record of the arrest of CAN party members in relation to this violence (Adele 2012). The arrest of these youths proved that there was an alliance or an agreement between these youths and the CAN. The significant point is the absence of prosecution of ACN party members. Although an enquiry was conducted the result is yet to be published.

Human Rights Watch (2007) interviewed retired employees of Katsina state government who argued that the Katsina state government paid a monthly stipend of 5,000 naira (20 GBP) to youth gangs identified as ‘PDP youths’ in exchange for political thuggery services. These funds were said to have been sourced from the state government security vote, which was earmarked for prompt response to security threats. This assertion is evident in the 2007 gubernatorial elections, where acts of electoral and political violence were reported and levied against the PDP in Katsina state. Another case is the attack attributed to PDP targeted at an ACN senatorial candidate, General Lawrence Onoja in Benue state. This attack was preceded by an ACN attack with the aid of political thugs against the convoy of the deputy governor of Benue state Steven Lawani (PDP), killing the chief press secretary and a driver. Yet, there is no record of the arrest of PDP or ACN members. However there were records of the arrest and immediate release of identified political thugs (Aniekwe and Kushie 2011). The prevalence of these activities indicates, that violence, electoral fraud, bribery and intimidation tactics are very much a part of elite’s political campaign strategy.

The pervasiveness of these violent expressions is considered as a function of the scramble for power in a zero sum game. Chinua Achebe asserts that the pursuit of power and material comforts by would be and incumbent leaders encouraged the use of violence to secure and maintain this position. Achebe also maintains that the cultivation of this phenomenon ensured the negligence of these leaders towards the socio-economic development of the State (Achebe 2012:69). This assertion is supported by Hill (2012:32-62) who maintains that the application of violence in
accessing State power aided in the decline of State services and the development as well as sustenance of organised political violent groups such as MEND and Boko Haram. This culture of violent political campaigns is interpreted as a manifestation of the elites’ political culture that is willing to use violence to secure access to office and the illicit resources available to office.

This politics by violent means only promoted the use of violence by social movement groups to achieve their own goals. This was exhibited in the Niger Delta region and the north eastern part of the country. Social movement groups in the Niger Delta merged under the umbrella of MEND and turned militant. Through their violent activities they gained the Federal government’s attention which resulted in the development of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and Amnesty program. The existence of these movements is not directly as a result of violent political campaigns. Access to weapons and immunity from prosecution as a result of alliances with political elite ensured the sustenance of violent activities perpetrated by these groups. Alliances between the political elite and social movement groups fuelled the transition of these groups to organised violent organisations. In addition, the government’s poor governance which excludes the expected positive dividends of governance, created an environment conducive for the development of social movement groups. This aided in the formation of networks with interested political elites and subsequently morphed into violent organisations. This was demonstrated in chapter four analysing the alliance between two successive PDP governors (Chinwole Mbadinuju and Chris Ngige) in Anambra state and the Bakassi boys.

The link between the norm of violent political campaigns and the prevalence of organised political violence groups in Nigeria is centred on the motivation for State power. Aspiring elected officials motivated by pecuniary interests will employ any method including violence to secure government office. This has been proven and examined in chapters four and five. With the inclusion of violence, support is secured from political godfathers and business elite, whose patronage network and funds ensures victory for elected aspirants. The stakeholders involved in electoral campaigns in the State such as the elite - ‘political godfathers’ can be identified as the key percentage of the population whose needs are met by the elected officials (Campbell 2011:29). Campbell’s declaration is supported by the evidence of client-
patron networks between former president Olusegun Obasanjo, Aliko Dangote and Femi Odetola amongst others. President Obasanjo was not the only elected official to form networks with selected political and business elites. Relations with these actors ensured that the interests of these actors are put before the State or electorates. Human Rights Watch (2007) identifies political godfathers and their network patronages as the benefactors of the ruling elite’s governance activities. This assertion was supported by findings from empirical analysis, amongst which is the statement from a former governor of Oyo state Victor Olunkloyo.

Money flows up and down... during the election period, these honourable members (of Oyo state house of assembly), they want the patronage of the puppeteer. Afterwards money will flow in the opposite direction – back from the puppet to the puppeteer (Olunkloyo 2007 cited in Human Rights Watch).

These unwritten rules shape the governance decision of the ruling elite (Cilliers 2003). The allocation of State resources to these select few serves as an impediment to State building and is usually manifested in flagrant corrupt practices which are witnessed by the masses and capitalised on by groups such as Boko Haram to justify violent responses.

8.2 Success in Political Competition Arises from Mobilising Key Social Groups

Social cleavages in the context of this thesis are defined as deep divisions within society amongst social groups. These groups are categorised by religion and ethnicity. Members of these groups relevant to this analysis are limited to the representatives of these groups who serve as decision makers and mobilizers. This is as a result of their influence on the general population of a particular social group. The size of social groups present in a particular community, constituency or country impacts on the level of competition between these social groups and its relevance to competing political parties or politicians. This is considered within the context of this research a reaction to competition for State resources and State power. The presence of these social groups and its impact on political network patronage highlights its relevance to competing political elite. This was demonstrated in chapter five examining the
relationship between selected Islamic religious associations and Kano state government. Where Kano state government gave preference to the Islamic community over the Christian community and other religious groups, in exchange for political legitimacy, the same was recorded in Kaduna, Zamfara and Borno state. It was observed that, there were similar patterns present in events of organised political violent activities between social groups’ highlighting increased spurts of violent activities during the period leading up to elections at the local, state and national level. Deliberating on this circumstance, a commander of a joint task force in northern Nigeria maintained that violence between social groups is as a result of elite competition for control. He stated that:

Lack of the appropriate platform for people to gain dominance ensures that they resort to exploiting religion, ethnicity and all this tendencies to win elections (Interview, Commander Joint Task Force 2013)

This assertion is supported by previous cases of violent clashes between social groups manifested in political undertones. History records political lines drawn by ethnic, religious and socio-economic affiliations which are reflected in the formation of political parties. The formation of the Action Group political party was focused on representing the political interest of the western region (the Yorubas), while the National Party of Nigeria represented the northern region (Hausa-Fulani) and the Nigeria Peoples Party represented the political interest of the southern region (the Igbos). These political parties were not formed for national unity, but rather were developed as a result of competition between the three major ethnic groups for access to State power and control of resources (Falola 1998: 55, 66). Focusing on the perceived competition between the three ethnic groups for supremacy in the State ensured political campaigns launched on the platform of ethnic solidarity.

Likewise, religion has been used for mobilisation of support. This is evident in northern Nigeria, specifically during the 1999 gubernatorial elections where sharia law was a major part of the political campaign. Members of the general public were encouraged to vote for candidates of certain political parties who had a particular religious preference. Examples include the electoral victory of Zamfara state governor (Ahmad Sani Yarima) in 1999, a member of the ANPP on Islamic religious platform,
the first state to implement sharia law. In addition presiding president Goodluck’s visit to the Redeemed Christian Church of God, which is one of the largest churches and whose general overseer is well respected by the Christian population in Nigeria during his first presidential campaign is another example of religion being mobilised within a political campaign. The manipulation and mobilisation of social divisions (ethnicity and religion) by political elites fosters competition between these groups. Frequently leading to increased tension and the expression of violence during the period leading to election.

A case of this phenomenon was the eruption of violence in Warri, Delta state during the run-up to the 2003 state and national elections. Violent conflicts were as a result of disagreements on how the government chose to run the elections (Human Rights Watch 2003). Culprits were identified as youths of the Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo ethnic groups. Reports indicated that each ethnic group alleged that political candidates and the allocation of local government areas based on ethnic origins were unsuitable and as a result they called for the suspension of the elections. Likewise members of the PDP, AD and APGA insisted that the eruption of this violent clash was as a result of their opposition’s alliance with other social groups (youth ethnic associations). The political undertones coupled with existent competition between the three ethnic groups resulted in violent clashes manifested during the period leading up to the 2003 elections. Despite these occurrences the elections were still scheduled to take place in areas affected by the violence regardless of mass death and large displacement of people, consequently making the results questionable.

The principal issue of this crisis was the timing of the conflict, the attack on the office of the independent national electoral commission (INEC), the decision to go ahead with the elections in affected areas and the presence of political thugs and intimidation by the political parties involved. This suggests the deliberate manipulation of social divisions based on ethnicity to instigate violent activities. The underlying point was the decision to count votes of electorates in communities which were attacked and almost deserted (Human Right Watch 2003). The political representation of different social groups catalysed the use of violence in the absence of alternative methods of solving perceived slights by the different social groups. This was as a result of the politicisation of these conflicts. Examples examined included
the Matatsine crisis and the Niger Delta insurgency. Chapters four and five examined the alliance between the political elite notably in Kano and Rivers state allied with these groups by agreeing to present their cause on a political platform in exchange for political mobilisation. The implication of violence used as the language of political campaigns aided in the violent expression of these social groups encouraged the development and creation of organised political violent groups representing these social groups.

As the State developed, the political elite realised that relying on ethnic and religious divisions as tools for political campaigns was becoming unmanageable, due to the difficulties in managing militias. This was reflected in the kalo kato riots, Bakassi and the maitatsine riots as well as the ECOMOG group, where each group was allied with the ruling elite in Kano, Anambra, Bauchi and Yobe state. Hence emphasis was placed on creating a political party that reflected both ethnic and religious differences. However class distinction became an important factor. When the PDP was created, the party gave the impression of being secular and non-ethnic and it embraced nationality - a party for all the people. The essential factor of this party was its exclusive top membership of the elite (the wealthy) from the military, business and political sector.

Zero sum politics encouraged the manipulation of social cleavages by competing political parties or candidates. The mandate or grievance of a social group is adopted against the opposition. Political parties or candidates are able to split the opposition’s constituency and ensure high voter turnout. This is reflected in the age long Christian versus Muslim conflict. Religious division is used as a tool to reduce the importance of other social divisions such as tribes, labour groups, and class. The focus on religious supremacy eclipses other social divisions. Examples include the support of sharia law by Zamfara governor and Kaduna Governor and the resulting violence perpetrated by members of Christian and Muslim groups. Note that this conflict occurred during the run-up of the gubernatorial elections.

The cases of November 2002 miss world pageant riots in Kaduna state, which occurred several weeks before the state and national elections. The initial spark of violence is attributed to a ‘blasphemous article’ about the prophet Mohammed which
was retracted (Human Rights Watch 2003). However the slow response by the Kaduna state government resulted in the escalation of the conflict leading to the death of Christians and Muslims alike. During the conflict, posters for the re-election campaign of the Kaduna state Governor Ahmed Mohammed Makarfi were torn and buildings housing his campaign offices and posters were attacked (Human Rights Watch 2003). This vandalism targeted against Governor Makarfi’s political party is contrary to the branded cause of it, which was identified as an attack on Islam religion. Although Governor Makarfi won the elections, the period leading up to the election was riddled with violence. It is suggested as indicated by the Governor during a press conference that his political opponents were behind the attacks. The essential issue is the deliberate stoking of religious dissent leading to violent uprisings to undermine the competency of the opposition group. This was manifested in the electorate’s complaints against the ruling governor during the violent uprisings and the media’s consistent publications of the Kaduna state government’s inability to curb the violence (Weekly Trust 2002).

In effect, conflicts between social groups are fuelled by opposing political parties or candidates for the purpose of securing electoral votes and legitimacy. Recall the case of the alliance between the Niger Delta social movements groups and the PDP in River State 1999 elections. Likewise the case of an alliance between the Kalare gang and the political elite in Gombe state, demonstrated during the 2007 elections. The Kalare gang are identified as a criminal organisation whose emergence amongst other factors was termed as a result of unemployment and poverty – identified outcomes of political elite’s poor governance. Human Rights Watch (2007) identified this group as the main source of political thugs for opposing parties in Gombe state – PDP, ANPP and the Democratic Peoples Party (DPP). A specific example of this alliance was the arrest of former governor Abubakar Hasbidu who was a gubernatorial candidate in Gombe state in relation to political violence charges. Upon his arrest and arraignment in court, members of the Kalare gang stormed the court premises and attacked the magistrate and violently secured the release of Abubakar Hasbidu. He was never re-arrested. This event was reported by the leadership newspaper February 7th 2007. In exchange for services rendered, these social movement groups get political representation for their grievances, access to resources and immunity from legal prosecution. The crucial element of this alliance is the militarisation of these groups,
the decrease of the State’s monopoly on violence and the increase in privatisation of violence by social movement groups and interested political elites. The current onslaught of organised political violence by Boko Haram is linked with this phenomenon.

In relating this phenomenon to Boko Haram’s insurgency, recall that Boko Haram before its evolution into a terrorist organisation was a Muslim sect and a social movement group. The group’s mandate was rooted in Islamic religious principles, geared towards social and political reforms. As such the group amassed a large following, which attracted the attention of the political elite in north-eastern Nigeria. Ali Modu Sherif a Senator with aspirations of becoming the next governor of Borno state under the flagship of the All Peoples Party (ANPP) was one of the identified elite. Boko Haram was not the only Muslim sect in Borno state and Islam was not the only religion in the state. There was a social divide within the state and each division naturally required access to a power base or a political patron. The alliance between an interested political elite in Borno state and Boko Haram ensured ANPP’s political victory and the necessary resources needed for Boko Haram’s pursuance of their religious mandate. The acceptance of this alliance as a political campaign strategy is rooted in elite’s encouragement of religion in the political sphere. Elite manipulation of the mandates and grievances of social movement groups, ethnicity or religion for political rewards is a catalyst for the transition of these groups into organised politically violent groups. A case in point is Boko Haram’s transformation to a terrorist organisation, analysed in preceding chapters.

8.3 The Value of Politicing Conflicts in the State

The engagement in political debates centred on conflicts is consistent in global political campaigns such as the presidential debates of George Bush and Barack Obama centred on ‘war on terror’. The Nigerian polity is not an exception. Various reports recording events and statements of the ‘blame game’ played by political parties and their opponents illustrate the politicisation of violent and non-violent conflicts in the State. Hence Senator Zanna of Borno state accused former Governor Ali Modu Sherif of Borno state as the creator of Boko Haram in Leadership
newspaper, March 27th 2014. Likewise APC member Honorable Salisu Daura’s statement that ‘the government of today is not capable’ of maintaining security, referring to the Boko Haram insurgency in *Blueprint* newspaper 22nd October 2012. The pertinent concern is the implication of this blame game and the escalation of organised political violent activities in the polity. It is suggested that, political debates or the blame game participated in by political parties and their opponents, triggers violence or escalates violent conflicts within the polity. Recall the argument that the State’s political campaigns are rooted in the encouragement of violence as an expression or method of accessing power. Therefore the politicisation of conflicts by elected officials or potential elects is not limited to highlighting perceived flaws of incumbent elected officials but rather calculated to manipulate existing conflict and escalate violent uprising to access State power.

On May 14th 2012, General Muhammadu Buhari a presidential aspirant for 2015 was recorded to have made a statement which was interpreted as a calculated strategy to incite violence.

God willing by 2015 something will happen. They either conduct a free and fair election or they go a very disgraceful way. If what happened in 2011 [referring to the case of PDP rigging the election] should again happen in 2015, by the grace of God, the monkey and the baboon will be soaked in blood (Cited in Adedayo et al 2012).

Buhari denied the motive attributed to this statement and insisted that he called for a strong resistance to PDP winning the elections. This statement triggered dissention between the supporters and opponents of Buhari, best described as a call to arms by both camps. Buhari was reported to have made provocative remarks before the 2011 elections which lead to escalation of violence between the northerners and southerners disclosed as ‘religious’ violence. He attributed this statement as a lie perpetrated by the opposition party PDP to tarnish his reputation. The aftermath of the 2011 presidential elections recorded post-electoral violence concentrated in the northern part of Nigeria. The media in Nigeria reported the crisis as a case of re-occurring religious conflict, however a large percentage of properties destroyed were identified as possessions of members of opposing political parties (*BBC* News 2011 and Human Rights Watch 2013).
The contention is these statements were released during a period fraught with Christian and Muslim tensions and north and south divide debates. Consequently, leading to escalation of violence between the north and south, Buhari’s campaign has historically been limited to the northern region and followers of Islam. Any statement perceived as provocative is termed as a battle call against Christians or the southerners. Likewise a statement released by the Northern Elders Forum, supporters of APC and opponents of PDP, asserts the sustenance of terrorists’ activities as a result of ‘leadership not rightfully given to the North’ (Godwin 2014). As such, focus is shifted from the emergence and sustenance of Boko Haram violent activities to the age old battle of north versus the south. Statements’ reflecting the need for ‘the North to fight back’ limits the electoral process to a regional battle, consequently escalating discontent and shifting the focus from electoral selection based on merit and agenda. The significance of this statement assert that only a government headed by a northerner can put a stop to terrorism, hence cultivating a climate of dissention between citizens of both geographical regions.

Another politicised conflict that led to the escalation of violence in the State is the Niger Delta crisis. The Niger Delta insurgency is decades old and consisted of warfare between the Niger Delta militias and the federal, state and local government as well as the oil producing companies in the region. The goal of the militants is resource control and compensation for oil producing communities whose source of livelihood were destroyed as a result of the drilling activities of oil producing companies. The renewed campaign of the Niger Delta militants after the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa was non-violent. The petitions and campaigns of the groups were largely ignored or payed lip service to by the local, state and Federal government (Obi 2009). Increased agitation by these social movement groups led to the increase of revenue allocated to the oil producing region, yet the standard of living and basic social and infrastructural amenities showed little improvement. This is another occurrence of violence resulting from the elites’ poor governance. The unimproved plight of the oil producing communities fuelled resentment against the State and the multinational oil companies by the Niger Delta groups, which was later manifested in acts of vandalism and hostage kidnappings. Against this backdrop, the local and state political elites recognised the advantage of courting the leaders of these groups as political thugs to
intimidate their opponents and rig the elections (Muzan 2014). Recall network analysis of alliances between the political elite and interest groups in chapters four and five. This was achieved by promising the leaders of these groups access to political incentives to aid in the achievement of their objectives. This led to the militarization of these groups (Bagaji et al 2011, Human Rights Watch 2004 and Walker 2008). The subsequent fallout between these groups and the political elites led to an all-out war against the State. Examples include alliances between the governor of Rivers State Peter Odili and Mujahed Asari and Ateke Tom, leaders of Ijaw Youth Council and Niger Delta Vigilante group respectively (Human Rights Watch 2007). The perpetrators and sponsors of political and electoral violence were not prosecuted, hence promoting a culture of violence with impunity for political objectives. The salient point is the manipulation of Niger Delta militants’ objectives or conflict for the pursuance of political interests. Commenting on this issue, Onuoha, a research fellow in national defence war college Abuja, cites the relationship between Niger Delta militants and southern political elite as a comparison with the emergence of Boko Haram and its ties with northern political elite. He maintains that the emergence of these groups is as a result of the internal challenges faced by the State, which this thesis identifies as the elite’s political culture and poor governance.

As the society evolves, the political class masters the dynamics of the society and tries as much as possible to use any instrument they can to get and retain political power (Interview, Onuoha 2013).

Onuoha’s observation tallies with the proposition that organised political violent groups were not created for access to State power, but rather their mandates were politicised by the political elite access to power. The existence of these groups and their grievances or objectives served as a platform for political campaigns and alliances. This view is shared by Adesoji who argues that Boko Haram at its early stage was manipulated by the political elite resulting in violence:

Boko Haram is not the first of its kind in Nigeria…the political landscape is such that politicians wanted to have foot soldiers…politicians made promises to Yusuf, it was because the promises failed that he now took to arms (Interview, Adesoji 2013).
Adesoji’s assertion is supported by findings and analysis of Boko Haram’s emergence in chapter six and Yusuf’s verbal attacks against the former governor of Borno state Ali Modu Sherif. These observations in addition to Mohammed Yusuf’s and some of his members’ previous employment in Borno state government (ministry of Islamic affairs) validates an association between Boko Haram and Borno state government. Likewise, Joshua Bolarinwa a research fellow in the NIIA supports this argument. He maintains that the run up to elections makes socio-economic movement groups attractive to politicians:

Unfortunately the political development of Nigeria encourages the use of political thugs, we see the 2010-2011 election campaign of Goodluck aggravating the operations of Boko Haram movements…it is not a secret the politicians promised the Boko Haram heaven and earth…you help me campaign, you work in my government, we will create a ministry of Islamic affairs (Interview, Bolarinwa 2013).

Bolarinwa’s observation is reflected in the aforementioned alliance between Boko Haram and the Borno state government. See chapter five where it was discovered that Yusuf’s objective of sharia law became a political campaign interest in exchange for Ali Modu’s electoral victory.

The Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) is another example of a movement politicised for its strong ethnic origins, social and political networks. The OPC was formed as a response to the perceived slights against the Yoruba ethnic group. The successful election of Olusegun Obasanjo a Yoruba president in 1999 brought a temporary end to the political violent attacks by OPC (Guichaoua 2007). Records of violent clashes between the OPC and APC (Arewa Peoples Congress a response to the formation of OPC), representing the interest of Hausa Fulani political interests attests to the politicisation of ethnic conflicts by opposing parties. Reports indicated the vocal displeasure of the northern political elite such as Abubakar Rimi, Muhammad Buhari and Wada Nas against a re-election by Olusegun Obasanjo a Yoruba in the year 2003 (Ukiwo 2003). The resulting implication of this event was evidenced in violent clashes between the Hausa Fulani and the Yoruba across the polity. This was reflected in attacks on the PDP and ANPP campaign offices and their staff. This was due to the political elite fuelling or reminding members of the ethnic groups of past grievances.
An example was the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections where M.K.O Abiola, a Yoruba won the elections. Nonetheless, the group was recorded to have escalated into a vigilante and criminal gang. It is considered that, after the usefulness of the group as political enforcers was no longer deemed relevant by the political elites, armed members and unemployed youths who had adapted to violence as a tool for access to resources or attainment of goals were relegated to a life of organised violence.

The Jos crisis in 2004 and 2008 that led to the deaths of over 1,800 people occurred shortly after the national and local government area (LGA) elections. It is argued that these violent clashes escalated as a result of the politicisation of existing conflicts between ethnic groups (Jasawa and Afizeres versus Berom and Anagutas) and religious (Christian versus Muslim) groups in Jos, regarding LGA chairman allocation as such voters were polarized (Kwaja 2011 and Sampson 2012). This was reflected in events leading up to the LGA election in Jos-north, the governor of Plateau state was recorded to have imposed a non-indigene of Jos north LGA as a candidate for LGA chairman in Jos north (Ostien 2009). This enflamed dissent and conflict amongst the ethnic and religious groups. It came as no surprise when supporters of ANPP and PDP parties representing the rival ethnic and religious group resulted in post-election violence. Ostien (2009) highlights the dynamics of the competition between the religious and ethnic groups for political supremacy in Jos north during the period leading to the LGA elections:

The pastors were preaching in the churches that everyone should go out to vote, that they must not vote for any Muslims...They want to Islamise the place…we have voted for them before and they disappointed us (Interview 11, 2009 cited in Ostien 2009)

Some Muslim preachers were saying; if you are in PDP or vote for PDP you are pagan…Members of the Hausa Fulani community were being sensitized in mosques to vote for the Muslim ANPP chairmanship candidate (Interview 12, 2009 cited in Ostien 2009)

The indigenes believed that there will be a fight, especially if the Hausa Fulani did not win (Interview 9, 2009 cited in Ostien 2009)
The comments above, indicates the overlap of local politics and existing discord between these social groups and how this was politicised by members of the PDP and ANPP for political interests. These observations were reflected in violent clashes between ethnic groups and religious groups shortly after the elections (International Crisis Group 2012). Violent clashes during elections in local government areas in Jos 2004, were instigated as a result of stirred up land conflicts between communities in the LGAs, these elections were used as an avenue to propagate land rights and political power between the communities (Human Rights Watch 2004).

The manipulation of existing conflicts between competing social groups by political elites is manifested in electorates voting as a result of ethnic, religious and social preferences excluding the merits or suitability of candidates for government positions. Therefore, elected leaders take advantage of existing ethno-religious conflicts to secure legitimacy and approval from the public as opposed to legitimacy and approval accessed by performance or mandate. The consequence of this is the absence of leadership accountability. Leaders who are willing to manipulate existing conflicts to secure positions of State power are less liable to secure the end of these conflicts as well as exhibit qualities of governance that encourages State growth and development.

Obiageli Ezekwesili, the former World Bank vice president for Africa and co-founder of transparency international Nigeria addressing Mehdi Hasan in the Al-Jazeera head to head program, May 2015 sums up the problem of Nigeria and the root cause of its political violence:

It is not a religion issue, it is not an ethnicity issue, it is not any other primordial issue that we are dealing with, we are dealing with the failure of our elite class to galvanise a shared view for our society (Ezekwesili 2015).

Identifying the role of the political elite and their complicity in organised violence has not been clearly recognised before in the literature. The challenges that such an elite culture creates for Nigeria are not unique to it, as many countries in Africa notably West Africa are facing similar elite produced violence. The political elite’s history in Nigeria of allainces with social movement groups, their interference in governance
and the ideology of State or political power as a source of financial rewards should serve both as a warning and as a cause for action. Yet this study shows a persistent neglect to tackle the issue and hence repeated political complicity in events of organised political violence. The inattention to the problem has created a sense of elite immunity from interference. Hence the senator in Borno state who was identified by the State security service as an ally and financial sponsor of Boko Haram was never prosecuted and continued his public service as a senator.

The case of political elite complicity in political violence raises the question of why Nigeria’s adoption of a democratic form of governance has not changed the prevalence of this form of violence, but rather records an increase in political violence. The answer lies in the overwhelming presence of the elite in the political system and their influence in State governance. Nigeria since 1999 till date has recorded a series of elections where the ‘elected leaders’ both at the federal, state and local levels are individuals from the military regime elite or under the patronage of the political elite. It is a case of recycling ‘elected leaders’ and most importantly these leaders share the same cultural traits. In essence the interpretation of democracy by the political elite is limited to the election process within a context of zero sum politics. It ensures that the votes of the electorate are undermined by ballot box rigging. When the limits of voters’ power is so obvious there can be only limited accountability from elected State officials to the populace. This research concedes that there are networks and oversight institutions set up for the sole purpose of regulating and monitoring State and governance activities. However, the existence of patronage networks linked to these institutions makes the business of demanding accountability from elected leaders or government officials difficult or near impossible. Although newspaper reports, television shows and the presence of civil rights activists amongst other avenues gives credence to the populace’s efforts at demanding accountability, Bratton and Logan (2006) demonstrate the electorate’s inability to demand accountability from the ruling elites. Two factors remain prevalent: loss of faith in elected officials; and the elite’s strong influence in governance activities as well as patronage networks such that they escape prosecution for fraud and embezzlement cases. These realities discourage the populace from direct involvement. Hence the continuation of State elected officials who are unwilling or unable to provide the required public services. This breakdown in democracy encourages the development of
social movement groups targeted towards filling in the demand for socio-economic development. These groups not only met the immediate needs of those they represented but too often morphed into violent groups whose criminal activities became difficult to control by the governing authority, as a result of political elite alliances with these groups.

This study highlights the question of change regarding political elite complicity in organised violence. Despite changes in the social, political and economic environment in Nigeria, the role of the political elite and the link to violence remains constant. In other words, electoral violence still persists, elite manipulation of grievances and social groups’ competition in particular religion still occurs both at the national and regional level and widespread socio-economic problems remain.

This research examined the aforementioned factors in relation to Boko Haram’s emergence and cited similar cases with different groups across the polity. Specific to Boko Haram, the socio-economic and political environment created by the political elite ensured the development of this group. Furthermore, just like other groups in the State, Boko Haram’s objectives were co-opted by the political elites for their own political interests. The subsequent alliance between Boko Haram and the political elite catalysed the group’s transition to violence. This illustrates political elite’s ability to influence happenings in the political environment. This conclusion means that the elimination of Boko Haram will not bring an end to organised violent activities in Nigeria. It will only serve as a temporary reprieve before the advent of the next violent movement, if elite political culture and approach to governance remains same.
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APPENDICES

Appendix One

Semi-Structured Interview Questions and Frequent Follow-Up Questions

*Semi-Structured Interview Questions*

Question 1

What is behind Boko Haram’s emergence?

Question 2

What caused Boko Haram’s transformation to terrorism?

Question 3

In relation to Boko Haram’s movement, do you think the employment of terror tactics or violence is an effective tool?

Question 4

Where does Boko Haram get funding?

Question 5

Do you think the Boko Haram sect reflects a deeper crisis of the Nigerian state or is it one of the myriad challenges faced by the state?
Frequent Follow-Up Questions

Question 1

Nigerian history has recorded a collection of violent groups such as the OPC, MEND and most importantly Boko Haram. These groups were formed for the propagation of a particular cause and subsequently adopted violent and terrorist techniques. In the case of Boko Haram, how can this phenomenon be explained?

Question 2

Boko Haram’s demand are not quite clear but however statements made by the group leans towards religious issues such as Islamisation of the Nigerian state, is religious supremacy the sole factor of the sect’s movement and on what grounds?

Question 3

What are those issues that may have provoked the emergence of Boko Haram?

Question 4

Could the origin of Boko Haram, in terms of ideologies and motives be linked to the maitatsine crisis? If so could you elaborate more?

Question 5

There seem to be a symbiotic relationship between religion and politics in the Nigerian polity, taking this fact into cognisance is there a possibility of this phenomenon influencing the emergence of Boko Haram and subsequent adoption of terror tactics?
Question 6

Is it possible that the sect has been successful in getting its strategic aims across to the general populace as well as articulating what it is trying to achieve?

Question 7

Could the development of Boko Haram be linked to the desire by Northern political interests to ‘domicile’ political leadership of the country in Northern hands?

Question 8

In a video by the leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, it was indicated that Boko Haram forces are stronger than the Nigerian military forces, how prepared is the Nigeria military for the continuing confrontation?

Question 9

Placing Boko Haram within the international context, is there a link between the insurgency in Mali, Somali and the intensity of the Boko Haram attacks?
Appendix Two

Respondents

- **State Security Service**
  i. **Borno state**
  - State Director of Security; Mr B
  - Senior Security Officer
  - Junior Security Officer

  ii. **Plateau state**
  - State Director of Security

  iii. **Lagos state**
  - State Director of Security; Mr S
  - Junior Security Officer

  iv. **Rivers state**
  - Senior Security Officer
  - Junior Security Officer

  v. **Bayelsa state**
  - Senior Security Officer
  - Junior Security Officer

  vi. **Yobe state**
  - Senior Security Officer
  - Junior Security Officer

  vii. **Kano state**
  - State Director of Security; Mr K
  - Junior Security Officer

  viii. **Anambra state**
  - Senior Security Officer
  - Junior Security Officer

- **Counter Terrorism insurgency Unit, Abuja**
  1. Senior officer
  2. Junior officer
3. Security officer 3

- Nigerian Police Force (Abuja)
  1. Junior officer 1
  2. Junior officer 2

- Joint Task Force (Borno and Bauchi states)
  1. Task Force Commander 1
  2. Task Force Commander 2

- Nigerian Scholars
  i. Freedom Onuoha (Centre for strategic research and studies, national defence college Abuja)
  ii. Adesoji Abimbola (Obafemi Awolowo University; department of History)
  iii. N.D Danjibo (peace and conflict studies programme, institute of African studies, University of Ibadan)
  iv. Simeon, H.O. Alozieuwa (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution Abuja)
  v. Shola Omotola (Redeemers University)

- Other organisations
  i. Nigerian Institute of international affairs (Lagos)
  ii. CLEEN Foundation; Centre for Law Enforcement Education (Lagos and Abuja) Miss V and Mr C

- Government Officials 1 and 2 (National Assembly)
- Residents in Northern Nigeria
- Residents in Niger-Delta
- Journalists