Strategies of intervention in protracted violent conflicts by civil society actors: the example of interventions in the violent conflicts in the area of former Yugoslavia

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Submitted version deposited in CURVE May 2011

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Strategies of Intervention in Protracted Violent Conflicts by Civil Society Actors

The Example of Interventions in the Violent Conflicts in the Area of Former Yugoslavia, 1990 – 2002

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the University’s requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

July 2009

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to contribute to the understanding of conflict intervention in protracted violent conflicts by studying the activities of civil society actors in regard to the conflicts in what was Yugoslavia until 1991. A very broad understanding of ‘intervention’ is used for this purpose that includes all kinds of activities that relate to the conflicts. Based on a survey of activities in the period between 1990 and 2002, a framework for categorising and describing these interventions is applied according to basic functions in four ‘grand strategies’ of ‘peace-making’, ‘peace-keeping’, ‘peace-building’, and ‘information, support, protest and advocacy’, with a total list of about 230 instruments of conflict intervention identified.

The study concludes that civil society actors played three different basic roles: They complemented the work of state actors, they were the avant-garde for approaches, strategies and methods that later became ‘mainstream’ in conflict intervention, and in some cases, they were able to control or correct actions by governments through advocacy or direct action. The development of instruments of civil conflict transformation received a massive boost through this engagement in the 1990s.

The study supports the position taken recently by some researchers making comparative studies of cases of conflict intervention regarding the limited role played by dialogue and reconciliation work in regard to dealing with the overall conflicts: In spite of ‘reconciliation’ and inter-ethnic cooperation being at the core of the vast majority of all projects and programmes undertaken in the area, indicators of real impact regarding an overall positive change in society and prevention of future violence seem to be rather weak.

The study further observes that there was a social movement developed relating to former Yugoslavia in many Western countries that in a hitherto unknown way combined traditional methods of protest and advocacy with concrete work in the field.
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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude and deep appreciation to all those in the countries of Former Yugoslavia who I had the privilege to come to know and work with over the past twenty years.

I thank my supervisor Prof. Dr. Andrew Rigby for his patience and his encouragement for this study that took some years more than originally envisaged before it was ready. My thanks go also to Institute for Peace Work and Conflict Transformation (IFGK) which has been the author’s employer through all these years.

For thorough proof-reading to get this thesis into correct British English I thank Howard Clark (Madrid).

Last not least, this study would not have been possible without the grant by the Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung (German Peace Research Foundation) for the project Complex Interventions in the Conflicts of the Former Yugoslavia, 1988-2003.
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Acronyms

ABA = American Bar Association
AIM = Alternativna Informativna Mreza (Alternative Information Network)
ARK = Antiratne Kampanje (Antiwar Campaign) Croatia
BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina
BPT = Balkan Peace Team
BSV = Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung (Federation for Social Defence)
CCCRTE = Coordinating Committee for Conflict Resolution Training in Europe
CCTS = Committee for Conflict Transformation Support (until 1997 CCCRTE)
CDA = Collaborative for Development Action, USA
CELI = Central European Law Initiative
CIMIC = Civil-Military-Cooperation
CIVPOL = United Nations Civilian Police
CNA = Centre for Nonviolent Action
CRS = Catholic Relief Services
CS = Christine Schweitzer
CSCE = Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
DDR = Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of combatants
DOS = Democratic Opposition of Serbia
EC = European Community
ECMM = European Community Monitoring Mission
ECCY = EC Conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague (also called the ‘Hague Conference)
EPRD = European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EU = European Union
EUAM = European Administration in Mostar
EUFOR = European Force, BiH
EUMM = European Union Monitoring Mission
EUPM = European Union Police Mission
EWI = East-West Institute
FERL = European Federation of Free Radios
FOR = Fellowship of Reconciliation
FRY = Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM = Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GfbV = Gesellschaft fuer bedrohte Voelker
GSOA = Gruppe fuer eine Schweiz ohne Armee (Group for a Switzerland without an army)
HCA = Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly
HDZ = Croatian Democratic Union, Croatia
IALANA = International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms
ICFY = International Conference on Former Yugoslavia
ICRC = International Confederation of the Red Cross Societies
ICTY = International Criminal Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia
ICVA = International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP = Internally Displaced Person
IFIAS = Initiative fuer Frieden
IFOR = Implementation Force, BiH
IMF = International Monetary Fund
IPB = International Peace Bureau
IPPNW = International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
IPTF = International Police Task Force
IRI = International Republican Institute
JNA = Yugoslav People’s Army, SFRY, or Yugoslav National Army, FRY
KFOR = Kosovo Force, Kosovo
KDOM = Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission
KVM = Kosovo Verification Mission
LDK = Democratic League of Kosovo
MAN = Mouvement pour une alternative non-violente
NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDI = National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
NGO = Nongovernmental Organisation
OEFD = Oesterreichische Friedensdienste (Austrian Peace Services)
OHR = Office of the High Commissioner, BiH
OMIK = OSCE Mission in Kosovo
OSCE = Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSI = Open Society Institute
PIC = Peace Implementation Council, BiH
PoW = Prisoners of War
PTA = Parent-Teacher Association
Quango = Quasi- Nongovernmental Organisation
RS = Republika Srpska (Serbian Republic), BiH
SDA = Party of Democratic Action; BiH
SDS = Serbian Democratic Party, Croatia, BiH
SFOR = Stabilization Force, BiH
SFRY = Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SPO = Party of Serbian Renewal, SFR
SPS = Socialist Party of Serbia, FRY
SRS = Serbian Radical Party, FRY
TFF = Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research
UCK = Kosovo Liberation Army, Kosovo
UMCOR = United Methodist Committee on Relief
UN = United Nations
UNCRO = UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
UNDP = UN Development Programme
UNHCR = UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF = UN Children’s Fund
UNMIK = UN Mission in Kosovo
UNPA = UN Protected Area, Croatia
UNPREDEP = UN Preventive Deployment Force, Macedonia
UNPROFOR = UN Protection Force, Croatia, BiH and Macedonia
UNSCR = UN Security Council Resolution
UNTAES = UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia
USIP = U.S. Institute for Peace
VOPP = Vance-Owen Peace Plan
WILPF = Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
WRI = War Resisters’ International
WEU = Western European Union
WPRT = World Peace and Relief Team
1. Introduction

The wars in what soon became ‘former’ Yugoslavia began less than two years after the breakdown of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, in a time of international political upheaval and reconfiguration of relationships within the international community. They shaped international relations and organisations probably more than any other development of the 1990s. At the end of the decade, NATO had established itself as a world-wide actor *inter alia* delivering military peace-keeping instead of the United Nations, the USA had firmly emphasised its leadership role as the only remaining superpower, and the European Union started to establish itself as both a civilian and military power pursuing a Common Foreign and Security Policy and expanding into Eastern Europe (see Lucarelli 2000, Durward 2001, Kaufman 2002, Popowski 2003, Siani-Davis 2003).¹ On the other hand, in that same decade unarmed, civilian or nonviolent intervention in conflicts also came to the attention of policy-makers, donors and many international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) that hitherto had worked exclusively in the fields of humanitarian aid or development.

The armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia moved from West to East:² They began with Slovenia in summer 1991, moved from there to Croatia where a ceasefire at the beginning of 1992 and the arrival of UN peace-keepers stopped the open violence until 1995 when war erupted again for a short period, and reached Bosnia-

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¹ Another development that can be directly traced back to the wars in Yugoslavia and in Rwanda were developments in the international legal system, with the war crime tribunals on these two conflict areas becoming the model for other country-specific courts, as well as providing an impetus for the formation of the International Criminal Court which was established in 2002 (see United Nations 2004a, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2008, Orentlicher 2008:9p).

² To describe the whole region studied I am quite often using the term ‘former Yugoslavia’ in spite of the fact that many people in the newly independent countries reject this term as a reminder of a past they wish to leave behind. But I just could not think of another way to describe the whole area studied without having to list each time the names of all the different countries which would have made the text rather unwieldy. Alternatives like “Balkans” or “South East Europe” include countries not under research here (like Albania, Bulgaria) or exclude some that are (Croatia and Slovenia reject the designation ‘Balkans’ as discriminatory).

‘Former Yugoslavia’ must also not be confused with ‘FR Yugoslavia’. The first term refers to the whole territory of what was Yugoslavia until end of 1991. FR Yugoslavia was founded in 1992 and consisted of two republics: Serbia and Montenegro. Generally, I have tried to use the official names used by the different countries and entities at the respective time in their usual international version (for example Kosovo instead of Kosova).
1. Introduction

Herzegovina in April 1992. The Dayton agreements that made Bosnia-Herzegovina an international protectorate ended that war in 1995, but after an interlude of a few years fighting in Kosovo in 1998 culminated in the attack by NATO on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in early 1999 and the subsequent establishment of a protectorate in Kosovo. Two years later ethnic violence between Slavic Macedonians and the Albanian minority in Macedonia was settled comparatively quickly and without significant bloodshed.

Many studies have been written about the conflicts in former Yugoslavia and the different efforts made by the international community to settle them and to build peace. These conflicts have elicited probably the broadest range of interventions by external parties ever seen so far. There has been little that was not tried over the years, by international organisations and individual governments, by nongovernmental organisations, churches, an uncounted number of small citizens’ groups in Western Europe and North America, by civil society groups from the former Yugoslavia itself, and others. But while activity at the level of states and intergovernmental organisations is reasonably well documented, this is not so much the case for the activities of international civil society.

Governments and international organisations as well as researchers on conflict transformation have increasingly acknowledged a role for various forms of ‘civil’ or ‘nonviolent’ intervention. However, comparatively little attention has been paid to the beginnings of this approach in response to the conflicts of former Yugoslavia. The response by civil society was unique in many ways: the humanitarian effort probably surpassed any earlier crises since World War II. But more importantly, many civil society organisations were not content with helping from afar but went to the countries of former Yugoslavia and began working there on the ground, with activities ranging from delivering the goods they had collected themselves to protective accompaniment of human rights activists, social work with displaced people, and training in nonviolence. And in addition, an embittered public debate on the right approaches and methods of ending the wars in former Yugoslavia characterised the discourse in that decade, with civil society groups arguing among each other as much as targeting their governments.
This introductory chapter seeks to provide a brief overview of the goals and scope of the study, the methodology used, and gives an overview over the chapters to follow.

1. Introduction

The basic goal of this study is to contribute to the understanding of conflict intervention in protracted violent conflicts, in particular the role played and approaches taken by civil society actors. The approach is an inductive and historical one. A very broad understanding of ‘intervention’ is used for this purpose: All kinds of activities by external actors that related to the violent conflicts in question are included, no matter whether or not the actors themselves saw them as conflict intervention, or whether they were pursued with the objective of influencing or solving the conflicts. In chapter 2 the concept of intervening actors will be further discussed. In my use of the term, actors from the area of Yugoslavia itself (so-called ‘embedded actors’) are considered to be ‘intervening actors’ if they assumed a quasi-third-party role.

1.1 Objectives

The study pursues four concrete objectives:

1.1.1 Objective 1) Assess Assumptions Regarding Conflict Intervention

The first goal is to test certain commonly-held assumptions regarding conflict intervention by civil society actors. These basic assumptions or hypotheses are:

1. Different actors have different instruments and strategies of conflict intervention available – not all can do the same, or with the same degree of effectiveness.


3 The rationale is that - as for example the discussion on “Do no harm” has shown – all activities undertaken in the context of a conflict are likely to have an impact on that conflict, no matter if intended or not (see Anderson 1999 and 2001b).
1. Introduction

1.b They have a very limited role in finding negotiated solutions at the governmental level (see the same references as in 1.a).

2. Different levels of society (top level, middle range, grassroots) require different instruments and strategies of intervention to deal effectively with the conflict (see Ropers 1999 and 2005).

3. Different stages of conflict escalation warrant different instruments and strategies of intervention – or the effectiveness of different methods varies depending on when they are used.

3.a The greater the escalation in a conflict, the more coercion /force is needed in order to intervene successfully (see Fisher 1993b, Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:21p, Fisher 2001, Paffenholz 2001:76 pp).

3.b Nonviolent peace building and development projects are only possible before a conflict escalates to war, and in the post-war period (see Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst 2003).

These assumptions and hypotheses have been tested against the facts observed regarding interventions by civil society actors in the former Yugoslavia, and are discussed in the conclusions of this study (chapter 9.2.1).

1.1.1.2 Objective 2) Suggest an Inclusive Framework for the Categorisation of Activities of Conflict Intervention

It will be asked if the three common categories of peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building indeed cover everything that external actors undertook in relation to the conflict in former Yugoslavia. The premise informing this objective was that if these categories proved to be comprehensive in their coverage, then it would confirm that this framework has utility not only as a prescriptive model (what should be done), but also as a model for the analysis of civil society interventions in other

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4 The German Development Service there categorically states that during war “no projects are possible”. See also Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse who provide some discussion of activities possible in war times (1999:128pp). This does of course not refer to humanitarian aid.

5 For these categories, see Galtung 1982 who first defined these three ‘peace strategies’ as follows:

   Keeping the opponents apart [peace-keeping], negotiating a political solution [peace-making] and finally, tying the adversaries into something that could be called a peace system [peace-building] (Galtung 1982:8, translation by CS).
violent conflicts. If, on the other hand, there were activities falling outside the three broad categories, this would raise the question of whether the model needed to include additional categories (see chapters 2 and 9).

1.1.1.3 Objective 3) Document and Analyse the Activities of Civil Society
As a historical study one objective of the research was to document the activities of civil society in relation to the conflicts in former Yugoslavia in order to fill the gap left by the focus on interventions by state actors that has been the prime focus of other researchers.

1.1.1.4 Objective 4) Develop an Inclusive List of Instruments of Conflict Intervention
As a by-product and presented in an appendix, this study has tentatively drawn up a list of instruments or methods of conflict intervention by state and by non-state actors that complements the well-known list of methods of nonviolent action published by Gene Sharp (1973).

1.1.2 Scope
The case study had to be limited both geographically and time-wise. Geographically it is limited to those countries which were (as republics or regions) part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between the end of World War II and 1991. 1988 was originally chosen as the starting date for the study in order to capture the early years of emerging conflict which eventually led to war. The intention was that by commencing the study at this point the ‘normality’ of the preceding period would highlight the escalation that followed. But in fact, 1990 became the start date of the study as little activity by governments or international civil society actors could be identified before that date. The same flexibility was followed regarding the end-date. The systematic survey ended with 2002, but in a few exceptional cases, when interesting projects had just begun around that date, the time-span was extended beyond that date.
1.2 Methodology

The researcher professes a special affinity to the research subject. By academic training, I am a social anthropologist, but I have spent most of my professional life working for different nonviolent or peace organisations. Throughout the 1990s I was involved - sometimes as volunteer, sometimes as staff person - in NGO work in the area. This involvement included *inter alia* organising nonviolence training programmes, co-initiating and co-leading an international volunteer project known as the ‘Balkan Peace Team’, and organising and participating in protests against military interventions by NATO. A number of activities and interventions described in this study I witnessed first-hand.

The bulk of the data collection for the study was undertaken over a two year period between autumn 2002 and winter 2004/2005, financed with a grant from the German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF). This phase of the research was concluded in June 2005 with a 60-page research report to the DSF. For this PhD study, the data collected on non-state actors were analysed in more detail.

1.2.1 Literature and Sources

There is a multitude of secondary literature which deals historically or analytically with the behaviour of the different international (state) actors that intervened in the conflicts of former Yugoslavia. However, most of these studies are more interested in the motivations and the political interaction between these actors than in the question of the impact of their different approaches to the conflict. There are only a few studies that seek to analyse different interventionary approaches to the conflicts in the Balkans (for example Sloan 1998), whilst those theoretical studies dealing with conflict intervention *per se* have merely drawn on the examples from the Balkans for illustrative purposes (for example Rupesinghe 1998).

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6 In reality, it took almost three years before the research report to the Foundation was submitted (Schweitzer 2005).

7 There has been no further publication from that research grant. Rather, the writing-up of the findings has happened with this thesis here.

8 They are too numerous to cite. Please see instead the references in the different sections of this thesis.
1. Introduction

Although the scientific output on conflict intervention in the last decade has been enormous, only a small fraction of this literature focuses on civil society approaches. There are only a few general studies on civil society conflict intervention into the former Yugoslavia: Large (n.d., c. 1997) on second-track intervention in former Yugoslavia, Schmitz (1998) on nonviolent interventions by the European peace movement, Scotto (2002) on NGOs in Mostar, and some books with collections of articles on different civil society activities, usually with a focus on civil peace services (deployment of civilian ‘conflict consultants’) and on Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo (e.g. Chagnon 1998, Evers (ed.) 2000, Fischer and Tumler 2000, Tullio (ed.) 2002, CDA-Collaborative of Learning Projects 2006, Fischer (ed.) 2007).

In addition, there have been a number of studies and evaluations of the work of individual NGOs: For example Fischer (2001 and 2007d) on the Centre for Nonviolent Action, Leatherman (1999), Neufeldt, McCann and Cilliers (2000) and Gagnon (2003) all on Catholic Relief Services, Schweitzer and Clark (2002) and Mueller (2004) on Balkan Peace Team, Fischer (2006b) on youth work in Tuzla.

Since the basis of the study was to obtain an overview of interventions and their impact over a period of about fifteen years, it has not been possible to use exclusively primary sources. The information on different state actors relies on secondary literature. Compilations of NGO addresses proved to be a valuable source for obtaining a preliminary overview of civil society activities (Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1994, 1995 and 1996, Pax Christi Nederland (ed) 1995, ICVA 2000, Cereghini and Sighele 2002, Tullio and Vertucci 2002). The sources upon which the study of civil society actors has been based included not only the studies and evaluations mentioned above but also the leaflets, booklets and other ephemeral or ‘grey literature’ produced by the organisations themselves. In some cases I had access to correspondence and minutes of meetings and other ‘in-house’ documents.

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9 Amazon gives the publication date as October 1997 for Large but in the version of the book used by me there is no date given.

10 Primary sources used have been biographies of diplomats, politicians and peace-keepers, interviews, documents like UN Security Council Resolutions, OSCE and EU reports, web-pages of EU, NATO, UN and several of their sub-organisations and their project reports, texts of official agreements, media reports.
This data was supplemented by a few interviews and information collected through participation at NGO meetings.¹¹

Country-wise, there emerged a clear focus on some countries from where I had most information: Germany first, France, Italy and the USA second, with Britain, Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries and some others coming third.

1.2.2 Research Steps and Methods Used

1.2.2.1 Collection and Codification of Data

The first step of the research was a survey of interventions in the area of former Yugoslavia between 1988 and 2002. For this purpose, information from the above-mentioned sources was collected, codified and categorised. Both primary sources like original documents and secondary literature were treated alike as sources for information at this stage. For this study information was collected about activities of around 50 state and international organisations and around 770 citizens’ groups and NGOs, mainly from Europe and the USA. Of these about 35 could be categorised as having an international character (INGOs). This list was far from exhaustive – in Germany alone one activist estimated that there were 1,700 such groups in 1994 (Vack 1996:14).

These categories were freely adapted from the codification method developed using the methodology of ‘grounded theory’. (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Strauss and Corbin 1998, Silverman 2001). This is a method of inductive analysis in which, instead of beginning with hypotheses which are tested, the researcher begins with a rather general formulation of what s/he wants to develop a theory about (the research subject). He or she then collects data – for example conducts qualitative interviews or gathers texts. Important here is that what constitutes secondary literature for other types of research can become a source to be analysed itself. The next step is the codification of the data. Data are transformed into concepts which entail a process akin to the translation of mere observation into interpretation. Strauss and Corbin give the example of watching a woman in a restaurant standing close to the kitchen

¹¹ This ‘ephemeral’ material is listed in the bibliography. If not otherwise indicated there, it is part of my collection of materials.
1. Introduction

and looking around. The researcher asks what she is doing and comes up with the answer “observing” – observing being the concept. These concepts then are put together in categories. These then can be analysed in regard to their frequency, intensity, duration etc. Having done this first step of coding – which can be done line by line or in a more summary manner, the researcher then asks certain basic questions in order to compare the data and thereby eventually arrive at hypotheses about their connections.

In this study, the methods of Grounded Theory have been adapted to meet the need to analyse a very large number of sources – literally thousands of pages. A line-by-line analysis was impossible, and has only been used for certain texts in order to identify strategies of civil society intervention. For the bulk of the materials, charts with a rather crude list of categories were created. These categories which constituted columns in large Word tables into which I then entered the data were:

- **Actor** (for example UN, Peace Initiative Town X)
- **Category of actor** (for example international organisation, NGO)
- **Instrument of intervention**: the concrete activity/activities the actor was engaged in. Leaving aside the question of purposes, impact of interventions and the actor using them for the later step of analysis of the data, I chose here a rather simple model based more on grammatical than conflict transformation related criteria: I sought to portray the activity found in the sources in a simple sentence describing an *activity*: Actor (*subject*) does or applies (*verb*) something (*object*). This *activity* is usually explained by the actor with a *reason* (mostly something that happened before), it is intended to fulfil one or several *purposes*, and applying the *object* leads to an *outcome* (intended or unintended). For example: “The UN (*subject*) sends (*verb*) multinational lightly armed forces (*object*) in order to separate the Croatian Army and the Serbian forces in Croatia (*intention*)”. I then formulated sentences which I could compare. For example: “Balkan Peace Team sends teams of volunteers to Serbia and Kosovo to facilitate dialogue”. “The EC sends civilian monitors to Croatia to monitor the ceasefire and the protection of civilians”. What they had in common was the “sending” of personnel, which thus became one of the initial headings in a long and open-coded list of concrete activities which was allowed to grow freely as I worked my way through the
texts. The eventual total number of types of activities in this first list was around 588.\textsuperscript{12}

The other categories in these tables were:

- Short summary of the activity
- Target area (town, region, country, area)
- Target groups, persons (for example refugees, women)
- Time, duration (date and duration of the activity)
- Reasons given by actor for intervention (this is the motivation and different from the intention. Usually it is based on what happened \textit{before} the action is taken)
- Context, situation
- Intention (What the actor wants to be the outcome of his action. This is what happens \textit{after} the action is taken.)
- Assumptions the actor has on the conflict
- Impact: What the source used says about impact
- Transactions with other interveners
- Sources (if one and the same activity was described by more than one source, they often were put into one and the same entry line)

This way, there was a table created for each year between 1988 and 2004, and there were extra tables for interventions by state and non-state actors which went on over a longer period of time.

Many thousands of activities were found, but the data did not lend itself to statistical evaluation. For example, units were “Y started doing X in 1992“, or ”Z giving a workshop in 1999“. These two do not compare with each other, because the latter was a single event, the former referred to an ongoing programme. Nevertheless, sometimes trends could be discerned based on the frequency with which certain...

\textsuperscript{12} These original headings have little to do with the categories of instruments formed in the next step. They were only an internal help for easier coding. Identified were the following: Military instruments / peace-keeping (74 activity types), Civilian peace-keeping/monitoring (15), Humanitarian aid (67), Diplomatic and political activities (39), Conflict mediation (31), Sanctions (18), Administration and democratic regime (47), Human rights (36), Reconstruction (18), Economic Activities (28), Protest/Appeals (32), Creating publicity (40), Peacebuilding (113), Research /Science (27), General/other (3).
activities appeared in the data. Such phenomena are examined in the chapters to follow.

1.2.2.2 (Re-)Categorisation of Data into ‘Grand Strategies’

The next step after the initial coding of the activities in these charts was their re-categorisation into broader and more comprehensive categories based on the triad of the ‘grand strategies’: peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building. For each of these broad categories I created a number of sub-categories. Furthermore, in addition to the three broad categories, I introduced a fourth covering activities that did not deal with the conflicts directly but targeted other interveners and the public in third countries, e.g. media reports, appeals and advocacy work with other external actors (see chapter 2.2.4 and 2.4.5).

As will be described in chapter 2, there are already a number of different categorisations of conflict intervention and in particular of peace-building. So the question may be asked: “Why yet another list of categories?” Indeed, when preparing the analysis of the sources on interventions in former Yugoslavia, I had hoped to make use of one of the existing categorisations and just apply it. But there have been three problems that in the end caused me to develop and use my own categorisation.

1. Some of the categorisations seem not to be based on any coherent criteria – rather, they compare ‘apples with pears’. Alger’s tool chest with “diplomacy” side by side with “feminist perspectives” is the best example of that (see Kille 2004).

2. Other lists (like the ones by Lewer and Rambotham 1993 or Lund 2001) reflect the common knowledge of practitioners involved in conflict transformation work. But they lack an empirical basis explaining why these distinctions and not others had been made. And the mere fact that the lists all differ from each other shows that there is no ‘natural’ categorisation suggesting itself almost automatically.

3. The inductive approach taken in the gathering of data made it necessary not to use lists based on assumptions that I wanted to research – like the relationship to the conflict stage, or the purpose or impact, or any combination of the three.
One important point needs to be addressed here: the distinctions between ‘activities’, ‘instruments’ and their purpose. ‘Activity’ refers to what an actor appears to have been doing, for example ‘conduct a trauma workshop’. The instrument used in such a case would probably be ‘trauma healing through group sessions’, and the purpose would most likely be to help war victims resume normal lives without being handicapped by trauma. The difference between instrument and purpose may be considered obvious (it certainly has been obvious for the military theoreticians writing on strategy), but in my experience equating the means with the purpose is still something that happens too often in discussions on conflict intervention. Thus dialogue meetings may serve as second-track diplomacy to find a solution to the matters at hand (peace-making), or to overcome prejudice and achieve eventual reconciliation (peace-building). International volunteers can be sent to provide protection to local activists (peace-keeping), or to work on one or another of the many different projects falling under peace-building, etc.

13 For example it can be noticed that none of the various categorisations of conflict interventions discussed below in chapter 2.2 lists an instrument twice for different purposes.

14 To illustrate the point of similar means having different strategic ends, military means are a good example since they were used in the case studied for a large range of different purposes. The following purposes can be listed under peace-keeping:

a) Surveillance of cease-fires and of the disarmament of soldiers, separation of forces, the protection of demilitarised zones and ‘safe zones’. These traditional peace-keeping tasks, undertaken by all peace-keeping missions in the region.

b) Armed protection of humanitarian aid.

c) To enforce certain behaviour on the ground, for example opening roads and protecting ethnic minorities, securing elections etc.

d) To protect international military and civilian personnel.

Under peace-making would fall the following:

e) To supervise sanctions.

f) To use bombing as a sanction/ punishment: Most of the air strikes by NATO that were requested by the UN before the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994 and 1995 had that character.

g) In its extreme case, air strikes were used to directly force a conflict party to lay down its arms and to agree to a ceasefire / peace treaty by destroying its (military) resources and by increasing the price for continuing the war. Examples are the bombings in the last months of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the NATO war on Yugoslavia in 1999.

h) The clandestine arms smuggling and the activities of mercenaries (both ‘real’ mercenaries coming by private initiative, and soldiers sent clandestinely by their governments) that happened in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia / Kosovo before and during the wars happened with the goal to influence the outcome of the conflict, and therefore would also fall under this category here.

And finally as peace-building has to be considered:

i) To provide humanitarian and reconstruction aid (in the periods after the conclusion of cease-
1.2.2.3 Writing-Up

In the process of writing up this study, I did not only use the material collected in the mentioned Word tables but went back to some original sources in order to be able to describe in more depth the activities of some of the projects.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

The first three chapters, including this introduction, are meant to lay the framework for the analysis: The second chapter of this thesis deals with core concepts relating to interventions in conflict zones: Terms like conflict, strategy etc. are defined, and concepts and categorisations of conflict intervention discussed.

The third chapter gives a short overview of the history of the geographical area studied, and reviews the different theories presented regarding the causes of the armed conflicts in the region.

The fourth chapter analyses interventions in the conflicts of the former Yugoslavia by state actors, including international organisations. The motivation for that chapter has been twofold. Firstly, the actions of civil society actors were in many ways related and woven into what the state actors did, and therefore their interventions could not be grasped outside of the context shaped by the international state community. Secondly, it would distort the overall picture of the events in the region in the decade studied if the focus on civil society actors resulted in under-emphasising what was in many ways the much heavier impact and influence of international organisations and governments.

The next four chapters then document and analyse the interventions by civil society actors, organised according to the framework of four categories mentioned above. The chapters on ‘peace-making’ and ‘peace-keeping’ are rather short compared to the chapters on ‘peace-building’ and on ‘information, support activities protest and advocacy’, but that only reflects the data available.

Having taken care of the documentation and analysis of the data (objective 3), the conclusions at the end of the study then take up the first two of the objectives

j) To arm and train local forces, for example the ‘Train and Equip Program’ the USA undertook in Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1995.
formulated: They discuss issues about intervention by civil society actors, and present a revised model or framework for categorising conflict interventions.

There are two appendices: A list of the methods of intervention identified (meeting objective 4), and some graphics on distribution of certain types of activities during and after wars.
2. Approaching Conflict Intervention: A Discussion of the Theoretical Basis

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss theoretical concepts and terminologies that relate to conflict intervention. Many of these concepts are contested, with different authors having very different understandings of what they mean. Therefore it is necessary to define how each of these terms is used here in this study. There is no claim implied that these definitions are the ‘right’ ones, and all the others are ‘wrong’. Definitions are just tools, and those definitions were picked or developed that best serve the purpose of this study.

The discussion of basic terminologies is followed by an overview over different categorisations of conflict intervention, and an explanation of the categorisation that I chose for this study. The last section of this chapter looks at the concept of intervening actors, so-called ‘third’ or ‘external’ parties in general, and on the plethora of ‘civil society actors’ in particular.

2.1 Basic Terminologies

2.1.1 Social Conflict and War

Conflicts may be categorised according to

- Different objects (e.g. resource-based conflicts, conflicts over governance and authority, ideological and identity conflicts, see Rupesinghe 1998:33pp),

- Visibility (latent or manifest conflicts),

- Characteristics of the conflict parties and their position and relationship to each other (e.g. individuals-groups, rulers-ruled),

- The ABC-triangle of Johan Galtung (1996:70pp) of A = Attitude or Assumptions, B = Behaviour and C = the Contradictions / Content of the conflict.

- Levels of escalation (see Glasl 1990 who distinguished nine stages and Fisher 1993a and 1993b who reduced Glasl’s stages to four main ones), and
2. Theoretical Basis

- The means used to carry the conflict out (violent – nonviolent etc.)

There are many definitions of social conflict. Space does not allow discussing them in detail. In this study, the term is used in the definition proposed by Friedrich Glasl, which has the advantage of being broad and neutral enough to allow an all-encompassing view of social conflict.

Social conflict is an interaction between actors (individuals, groups, organisations and so on), where at least one actor sees incompatibilities in the thinking/ imagination/ perception, and/or feeling, and/or wanting with another actor (other actors) in a way, that in the realisation there is impairment by another actor (the other actors). (Glasl 1994:14, translation CS)  

Conflicts become a special issue for attention when and if they are carried out by violent means. Peace researchers have reserved the term ‘war’ for violent conflicts that fulfil certain criteria. Usually there has to be a minimum number of casualties (1,000 per year or per conflict), and some kind of regular army and central organisation on at least one side of the conflict.  

Violent conflicts that do not fulfil these criteria are just called ‘armed conflicts’.  

2.1.2 On the Concept of Strategy

Terms like ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’ have spilled over from the military jargon not only to common language, but also to theoreticians of conflict transformation and

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15 "Sozialer Konflikt ist eine Interaktion zwischen Aktoren (Individuen, Gruppen, Organisationen usw.), wobei mindestens ein Aktor Unvereinbarkeiten im Denken/ Vorstellen/ Wahrnehmen und/oder Fuehlen und/oder wollen mit dem anderen Aktor (anderen Aktoren) in der Art erlebt, dass im Realisieren eine Beeinträchtigung durch einen anderen Aktor (die anderen Aktoren) erfolge." (Glasl 1994:14p). This is not very different from Fisher’s definition who calls conflict “a social situation involving perceived incompatibilities in goals or values between two or more parties, attempts by the parties to control each other, and antagonistic feelings by the parties toward each other.” (Fisher 1990:6)

16 Not in all definitions. The German AKUF (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung, www.akuf.de) for example does not use numbers of casualties as a criterion (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung 2000:60). See also Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:23 for an overview of different categorisations. Major organisations carrying out annual statistics include the PLOOM program at the University of Leiden/Netherlands, Wallensteen et. al. at Uppsala University, the "Military Balance" of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the German AKUF based in Hamburg, and the “Conflict Barometer” produced by the HIIS in Heidelberg.

17 Using that definition, the conflicts in Slovenia 1991 and Macedonia 2002 would not qualify as a war, and the conflict in Kosovo in summer 1998 be borderline. The other armed conflicts – Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the NATO war on Kosovo/Yugoslavia in 1999 were definitely wars.
intervention. Clausewitz, writing on military strategy, defined strategy as “the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war”, and tactics as “the use which is made of the armed forces in battle” (Clausewitz 1998:103, translation by CS).

The military historian Basil Liddell Hart criticised Clausewitz’s definition of strategy for narrowing its meaning to the battle-field, thus conveying the idea that battle is the only means to the strategic end. He distinguished three areas: policy, grand (or higher) strategy and strategy. Policy governs the object of war. The purpose of grand strategy is to coordinate and direct all the military, economic, moral and diplomatic resources toward the attainment of the political object of the war. Strategy is “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy”. Tactics then are the “dispositions or/and control of such direct action” (Liddell Hart 1967:321).

Clausewitz and Liddell Hart used the concept of strategy in a purely military context. One of the first authors to transfer the term to non-military contexts (in his case: nonviolent action) was Gene Sharp. He defined grand strategy, strategy and tactics without referring to its military origin:

Grand strategy is the broader conception which serves to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of the struggle group toward the attainment of the objectives of the conflict. Strategy, a more narrow term, is the broad plan of action for the overall struggle, including the development of an advantageous situation, the decision of when to fight, and the broad plan for utilising various specific actions in the general conflict. Tactics refers to plans for more limited conflicts within the selected strategic plan (Sharp 1973:493).

For the purpose of this study, the concept of strategy in the context of conflict intervention was used following Sharp’s definition.

18 Building on Sharp, Robert J. Burrowes in order to develop a strategy of nonviolent defence describes a comprehensive strategic theory, using elements from Clausewitz, Gandhi and the human needs/conflict theory. He points out – and that issue will be pursued further in the last chapter of this book – that “any strategy for dealing with conflict…is based, implicitly or explicitly, on a conception of conflict.” (Burrowes 1996:62). According to him strategic theory has three functions:

1. to explain the nature and causes of conflict in the international system and to identify the causes of conflict in a particular situation, 2. to identify the appropriate strategic aims for dealing with a particular conflict and to guide the formulation of a strategy to achieve those aims; and 3. to provide tactical guidance within the context of this strategy. (Burrowes 1996:125)

Jean-Marie Muller defined it more simply: “Strategy concerns the conception and execution which regulates and co-ordinates the different activities of an intervention; tactics concerns the conception and execution of each of these activities” (Muller 1999:4, translated by CS).
2.1.3 Different Terms for Handling Conflict

There is a confusing panel of generic terms describing approaches and methodologies of how to deal with conflict: conflict resolution, conflict settlement, conflict management, conflict regulation, conflict transformation, peace-building, Alternative Dispute Resolution and others.

Some distinguish a triad of conflict resolution, settlement and transformation. Here conflict resolution implies that "the deep-routed sources of conflict are addressed, and resolved". Conflict settlement then refers to the “reaching of an agreement between the parties which enables them to end an armed conflict. It puts to an end the violent stage of conflict behaviour.” And conflict transformation, a term usually ascribed to John Paul Lederach (1997) “implies a deep transformation in the parties and their relationships and in the situation that created the conflict” (all quotes from Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:21). In German the standard generic term is ‘Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung’ (‘civil conflict resolution’ -, though ‘resolution’ is not a good translation of what in German just means ‘working on conflict’). The ‘civil’ in this term has a threefold meaning: It may refer to a) anything which is not military-based (and thereby for example including international police forces), or b) to activities by civil society organisations alone (for example Mueller and Buettner 1996), or c) it may refer to efforts to ‘civilise’ a conflict, bringing it back to institutionalised and nonviolent forms of transformation (see Haller 2003).

2.1.4 Conflict Intervention

Intervention is a term with highly diverse definitions. At least three meanings can be distinguished:

In International Relations the term is usually reserved for cases where military action is taken against the will of the parties in conflict (see Debiel and Nuscheler 1996). It is usually used synonymously for ‘humanitarian intervention’. For example, the report The Responsibility to Protect defined humanitarian intervention as “coercive –

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19 Similar the Berghof Handbook (2001). For definitions of conflict resolution, see also Burton and Dukes 1990.

20 See Weller 2007 for a discussion on the history of the term ‘Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung’.
2. Theoretical Basis

and in particular military – action again another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state” (The Responsibility to Protect 2001:vii).

Others broaden conflict intervention to include other kinds of coercive action. Siani-Davies (2003:2-3) points out that those concerned with international law tend to see intervention as “improper interference by an outside power with the territorial integrity or political independence of a state”, measuring it against established norms of non-intervention. 21

Others made a distinction between coercive and non-coercive modes of intervention. Partly these broader usages stem from social psychology; partly they were developed by those wishing to include non-state actors who have no (or less) ‘sticks and carrots’, and distinguishing explicitly between coercive and non-coercive intervention (see e.g. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:11). 22

Burrowes writing about ‘cross-border nonviolent intervention’ classified intervention as follows:

1. Who? The intervention can be classified by the nature of the party that carries it out. ….

2. Why? The intervention can be classified by nature of its political impact. At one end of the spectrum, intervention might reinforce the

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21 See also Popovki (2003:42) and Weiss (1996:58) for comparative definitions.
22 To substantiate this point that may still present a minority point of view, at least in International Relations, several such definitions are quoted below.

Kelman and Warwick have defined already in 1978:

Social intervention is any act, planned or unplanned, that alters the characteristics of another individual or the pattern of relationships between individuals. The range of acts covered in this definition is intentionally broad. It includes such macro phenomena as national planning, military intervention in the affairs of other nations, population policy and technical assistance. It also applies to psychotherapy, sensitivity training, neighbourhood action programs, experiments done with human beings and other micro changes. (Quoted after Lewer and Ramsbotham 1993:26.)

Czempiel sees intervention as

any influencing a system of domination from the outside, no matter if that is done without violence or violently. (Czempiel 1994:402, translation by CS).

Matthies speaks of

intervention as a normative and practical approach of the politics of the international community to protect human rights and to contain and prevent wars and horrors of wars, using a broad spectrum of means and methods” (Matthies 1993:10, translation by CS).

Crocker writes:

The term ‘intervention’ is intended to convey the full range of methods and tools whereby a variety of external parties – for instance, the United States, other major powers, the United Nations, and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) – may become involved in attempts to cope with conflict. (Crocker 2001:229).
dominant social cosmology; at the other end, it might facilitate structural change and the creation of social cosmologies that satisfy human needs…

3. How? The intervention can be classified by the means used to conduct it. … Intervention might be military, economic, ideological, or nonviolent, although these means are not mutually exclusive (Burrowes 2000:47-48)

In this study the following definition of conflict intervention is proposed:

Conflict intervention refers to activities in relation to the conflict undertaken by actors who have not been direct parties to the conflict before its escalation began, irrespective of whether such measures take place with or without the agreement of the parties in conflict, and whether they are violent or nonviolent in nature.

In this study I have tried to avoid using the terms 'nonviolent intervention or civil intervention. The reasons are that on the one hand nonviolent instruments are also used by civilians working for state agencies, actors who are not the focus of this study. And on the other hand I was interested in all strategies that civil society agents may have used without getting into a debate on the nature of violence and nonviolence and which activities to include and which to exclude because they were not ‘truly nonviolent’. 24

Jonathan Goodhand (2001) made another distinction regarding this field that is often referred to. He pointed to the difference between work that is primarily intended to deal with conflict, and work that has other objectives, for example development cooperation and humanitarian aid, but which takes place in violent contexts. This led

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23 There are very few comprehensive articles or studies on nonviolent intervention in the broad understanding of intervention as I am using it. Most studies interested in nonviolent approaches of movements are dealing with issues in their own society, or of globalisation. Articles on nonviolent intervention focus usually on one particular approach or activity which I would define as ‘nonviolent peace-keeping’ (see Mueller and Buettner 1998, Moser and Puangsawan Weber 2000, Schweitzer et al. 2001, Hunter and Lakey 2003 and the bibliography by Carter, Clark and Randle 2006).

24 For example in earlier solidarity movements with Latin American countries international armed brigades were a rather well-known phenomenon.

In international relations as well as in part of the literature on conflict transformation, one finds the distinction between “hard” and “soft” power that has been introduced by Joseph Nye (2001). Both terms are mainly used by adherents of the so-called realist school of International Relations. By hard power they mean the power to command, to order or to enforce. The concept of ‘carrots and sticks’ is closely related to it. Soft power means the capacity to influence an actor by different, usually non material means. It is often linked to intervention by civil society actors. The intervener here seeks to convince the parties, not to force them, using symbolic resources like prestige and respect he may have (see Hampson 2001:297, Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:10 and 388pp, Nye 2001:354pp).
him to make the distinction between working on conflict, and working in conflict.\textsuperscript{25} Using the definition proposed here, both working in and on conflict is included. Intervention in this sense does not need to take place in the target country. In particular protest and advocacy work intended to make another actor take certain actions often takes place outside the target country. The campaigning by many citizens’ groups and NGOs in Western European countries and the USA for the lifting of the arms embargo and/or a military intervention in Bosnia in the early 1990s are examples for that.

2.2 Overview Over Different Categorisations of Conflict Intervention

2.2.1 ‘Tool Chests’ and Categorisations by Function

Some authors have been content to define lists of interventionary tools without making explicit which parameters or criteria they used to create them. The most expanded one is probably the ‘peacebuilder’s tool chest’ developed by Chadwick Alger. It includes 24 tools ranging from ‘diplomacy’ and ‘balance of power’ to ‘peace education’ and ‘feminist perspectives’, sorted in six vaguely historically defined sections. Other authors have subsequently followed his example adding even more tools to the ‘chest’. (see Kille 2004).

Other authors have developed categorisations that are based on the concepts and typologies used by practitioners. One example would be the peace-building categories suggested by the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, quoted by Llamazares and Reynolds Levy (2003:12) that includes 13 categories, starting with conflict resolution and early warning, and ending with training and policy development.\textsuperscript{26} Unlike the exhaustive listing of methods by Gene Sharp (1973) in a somewhat related but different field of nonviolent action, these are not lists of methods but of vaguely defined and sometimes inconsistent categories of methods. They often mix methods (for example “monitoring”), target groups (for example “youth”), and objectives (for example “peace work”). And while some

\textsuperscript{25} His third category is “working around conflict” what refers to the attempt to ignore the conflict or see it as a purely environmental factor.

categories are widely used (e.g. “human rights”, “media”), each author also names categories none of the others have.

2.2.2 Categorisations According to Conflict Stages

Some authors have linked intervention to conflict stages, and/or to the level of society at which it is targeted. Fisher (1990:235pp, 1993a:253pp), to give an example, linked particular modes of intervention to his four stages of conflict intervention.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992:12), the former Secretary General of the United Nations, suggested in his report Agenda for Peace four areas of action taken together offering ‘a coherent contribution towards securing peace’ in a sequential order. These were preventive diplomacy (including fact-finding, early warning, preventive

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27 To confuse the picture even more, there is a multitude of categorisations for the activities of mediation or negotiation. Here, not only almost every author chooses again his or her own list of terms, but the definition of some of these terms are outright contradictory. This is especially true for ‘mediation’. For some, the role of mediator describes a situation where the external party does only help those in conflict to find a solution, but without interfering by making proposals of his own or propagating specific solutions. Others would describe that as facilitation, and reserve mediation to cases where the external party gets rather actively involved. For still others, it is the generic term describing all kinds of such situations which leads to strange sentences like: “Mediation...is more interfering than other types of mediation” (Paffenholz 2001a:76).

Almost the only thing they have in common is the recognition of arbitration as a method of its own, and that most recognise a continuum between third-party negotiators who use considerable pressure to bring the parties in conflict to an agreement, and third-party negotiators who act as facilitators helping the parties in conflict to find their own solution.

28 Stage I (discussion/debate): The intervention in that stage he calls ‘conciliation’, “in which a trusted third-party provides a... communicative link between the antagonists for the purposes of identifying the issues, lowering tension and encouraging direct interaction, usually in the form of negotiation.”

Stage II (polarisation): The intervention is ‘consultation’, “in which the third-party works to facilitate creative problem-solving through communication and analysis, making use of human relations skills and social-scientific understanding of conflict etiology and dynamics.” Once the misperceptions and misunderstandings are cleared up, the parties can then may begin mediation in order to reach an agreement.

Stage III (segregation): Threats are being dealt with by arbitration, “wherein the third-party renders a binding judgment arrived at through consideration of the individual merits of the opposing positions and then imposes a settlement which is deemed to be fair and just”, or by mediation with muscle, “which encompasses pure mediation but also moves beyond it to include the use of leverage or coercion on the part of the mediator in the form of promised rewards or threatened punishments, and may also involve the third-party as monitor and guarantor of the agreement”.

Stage IV (destruction). The interventions here are first peace-keeping to control the violence, and then arbitration or mediation with muscle, or a direct step to consultation and development aid to reduce inequity (all quotes from Fisher 2001:15-17).
deployments, and demilitarised zones); peace-making (bring the hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means) that embraced mediation and also included services of the International Court of Justice and assistance through the different UN agencies and programmes, sanctions and the use of military force; peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building.  

There are two problems with the categorisation by stages if the intention is to use it as a means to sort activities found in a case study. One is that conflicts rarely develop in an ideal-typical way and different conflicts in different stage of development can often be found side by side. Another is that some of these categorisations include assumptions that this study would like to test, e.g. the relationship between escalation and the need for increasing force. For these reasons these models did not seem appropriate for the purpose of this study.

2.2.3 Multi-variant Models of Conflict Intervention

Reimann (2001) links main concepts of conflict management with three ‘tracks’ of actors, as well as with the presence or absence of coercion involved, and comes to four ideal-typical ways of dealing with conflict:

1. Conflict Settlement (track I, governments / international organisations): Official and coercive measures (e.g. sanctions, power mediation, peace enforcement)
2. Non-coercive measures: facilitation, negotiation/mediation, fact-finding missions, peace-keeping
3. Conflict resolution (track II, second-track diplomacy): non-official and non-coercive strategies (e.g. facilitation or problem-solving workshops).
4. Conflict Transformation: Wide ranging activities from track I (e.g. ‘power mediation’), track II (e.g. facilitation/consultation) and track III (grassroots’ level activities, e.g. psychological, trauma work, capacity building, development and humanitarian aid).

29 In the second edition of the Agenda for Peace Boutros-Ghali (1995) separated out the use of military force as peace enforcement.

30 Though she does not use the term ‘intervention’, all her methods of conflict management refer to the work of third parties.
One of the most complex pictures has been drawn by Ropers, Heinrich and Mueller. (See table 1 below) They combine conflict stages with Lederach’s (1997:38pp) three levels of leadership in society (top, middle-range and grassroots’ leadership) in an overview called Options for Conflict Transformation.\(^{31}\) It is probably one of the most complex and thorough models (though not easy to read) but like the other categorisations it lacks a solid empirical basis. For example, it will be shown later that there have been facilitation and ‘good offices’ at the top leadership level, and trauma work and care for war victims at grassroots’ level right in the middle of the wars in the former Yugoslavia.

Table 1) Options for Conflict Transformation

Another concept that aims at encompassing different approaches and strategies at different stages of conflict development has been presented by Volker Matthies

(2003). He speaks of “primary” prevention that are measures before a conflict has turned violent, “secondary” prevention meaning measures during war and “tertiary” prevention after the end of the war. The measures are further distinguished as to whether they seek to influence process (the actors), or structures and institutions in order to empower them to deal with problems and conflict in future. Key areas are security (including the so-called ‘DDR’ – demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of soldiers as well as security sector reform), the political system (rule of law, public services), the economic system (reconstruction and development as two issues here), and psychological dimensions (under which he not only places dealing with trauma but also what other authors would call community dialogue and networking).

2.2.4 The Three ‘Grand’ Strategies

Another way to categorize conflict intervention is to use the triad of peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building. Since the Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali published in 1992 the already mentioned Agenda for Peace, these terms have become well known. However, it was not Boutros-Ghali who invented these terms but Johan Galtung (Galtung 1976, reprinted in Galtung 1982) 20 years earlier who called them “approaches to peace”. Since then these terms have been refined by other authors such as the social anthropologist Stephen Ryan who speaks of “peace strategies” (Ryan 1995:102). Together, these three strategies formulate a general theory of achieving or maintaining peace. As Miall et al have written:

> With reference to the conflict triangle, it can be suggested that peace-making aims to change the attitudes of the main protagonists, peace-keeping lowers the level of destructive behaviour, and peace-building tries to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root of the conflict (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:22, referring to Galtung’s ABC triangle).

For both Galtung and Ryan these three strategies are seen as complementary, to be pursued at the same time. Peace-keeping without peace-making and peace-building would be very difficult because the violence might overwhelm the process, and any group wishing to sabotage a peace initiative would find it easy to provoke armed
clashes. If peace-building is ineffective, the decision-makers might lose the support of their communities, and if peace-making is ineffective, the perceived disagreement that caused the conflict will remain unresolved, and the probability that violence would restart would be high. (Ryan 1995:117 pp).

In this study these three types of intervention will be referred to as the ‘grand strategies’ of conflict intervention, and used as the basis for the categorisation of the findings, because they constitute the most adequate organising framework for categorising all the different interventionary activities identified within this study and describe different functions that serve well to distinguish activities. Below and in the conclusions I will however discuss some modifications of the framework that are suggested by an analysis of the data on interventions in the former Yugoslavia.

2.2.4.1 Peace-making

Stephen Ryan defined peace-making as being concerned “with the search for a negotiated resolution of the perceived conflicts of interests between the parties” (1995: 106). He distinguishes three main approaches to peace-making.

- The use of the law, such as when a conflict is taken to an international court whose rulings are considered binding for the parties in conflict, or when a conflict involving a minority group is addressed through the introduction of new laws aimed at protecting that minority.

- Negotiation which includes ‘track 1’ and ‘track 2’ approaches

- Violence or power, seeking to impose a solution on the parties (Ryan

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32 Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse speak of “moving towards settlement of armed conflict, where conflict parties are induced to reach agreement voluntarily” (1999:22). And the Berghof Handbook defined

Peace-making - Track I intervention consisting mainly of negotiation and mediation beginning after the outbreak of open conflict and aimed at moving towards the brokering of an end to the violent conflict. A process usually striving for a political settlement on the level of legitimate or de facto leaders. Usually result-oriented which may also seek to change the attitudes of the main protagonists. (The Berghof Handbook 2001:Vp)

33 Different categories of peace-making by negotiation have been discussed in footnote 27, p.38. For the different “tracks”, see below section 2.2.5.
2. Theoretical Basis

So peace-making is defined here as working as an external party towards a settlement of the conflict through either law, negotiation, or the exercise of violence and/or other forms of power.

2.2.4.2 Peace-keeping

Johan Galtung (1996:103) defined peace-keeping as efforts to “control the actors so that they at least stop destroying things, others, and themselves”.

Traditionally peace-keeping has been considered a task of the military and perhaps the police, best represented in its classical form by the UN ‘blue helmets’. However, it should be noted that there have also been a number of civilian peace-keeping missions by both state and civil society actors (see Schweitzer et al. 2001, chapter 2).

Authors who are mainly interested in nonviolent intervention have broadened the concept of peace-keeping to include other smaller-scale activities such as the unarmed accompaniment of human rights activists threatened by death squads. Schirch (1995:20-31) has called such activities intercessionary peace-keeping, a mode of intervention which maintains unequal distance between the parties and is appropriate for situations where the parties to a conflict are not easily spatially separated.

In this study, peace-keeping will be understood as the prevention of direct violence through influence or control of the behaviour of potential perpetrators.

2.2.4.3 Peace-building

Peace-building is the strategy that more than peace-keeping and peace-making includes normal citizens in the peace process. It “underpins the work of peace-

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34 Bercovitch makes a somewhat similar distinction but with four subcategories: a) violence and coercion, b) deterrence, c) adjudication, d) accommodation (e.g. bargaining and mediation), saying that “These four ways of managing conflicts correspond roughly to power-based approaches to conflict (violence and deterrence), rights-based approaches (adjudication), and interest-based approaches (accommodation).” (Bercovitch 2002:40)
making and peace-keeping by addressing structural issues and the long-term relationships between conflictants” (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:22).

The Berghof Institute writes that as a generic term it refers to

… all activities intent on building and promoting peace and overcoming violence. A long-term process that seeks to positively alter structural contradictions, improve relations between the conflict parties, and encourage overall constructive changes in attitudes. May also refer to activities connected with economic development, social justice, reconciliation, empowerment of disadvantaged/strategic groups, and humanitarian support. Applicable to all conflict stages, levels, and mainly to Tracks 2 and 3. (Berghof Handbook 2001:V)

If peace-building is limited to the functions of addressing a) structural issues and b) long-term relationships, it seems difficult to include some of the activities named above in the Berghof Handbook and/or identified in the survey for this study. Making sure that people have food or shelter, or that soldiers are disarmed, stands of course in a certain relationship to these functions but it seems stretching their meaning to say that, for example, sheltering refugees is firstly about improving relationships or dealing with structural issues.

A possible solution may be to borrow something that Ryan wrote about peace-building. He calls it “the strategy which most directly tries to reverse those destructive processes that accompany violence” (Ryan 1995:129). Relief and reconstruction definitely do that. Therefore, I suggest “reversing destructive processes” as an additional third function of peace-building, while taking the view that helping people to survive a war as a first step to reversing its destructive processes.35

*Peace-building in this study could then be re-defined as all those activities that are not either peace-making or peace-keeping but which address structural issues and relationships between the conflict parties or that otherwise seek to reverse the destructive processes of conflict and war.*

I suggest this wide definition in spite of the (well-founded) criticism that while peace-making and peace-keeping might be pretty clear-cut categories, to designate

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35 I am not the first to suggest including relief under peace-building. For example, the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (quoted by Llamazares and Reynolds Levy 2003:12) lists “humanitarian relief and emergency assistance, tackling basic needs (food, shelter, health, suffering)” under peace-building.
all activities that fall outside the parameters of peace-making and peace-keeping as peace-building means that such a category or grand strategy “is in danger of becoming meaningless” (Llamazares and Reynolds Levy 2003:11). Since in this study however the categories of peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building are used solely as a means of categorising the activities that external actors undertook in regard to former Yugoslavia, I decided to use the wider term and find meaningful subcategories to encompass different activities rather than expand the listing of grand categories/strategies.

Since peace-building is such a large category, I developed a list of nine subcategories to cover the different types of activities that can be subsumed under peace-building. Some of these categories are rather standard, like ‘DDR’ (‘disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration’), reconstruction, transitional justice or state-building and democratisation, but others may be less common: So I created for example an extra category of cultural activities (theatre, film, music events), and I did not use a category ‘reconciliation’ because this goal entered into so many different kinds of activities. The nine categories of peace-building distinguished in this study are the following:

1. Humanitarian Relief (during and after war, including material aid, sheltering and caring for refugees)
2. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants (DDR)
3. Reconstruction and refugee return

36 Their answer is to restrict the term to those activities that “promote positive peace”.  
37 The CDA- Collaborative Learning Projects (2006:10), facing the same dilemma of peace-building being a rather vague concept, chose another solution within the broad framework of addressing the causes of ongoing and future conflict: “Consequently, rather than supply a definition of peacebuilding, this research sought to identify and reflect on what people themselves – from UNMIK to NGOs to local community members – characterised as peacebuilding in the Kosovo context”  
38 As an objective, reconciliation is present in many different instruments, for example civil society building, dialogue promotion and social work.  
39 See Spear 2002. The reintegration part of ‘DDR’ overlaps with other categories because it can include economic support, vocational training or working on trauma. But since ‘DDR’ is a standard category for donors as well as in the literature on peace-building, I decided not to separate these three elements even though it would be more systematic in this context to rename this category here only ‘disarmament and demobilisation’ without ‘reintegration’.  
40 It must be seen however that the boundaries between humanitarian aid, reconstruction and development work tend to dissolve increasingly as the same organisations tend to engage in all three, and nowadays, as donors provide such budget lines, also adding programmes that explicitly
4. Social and psycho-social work
5. Economic recovery
6. Transitional justice and human rights documentation
7. State-building, democratisation and civil society support. This vast category includes support for the reform of juridical systems, police, educational systems, elections etc. as well as the multiple activities addressing civil society.\textsuperscript{41}
8. Promote peace skills and dialogue: Under this category I included all those activities that took place with the explicit goal of promoting peace and reconciliation, like nonviolence training or dialogue meetings. It is so-to-say ‘peace work pure’: Activities that pursue peace and reconciliation without linking this objective to activities of social work, aid or civil society support.
9. Cultural activities.

2.2.5 Possible Additions to the Three ‘Grand Strategies’

Having introduced the concept of the three ‘grand strategies’ of peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building the question however remains if they indeed cover everything that external actors have been found to undertake in regard to the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Before analysing what additional approaches the empirical data suggests, two additional concepts from the literature need mentioning – prevention and early warning.

2.2.5.1 Prevention and Early Warning

The three peace strategies are usually presented as strategies to be used after a conflict has escalated to violence, and many authors identify prevention as an approach of its own (Leatherman et al. 1999, Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse deal with conflict (see Adams and Bradbury 1995, Gass and van Dok 2000). Many speak of a ‘continuum’ of emergency relief - rehabilitation - development co-operation (similarly the phases the UN defined for Kosovo after the NATO war, with ‘consolidation’ as the third phase. See Llamazares and Reynolds Levy 2003).

\textsuperscript{41} The reason why state and non-state functions are being put in one category is that it is sometimes not easy to separate them. Not only are political parties while being a non-state actor a crucial factor in state-building, but also support for the educational systems tends to have both aspects (see chapter 7).
Nevertheless, when looking at the different activities undertaken with the objective of preventing a conflict from becoming violent, we find the instruments such as monitoring missions, convening international meetings, shuttle mediation, and even a military peace-keeping mission – none of them fundamentally different to what was done once violent conflict erupted. Preventing violence, finding a negotiated solution, and dealing with the relationships and structural issues are all elements of prevention, and therefore I would argue that the activities of prevention can be found in all three ‘grand strategies’ and do not consist a strategy of their own.

Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999:97) distinguish ‘light’ prevention which is aimed at preventing situations with a clear capacity for violence from degenerating into armed conflict, and ‘deep’ prevention: addressing the root causes, including underlying conflicts of interest and relationships. Lund (2004) also uses the term ‘deep’ prevention for the latter. Other terms are ‘structural’ (Carnegie Commission 1997) or ‘structural’ and ‘systemic’ prevention (Rubin 2002). ‘Systemic’ prevention refers to the ‘promotion of policies that counteract ways that global institutions promote or facilitate violence’ (Rubin 2002:131), for example in the field of global economics, and is not country-specific. ‘Deep’ or ‘structural’ prevention deals with a situation in a specific country or region before the spiral of escalation is put in motion, and the danger develops of mass atrocities being committed. Structural prevention may mean to deal with economic injustices and to ensure human rights and political participation of all levels of society and all minorities. International wars, the number of which has been greatly reduced in the last decades, can be prevented by traditional mechanisms like power balances, conventions on disarmament and cooperation, democratisation of all countries in question, or joint membership in international organisations. Burg and Shoup (1999:389) distinguish genuine preventive action that addresses the sources of conflict from early prevention in brespo nse to an outbreak of violence, aiming at stopping its escalation, and crisis intervention.

If a conflict has clearly begun to escalate, then what is needed is what the Carnegie Foundation and Rubin call ‘operational’ prevention – specific actions taken to confront an imminent crisis. Here there needs to be no doubt that a certain situation may be of relevance for R2P, because there is usually clear evidence that indicates the potential for such crimes. Instruments applicable by civil society actors in such contexts include second-track mediation, dialogue support, and advocacy for decisive action by the country in question and/or by the international community. Ackermann (2000:19,99) says that the approaches taken to prevent conflict can be found also in post-war situations, in what she calls post-conflict prevention: preventing the re-emergence of disputes by reintegrating and reconstructing the war-torn society.

Besides early warning as a much-discussed prerequisite, instruments may include confidence building, economic measures (sanctions, conditionality, economic dispute resolution mechanisms), and structural measures like development aid, support for transition to democracy and capacity-building, support of civil society, measures aiming at countering a ‘culture of violence’, prejudice-reduction and encounters between members of enemy groups, human right protection, and many things more. See Lund 1996, Berghof Handbook 2001, Paffenholz 2001b:22, Tullio and Vertucci 2002:299.
2. Theoretical Basis

2.2.5.2 Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement is a rather vague term, and is used to describe different approaches usually of the military kind. The term became broadly known when Boutros-Ghali (1995) used it in the second edition of his Agenda for Peace as an activity distinct from prevention, peace-making, peace-building and peace-keeping. It includes what elsewhere is called robust peacekeeping - the use of force to carry out the mandate - as well as ‘war to end war’ enterprises. The latter was the official legitimisation for the NATO bombing in Bosnia 1995 and the Kosovo/Yugoslavia war by NATO in 1999. The essence of peace enforcement is not so much the use of force per se, but rather the lack of consent by one or all of the parties in conflict to the intervention.

Peace enforcement operations range from low-level military missions to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance, to full-fledged enforcement action to roll back aggression. Undertaken under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, their defining characteristic is the lack of consent to some or the entire UN mandate. Militarily, these operations seek to deter, dissuade, or deny success to acts of aggressive force. By using collective force to preclude an outcome based on the use of force by the parties, the UN seeks to persuade the parties to settle the conflict by negotiation. (Doyle 1997:4)

But is peace enforcement really an approach or strategy of its own? Stephen Ryan (1995) considers ‘violence and power’ one of the three subcategories of peacemaking. In this sense, ‘peace enforcement’ as practised in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo belongs to the category of peace-making (see chapter 4) and is what Art and Cronin (2007) call ‘coercive diplomacy’. In other cases, it falls under military peace-keeping if it is mandated invoking chapter VII of the UN Charter, but in neither case it is a ‘grand strategy’ of its own.

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44 The question if there can be nonviolent ‘enforcement’ through direct nonviolent action, e.g. interpositioning of activists between the front of two warring parties, has been discussed in the literature on nonviolent intervention. Most authors studying interpositioning projects have come to the conclusion that it is not a promising strategy. See different contributions to Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber 2000, and Schweitzer et al. 2001, Chapter 2. It seems, however, that stopping a war is something different than preventing violence at a more local level – interpositioning, unarmed body-guarding and the like have proven very successful in the latter cases.

45 Also for the 2nd Iraq war in 1991. An early example may be the Korean War (1950-53).

46 The Berghof Handbook (2001:vi) defines peace enforcement broader as “diplomatic and military measures to stop a violent conflict and/or enforce a peace agreement; usually carried out by a third party military force to bring an end to armed hostilities in a conflict situation”.
2. Theoretical Basis

2.2.5.3 Information, Support to Other Actors, Protest and Advocacy

The activities that can be subsumed under peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building do not exhaust the list of activities that different actors undertook in regard to the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. What was not possible to place under them have been:

- Information – media outside of former Yugoslavia reporting on the conflicts, and ‘pure (academic) research’ studying them;
- Numerous activities of protest and advocacy by civil society groups targeting other intervening actors or the general public, seeking to inform them and/or to change their behaviour;
- Activities supporting intervening actors - applied research, funding, coordination and capacity-building of interveners.

All three have in common that they are not directly dealing with the parties in conflict like the three grand-strategies identified so far, but are ‘one step removed’, addressing those who intervene. It seems to me therefore better to consider targeting other intervening actors as a strategy of its own, though it is a strategy standing in an instrumental relationship to the other ones.

2.2.5.4 A Widened Framework for Categorising Conflict Intervention

To summarise what has been said so far:

- It has been suggested that ‘prevention’ and ‘peace enforcement’ are no ‘grand strategies’ of their own. Prevention is an objective requiring elements of all the three ‘grand strategies’. And ‘peace enforcement’ can be found as a means in both peace-making and peace-keeping.
- For the category of peace-building, it has been suggested to add “reversing destructive processes of war” as an additional third function in addition to addressing relationships and dealing with structural issues.
- As a strategy of its own, information, support to, and protest and advocacy targeting other interveners is added as a fourth one, although it stands in an instrumental relationship to the other three strategies.
After having analysed the different activities of civil society actors (and of state actors) in the following chapters, I will return in the conclusions (chapter 9) to this framework and present a model outlining its different characteristics.  

2.3 The Different Actors in Conflict Intervention  

2.3.1 The Relationship of Interveners to the Conflict  

Generally, actors in a conflict are all those individuals, groups and institutions that have some kind of relationship to the conflict, be it through:

- direct involvement as representatives of those who are perceived to be direct parties to the conflict,
- being affected by the conflict by being a member of one of the communities in war, or
- choosing to intervene in the conflict as what is usually considered an ‘external’ or ‘third’ party.

Of course, the distinction between internal and external actors is not altogether as clear as it seems at first glance. The case of former Yugoslavia shows clearly how quickly ‘external’ parties became factors in the complex relationship between the parties in conflict. Rather than being the ideal-typical ‘neutral’ party still depicted in some of the literature on conflict mediation, there are at least two factors at work that quickly tend to destroy this fiction of the neutrality of interveners:

1. Local actors take them into account in the pursuit of their goals and strategies, sometimes to the degree of seeking to manipulate them.

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47 The categorisation developed for this thesis I have since then used for another publication that gives a general and systematic overview over all the different approaches and strategies of non-violent conflict transformation (without special reference to the Balkans): see Schweitzer 2009.

48 See Ropers who defined: “Third parties may be either state or non-state institutions or individual persons or groups of persons who at least are not immediately involved in the conflict.” (Ropers 1996:417, translation CS).

49 Ropers calls the concept of a neutral third party an ‘ideal-typical figure’, referring to Max Weber’s term (see Ropers 1996:419).

50 There have been at least four different strategies how local actors sought to influence the so-called international community or individual external actors in the former Yugoslavia:

- Advocacy Work: The leaders of the secessionist republics quite early (in 1990) sought support from Western governments through diplomatic means and the sending of delegations. Croatia
2. External actors have motives for being involved, invariably pursuing their own interests at least to some degree.\textsuperscript{51}

Both factors have been amply recognised in the literature on conflict intervention, as Touval and Zartman have observed,

\begin{quote}
Initially, third parties are accepted as mediators only to the extent that they are seen as capable of bringing about acceptable outcomes; then, their subsequent meddling is tolerated because they are already part of the relationship. (Touval and Zartman 2001:432)
\end{quote}

For these reasons, some authors have suggested that the relationship of external parties to a conflict should rather be thought of as a continuum or as an onion with different layers. In its core are fully internal actors (core parties). In the next layer there are active influential and marginal parties, and at the outer border are very few almost uninvolved, purely external ones:

\begin{itemize}
\item Even hired the Washington-based PR firm Ruder Finn Global Public Affairs for US$10,000/month plus expenses to present a “positive Croatian image” to members of Congress, administration officials and news media (Sremac 1999:71, 110).
\item Using supporters (mainly from the diaspora, but also parts of the human rights and peace movements) to promote issues in certain Western countries: Especially Croats and Bosnians have had a lot of support for their claims and suggestions in the West, expressed by demonstrations, press releases and other media work, as well as by advocacy work with politicians.
\item Not proven though often speculated about is the issue of certain military incidents (like the grenade attacks on a market in Sarajevo, or attacks on hospitals in Croatia) having been consciously provoked or even staged in order to provoke a stronger military reaction by the international community. (Generally commenting on it are e.g. Schwegmann 2003:185 and Calic 1996:181. General MacKenzie (1993:99) doubts that the Bosnian Serbian Army was to blame for the so-called breadline massacre in 1993.)
\item Threatening interveners: When NATO in support of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping troops began bombing military installations of the Bosnian Serbs, they responded in November 1994 and again in May 1995 by taking UN soldiers as hostages, and demanding the end of the attacks. (This has been described in many sources. See for example Meder and Reimann 1996:20, Krech 1997.)
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{51} This has been much reflected in the literature on international intervention. See Woodward 1995, Gow 1997, Burg and Shoup 1999, Carpenter (ed.) 2000, Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000 and many others.
In the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, just to give an example, there were at least three major internal parties: the political-military organisations of the Muslims/Bosnians, the Croats and the Serbs. The two neighbouring countries FR Yugoslavia and Croatia formed a second circle around those, and then as a third circle there was the international community with its different organisations (see Ducasse-Rogier 2003:34).

‘Embedded’ actors in this model are those who are ‘internal’ but who seek to adopt a non-partisan stance in relation to a conflict of which they do not consider themselves to be a party. An example would be those individuals, groups and agencies who sought to de-escalate violence or work for reconciliation between ethnic and religious groups in the midst of violence. In the former Yugoslavia there have been some such groups formed in the early 1990s in each republic. Many of them widened the range of their activities from their country to those of the neighbouring countries – e.g. groups from Belgrade working in the Serbian-controlled parts of Croatia, a trainers’ group based both in Sarajevo and Belgrade, or Croatian human rights activists supporting groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see chapters 5 and 7 for some examples of such ‘embedded groups’).
2.3.2 Categories of External Actors

External parties are often categorised into governments and international organisations on the one side (track 1) and all the others on the other (track 2).\footnote{According to Lewer (1999), the term ‘Track Two Diplomacy’ was first coined in 1981 by Davidson and Montville”. See below 2.3.2 for a discussion of the concept of ‘tracks’.}

Other authors introduced a track 3 to refer to actors at the grassroots level, or all those

\begin{quote}
process- and structure-oriented initiatives undertaken by actors involved in grassroots training/capacity building and empowerment, trauma work, human rights and development work, and humanitarian assistance. (Reimann 2001:4-5).
\end{quote}

However, even three tracks do not adequately cover all the very different roles performed by non-state actors in particular. The former Ambassador John McDonald observed that “the designation of Track Two could no longer hold the variety, scope and depth of all the different kinds of citizen involvement” (Diamond and McDonald 1991:3). He came up with the term ‘multi-track diplomacy’, distinguishing originally five different ‘tracks’, which with Louise Diamond was expanded to nine.\footnote{These nine tracks are: governmental; professional conflict resolution; business; private citizen; research, training and education; activism; religious; funding; and public opinion.}

I have drawn on this model for my own categorisation of external actors which seemed a better fit for the case under study. The first distinction needs to be made between two main types of actors: state and non-state, but with a grey middle area. State actors fall into four main subtypes:

1. International organisations (defined with Willetts (1997:303) as “any institution with formal procedures and formal membership from three or more countries”) like the United Nations, the European Community or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)\footnote{The OSCE was called Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) until 1994. The former Polish President Tadeusz Mazowiecki was the first Special Envoy (see for example Mazowiecki 1995). He stepped down in 1995 and was replaced by Elisabeth Rehn, who in turn was followed by Jiri Dienstbier (Benedek 2001:210p).},

2. Individual states acting on their own or within a group of states,

3. Sub-state entities like municipalities, districts or states within a federative nation (like the German bundeslaender), and
4. State-run agencies, institutions and foundations.\textsuperscript{55}

Between state and civil society there are institutions and organisations that are closely linked to a state. These could be state-run media, different types of cooperation between state and nonstate entities (an example would be foundations in which governmental as well as civil society organisations are jointly forming a board), political parties and so-called Quangos – organisations that are formally non-governmental but heavily dependent on state structures.

Non-state actors could be categorised in two different ways, regarding their scope or their type.\textsuperscript{56} For the scope, there are local, national and transnational or international actors. As to different types, again as is the case with other categorisations presented in this chapter, there is no generally recognised list of types of non-state actors that all authors would refer to.\textsuperscript{57} For the purposes of this study, the categories shown in the following table seemed to serve best: Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs)\textsuperscript{58}, citizens’ Groups / Community-based organisations\textsuperscript{59}, traditional governmental structures, e.g. Councils of Elders, religious or faith-based organisations with an

\textsuperscript{55} For example the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency SIDA or Canadian International Development Agency CIDA.

\textsuperscript{56} Fischer (2006:4) argues out that the term ‘non-state actor’ “reflects the assumptions of realism theories which assert that interactions between states are the central relationships of interest in studying international policy.” However, when the term is used here it is merely done so for practical reason, as a category describing in fact everybody who is not ‘state’, but without the underlying assumption about the relative value of state and non-state actors that she is reading into the term.

\textsuperscript{57} Just to give one more example for such lists to compare with Diamond and McDonald: Barnes (2005:8) distinguishes three main types of organisations: Nongovernmental organisations, voluntary charities and community-based organisations, and a number of ‘secondary’ groups: Political parties and movements, Business Associations, Trade Unions and Professional Bodies, Cooperatives and SelfHelf Initiatives, Private Foudnations and Philanthropy, Media: State and Non-Profit, Educational and Research Institutes, Arts collectives and Cultural Associations, Religious Institutions and Faith-Based Organisations, Traditional Structures and Councils of Elders, Youth Unions and Student Organisations, Women’s Groups and Associations, Social, Environmental, and Human Rights Movements, Political Parties and Movements.

\textsuperscript{58} Understood with Anderson as

privately organised and privately financed agencies, formed to perform some philanthropic or other worthwhile task in relation to a need that the organisers feel is not adequately addressed by public, governmental, or UN efforts (Anderson 2001:638).

\textsuperscript{59} The distinction between citizens’ groups and NGOs is a rather fluid one. One criteria which may at least work for Europe is the question of registration as a non-profit or charitable organisation, and the degree of formality of their association.

Another related term sometimes found in the literature is ‘social movement organisation’. Such organisations are the structural basis for social movements. They may be associations, citizens’ committees, church institutions etc. See Janett 1997:146.
explicit religious background or mandate\textsuperscript{60}, cultural institutions, private media, trade unions and professional organisations, private research institutions, private donors, diaspora groups and individuals\textsuperscript{61}. A non-state actor usually not counted as part of civil society is business.\textsuperscript{62}

The types of intervening actors are presented on the next page in tabular form:

\textsuperscript{60} Religion-based actor is the term that Weingardt (2007) is using.

\textsuperscript{61} Individuals acting on their own are usually missing from lists of non-state or civil society actors. However, they played an important enough role in the area of former Yugoslavia to deserve a category of their own.

\textsuperscript{62} On the role business could play in conflict transformation, see Haufler 2001.
### Table 3) Intervening Actors

![Intervening Actors Diagram]

© Christine Schweitzer 2009
This study here is dealing with what is termed ‘civil society actors’. For that reason, the concepts of civil society and how it relates to ‘non-state actors’ in general needs special mention. ‘Civil society’ is a term which is defined differently by different authors. I won’t discuss the different concepts because that is not of real relevance for this study here. Instead, I would like to refer to Barnes and her definition that in my eyes reflects well what many authors agree on civil society:

Most broadly understood, ... civil society refers to the web of social relations that exist in the space between the state, the market (activities with the aim of extracting profit), and the private life of families and individuals (Barnes 2005:7).

Using this definition as a basis, it means that non-state actors and civil society actors overlap a lot, but that there is one type of non-state actor listed above that does not meet the definition of civil society actor, namely business.

2.4 Conclusions

Studying the full picture of conflict intervention rather than just its diplomatic side has only begun in the last 15 or 20 years. Today there are many studies seeking to lay a theoretical basis, as well as case studies on certain conflicts. Most of them have been published since the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that many of the interventions at least in these early years of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia took place without being able to make use of this research and theoretical groundwork. However, there is still no model shared by all theoreticians and practitioners alike on what conflict intervention in total entails, what the methods and strategies are and how they can be categorised. Empirical studies surveying different practices have only been undertaken for single fields, for example media support, or single periods and places.

This chapter has aimed at laying the groundwork for the different concepts and terminologies used. In the first step, social conflict, war, strategy, different terms of handling conflict and conflict intervention were defined.

Going through different categorisations of conflict intervention, in the end it has been suggested for this study to use a categorisation with the ‘grand strategies’ of peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building plus ‘information, support, protest and
advocacy’ added as the basic categories. The aim of peace-making is to help achieving a settlement of the conflict, peace-keeping seeks to control, prevent or reduce violence and peace-building attempts to address the destructive effects of war and the structural issues and relationships that drove the conflict. ‘Information, support, protest and advocacy’ address other intervening actors or the general public abroad, and therefore stand in an instrumental relationship to the first three strategies.

A third topic has been the different actors in conflict intervention. The first was the issue of the relationship of so-called ‘third’ or ‘external’ parties in general where it was concluded that the existence of such parties is to some degree a fiction because actors involving themselves in a conflict become part of the conflict whatever they might wish. As regards the categorisation of intervening actors, the organising framework adopted consists of two main categories of state and non-state actors, each with a number of sub-categories.
3. On the History of the Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia

Today there are seven formally independent states on the territory of what had been Yugoslavia until the end of 1991. Since it is by now almost 20 years that the wars in former Yugoslavia began, it seems advisable to give a historic overview to be able to mention situations and events in later chapters without having to explain then in detail the context. Therefore, this chapter gives a short introduction on the basic facts and figures of Yugoslavia, and then goes through the history of the conflicts country by country.

3.1 Yugoslavia until 1991

John R. Lampe (2000), a well-known historian, subtitiled his book on the history of Yugoslavia *Twice there was a country*. In fact, there is hardly a better way of describing the history of ‘Jugo-Slavia’ which means ‘South Slavia’. Yugoslavia (to use the English spelling) made a relatively recent appearance on the world map. The first state that united the South Slav peoples under one government was founded in 1918 as the ‘Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes’, later renamed the ‘Kingdom of Yugoslavia’, which ended with the German occupation in 1941. The second, the ‘Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia’ (‘Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia’ until 1963) was founded in 1945/46 and ended in January 1992. The last remnant with the name Yugoslavia, the ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ which consisted of only two of Yugoslavia’s former republics, Serbia and Montenegro, had a little noticed end in 2002 when it was renamed ‘Serbia and Montenegro’.

The socialist Yugoslavia, inhabited in 1990 by around 23.5 million people, consisted of six republics: Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia. After 1974, two autonomous areas within Serbia (Vojvodina in the North with a large number of Hungarians, and Kosovo in the South with up to 85% - 90% of Albanians) had a status which almost resembled those of the five republics. Its six

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63 The sources for the events described in this chapter are not annotated case by case when it was assumed that the events are undisputed, common knowledge. For an overview over the history of Yugoslavia, see especially Lampe 2000 and the literature quoted in chapter 4.

64 In 2006, these two parted company as well.
main peoples were Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Muslims and Macedonians. Three main religious orientations (Islam, Orthodox and Catholic), two scripts (Latin and Cyrillic), at least three undoubtedly different Slavic languages (Macedonian, Slovene and the different dialects or languages that after 1945 were subsumed under ‘Serbo-Croatian’), plus Albanian and Hungarian as languages with a completely different linguistic heritage, and a sharp city-countryside divide were other distinctive features of what was a very multi-cultural country. None of the republics were mono-ethnic before the war. Most mixed was Bosnia-Herzegovina where no ethnic group – neither Muslim, Serbs nor Croats - constituted an absolute majority.

Table 4) Map of Yugoslavia 1990

Yugoslavia in 1990, with the borders of Kosovo that is today an independent country emphasised.

Map courtesy of www.theodora.com/maps, used with permission.

65 This is not the place to enter the discussion if Serbian, Montenegrian, Croatian and Bosnian are distinct languages or just dialects. At least formally linguists tended to categorise them as the latter, but with political independence not only each country insists on its language being considered a language of its own, but also differences between them were strengthened, for instance by introduction of archaic words. Clearly different languages of their own are Slovenian, Macedonian and Albanian – the latter not being a Slavic language.

66 In Bosnia-Herzegovina lived in 1991 c. 44 % Muslims, 31 % Serbs and 17 % Croats, ‘Yugoslavs’ and ‘others’ being less than 8 %. (Lampe 2000:337)
1986 can probably be considered the year when the fundamental political changes in Yugoslavia began which eventually led to its dissolution. Tito had died in 1980 and six years later new political leaders came to power in the Communist Party in most republics.\(^{67}\) From the beginning, this change had two interwoven faces: democratisation and nationalism.\(^{68}\) Youth protests, nationalistic demonstrations and a strike of Albanian miners in Kosovo characterised these years. In March 1989 the Serbian constitution was amended and both Kosovo and Vojvodina lost their status as autonomous regions.

In 1990 all republics held elections for the republican leadership which were the first multi-party elections. In Croatia and Slovenia those parties or coalitions won that stood for autonomy or secession from Yugoslavia, and referenda soon after confirmed the wish for independence from Belgrade.

### 3.2 The Beginning of the End: the Wars in Slovenia and Croatia and Their Aftermaths

The conflict finally escalated to violence right after the declarations of independence of Slovenia on 25 June 1991 and of Croatia one day later. The government in Belgrade tried to prevent the secession of Slovenia by having the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA) secure Slovenia’s international borders. But the Slovene leadership, which had managed to build up some kind of army mainly using the weapons stored in Slovenia for the Territorial Defence, confronted the JNA. Thanks to successful mediation by the European Community (EC), a cease-fire was negotiated at Brioni on the 7th July, and in a later Brioni Agreement of 3rd August, it was agreed that the declarations of sovereignty be suspended for three months.

There has been some speculation why this ten-day conflict was so short and relatively ‘un-bloody’ compared to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. The commonly held view is that Belgrade decided to let Slovenia go because it was considered to be the main trouble-maker in the Federation, and the fact that there was no Serbian

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\(^{67}\) The later Presidents of Serbia and Slovenia, Milosevic and Kucan, were two of them.

\(^{68}\) Before 1986, ethnic tensions had broken out in Yugoslavia already more than once. In the 1950 protests in Kosovo were brutally suppressed by the Serbian police. In Croatia there was some kind of nationally-motivated unrest in 1971-72, the so-called ‘Croatian Spring’ that triggered the reform of the constitution in 1974.
minority in Slovenia worth mentioning probably eased that decision. Lord Owen, who served as a negotiator for the EC between 1992 and 1994, has posited that there was a deal between the Slovenian leadership and Belgrade that Slovenia would stay neutral in the dispute between Serbs and Croats if it were allowed to secede from Yugoslavia (see Owen 1995:34).  

But while the JNA eventually withdrew from Slovenia on 19 July, a few days later local fighting between Croats and Serbs in Croatia escalated. The JNA soon began fighting on the side of the Serbs instead of, as it seemed initially, trying to stop the violence. Those areas in Croatia where a considerable Serbian population (not always the majority) lived were quickly brought under control of the JNA and local Serbian militias. Croats living in Eastern Slavonia and Krajina had to flee, whole villages were raided and destroyed. After the fall of the town of Vukovar in Eastern Slavonia, borders between Croatian-controlled and Serbian-controlled areas were established, and a military stalemate was achieved.

From the international side, in 1991 the European Community was the first to lead negotiations but was unable to bring about any lasting agreements. In November a UN envoy, Cyrus Vance, succeeded in getting the parties agree to a cease-fire, and by the end of November 1991 the JNA finally withdrew from Croatia after the Croatian army lifted its blockade of the JNA barracks. The cease-fire was finally signed on 2 January 1992, and the UN sent peace-keeping forces (UNPROFOR) to Croatia to monitor the Serbian-controlled parts that proclaimed themselves in 1992 as Serbian Republic of Krajina.

Already by November 1991, the break-up of Yugoslavia seemed irreversible. An arbitration commission known as the Badinter Commission was established by the

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Slovenia after recognition managed to keep apart from most of the conflicts in the countries with which it once had shared a state, aside from receiving large numbers of refugees, and some minor disputes with Italy regarding the Italian community in Slovenia. Slovenia joined NATO in March 2004, and on 1\textsuperscript{st} of May 2004 became a member of the EU.

The role of JNA in the secession process is a matter of debate. The JNA was always a powerful institution in Yugoslavia. Was it now the arm of Serb nationalists, as many in the Western former Yugoslav countries now maintain, pointing at the number of high officers who were of Serbian ethnicity (and overlooking that in the navy Croats dominated, and in the air force Slovenes)? Or did it until autumn 1991 seek to maintain a socialist Yugoslavia, being a neutral buffer between Serbs and Croats until September 1991 when the army more or less broke apart on ethnic lines - mostly Serbian and Montenegrin officers remaining, while most others deserted to join the new armies of their republic? See Woodward 1995:257. The EC mostly accepted the Croat and Slovenian interpretation of the JNA being a Serb army and an occupation force.
EC to collect and decide upon applications for independence from former Yugoslav
republics. It declared Yugoslavia to be in state of dissolution, but even before it made
its final report that recommended the recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and
Macedonia, and asked Bosnia-Herzegovina to conduct a referendum on its future
status, the EC had decided to recognise Slovenia and Croatia.\footnote{With Germany (and Austria) pushing the recognition of these two Catholic republics.
Macedonia was not recognised because of a veto by Greece which suspected Macedonia of having
claims on its territory.}

Unhappy and dissatisfied at the failure of the UN to take steps towards demilitarising
and re-integrating Krajina, in May 1995 Croatia reoccupied the Serbian-controlled
part of Western Slavonia in the so-called ‘Operation Flash’, and two months later in
a second operation (‘Storm’) the other parts of Krajina (with the exception of Eastern
Slavonia) were also reoccupied.\footnote{Correctly: Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, the UN-Protected Area East.}
The majority of the Serb inhabitants of Krajina, around 200,000 (US Committee for Refugees 2001), including many who had come
earlier as refugees from Bosnia, fled to Serbia or neighbouring Serbian-held parts of
Bosnia.\footnote{Other sources speak of 300,000 refugees.}

Thanks to international mediation, there was no third offensive directed at Eastern
Slavonia. The Erdut agreement of November 1995 agreed that the territory be
reintegrated into Croatia after a two-year period of transitional administration by the
UN (UNTAES mission). UNTAES worked out well and the area came back to
Croatia in January 1998.

After 1990, Croatia was ruled by one national and rather authoritarian party, the
HDZ. Following the death of President Tudjman in December 1999, the power
balance in Croatia shifted, and the next elections brought a Social-Democrat-led
coalition to power\footnote{Dvornik and Solioz (2007:15) distinguish four distinct phases of the transition process in Croatia:
a transitional period (1991 - 1995), a period of authoritarian nationalism and economic recovery
consolidation and EU integration (2001-2007).}

In 2000, Croatia became a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace, and began
negotiations with the EU on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement which was
then signed in October 2001. At the time of writing (2009) Croatia has joined NATO
but the application for membership with the EU is still being processed.
The armed conflict in Slovenia had relatively few casualties – official statistics speak of 19 dead on the Slovenian side and 44 dead from the Yugoslav army. For Croatia, there are no reliable casualty figures because these figures are usually presented together with the casualties in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see below 3.3). The Croatian government in 1995 gave the figure of around 9,000 dead plus almost 3,000 missing people. Between 1991 and 1995, between 300,000 and 350,000 ethnic Serbs left Croatia (mostly to FR Yugoslavia or to the Serb-controlled areas such as Krajina), whilst approximately 220,000 ethnic Croats were internally displaced from the Krajina, mostly going to government-held areas or in smaller numbers to the Croatian-dominated parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within the period of ten years after the war, almost all Croats were able to return, while more than 110,000 ethnic Serbs were still waiting (Klincov n.d., Mikic 2003).

### 3.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina: No Time for Real Independence

In Bosnia-Herzegovina the referendum on independence demanded by the EC took place on 1st March 1992, and on 3rd March Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence, against the will of most of its Serb population. It was recognised on 6 April by the EU and the USA – two days later the war began.

In the first phase of the war until end of August 1992, the Bosnian Serbs brought almost two thirds of the territory under their control – almost all of eastern Bosnia, a northern corridor, eastern Herzegovina and the Bosnian Krajina. 750,000 people were displaced within one month. A quickly-founded Serbian Republic announced in May the establishment of a government of its own led by President Karadjic, and the founding of its own army under General Mladic.

In the second phase in autumn and winter 1992/93, there was a consolidation of the territories controlled by each side, and some counter-offensives by the Bosnian army regained Serb-held areas around Srebrenica and Tuzla. Fighting occurred mainly

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75 Fischer 2007a:x confirms the unclarity.

76 Unknown to the public at that time, in early 1991 or perhaps even already in July 1990 Milosevic and Tudjman met several times and discussed the partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina between their two countries. That they had had secret meetings, the most famous at Karadjordjevo in March became known when Tudjman gave an interview to the London Times in July 1991. See Woodward 1995:172, Silber and Little 1996, Burg and Shoup 1999:82, du Pont 2002:234.

77 Locally-based violence had already started in some areas in 1991.
where borders differed from the cantonisation plans proposed by the international mediators.

The third phase was the time of a second parallel war in Bosnia between the formerly allied Croats and Muslims when the Bosnian Croats (supported by Croatia) aimed at portioning out a territory of their own. This war began in April 1993, although there had been armed clashes as early as May 1992. In August 1993, the Bosnian Croats proclaimed a ‘Croatian Republic Herceg-Bosna’, with Mostar as its capital. The Serbs in that phase retook most of the territory which they had lost during the winter, even co-operating with the Croatian army from time to time. In December 1993, a ‘Christmas Truce’ was concluded but did not hold long.

The fourth period began when in February/March 1994 the USA managed to mediate a cease-fire between Croats and Muslims. The so-called ‘Washington Agreement’ also put Mostar under EU administration. Some fighting between the re-allied Muslims and Croats and the Serbs during 1994 ended with another cease-fire mediated by elder statesman Jimmy Carter at the end of 1994. At the same time, the relationship between the Bosnian-Serb leadership and Belgrade changed. With the closing of Serbia’s borders to Bosnia-Herzegovina in autumn 1994 it became clear that some kind of split had occurred though it is contested how serious it was (see Ripley 1999:35).

The fifth and last period began in May 1995 after the break-down of the cease-fire. First the Serbs sought to eliminate all Muslim enclaves, the so-called ‘UN-protected zones’ that UNPROFOR had established under their humanitarian mandate in Bosnia since summer 1992. The Serb forces succeeded in occupying two of them, killing or displacing most of their Muslim inhabitants. This led to increased engagement by NATO that had arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina earlier to supervise the arms embargo and no-fly zone that the UN had established. A bombing campaign on Serbian troops and installations was intended to seriously impair the military capacity of the Serbian side. In September 1995 the new Bosnia-Herzegovina coalition government representing Muslim and Croat forces managed to supply themselves with modern arms in spite of the official arms embargo, and started an offensive against Serb troops mainly in the Western parts of Bosnia.
The war ended after months of shuttle mediation led by US envoy Holbrooke with the Dayton Agreement which was signed in December 1995. This placed Bosnia-Herzegovina under international administration secured by NATO-led peace-keeping forces.\(^{78}\)

The exact total number of casualties in this period is unknown. Estimates of the number of casualties in Bosnia-Herzegovina range between 145,000 and 280,000, of which over two thirds were civilians (see Krech 1997:100, Rathfelder 1998:214, Burg and Shoup 1999:169pp, Lampe 2000:365pp, Schnecener 2003:43, Gromes 2007:143).\(^{79}\) The Croat-Muslim war is estimated to have cost more than 20,000 victims. Around 1.2 million became refugees, around 1 million were internally displaced – together this amounted to around 60% of the pre-war population - many never to return to their homes (Cousens and Cater 2001:25, quoting World Bank and UNHCR). In total more than 3 million people are assumed to have become either IDPs or refugees (Lampe 2000:366).\(^{80}\)

With the Dayton Agreement the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina were ended. The international community took over the government and administration of the country, and the Office of the High Commissioner (OHR) for many years became the real government (see chapter 4). Bosnia-Herzegovina today consists of two entities – the Federation with Croats and Muslims as its constituent peoples, and the Serbian Republic (Republika Srpska-RS). Following the post-Tito model of the former Yugoslavia, a three-head rotating presidency was formed, one for each nationality. But in fact until recently most political decisions (if not made by the international administration) were made on the level of the entities, in spite of the internationally-enforced introduction of some Bosnia-Herzegovina-wide regulations such as common citizenship, passport and vehicle number plates in 1997. In 2000 and 2001, Croats in Herzegovina tried to establish a Croat entity but failed under the pressure

\(^{78}\) The NATO forces were called Implementation Force IFOR (end of 1995-December 1996), replaced by Stabilization Force SFOR (December 1996 – December 2004). SFOR in its turn was replaced by a EU-led force EUFOR.

\(^{79}\) A civil society organisation in Sarajevo, the Research and Documentation Centre, in its 2006 report speaks of secured data on ‘only’ 96,000 dead and missing persons (Fischer 2007a:x).

\(^{80}\) Bosnia-Herzegovina also hosted some 25,000-30,000 refugees from Croatia and after the war of early 1999 a few thousands from Kosovo. Currently (meaning 2007 or 2008), there are approximately 9,000 refugees from Croatia and about 500 from Kosovo still living there (Klincov n.d.)
of the international administration. In 2003 more power was shifted to the national government at the expense of the entities, and in 2005 Bosnian armed forces were unified, whereas under Dayton each entity had had its own army. In the second half of the 1990s several communal, entity-wide and federal elections were held. In the local elections in spring 2000 for the first time parties won that were not based on the ethnic principle. This tendency was confirmed by the third nationwide elections in November that year. But in the general elections in 2002 (the first organised without the assistance of international administrators, and with a turnout of only 55%) the ethnic divide grew again and the three national parties won once more.

3.4 From the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia through the Federal Republic Yugoslavia to Serbia and Montenegro

After the recognition of the secession of all other republics in early 1992, the two remaining republics Serbia and Montenegro decided in April 1992 to form a new state of their own, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FR Yugoslavia), claiming to be the legal successor of SFR Yugoslavia.

After the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, most sanctions on the FR Yugoslavia were lifted with only a so-called ‘outer wall’ left which controlled certain financial transactions and blocked FR Yugoslavia from reintegration into the international community. Also in 1996 FR Yugoslavia normalised its relations with Macedonia and Croatia and established full diplomatic relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In November 1996, a coalition of oppositional parties called Zajedno won in November in the second round of local elections in 32 municipalities, among them almost all larger cities. But Milsevic’s electoral commission declared the results in 14 cities invalid because of alleged irregularities, and organised new elections that were boycotted by the opposition. In December mass protests of the opposition started in Nis, then in Belgrade and other towns, joined by a number of different groups, among them students, professional groups and pensioners. The protests

81 Anti-government protest in Serbia has had a longer history going back to 1990 when (like in other republics at that time) a first anti-governmental protest took place, and opposition parties formed. (Three parties with a democratic outlook became important in the years to come: the
3. History

continued over Christmas, and in January 1997 there were more than 100,000 in nightly demonstrations on the streets, even after Milosevic conceded the victory of Zajedno in Nis. After 60 days of protest, he relented in February and declared the original election results valid.

Though the protests for some time continued after February, the opposition was not prepared to use its advantage. Observers at that time thought that Milosevic’ days may have been numbered, but by end of the year he had stabilized his position again. He won the elections for President of Yugoslavia in July 1997 with a high majority, and his ally Milutinovic became in December 1997 President of Serbia (the office Milosevic held before).

The year 1998 was mainly characterised by new inflation (a hyperinflation caused by the international sanctions in 1992-93 had been stopped with the introduction of a new currency), and the beginning of the armed conflict in Kosovo (see below 3.5).

After the break-down of the Rambouillet negotiations in March 1999, NATO attacked FR Yugoslavia on 24th March. Many towns, the economic infrastructure, transport ways etc were repeatedly bombed, although NATO claimed its targets were militarily relevant. The bombing of chemical plants caused heavy poisoning of the environment, as did the use of uranium-depleted weapon heads. On 10 June 1999 FR Yugoslavia eventually signed an agreement with NATO which put Kosovo under international administration.

After the war the opposition in Serbia gained ground. In January 2000 18 opposition parties and alliances agreed to stand against Milosevic and mobilised, supported by the student movement Otpor (see also chapter 7.7.5.3). When early presidential and


An important date has been the 9th of March 1991 when a demonstration of 100,000 to 150,000 by the new opposition parties ended in street fights with the police, and one protester and one policeman lost their lives. The next day 10,000 students went to the streets, blocking the centre Belgrade with a sit-in until the military withdrew from the town.

One year later, in spring 1992 there have been large student protests demanding a liberalisation of the university system that spread from Belgrade to Novi Sad, Nis and Kragujevac. They were joined by major opposition parties that formed a coalition called DEPOS, and in June more than 100,000 protested in front of the Federal Parliament demanded better election conditions. After that, the parties (whose coalition DEPOS had soon dissolved), media and NGOs continued their work but there have been no more mass protests until 1996.
parliamentary elections on 24 September appeared to be manipulated, public protest was joined by more than a million citizens from all over Serbia. In an almost completely nonviolent uprising in October 2000 Milosevic was toppled.

The year 2001 saw the extradition of former President Milosevic to the International Tribunal in The Hague, and also was marked by violent incidents caused by an Albanian resistance group in a region of South Serbia, the Presevo valley bordering with Kosovo, that demanded the integration of Presevo into Kosovo. NATO and the UN eventually reacted by mediating an agreement with the Albanians, and allowed Serbian armed forces to return to the border region to maintain order. This armed conflict cost around 100 lives, and displaced for a short time about 12,500 people.

In 2002 Serbia and Montenegro engaged in protracted negotiations about their future relationship. They came under significant pressure from the international community who were opposed to any further secession in the region. Initially they agreed to the creation of a looser confederation between the two republics. The new state was called State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, but in June 2006 Montenegro split from Serbia, becoming a state of its own.

3.5 Kosovo: From Autonomy in Serbia Through ‘Kosmet’ to War and Becoming a Protectorate

In Kosovo in July 1990 the parliament was suspended, and many Albanian civil servants as well as medical personnel and others were dismissed from their jobs. In 1991 Albanian-language school curricula were replaced by Serbian ones, and ‘Kosmet’ (for ‘Kosovo and Metohija’), as the province was officially called, was put fully under Serbian control. The Kosovo-Albanians under the leadership of ‘President’ Rugova reacted to the developments with a campaign of nonviolent resistance. An alternative parallel system in mainly three fields was built up: politics (elections were held and a government put in place), education (‘shadow schools’) and health (with the NGO ‘Mother Theresa’ as the major supplier of medical aid). But the nonviolent resistance movement also had its weaknesses. Its strategy depended on support by the international community – right from the beginning

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82 For a description of the nonviolent resistance, see Clark 2000.
people hoped that international pressure and the presence of international peace-keepers would secure Kosovo’s independence. It also lacked a willingness to try to negotiate with Serbia, an attitude matched by the FRY leadership. In 1997, young people were not willing any more to accept the ban of public demonstrations by the leadership that considered public action as too dangerous, and held mass demonstrations. About the same time, an armed movement had emerged, called the UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army). Its first attacks on police stations and on Albanians whom they considered collaborators with Serbia began in 1996. By 1997 the violence was undeniable, although in October 1997 there was still also nonviolent activism, like student demonstrations for the re-opening of the university and schools.

In 1998 the UCK became more and more the real power factor. By mid-June it temporarily controlled large areas in central Kosovo, rapidly retreating in the face of a summer offensive by FRY security forces. Contrary to the reports in Western media, the fighting in 1998 was a confrontation of the Yugoslav Army with the UCK. There was no attempt at systematic ‘ethnic cleansing’ as has often has been claimed by Western politicians trying to legitimate the NATO-war of 1999, though most victims were civilians and the numbers of IDPs rose to between 230,000 and more than 400,000 (see Hamilton and Man 1998, Schweitzer 1998, Loquai 2000). Under a massive threat by NATO to intervene, the fighting between the Serb forces and the UCK was suspended in autumn, and a large-scale civilian observer mission by the OSCE sent to Kosovo. But in early 1999, violence was on the rise once again. On the one side, the UCK had retaken control over those areas it had already controlled in summer 1998, and on the other the Yugoslav Army probably got ready for another offensive after the end of the war.

A coalition of Western States called for negotiations in Rambouillet in which they sought agreement from both sides to put Kosovo under international administration. When these negotiations failed, NATO attacked on 24 March, first with the explanation that it wanted to force Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet agreement, then claiming it wanted to prevent ethnic cleansing and a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ which in fact it had just caused (Marcon 2000:41, Lutz 2001).
3. History

The war in 1999 cost the lives of an estimated 7,000-11,000 Albanians and 1,200-2,000 Serb civilians. The number of Serbian soldiers killed is estimated at around 1,000. More than 850,000 Albanians left Kosovo, up to 600,000 were internally displaced. After the war 125,000 out of a total population of 200,000 ethnic Serbs left Kosovo, since then even more have gone. The same is true for other minority groups such as Roma and Ashkali. (For these figures, see Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000:3, Lampe 2000:408, Buckely and Cummings 2001:1, Dannreuther 2001:26, O’Neill 2002:15, CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects 2006:4).

After the cease-fire the UN and NATO together with a larger number of other international organisations and institutions set up a protectorate with NATO as its peace-keeping arm (KFOR), and the UN as civil administrator (UNMIK).

While the physical reconstruction has gone ahead quickly, there has been very little change on the other fronts. The economic situation is disastrous and again, as in the 1990s, many people have started to migrate to other countries as cheap labour force in order to feed their families. Serbs have regrouped, living mainly in enclaves and even there found themselves insecure as three days of ethnic violence in March 2004 proved in which 19 people died, nearly 1000 were injured, perhaps 4,000 Serbs driven from their homes, and several hundred houses burned. These incidents also showed that neither NATO nor the newly-created multiethnic police of Kosovo were equipped (or perhaps willing) to quell the unrest (see International Crisis Group 2004a, CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects 2006).

For a long time, the status question of Kosovo remained unresolved, the international community arguing that ‘standards came before status’. After unsuccessful EU-led negotiations in 2007, however, Kosovo declared its independence in spite of bitter resistance by Serbia and its ally Russia in February 2008, and was quickly recognized by a number of relevant countries, among them most EU members as well as neighbouring countries.

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83 Human Rights Watch which is the only NGO that researched all military incidents involving civilian victims came to a figure of 500 Yugoslav civilians killed (Human Rights Watch 2000).

84 Before the war there had been up to 155,000 Roma and Ashkali, of whom more than 100,000 have been displaced.

85 Until November 2008, Kosovo has been recognised by 51 of the 192 U.N. member states, among them 22 members of the European Union and the USA. (Karajkov 2008)
3.6 Macedonia: From an Example of ‘Working Prevention’ to Armed Uprising

Macedonia’s (official name till today: ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’-FYROM) path to independence was thorny because of the resistance its neighbour Greece put up. Greece expressed concerns that Macedonia had territorial claims, and disliked the use of antique symbols which it considered its own. It set up a trade embargo which harmed Macedonia’s economy quite a lot. Only in April 1993 was Macedonia accepted into the United Nations and simultaneously recognised by most EC countries. To prevent Macedonia from being drawn into the wars of the neighbouring countries, a UN peace-keeping force and later a long-term OSCE mission were deployed, and throughout the 1990s Macedonia was considered a successful example of conflict prevention (see Ackermann 2000 and Lund 2000).

Greece lifted its embargo after US mediator Holbrooke managed to get an agreement between the two governments during his shuttle tours to end the Bosnian war in September 1995. This agreement then opened up Macedonian membership of the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the NATO Partnership for Peace. In 1996, also a trade and cooperation agreement with the EU was concluded.

The second half of the 1990s was characterised by some tensions with the Albanian minority, particularly in the context of the Kosovo crisis and war. In spring 1999, Macedonia had (rather unwillingly) become host to about 344,000 Albanian refugees from Kosovo.

In 2001 unrest in the Western parts of Macedonia, inhabited by a large Albanian minority, escalated to violence. Macedonia first tried to deal with the insurgency by military means. When this failed and the fear of a second Kosovo became predominant, EU, NATO and OSCE stepped up their mediating efforts and managed to conclude the so-called Ohrid agreement signed on 13 August 2001.

While the number of casualties was low compared with the other violent conflicts (around 400 dead), the crisis in Macedonia 2001 temporarily displaced about 150,000 people, the majority of whom fled to Kosovo, but most were able to return quickly (Wilkinson 2001).

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86 The name Macedonia, and Macedonia’s flag with the Macedonian star.
87 For an overview over the events of 2001, see Gallagher 2005.
3. History

In March 2004 Macedonia applied for EU membership and like Croatia is close to concluding the steps needed to join NATO but has not been issued an invitation yet because Greece is blocking its membership (International Crisis Group 2009).

3.7 Conclusion

The discussion about the causes of the conflicts leading to war in former Yugoslavia took place inside the countries concerned as much as outside (see Cox 1998:7pp and Kaufman 2001:4 pp). The debate among the citizens of former Yugoslavia focused on the question whether the wars were ‘wars of aggression’ by Serbia/Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav People’s Army an occupation force (although it had been in all republics before secession), or if they were ‘civil wars’ which was usually equated with the term ‘ethnic conflict’. 88 The international debate partly mirrored this discussion but also offered some other explanations of which only a few can be mentioned here.

The interpretation as an ethnic conflict has been popular among Western observers, often considering the wars as expression of deep-rooted and intractable antagonisms handed down through the generations until a liberating ethno-nationalist explosion blew off the heavy lid from an over-heated ‘boiling cauldron’ caused by the suppression of ethnic conflict during Tito’s time (see Kaplan 1993, Glenny 1996). 89 An explanation favoured by many critical and anti-nationalist scholars both from the region and outside has focused on power struggles of nationalist leaders who appeared in the wake of the breakdown of Communism, and who resorted to violent

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89 However it has to be observed that these conceptions usually display a simplistic understanding of ethnicity as something primordial and not subjected to manipulation. The existence of political leaders claiming that the problems their society faces originated in the existence of antagonistic ethnic groups, referring to historical events (including traumas) to strengthen the ethnic/national identity, using ethnic identity to promote political and representative claims, artificially strengthening a separate identity by reforming language and introducing separate cultural symbols – in short, all that could be observed in the former Yugoslavia can be described as characteristics of ethnic conflict without going back to assumptions on the primordiality or instrumental character ethnicity and nation. (See for the discussion between ‘primordialists’ and ‘instrumentalists’ Shils 1957, Geertz 1963, Glazer and Moynihan 1963 and 1975, Narroll 1964, van den Berghe 1978, Cohen 1978, Tilley 1997:509, Banton 2001).
conflict along ethnic lines to keep their opponents from mobilising the population against the regime itself (see Licht and Kaldor 1992, Stubbs 1999).

Another explanation associated with Susan L. Woodward (1995) explains the development of violent conflict at the beginning of the 1990s as the result of a deep economic and political crisis in the area. In the economic field, the long-lasting inflation and the economic reforms undertaken to deal with the crisis caused civic unrest, and competition between the republics. When in the wake of the breakdown of the political systems in Eastern Europe in 1989 the (already weakened) leadership of the League of Communists had to give way to multi-party systems, the transition of the constitutional order, including its social and economic rights to another order led to disintegration of governmental authority and breakdown of a political and civil order.90

Stuart J. Kaufman offers a synthetic ‘symbolic politics theory of ethnic war’:

The symbolic politics theory holds that if the three preconditions – hostile myths, ethnic fears, and opportunity – are present, ethnic war results if they lead to rising mass hostility, chauvinist mobilisation by leaders making extreme symbolic appeals, and a security dilemma between groups. Different kinds of triggering events work by activating either the hostility or chauvinist mobilisation (Kaufman 2001:34).

According to him “people choose by responding to the most emotionally potent symbol evoked” (Kaufman 2001:28). Nationalist myths of Serbs and Croats encouraged mutual hostility as did memory of violence during World War II. Chauvinist mobilisation by leaders in order to build coalitions was based on making other Yugoslav peoples scapegoats for the problems of their own populations. Economic rivalries and declining living standards deepened the crisis. This created also a security dilemma which led ethnic groups to mobilise against each other.

90 A related explanation is offered by Schierup (1999a and 1999b). He believes that the economic reforms in the 1970s, rather than modernising the socialist system, led to growing autonomy of republics and weakening of the federation. According to him, by 1980 the republics were already beginning to look and act like small nation-states. Local party leaders and managers attempted to maintain legitimacy by continuing to provide employment and social services despite worsening economic conditions. In competition with the others, each republic, often at the level of the individual enterprise, tried to forge links with international companies. The deepening crisis tended to reinforce local relations and kinship ties. Urban-rural links were strengthened, republican structures were ‘blended organically with the most authoritarian features of the social and political relations of real socialism’. The local party elites and the increasingly ‘national’ working classes were to be bound together by innumerable ties of an increasingly traditional character. These were displayed in idioms such as kinship, friendship, locality and ethnicity, taking the form of a complex network of reciprocal favours (see also Duffield 2001:169).
Most of the different explanations sketched above seem to contain some element of truth. This also matches the general discussion on causes of armed conflicts that also seems to come to the conclusion that conflict cannot be reduced to a single cause, or a single explanation.\textsuperscript{91} It is obvious that there are "very few necessary conditions" which need to be fulfilled in order for a war to develop, and very many sufficient conditions, of which only a few of these may apply, in any single conflict. War is possible as soon as weapons are available with which to fight it and as long as there is a dispute between two or more parties. What makes war probable, however, is a far more complicated question (Smith 2000:4).

Smith proposes to distinguish background causes, mobilisation strategies, triggers and catalysts.\textsuperscript{92} Using this concept, amongst the main background causes one might refer to:

- A history of ethnic conflict going back at least to the first Yugoslavia, and the fear of which led to the suppression of expression of ethnic identity during Tito’s time, which in turn radicalised certain elements of society in all republics.

- The economic problems of Yugoslavia which were experienced differently in different regions / republics (depending on the degree of industrialisation, and access to foreign markets).

- The breakdown of the socialist regimes in 1989.

- A federative structure which favoured attempts to deal with these problems on a regional (republican) rather than the national level.

Mobilisation strategies were pursued at different levels:

\\textsuperscript{91} The research on causes of armed conflict in general so far has not produced a consistent theory acceptable to most scholars working in the field. There are different categories of explanations: genetic and evolutionary/biological theories (aggression as a genetic function, maximisation of survival chances), behaviourist theories (war as learned behaviour), cost-benefit theories (maximisation of benefit), ecological explanations (war for scarce resources), social/cultural theories (ethnicity and/or religion as conflict causes), and cognitive (attitudes) explanations (see Orywal 1996 and Smith 2001 for overviews over the different theories).

\textsuperscript{92} He refers to David Dressler’s model whose terminology he slightly changed. It distinguishes five causal roles: A reason (‘historical problems’), a trigger, a target (the objective of an actor), a channel (tie of political, social economic or national cleavage to design group identities), and catalysts (any factors that control the rate, intensity, and duration of a conflict). See Baechler 2002:8pp.
• Party leaders in the republics re-defined politics in national rather than in socialist terms in order to rally people to their support, and to protect particular interests of their republic or region.

• After the political changes of 1989, democratisation which was mainly defined as introduction of several parties added to the diversification of the political picture.

• Nationalisation of politics in turn caused radicalisation of those ethnic groups and resistance – mostly at a very regional level – by those who experienced or feared exclusion because they did not belong to the nation in question. They responded by seeking autonomy or inclusion into the ‘home country’ from which they were divided by a republican border.

• The moves by Milosevic to bring Kosovo, the Vojvodina and Montenegro under his control which probably can mainly be explained by the power politics of an over-ambitious man and his followers, and the dynamics which these moves caused (alienation of the Western republics etc).

• The first multi-party elections in 1990 in all republics and their results which led to disruption of the functioning of central institutions at the federation level.

All this in hindsight can be seen as clear warning signals that violent conflict might develop, but they in themselves do not explain why the wars then began when they did. For that triggers were needed. The main triggers of the escalation, meaning factors that affected the timing of the onset of the armed conflict, included:

• The declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia against the will of the central government and the (at that time still predominantly Yugoslav-oriented) army leadership.

• Once the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was used in Slovenia in an attempt to prevent secession, local tensions and limited violence in Croatia (and parts of Bosnia as well although this was hardly noticed at that time) fell into the pattern of Belgrade (“the Serbs”) and the JNA going to war against the secessionists, and led to a violent reaction by the new Croatian government and its fledgling army, whose actions (blockade of the JNA barracks) then escalated the conflict further.

• For the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina the trigger was the completed secession of Croatia and Slovenia and the internationally-promoted referendum on...
independence which left the three-nation republic caught between two stools: Croats looked towards Croatia, Serbs identified with Serbia and rejected a separation from it, and the Muslims without a ‘home nation’ outside Bosnia were in between.

Catalysts, factors that influence the intensity and duration of a conflict, may have been:

• The second Gulf War at the beginning of 1991 had set a precedent for internationally sanctioned and successful military intervention. I remember discussions in 1991 that Belgrade and the JNA assumed that their intervention in Slovenia would be tolerated in the same way as the US-led UN intervention in Iraq was.

• The speed in which the conflicts became violent may be explained by what Matveeva and Paes (2003) call a “gun culture”, referring to popular attitudes of general acceptance towards guns in societies where many people owned hunting rifles, as well as having access to other weapons in their capacity as members of the Territorial Defence.

• Pre-existing local conflicts which then fell into the pattern of the wider war.

• The UN arms embargo which initially clearly favoured those who inherited the weapons kept by the JNA – meaning mainly the Serbian armed forces in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

To sum up, what kind of wars were these? Civil war, wars of secession, international wars? I would reply: all of the above. The wars of secession in Croatia and Slovenia became an international conflict formally as soon as these republics were recognised internationally. Yet in Croatia there was a strong element of civil war still remaining because it was not the JNA occupying Croatia, but rather local Serbs seeking autonomy from Croatia led the struggle. Bosnia had an even stronger character of civil war, in spite of the international element, through the barely disguised involvement by Serbian and Croatian troops, military materiel and money.
4. The Main Interventions by Governments and International Organisations

The course of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia described in the last chapter was heavily shaped by the interventions of the international (state) community. It is necessary to give an overview of their interventions before coming to the instruments and activities of the civil society actors, because in many ways the state actors set the framework in which the civil society groups acted. It would also distort the overall picture of the events in the region in the decade studied if the focus on civil society actors resulted in under-emphasising what was in many ways the much heavier impact and influence of international organisations and governments.

4.1 The Use of Peace-making Instruments

In chapter 2, peace-making was defined with Ryan (1995) as working as an external party towards a settlement of the conflict through either law, negotiation, or the exercise of violence and/or other forms of power.

4.1.1 Peace-making by Law

In the period under study, peace-making by law played almost no role in the former Yugoslavia. Of course principles of international law were invoked many times, both in the context of appeals and decisions of the UN Security Council and in humanitarian activities (for example the protection of prisoners of war). However, these and other applications of international law, such as the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), belong under peace-building: their purpose was not to find a solution to the conflict. As for national laws, there have been many reforms in the successor states to Yugoslavia, including measures to protect minority rights, but they all came after the wars and therefore are also better placed in the context of the post-war institution- and state-building.
4. Governmental Interventions

4.1.2 Peace-making by Negotiation

4.1.2.1 The Structures of Negotiation Diplomacy

As for peace-making by negotiation, the organisational framework was first set by the European Community.\(^93\) After the Brioni conferences in July and August 1991 successfully dealt with the armed conflict in Slovenia, the EC created a new conference to settle the war in Croatia. On 7 September 1991 the so-called Hague Conference or ‘EC Conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague’ (ECCY) was opened, chaired by the EC’s special envoy Lord Carrington, but proved unable to reach any lasting agreements (see Lucarelli 2000:24). Frequent cease-fires were agreed and usually broken within a couple of days. The Conference was suspended in November and on 8 November EC foreign ministers agreed limited economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. With the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in August 1992 the ECCY was revived and enlarged into the ‘International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia’ (ICFY), being co-chaired by the EC/ EU (David Owen succeeding Carrington as envoy) and the United Nations (initially Cyrus Vance).\(^94\) ICFY provided the framework in which between 1992 and the end of 1993 a number of peace plans for Bosnia-Herzegovina were developed. It also handled other issues in the region (Kosovo, Macedonia, Croatia), achieving some positive outcomes (see Rossanet 1996 for a description of its work).\(^95\)

In 1994 a newly formed Contact Group consisting of USA, Britain, France, Russia and Germany assumed leadership in dealing with the Bosnia war, replacing ICFY in this role.\(^96\) Between 1994 and the Kosovo war in 1999, the Contact Group, in spite of

\(^{93}\) The European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU) in 1993.

\(^{94}\) Invited were the 12 EC member countries, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Japan and Canada for the ‘Group of 7’, Czechoslovakia and Sweden for the CSCE, Sweden, Switzerland (as a host of many humanitarian organisations), Senegal (for the Organisation of Islamic Conference), Turkey and Indonesia (as future coordinators of the Non-Aligned Movement), representatives of the neighbours of the former Yugoslavia and representatives of all six former Yugoslav republics. FR Yugoslavia was present with its President (Milosevic) and Prime Ministers (who varied over the period) in a personal capacity after the status of FR Yugoslavia became unclear. Kosovo Albanians were invited as observers. See Owen 1995, Rossenet 1996, Sloan 1998:21 and 46, Clark 2000:90 and 239; Kaufman 2002: xv, Woodward 1995:302pp.

\(^{95}\) ICFY established six Working Groups: Bosnia-Herzegovina; Humanitarian Issues; Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities; Succession Issues; Economic Issues; Confidence and Security-building and Verification measures.

\(^{96}\) The Contact Group had no contractual agreements as basis, and used only informal rules of cooperation (see Schwegmann 2003). Italy joined it in 1996.
its internal problems caused by very different views and the members’ regional alliances, has remained the main international coordination body dealing with the conflicts (see Schwegmann 2003).

4.1.2.2 The Contents of Negotiation Diplomacy

As described in Chapter 3.2, the EC and the USA in autumn of 1991 began to accept the dissolution of Yugoslavia and sought to contain the conflict by developing ‘objective’ criteria and processes for recognition of the separatist republics. In October the Hague Conference decided to suspend any decision on this issue for two months, and the EC established an Arbitration Commission of international lawyers (the so-called Badinter Commission) to make recommendations regarding the status of Yugoslavia and conditions for recognition. At the end of November, the Badinter Commission declared Yugoslavia to be in a state of dissolution, and on 11 January 1992 made its final report. This stated that Slovenia fulfilled the conditions defined by the Commission for independence. Croatia and Macedonia were asked to adjust their Constitutional Laws, and Bosnia-Herzegovina was asked to conduct a referendum. The application by Kosovo was denied on the grounds that Kosovo had not been a republic of Yugoslavia, as were similar applications by Krajina Serbs and Bosnian Serbs, although the Commission stated that these groups were entitled to enjoy minority rights. Yet even before this Commission report, the EC had decided to recognise Slovenia and Croatia, and ‘unofficially’ Germany already recognised Slovenia and Croatia on 23 December, arguing that the EC had already decided to do so. Macedonia was not immediately recognised, however, because of a veto by Greece which suspected Macedonia of having territorial claims against Greece. (For

To my knowledge and contradicting some of the myths of leftist factions of the peace movement that perceived an international conspiracy to break up one of the last strongholds of socialism, there was little official sympathy for the secession of Croatia and Slovenia before their declaration of independence in summer 1991, aside from some Catholic circles (Libal 1997:11, Eisermann 2000:33). However, the situation changed quickly once the armed conflict began. Germany and Austria were among the first to begin talking about the possibility of recognition. Mostly it was expressed in the context of ‘if the war does not stop, then we would have to consider recognition’. This attitude was read in the secessionist republics as support for their independence, and it seems that Germany already at the beginning of July proposed at a meeting of the Council of Ministers in the Hague that the EC could collectively recognise Slovenia and Croatia (see Genscher 1995:938, Woodward 1995:178, Libal 1997:16, 39pp and 52pp, Lucarelli 2000:124, Radan 2002:164).

Leaving aside the contentious issue of the internal politics and interests of the Western countries, the main international objective in regard handling the conflicts in former Yugoslavia was the containment of the crisis and specially the prevention of large refugee movements (see Gallagher 2003). The approach on which by end of 1991 most countries agreed was to internationalise the conflict. By the recognition of independence of Slovenia and Croatia, the conflicts were transformed from an internal to an international issue which was (at that time) a precondition for the UN to send peace-keeping forces, which in turn were an important factor of the cease-fire agreement concluded on Croatia in January 1992 (see Libal 1997:86pp, Holbrooke 1998:31pp, Kaufman 2000:xiv, 76; Lampe 2000:372, Lucarelli 2000:20,28 and 135pp).

Whilst recognition may have helped end the war in Croatia, it must also be considered one of the triggers for the war that started only four months later in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As described in chapter 3, Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised on 6 April 1992, although despite the firm opposition expressed by Serbs in the March referendum the Serbs. Inclusion in the EC-orchestrated process of dissolution of Yugoslavia left Bosnia-Herzegovina suspended between the Serbian-dominated rest of Yugoslavia and newly independent Croatia. 98

In the period that followed, the EC and the UN tried to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina by proposing different structural models for that country, all based on ethnically defined territories and thereby involuntarily mirroring the military development on the ground where so-called ethnic cleansing was in the process of creating mono-ethnic areas. 99 Even before the creation of ICFY and the beginning of

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98 The recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 6-7 April was pushed by the USA more than by the EC. The USA argued that the recognition was necessary because Croatia and Serbia planned to divide Bosnia among themselves, and both EC and USA hoped by their recognition to deter war (see Zimmermann 1996:18pp, Gow 1997:89pp, Libal 1997:93, Lampe 2000:78 and 364, Kaufmann 2002). Bosnian President Izetbegovic obviously saw that coming and pleaded with Western countries to wait with the recognition when he met with Genscher in December 1991 (see Woodward 1995:261). That it triggered the war was later recognised even by US mediator Holbrooke, though he – probably correctly- argues that the war was likely to have begun anyway (Holbrooke 1998:31pp). This is also the point of view of Gow (1997:34), Lucarelli (2000:129) and Gallagher (2003:72pp).

99 Before the war, there had been few mono-ethnic areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina there had been a proposal to create three constituent units within Bosnia-Herzegovina, brought forward by Cutilheiro for the EC (see Krech 1997:48 and 65, Burg and Shoup 1999:109, Markovic 2000:36). This plan failed, despite initially seeming to have chances for acceptance, and in the first months of war, the ICFY in different rounds of negotiations developed the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) at the end of 1992.

VOPP proposed a regionalisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten cantons. But the parties, especially the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs, disagreed with (different) part of the plan until eventually the negotiators had to abandon it after a referendum conducted by the Bosnian Serbs in May 1993 emphatically rejected it (Sloan 1998:50, Lucarelli 2000:45, Kaufman 2002:98). The next plan - the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan - reverted to the three-entity model, trying to be closer to the reality on the ground, and suggested a confederation or union with three ethnically defined constituents (see Owen 1995:xvii and 193pp, Krech 1997:92, Burg and Shoup 1999:263pp). However, this was also quickly rejected because the parties could not agree on the borders and the percentages of territory each of them would get. The European Union and ICFY then for some time tried to continue the negotiations varying the Plan and its percentages a bit (European Union Action Plan) but also failed (Owen 1995:238pp, Sloan 1998:55, Giersch 1998:167). The Contact Group, which began its work in 1994 after the Federation between Croats and Bosniaks was created, then proposed in summer 1994 a union of two states which more than twelve months later basically became the model for Dayton (see Calic 1996:188pp, Markovic 2000:153pp, Kaufman 2002: xvii, Schneckener 2002:112).


- The peace plans applied the logic of ‘one territory - one ethnic group’ which was at cross-purposes with the ideals of modern democracy (see Schneckener 2002 for a discussion of structural options available in civil wars).

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100 The Bosnian Serbs controlled at that time around 70% of the territory but the Plan allotted them only 43%.

101 Thorvald Stoltenberg replaced Cyrus Vance as co-chair of ICFY in April 1993.
• A division by ethnic group was the logic of at least two of the warring parties, and thereby the proposals seemed to strengthen and confirm the purposes for which they had gone to war.

• On the ground new peace plans and the maps accompanying them often led to the intensification of fighting, including contributing to the break-up of the original Croat-Muslim alliance.

Some years later, the international community took a very different approach to the conflict in Kosovo. Prior to 2007, international bodies were very hesitant to make a final decision on the status of Kosovo, instead insisting that first issues of democratisation, economic stability, rule of law, a dialogue with Belgrade and minority rights were to be resolved (see Knoll and Molina 2002). If this was partly a lesson drawn from the 1990s, the conclusion was not necessarily correct: insecurity about the future was itself a factor increasing “the political temperature in the province and arguably contributed to an increase in ethnically motivated violence” as Llamazares and Reynolds Levy concluded after surveying 21 humanitarian, development and peace organisations in Kosovo (Llamazares and Reynolds Levy 2003:10).

4.1.3 The Role of Violence and Power

Peace-making by negotiation and peace-making by violence or power can be quite hard to distinguish, at least in the cases of the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995, and Kosovo in 1998 and 1999. In both cases the negotiations were accompanied by pressure through sanctions and soon also by a threat and execution of air bombing to a degree that eventually went far beyond the negotiation techniques of ‘sticks and carrots’.

4.1.3.1 The Sanctions

Sanctions have been an important instrument used by international state actors to support their peace-making efforts, either by withdrawing means needed for the continuation of the conflict, and/ or by putting pressure on the targeted side to lay
down their arms and come to a peace agreement. In July 1991 the EC declared an arms embargo on all Yugoslavia, and in September this was adopted by the UN in Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 713. The embargo was monitored by the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO (see Leurdijk 1996:28, 228; Meder and Reimann 1996:5pp).

Until 1995, the arms embargo was the focus of much political controversy because it implicitly treated all sides in the conflicts as equal. The USA, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), and also many civil society groups – as well as Croatia and the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina itself – argued that the embargo violated the right of Muslims and Croats to self-defence (see for example Sloan 1998:50, Markovic 2000:104pp, Clark 2001:37, Kaufman 2002:100).


Economic sanctions started right after the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia in May 1991 with the freezing of economic assistance to Yugoslavia by the EC and the USA. When the war in Croatia began, both quickly threatened economic sanctions. In late October 1991 the EC decided to terminate its agreement on cooperation and trade, and this was soon to be followed by other countries. In

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102 Skidelsky and Mortimer see sanctions as one ‘link in a chain of graduated pressure short of war’, more powerful than diplomatic pressure but less powerful than military preparation (Skidelsky and Mortimer 1996:154). See also De Jonge Oudraat (2001:232) on economic sanctions, and the report ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (2001:30p) for a list of types of sanctions distinguishing sanctions in a military, economic and political/diplomatic area.

103 Between November 1992 and the end of 1995, 63,000 vessels were checked, with 833 diverted to Italian ports (see Pirani and Zucchoni 2001:50pp).

104 When in 1993 the US Congress voted to lift the arms embargo, President Clinton vetoed that decision.

105 Actually there were measures that can be considered economic sanctions of a more informal type already in 1990 when the USA withdrew an implicit offer of financial aid. See Gow 1997:208, Woodward 1995:384, ‘Jugoslawien will Schulden stunden’ 1991.

the next two years, in the face of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, these sanctions were targeted at Serbia, and tightened several times, until in the end there was an almost total embargo on all trade, traffic and cultural relations.\textsuperscript{107} The objective was to isolate Serbia which was considered to have control over the Bosnian Serbs, and thereby the key to a cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indeed, it was only in 1994 that the Bosnian Serbs were directly targeted by the UN. UNSCR 942 prohibited states from admitting into their territories Bosnian Serb officials and military officers forbade trade with any entity owned or controlled by Bosnian Serbs, and froze financial assets held abroad. During the last months of 1994, the EU tried a stick and carrot tactic by offering to gradually lift sanctions if the Serbs agreed to territorial concessions demanded by the Bosnian government (see Giersch 1998:167, Sloan 1998:55).

Most of these sanctions were ended in early 1996, with only a so-called ‘outer wall of sanctions’ against FR Yugoslavia maintained because of the situation in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{108} However, sanctions on FR Yugoslavia were reintroduced in early 1998 in response to the violence in Kosovo in form of a new arms embargo, an oil embargo, an embargo on other equipment ‘that could be used for repression’, denial of visa for FR Yugoslavia representatives, and a moratorium of export credits. During the war in 1999, with UNSCR 1160 and UNSCR 1199 additional sanctions were added, such as a total ban on export goods and any financial transactions with persons or companies in FR Yugoslavia, and the freezing of funds and assets. Their last remnants were finally lifted after the fall of Milosevic in 2000 (see Mueller 1999:68, Buckley 2001:157, Kaufman 2002:xx, Pavlovic 2002:286, United Nations 2002).\textsuperscript{109}

The sanctions against Serbia weakened its economy considerably and, as was often remarked, critically hit its citizens probably more than its government.\textsuperscript{110} The

\textsuperscript{107} The Resolutions in question were: UNSCR 757 on the economic and cultural sanctions, UNSCR 787 prohibiting transportation of oil, petroleum and coal through Serbia, and authorising NATO and WEU to search naval vessels, and UNSCR 820 freezing financial assets of Yugoslavia, and turning the sanctions into a blockade.


\textsuperscript{109} However, in the next years especially the USA have threatened with economic sanctions several times more in the context of their demand to extradite Milosevic and Mladic. See Borden 2001, Cvijanovic 2001a, b and c, Stephen 2003.

\textsuperscript{110} Already in October 1993 the report of the ICFY Humanitarian Working Group warned of the destructive effects of sanctions, estimating that 50% of the FR Yugoslavia citizens were without
damage between 1991 and 1994 alone was estimated to be slightly above US$45 billion. Hyperinflation was such that the government had to introduce a new currency in order to halt it (Babic 2001). As to their effectiveness, most analysts believe that they played a role in ending the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina by making Belgrade change its policy towards the Bosnian Serbs, but others, such as Woodward, have questioned their significance (Woodward, 2005). Moreover, opposition groups in Serbia have expressed the opinion that the sanctions strengthened the regime rather than weakened it (see de Jonge Oudraat 2001, Dragovic-Soso 2003:120pp).

4.1.3.2 The Use of Military Means

The military engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina grew slowly over the years. UNPROFOR was neither permitted nor equipped to enforce its mandate, or even protect itself in some circumstances. In 1993 NATO was asked to give ‘close air support’ to the peace-keeping mission, although permission for any air attacks had to be obtained from the UN. The first tactic was to attack only weapon sites deemed to be firing on protected zones (so-called ‘smoking gun targets’). The discussion on escalating air strikes continued through 1994. When in 1995 ‘close air support’ was considered no longer effective, the UN Security Council (in UNSCR 958) asked NATO air forces to undertake all necessary measures to support UNPROFOR and allow the fulfilment of its mandate. Air strikes were undertaken to serve as warnings or threats to make the warring parties comply with the UN rulings, and in this context NATO created a list of military targets. In May 1995 NATO attacked several

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111 As a side effect, also the neighbouring countries (Greece, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary) suffered losses of several billion of US$ each (Calic 1996:168p).
113 The USA propagated from 1992 on a strategy of ‘lift and strike’, meaning to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina and conduct air strikes. This was however rejected by those countries who contributed to UNPROFOR, fearing for the security of their peace-keepers. See Owen 1995:xiii and 159pp, Meder and Reimann 1996:10, Sloan 1998:50, Markovic 2000:70, Clark 2001:37, Kaufman 2002:100.
times but stopped its bombing when up to 500 UNPROFOR soldiers were taken hostage by the Bosnian Serbs (see Ripley 1999).^114^ The third step of escalation was decided in the face of the fall of the UN protected enclaves Zepa and Srebrenica in July 1995 and the wish to protect the remaining enclave of Gorazde. Russia managed to convince the Bosnian Serbs not to attack Gorazde, but on 30 August 1995 a mortar attack on Sarajevo provided the trigger for NATO to implement ‘Operation Deliberate Force’. This operation concentrated on more extended bombing of targets in or near UN-declared safe areas or military targets supporting forces besieging the safe areas (see Ripley 1999 for a detailed study on this operation). It focussed on Sarajevo, seeking to force the Serbs to withdraw their heavy weaponry from the area. The goal was to ‘inflict pain’ on the Bosnian Serb military by attacking key supporting facilities and bases. The bombing campaign was considered by the Holbrooke negotiation team as leverage for their parallel efforts to hammer out a peace agreement, though they themselves had no direct influence on the NATO activities. Most analysts give the bombing some credit (though not being the only factor) in forcing the Serbian side to eventually sign the Dayton Agreement (see Holbrooke 1998:146, Burg and Shoup 1999:334pp, Weiss 1999:12).

The second instance of the use of military means for ‘peace enforcement’ was in relation to Kosovo / Yugoslavia in 1998 and 1999. As described in chapter 3.5, the Albanian resistance against Serbian control of Kosovo had changed by 1998 from a nonviolent one to an armed uprising by the Kosovo Liberation Army UCK, and was met with heavy violence from the side of Serbian troops and Special Police. In the face of growing numbers of IDPs and refugees, by the end of September 1998 the USA and Britain started to threaten FR Yugoslavia with air strikes if the Serbian forces were not withdrawn from Kosovo. In the Contact Group, Russia announced that it would veto a UN Security Council decision sanctioning air strikes.^115^ NATO decided to go ahead on its own without a UN mandate and, when negotiations were stalled, NATO gave an activation order to its air force. Shortly before the end of an


^115^ Russia has always been very critical of any actions taken against Yugoslavia and was considered an ally of Belgrade (see Buckley 2001).
ultimatum NATO had set, FR Yugoslavia agreed to withdraw its troops, and to allow the OSCE to monitor the cease-fire through a civilian Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) (see Debie 1999b, Weller 1999:22pp, Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000:46, Judah 2002:183).\footnote{Durward (2000:31) says: “In Ambassador Holbrooke’s words, it was the credible threat of imminent NATO air strikes that induced Milosevic to comply.” Also after the signing of the agreement, the NATO activation order remained standing and it was quite clear for all actors on the ground that to resume fighting would lead to NATO intervention (see Schweitzer 1999c).}

But soon after New Year 1999, there were clear indicators that violence would be resumed in Kosovo in the spring. Accompanied by repeated NATO threats to bomb Yugoslavia, the Contact Group called for negotiations that eventually were conducted in February 1999 in Rambouillet, France. The mediators there presented a proposal that included a cease-fire, autonomy, a three-year NATO peace-keeping force in Kosovo and a mechanism for finding a final political settlement for Kosovo while maintaining the territorial integrity of FR Yugoslavia (the latter two were rather contradictory, see Clark 2000:181, Dauphinee 2003, Wolff 2003:91pp). When the negotiations failed because Belgrade did not agree to the presented plan, NATO attacked – without a mandate by the UN Security Council - FR Yugoslavia on the 24 March.

Various reasons were given to justify this attack. According to General Wesley Clark (2001:185 and 205) it was to hit the Yugoslav military and police activities on the ground as rapidly and effectively as possible in order to degrade its capacity to continue repression of the civilian population, and to force President Milosevic to comply with the demands of the international community (meaning to sign the Rambouillet agreement). NATO Secretary-General Solana said one goal was to remove Milosevic from office (see Schaefer 1999, while the diplomat Grabert (1999), as well as other officials and media, spoke of the prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe. The circumstances and legitimisation of the attack are highly contentious and triggered vivid protests by civil society groups in most NATO countries. The lack of a UN mandate and the readiness to put all blame for the conflict on the Serbian side alone were the most important points here.\footnote{One example of apparent one-sidedness is the handling of the so-called Racak massacre. The OSCE mission found in the village Racak in early January 1999 45 killed persons in civilian clothes and immediately blamed Serb forces for a massacre on civilians. Later forensic reports that in addition were kept partly secret were not able to remove doubts on the interpretation of the}
When the bombings did not lead to a quick result, NATO escalated its air raids, and added more and more targets to its list (Clark 2001:317). NATO also began considering the sending of ground troops, but before a decision was made Belgrade gave in and opened negotiations on a ceasefire at the beginning of June leading to the eventual end of the bombing campaign (see Zitzlaff 1999:54, Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000:174, Kaufman 2002: xxii). Immediately after the ceasefire, on 11 June, NATO (and Russian) troops entered Kosovo, and Kosovo was put under international rule by the UN, with NATO-led KFOR as its military arm.

The NATO war on FR Yugoslavia has been subjected to very divergent political assessments. While NATO presented it as a successful case of peace enforcement to prevent much worse happening in Kosovo, for many critics – not only from the peace movements, leftist parties, and Russia but many international lawyers and politicians as well - it was a clear violation of international law, and guided by ulterior motives that had nothing to do with war or peace in Kosovo but with NATO’s need to redefine its role after the end of the Cold War (see Chomsky 1999, Loquai 2000, Ronnefeldt 2001, and the contributions in Albrecht and Schaefer (eds.) 1999).

There were at least two main factors that caused the failure of negotiation diplomacy that preceded the war: First there was a miscalculation from the side of the international community about the importance the Serbian regime gave to Kosovo - it seems that they expected Belgrade to give in as it had in 1995 regarding Bosnia. Secondly, it was an explicit part of the strategy of the Kosovo Albanians to bring

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118 Contrary to public claims, NATO bombed a number of civilian targets including schools, television stations, trains and historic monuments. A list of these targets has been compiled for a complaint before the War Crimes Tribunal by the American Association of Jurists together with jurists from Toronto (Pinter 2000). The use of depleted uranium in shells, and the bombing of oil refineries and chemical factories caused substantial health hazards throughout Serbia.

119 Some commentators suggest other motives of economic or strategic nature, some of these I find less convincing (access route to the oil in the Caspian Sea), and some blatantly far-fetched (Serbia being seen by US policy makers a potential centre of resistance to the US ‘New World Order’). For these assumed objectives, see Chossudovsky 2006, Johnstone 2000:16, and the materials collected for a civil society tribunal on the NATO war ('Internationales Europaeisches Tribunal ueber den NATO-Krieg gegen Jugoslawien' 2000).
about an international military intervention that would separate Kosovo from Serbia and thereby enable them to achieve the independence they had struggled for since the early 1990s, and consequently they had no reason to sustain the 1998 ceasefire (see Clark 2000, Layne 2000a:14, Lutz 2001, Judah 2002:103).

4.1.3.3 The Relationship Between Conflict Stage and Degree of Force Used

At first glance the review of the successes and failures in peace-making (see below) could be seen as evidence to support the assumption that the more a conflict escalates, the more pressure by the international negotiators is needed to secure an agreement. Indeed, the negotiations on the Bosnian war between 1992 and 1995, and on the Kosovo war 1998-99, were accompanied by substantial pressure in the form of sanctions and threats of military action. So although officially NATO’s bombing in Bosnia 1995 was legitimised by reference to the need to protect Sarajevo and other UN protected areas, Holbrooke (1998) in his account of the shuttle negotiations in summer-autumn 1995 is quite frank about his hope that NATO’s intensified bombing would put pressure on President Milosevic to come to an agreement.

However, first impressions may be false, and indeed at second glance the story of the negotiations in the former Yugoslavia raises doubts about this assumption of a definite empirical link between ‘showing muscle’ and negotiation success:

• Generally speaking, there can be no doubt that in the case of Bosnia in summer 1995 the intervention of international parties was decisive, both in “helping to produce a new balance of forces on the ground and in pressuring parties to sign an agreement about which they were ambivalent at best” (Cousens and Cater 2001:26). Otherwise there would have been no negotiations and no treaty without the international intervention. But observers who studied the NATO bombing campaign argue that the military balance on the ground, and the joint Bosniak-Croat ground attack, were as decisive as NATO’s bombing in creating a ‘ripe moment’ for the negotiations to succeed (see Burg and Shoup 1999:408pp, Ripley 1999, Schneckener 2002:45). Therefore, to attribute the success of Dayton

120 This was found to be the common view of all negotiators who published their accounts. For a more theoretical assessment, see for example Clément 1997:10.
solely to the NATO bombing is to overrate the significance of international military force in this case.

- On the other hand, the Washington Agreement of 1994, ending the war between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, seems to have been achieved without much negative pressure but rather with a promise by the USA to step up its military and perhaps also financial support after the end of the war. According to an interview reprinted in the magazine of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly at that time, the initiative for and the contents of this agreement did not even come from the USA at all but from a (Croat) member of the Bosnian Presidency, Prof. Dr. Ivo Komsic, who claims that he had to persuade people from the US Senate, Congress, State Department and Vice President Gore to support the suggested agreement (Radio Zid 1994).

- The same is true for the Erdut Agreement on Eastern Slavonia that prevented a new military offensive by Croatia: There was certainly some urgency on the part of international mediators, but again the agreement was reached without any clear threat to use military force.

Looking at these three examples, there is no clear relationship between level of escalation and degree of pressure exerted. Ripe moments and stalemates (Zartman and Touval 1985), ‘carrots’ and a feeling for the political possible seem to have played the decisive role. These findings are by no means conclusive – that would have needed a far more in-depth study than the survey done here. But I believe that the indicators found justify the call for a renewed study on the relation between force and negotiation.¹²¹

4.1.4 Peace-making: A Picture of Mixed Results

To conclude this section: in spite of the assessment that “almost no instrument fell so much into discredit as that of negotiation diplomacy” (Calic 1995:187, translation CS), there was a significant range of more-or-less successful peace-making initiatives.

¹²¹ An earlier version of this section 4.1.3.3 that was fundamentally rewritten for this purpose here has been submitted in the final report to the German Foundation Peace Research that funded the original study on which this thesis is based (Schweitzer 2005).
• In July-August of 1991 the EC ‘troika’ of current, former and future EC Presidencies had the lead in the negotiations to end the conflict in Slovenia. This led to a cease-fire agreement (Brioni Agreement) and the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army from Slovenia.\textsuperscript{122}

• In November 1991 the UN Secretary-General sent an envoy, Cyrus Vance, who succeeded where the EC had failed. On 23 November a cease-fire was agreed at the UN headquarters in Geneva between Milosevic, Tudjman and the Yugoslav Minister of Defence Kadijevic.\textsuperscript{123} The fighting did not immediately stop, but on 28 November the JNA finally withdrew from Croatia after the Croatian army lifted its blockade of the JNA barracks. The cease-fire was finally signed on 2 January 1992, and the UN committed itself to send peace-keeping forces to Croatia.\textsuperscript{124}

• In September 1992 the EC monitors at local level, and ICFY at higher level negotiated the withdrawal of the JNA from Prevlaka (Croatia) and the subsequently demilitarisation of the peninsula (see Gow 1997:106).\textsuperscript{125}

• The US mediated behind closed doors the Washington Agreement in March 1994 between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats that ended the violence and created the Federation between Croats and Muslims.\textsuperscript{126}

• The Contact Group mediated the Erdut Agreement on Eastern Slavonia concluded in November 1995.\textsuperscript{127}

• Mediation by shuttle diplomacy conducted by the US negotiation team in the


\textsuperscript{123} Thereby including the JNA as a negotiating partner – something the EC had failed to do (Woodward 1995:183).


\textsuperscript{127} See the section on UNTAES below in 4.3.2, and Holbrooke 1998:266pp, Markovic 2000:244, Schoup 2001:389.
conflict between Macedonia and Greece eventually ended with an interim agreement between the two countries signed on 13\textsuperscript{th} September 1995 (see Ackermann 2000:122pp).

- The Dayton Agreement of December 1995 ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was prepared by shuttle mediation undertaken by the US negotiation team led by Holbrooke.\textsuperscript{128}

- During March-May 2001, NATO, the OSCE and the USA negotiated the end of the armed Albanian uprising in the Presevo valley in South Serbia (International Crisis Group 2003d).


- In early 2003, the EU mediated an agreement between Serbia and Montenegro to found a confederation (Klotz 2002:245).

On the other side there have been whole years spent with unsuccessful negotiations:


- EC / EU, UN and Contact Group all failed to secure the agreement of all sides to the different peace plans proposed for Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1994.

- NATO and the OSCE’s efforts to stop the escalation of violence in Kosovo in

\textsuperscript{128} To call the Dayton conference a face-to-face meeting may be misleading. Mostly the parties stayed in different rooms, and the negotiators went from one to the other. Holbrooke uses the term ‘proximity talks’.

There is no full agreement in the literature on why Dayton was successful. It was probably a mix of different factors, among them

\begin{itemize}
  \item the international community speaking finally with one voice,
  \item the escalation of the enforcement means,
  \item Croatia and Serbia being in basic agreement (to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina),
  \item a military balance achieved in summer / autumn 1995.
\end{itemize}

1998 achieved only short-term relief, undone by the failure of the February 1999 Rambouillet conference.\footnote{As in the case of Dayton, some shuttle mediation prepared the conference itself, but it was orchestrated from the beginning with the threat by NATO to bomb Yugoslavia if the Serbian troops did not stop their fighting. The Contact Group had defined a list of ‘non-negotiable principles’ for Rambouillet. Two of them were irreconcilable: the territorial integrity of FR Yugoslavia and mechanisms for a final political settlement for Kosovo. See Zitzlaff 1999:42, Zumach 1999:66, Clark 2000:250, Buendnis 90-Die Grünen Bundestagsfraktion 2001:18pp, Dannreuther 2001:19pp, Judah 2002:144, 201,220; Kaufman 2002:172pp, Dauphinee 2003, Wolff 2003:91pp.} The negotiators probably were guided by the false assumption that Milosevic would cave in when faced with the threat of military intervention as he had before Dayton (see Clark 2001:185, Dannreuther 2001:23, Kaufman 2002:177pp).

### 4.2 The Use of Peace-keeping Instruments

Peace-keeping has been defined here as the prevention of direct violence through influence or control of the behaviour of potential perpetrators.

In the area of former Yugoslavia during the time under consideration there were a large number of peace-keeping missions with different mandates, scope and character.

#### 4.2.1 Military Peace-keeping Missions

The first military peace-keeping mission was the United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR). UNPROFOR was set up in January 1992 (by UNSCR 727 and 743) to monitor the borders between the government-controlled and Serb-held territories within Croatia. For that purpose, four ‘UN Protected Areas-UNPA’ were created along the zones. In December 1992 UNPROFOR was split into three units: UNPROFOR I in Croatia, being renamed UNCRO in 1995 before being withdrawn in January 1996, II in Bosnia-Herzegovina until end of 1995 and III from January 1993 in Macedonia, renamed the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force Macedonia (UNPREDEP) in 1995 and withdrawn in 1999. UNPROFOR’s mandate was changed and enlarged several times between 1992 and 1995.\footnote{The deployment grew from 11,000 troops in Croatia to (figures from March 1995) 38,599 military personnel, including 684 United Nations military observers. The Force also included 803 civilian police, 2,017 other international civilian staff and 2,615 local staff. The expenses for UNPROFOR would have been...} In Gow’s words,
UNPROFOR’s “de facto mandate was to create and maintain a stalemate on the ground to allow international diplomacy to work” (Gow 1997:102). Over time it took on a number of roles (see Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:276pp):

- Peace-keeping functions in and at the border of four UN-Protected Areas in Croatia;
- Performance of immigration and customs functions on Croatia's borders;
- Monitoring of cease-fires in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
- Providing security and functioning of the Sarajevo airport; including the delivery of humanitarian aid through the airport;
- Delivery of humanitarian assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina, protection of UNHCR aid convoys;\(^{131}\)
- Monitoring of military withdrawals, heavy equipment removal, and demilitarisation of the Prevlaka peninsula;
- Passive monitoring of a flight ban over Bosnia-Herzegovina (its active enforcement was later given as a mandate to NATO),
- Deterring attacks against the so-called ‘safe areas’ in Bosnia (Srebenica, Sarajevo, Zepa, Gorazde, Tuzla and Bihac) that were created by the UN to protect these ethnic enclaves.

UNPROFOR is generally not considered to have been a successful peace-keeping mission. Croatia criticised its failure to implement the demilitarisation of the Serbian territories and their return to Croatia. In 1995, others noted that UNPROFOR could merely watch while Croatia reoccupied by force most of the Serb-held territories (Fetherston 1994:77, Gow 1997:104pp). In Bosnia-Herzegovina it undoubtedly contributed enormously to the humanitarian relief efforts (see Owen 1995:349 and 366). In many cases its presence contributed to the security in the area, and it separated the Croatian and Muslim troops after the Washington Agreement in 1994.

\(^{131}\) In 1993 alone, almost 5,000 UNHCR convoys were escorted (Hillen 2000:172).
On the other hand, the humanitarian convoys were also regularly used by Bosnians as a cover for attacks on the Serbian troops (see Ripley 1999:121). UNPROFOR often appeared helpless in the face of the ongoing violence and, because of the vulnerability of its own troops, was viewed by many politicians as more of a liability than an asset. It proved unable to give protection to two of the so-called safe areas (Zepa and Srebrenica) when the Serbian troops decided to occupy them in 1995 (see Leurdijk 1996:60p, Gow 1997:127, Sloan 1998:28, Ripley 1999:114).\(^{132}\) Two of its main problems were the lack of resources and an unrealistic mandate (Weiss 1999:97). Hillen (2000:195) identifies three reasons for the failure of UNPROFOR: the lack of co-operation from the warring parties, inadequate numbers to form a deterrent presence in a very difficult terrain, and the incapacity to use active force.\(^{133}\)

The military peace-keeping mission of the UN in Macedonia, although a part of UNPROFOR, had a very particular threefold mandate: 1) To monitor parts of border areas with Albania and FR Yugoslavia, 2) To strengthen Macedonia’s stability by providing preventive forces, and 3) To report on developments that would constitute a threat to the country, meaning an attack by FR Yugoslavia on Macedonia. Initially reducing tensions between Albanians and Macedonians was a secondary concern, mainly left to the OSCE, but it later came to receive more attention. UNPREDEP came to a premature end when China vetoed its continuation in February 1999 (in retaliation for Macedonia recognising Taiwan in the hopes of obtaining a loan - Ackermann 2003:118). The Macedonia mission has been evaluated very positively, almost all analysts acknowledging its role in enhancing the sense of security within the country and strengthening the moderate political orientation of the Gligorov administration (see Moeller 1997:293pp, Ackermann 2000:121, Lund 2000c:199).

Subsequently in 2001 NATO carried out a short-term disarmament mission in Macedonia, ‘Operation Essential Harvest’, after the Ohrid Peace Agreement brought an end to the flare-up of violence between Albanian rebels and the Macedonian government. It collected about 3,000 weapons and was declared successful by

\(^{132}\) The behaviour of the troops on the ground varied considerably. In several cases UN forces went beyond pure self-defence, as for example when British troops held Serbian troops in May 1995 at Gorazde until Muslim troops were able to take over.

\(^{133}\) Weiss (1999:131pp) developed an assessment of military costs and civilian benefits from UNPROFOR’s intervention that lists costs, casualties and political impact as well as civilian benefits in different areas.
NATO, although observers noted that little real disarmament had taken place, with only old weapons having been handed in (see Petruzeva 2001, Vankovska 2002).\textsuperscript{134}

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Dayton Accords charged NATO with the deployment of a ‘robust’ military peace-keeping force with 58,000 troops to ensure the exact delineation of the agreed cease-fire and inter-entity boundaries, the separation of forces, and demilitarisation.\textsuperscript{135} After a year, the ‘Implementation Force’ IFOR was renamed Stabilization Force (SFOR) whose mandate included also securing free movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, humanitarian work and support to civilian organisations, securing elections, protection of minority return and other tasks (see Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:17pp).\textsuperscript{136}

The overall purpose of post-war peace-keeping in Bosnia has been to create a secure environment in which reconstruction and peace-building could take place. Generally it has been considered highly successful (unlike its predecessor UNPROFOR) thanks to the ‘robustness’ of its Chapter VII mandate, its more limited focus, and the greater degree of acceptance and legitimacy it enjoys since it came after the cease-fire (see the literature cited above).

The ‘Kosovo Force’ KFOR was mandate by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 after the end of the NATO war. It is based on and led by NATO, but also includes troops from non-NATO-states including Russia. Initially it comprised 46,000 to 50,000 soldiers (42,500 in Kosovo and the rest in Macedonia) and its overall mandate was formulated along similar lines to that of SFOR: To establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and order; to monitor, verify and when necessary, enforce compliance with the agreements that ended the conflict; and to provide assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (KFOR Information n.d.).

\textsuperscript{134} The almost daily articles published in \textit{die tageszeitung} between 8 August and 27 September) were also a source.

\textsuperscript{135} By UNSCR 1031. The numbers were gradually reduced. In 2003, 12,000 troops remained. IFOR’s very limited mandate was criticised and led to the eventual change of the mandate one year later. So for example IFOR refused to accompany and protect minority returns (see Riegler 1999:51).

\textsuperscript{136} In 2004, the European Union took over the peace-keeping from NATO, and SFOR became EUFOR with a current strength (in 2008) of 6,500 troops (see the webpage of EUFOR, <www.euforBosnia-Herzegovina.org>).

Another of its functions has been to deter a new attack by FR Yugoslavia. Besides the pure peace-keeping tasks like separation of the armed forces, prevention of violence, de-mining, disarmament etc., KFOR also involved itself in a wide variety of peace-building activities including reconstruction, food distribution and provision of medical services.\footnote{On these activities, see Clark 2001:410p, Reinhard 2001, Kaufman 2002:200, Judah 2002:284p, O’Neill 2002:43pp, KFOR Information n.d. and KFOR Objectives/Mission n.d.}

KFOR has been criticised for its inadequate protection of the Serbian minority on occasions, and its failure to function effectively during the days of ‘ethnic’ clashes in 2004 (Judah 2002:288, O’Neill 2002:44, 107, Skoglund 2004.).\footnote{Reinhardt (2002), the second KFOR commander, considers KFOR a success and claims that it fulfilled its mandate.}

On three occasions in former Yugoslavia, troops capable of military enforcement have been deployed to protect (military or civilian) peace-keepers, although none of them saw major action:

- Sanctioned by UN Security Council Resolution 998, France and Britain sent about 10,000 troops as a Rapid Deployment Force to Bosnia-Herzegovina in June-July 1995 (see Ripley 1999:130pp).\footnote{See also Krech 1997:132, Lucarelli 2000:68, Markovic 2000:206p, Kaufman 2002:118.} They were meant to protect an eventual withdrawal of UNPROFOR that was foreseen at that stage as necessary to give NATO free hand with militarily enforcing an end of the war.
- The third was ‘Operation Amber Fox’ in Macedonia, set up by NATO in 2001-2002 with around 700 troops in the follow-up to Operation Essential Harvest. Its mandate was to protect the civilian EU and OSCE monitors overseeing the implementation of the peace plan. (see International Crisis Group 2002c, Saskova 2003)\footnote{In 2003, the EU took over responsibility for the deployment, and Amber Fox became Concordia. It was in 2004 replaced by a Police Operation (‘Proxima’)}

One further type of military peace-keeping needs to be mentioned here, observer missions such as those deployed in the Prevlaka peninsula 1992-2002. Mostly these observer missions were part of the respective overall peace-keeping mission in the
region. They served as ‘eyes and ears’ of the UN, sought to deter atrocities, acted as mediators between warring parties (for example in Mostar in summer 1993 and in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the winter of 1993-1994) and as confidence builders for the local population (Husum 1998).

4.2.2 Civilian Peace-keeping

There have been two larger-scale civilian peace-keeping missions. They are of special interest from the point of view of nonviolent intervention because they are early examples of civilian peace-keeping organised by intergovernmental organisations.¹⁴¹

The first was the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM, later EUMM, from 1991-2007).¹⁴² In July 1991 the ECMM was sent to Slovenia and Croatia with a typical peace-keeping mandate, namely to help establish the ceasefire by

- Lifting the blockade of JNA units and facilities,
- Facilitating the unconditional return of JNA units to their barracks,
- Clearing roads,
- Effecting the return of all facilities and equipment to JNA,
- Monitoring the deactivation of territorial defence units and their return to quarters,
- Monitoring the suspension of the implementation of declarations of independence for the agreed period of three months in 1991,
- If and when required, monitoring the release and return of prisoners detained in connection with hostilities since 25 June 1991 in cooperation with ICRC

¹⁴¹ Though their civilian character however was limited since they operated in heavily militarised scenarios. The Kosovo Verification Mission was even protected by a NATO Extraction Force (see above).

¹⁴² They were mainly recruited from civil servants (diplomats) and the military (professional soldiers). Besides the (then 12) EC countries also Canada, Sweden and some Eastern European countries participated. The head of the mission automatically came from the country which had the EC (EU) presidency, and changed every six months (as did most of the monitors, few of whom had contracts for longer than six months.) The EUMM in the Western Balkans came to an end formally on 31 December 2007, during its final years only maintaining a presence in Montenegro and Albania. For ECMM / EUMM in general, see Mercier 1995:29, Zimmermann 1996:172, Giersch 1998:96pp and 129pp, Ripley 1999:57, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:88, Weller 1999:220, ICVA 2000, Goulding 2002:303.
With the deployment of UNPROFOR in 1992, the mandate of ECMM changed. It concentrated then on those thematic and geographic areas which did not fall under the UNPROFOR mandate, gathering information on ceasefire violations, military movements, the local civil situation and the status of implementation of the Vance Peace Plan of 1991 (the plan that had led to the deployment of UNPROFOR I). They also accompanied international negotiator teams, brokered local cease-fires, helped with the exchange of prisoners of war, escorted (without arms) humanitarian aid, reported on human rights violations, etc.\textsuperscript{143}

At the end of 1992 EC monitors were also sent (on request by these states) to Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Macedonia. The intention of these deployments was to prevent ‘spill-over’, and to monitor the security situation (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:88pp). After 1996 they started working in Kosovo, and in November 1999 deployed observers to FR Yugoslavia to monitor the political and security developments, and facilitate contacts between the parties (Mauro 2002:303). In March 2001, EUMM also became active in the North West of Macedonia (European Union Monitoring Mission n.d.).\textsuperscript{144}

In Croatia the ECMM ran into many problems. It faced logistical dilemmas and suffered from poor communication and confusion over objectives and priorities. The Serbs saw the monitors as spies for Croatia, while in Croatia they were considered highly ineffective and usually referred to by the nick-name ‘ice-cream men’ because of their white uniforms (see Maloney 1997, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:88pp, Weller 1999:220, Lucarelli 2000:26pp). Nevertheless, they may have achieved more on the ground than they were credited with at the time, preventing small incidents from leading to major confrontations (see Gow 1997:106, Libal 1997:49, Girsch 1998:98).

Under the threat of NATO intervention in Kosovo in the autumn of 1998, the Yugoslav government under Milosevic agreed at the end of October 1998 to the deployment of a ‘Kosovo Verification Mission’ (KVM) under the umbrella of OSCE

\textsuperscript{143} They also became involved in small-scale humanitarian aid, for example delivering letters across border-lines, locating missing people etc. (EUMM 2004)

\textsuperscript{144} At that time, it consisted of approximately 100 monitors seconded by EU member states as well as by Norway and Slovakia.
An unarmed OSCE mission was acceptable to both sides, although the Kosovo-Albanian leadership would have preferred an armed peacekeeping force. Deployment began in November 1998, but not having the personnel (or equipment) ready, the Mission only reached around 75% of the agreed number of 2,000 staff before it was withdrawn on March 20, 1999 after the collapse of the Rambouillet negotiations. Its mandate was to establish a permanent presence throughout Kosovo, monitor the ceasefire agreed between OSCE and FR Yugoslavia in October 1998 and to report ceasefire violations, conduct border monitoring, facilitate the return of refugees along with ICRC and UNHCR, and it was also anticipated that they would supervise elections in Kosovo. The Verifiers established permanent outposts in crisis areas, visited places where fighting was reported, monitored several court trials, conducted weapons verification inspections, accompanied Serbian police and Serbian investigators to places controlled by the UCK, and sought to intervene actively if they came across violent incidents (Loquai 2000:42, 60; the Kosovo Updates from 1999, OSCE 1999e, OSCE 1999f, Walker 1999).

The evaluation of KVM is rather contested. On the one hand, it undoubtedly managed to reduce violence by talking to both sides and convincing them to contain localised outbreaks of violence. In addition, their mere presence played a role in restraining violence (Walker 1999, Loquai 2000:62). Specifically, at the beginning of the mission the ceasefire was respected. Both the Serbs and the more moderate commanders of the UCK were willing to stop fighting, which gave a chance for stabilisation of the situation. Refugees and displaced persons returned in greater numbers as the fighting calmed down (Loquai 2000:61, Wenig 1999/2000:89). According to Wenig (1999 and 2000:84) even in January-February 1999 when the situation became tense again, the arrival of KVM personnel on the scene usually had a de-escalating effect.

On the other hand the Verifiers could not contain the violence. There were attacks on police and civilians all the time in varying degrees, and increasingly also on the


146 “The first weeks of deployment had shown that in those areas where verifiers were present, the number of incidents decreased.” (Wenig 1999:83p, translation CS)
Verifiers themselves (see OSCE 1999g, and the Kosovo Updates from 27.1.99, 22.2.99, 23.2.99, 26.2.99). The agreement to deploy KVM was also flawed because it was an agreement between the USA and FR Yugoslavia, with the UCK not being a party to it, and not feeling bound by it (Calic 1998b, Loquai 2000:24 and 54, Riedel and Kalman 2000:157, Schweitzer 1999c). As Judah (2002:198) and Loquai (2000:62) point out, the cease-fire was also used by the UCK to move back into its strongholds as soon as the Yugoslavs withdrew, probably in preparation for a new offensive in spring 1999.

My evaluation would be that under the circumstances KVM was deployed - with one party of the conflict explicitly hoping to bring about the military intervention already threatened against the other party - the KVM was surprisingly successful in the field.

Some opponents of NATO intervention have voiced the suspicion that the KVM was no more than a smoke screen to prepare the NATO campaign and spy out military targets for NATO (see Scheffran 1999:63, Loquai 2000:36p). The facts in the sources and secondary literature, however, all tend to indicate that NATO was already prepared and willing to attack, not wishing a second protracted war like in Bosnia, but that it did not have a primary overriding interest in starting this war as soon as a pretext offered itself.

There were several other missions and organisations with peace-keeping roles and functions:

- The Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), consisting of diplomats of the USA, Russia and the EU accredited to Belgrade, was created in July 1998 before the deployment of the KVM, and continued on in close cooperation with the OSCE until the two missions eventually were merged. Its tasks were reporting, escorting staff, investigating incidents, patrolling, and meeting village leaders to discuss security. See Petritsch et al. 1999:225, Troebst 1999, Zitzlaff 1999:42, Kaufman 2002:162, as well as the KDOM Daily Reports and KDOM Updates.

- International police (IPTF/ CIVPOL and EUPM) were deployed by the UN or the EU at one point or the other in almost all countries of former Yugoslavia. They have usually had a mandate that focussed on training of local police (which would fall under peace-building), but many of them also had a monitoring element to their mandate including dealing with incidents of political violence and how ethnic minorities were treated by the local police forces. The IPT in Kosovo from 1999 onward has been one of the first international police missions with an executive mandate, meaning that they have the right to arrest people themselves rather than only accompanying local forces. For the International Police missions, see Eide and Holm 2000, Hartz 2000, Gourlay 2004, Orsini 2004.

- UNHCR being UN’s lead agency to deal with the humanitarian crises in former Yugoslavia also had a clearly protection-related mandate, e.g. through its presence at vulnerable places. There were also cases when UNHCR helped threatened groups to leave the area or the country, although this was mostly the initiative of the staff on the ground and not part of their mandate. To avoid the accusation of helping with ethnic cleansing, UNHCR was not supposed to help people escape (see Woodward 1995:319 and 325, Otim 1996:121). For UNHCR in general, see the webpage http://www.unhcr.ba/, and also Mercier 1995:40 and 49, Woodward 1995:243, Gow 1997, Weiss 1999:108 and 117; Ackermann 2000:174, UNHCR 2000a, International Crisis Group 2002-b, UNHCR 2003.
4.2.3 Peace-keeping: Another Picture of Mixed Results

Peace-keeping interventions took place during each phase of the conflict’s escalation. There were not only missions after cease-fire agreements were concluded (SFOR, KFOR, KVM), but also during war (UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ECMM), and in one case as a preventive deployment (UNPROFOR/UNPREDEP in Macedonia).

As discussed above, the evaluation of each of the different military peace-keeping missions has been contested, with UNPROFOR II in Bosnia being probably on the negative end of the spectrum, and SFOR and UNPROFOR III / UNPREDEP rated most positively. The experience of these missions has also informed deliberations within the UN. The most important general conclusion drawn was that no future peace-keeping missions should be mobilised without a cease-fire first being established. They should also have clear and realistic mandates, and missions should be deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to ensure enforcement capacity. Another consequence has also been that the deployment of large-scale missions (Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1995, Kosovo 1999) became a role for NATO (see Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999, Hillen 2000:246pp, van Brabant 2001).

As to the civilian missions, once again there has been no consensus regarding their achievements. One side has drawn from the experiences in former Yugoslavia the conclusion that peace-keeping needs the capacity of armed enforcement, and that unarmed observers have no place in war. In this view, they can even tempt perpetrators to attack because they cannot defend themselves (see Seidt 2002:47). The other side believes that in spite of difficult circumstances the civilian missions in the former Yugoslavia are examples that unarmed peace-keeping may work, and that civilian large-scale peace-keeping is an instrument with significant potential (see Schweitzer et al. 2001).

4.3 The Use of Peace-building Instruments

Peace-building has been defined as all those activities that address structural issues and relationships between the conflict parties in an effort to reverse the destructive processes of conflict and war.
As a strategy it covers a much broader range of activities than the other two, peace-keeping and peace-making. The enormous amount and diversity of activities makes it very difficult to come to a good summary overview of such initiatives in relation to the Yugoslav conflicts.

The understanding of most of the external actors engaged in peace-building is that its overall objective is to help create a sustainable situation, marked by the absence of violent conflict and by rule of law, a state taking adequate care of the needs of its citizens, a democratic system with parties and elections, a vibrant civil society, free media and a working economy capable of providing sustained income to the population (see Licklider 2001:749pp, CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects 2006:10pp).149

4.3.1 Peace-building Activities by State Actors

Peace-building has been the strategy where civil society actors were as involved as state actors. Also, unlike in peace-making and peace-keeping where international organisations and state governments dominated the field, sub-state entities like regions, states (‘bundeslaender’), municipalities etc. have been involved in various peace-building activities (see Coletti et al. 2007).150

4.3.1.1 Humanitarian Relief

In humanitarian relief, UNHCR played the lead role during the periods of war in the coordination of material aid and support for IDPs and refugees (Cutts 1999, Ruessmann 1999c).

149 None of these objectives is value-free. The international community intervening in the former Yugoslavia (and in most other conflicts in other parts of the world) sees itself as part of the Western culture, and is seeking to implement its understanding and visions on how state and society have to look like and to interact.

150 See Coletti et al. 2007 for a discussion of the role of sub-state authorities in the conflicts of the Balkans.

A well-known example is the initiative Causes Communes which was founded in 1993 by Swiss and Belgium communities. Causes Communes in which more than half of all Belgium communities participated, formed partnerships on the community level with refugee camps in former Yugoslavia, mostly collecting humanitarian aid for them (see Busch 1992, Large n.d.:19).
Individual governments provided large sums of money and sent their aid organisations. There are no total figures, but perhaps the following give an impression of the size of aid that went to the area.

- UNHCR sent 950,000 metric tonnes of humanitarian assistance to some 2.7 million beneficiaries in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 (Cutts 1999:2).
- According to one statistic, Bosnia-Herzegovina alone in 1995 received US$ 391 million emergency aid which put it on the top of the list of aid recipients that year (Fearon 2006).
- Between July 1992 and end of 1995, UNHCR also co-ordinated an airlift to Sarajevo that delivered an estimated 160,000 tonnes of food, medicines and other goods to Sarajevo in over 12,000 flights (Cutts 1999:18) In 1994 alone, 55,000 tonnes came by airlift, and around 27,000 by truck (Weiss 1999:109).

4.3.1.2 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Soldiers (‘DDR’)

Where peace-keeping forces were deployed, DDR came under their mandate. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the demobilisation was supervised by IFOR / SFOR, and financed by the World Bank. Of the estimated 400,000 soldiers in 1995, around 370,000 were demobilised by 2000 (King, Dorn and Hodes 2002:10pp). In Kosovo, the UCK was officially disbanded, the weapons collected and stored in sites watched by KFOR, and the fighters either were supported in going back to civil life, or became part of the Kosovo Protection Corps that was intended to be an unarmed civil relief organisation helping with reconstruction. Some also were accepted into the newly formed police service (KFOR n.d.-a and b, O’Neill 2002:43pp, Reinhardt 2002:40 and 571). In Macedonia in 2001, NATO as mentioned in 4.2.1 collected weapons from the Albanian rebels after the Ohrid peace agreement.

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152 At the same time, the USA ran the ‘Train and Equip’ programme mentioned above, using a private mercenary firm (MPRI) to train Bosnian government soldiers (the RS was at first not included in the programme). See Krech 1997:138, King, Dorn and Hodes 2002.
153 IOM for example set up Employment Assistance centres and ran training programmes (Core 2002:51, Clark 2002, 19).
4.3.1.3 Physical Reconstruction and Refugee Return

Physical reconstruction has mostly been financed with international government money, and governmental as well as non-governmental agencies took care of much of the implementation (see chapter 7).\(^\text{154}\)

Reconstruction has been closely linked to refugee return: Soon after the Dayton Agreement the countries hosting refugees wished them to return which gave in consequence a boost to reconstruction efforts.\(^\text{155}\) On the ground, refugee return was the primary responsibility of UNHCR (see UNHCR 1999a, 2003a and 2004). It has been one of main challenges in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Initially UNHCR and other implementers emphasised repatriation to areas where displaced could be assured of their security which basically meant those areas where their own ethnic group was the majority. So-called minority return gathered pace only several years after the end of the war.\(^\text{156}\)

Another state actor involved in reconstruction (and in humanitarian aid) has been the military. Sometimes these were private initiatives of the soldiers involved.\(^\text{157}\) Frequently, however, international forces used humanitarian aid and reconstruction aid as a means to gain acceptance in the population - aid became here an element of force protection (Lambach 2004:9): It was part of IFOR’s mandate to rebuild schools

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\(^\text{154}\) To give a figure of the challenge the task of reconstruction posed: In Bosnia nearly 500,000 dwellings were damaged or destroyed of which by 2000-2001, 125,000 dwellings had been rehabilitated (Wilkinson 2001). In Kosovo, some 120,000 homes were damaged during the war, with 49,000 beyond repair (United States Committee for Refugees 2001).

\(^\text{155}\) Host countries of the Bosnian refugees adopted various policies. Austria after first seeking to restrict the immigration in 1992, offered all Bosnians work permits from 1993 on, an offer that 60,000 Bosnians accepted. Sweden offered the same for its 58,000 war refugees (though deporting Albanians from Kosovo, as did many other European countries as well before 1998), and so did Denmark, Norway and Turkey. Switzerland and Germany (who had hosted between 320,000 and 400,000 war refugees) sought quick repatriation and enforced it for those who did not accept to leave voluntarily, against the concerns raised by UNHCR. All countries provided some sort of financial aid for the returnees, and also facilitated test visits to prepare the return (see Woodward 1995:364, Krech 1007:172, Oschlies 1997:93pp and 118pp).

\(^\text{156}\) In the first two years, returns to the Republika Srpska (RS) were minimal. After 1997, minority returns stepped up. UNHCR announced in 2004 that in total 1,000,473 people had returned to their home areas. (All figures from Kleck 2007-a:107p and ‘Over A Million Bosnians Back Home’ 2004).

\(^\text{157}\) For example Italian soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina made collections at home of food, toys and clothes for distribution in refugee camps. A Norwegian Battalion in their free time repaired and cleaned schools and football fields in their free time. Turkish soldiers collected money among themselves and spend it on assistance (e.g. buying watches for blind children). A Canadian Army surgeon worked once a week in hospital in Kosovo to do operations, and German soldiers formed a organisation called ‘Lachen helfen’ – ‘Help to laugh’ (Hilaj 1998, Blix 1999, Paulsen 1999, Andersen 2000, Lambach 2004:7).
and hospitals, and restore key telecommunication assets. Their Civil-Military-Cooperation (CIMIC) team had 350 specialists (lawyers, educators, public transportation specialists, engineers, agricultural experts, economists, public health officials, veterinarians, communication experts) who gave technical advice and assistance to various commissions and working groups, civilian organisations, NGOs and local authorities (Joulwan and Shoemaker 1998, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:17pp, Riegler 1999:20pp and 50pp, Lambach 2004).

The same is true for KFOR which engaged public works and utilities, construction, transportation, railway operations, fire services, food distribution, removal of unexploded ordnance, mine-awareness education, medical services, etc. (KFOR Objectives/Mission n.d.-b).

4.3.1.4 Social and Psycho-social Work

In this field, the international state actors mainly played the role of donors financing NGOs doing the work, or working through their specialised development organisations. This kind of work will be described more in chapter 7 below.

4.3.1.5 Economic Recovery

While both state and non-state actors worked and continue to work in this field, the big financial aid and reconstruction programmes usually came from states and international organisations like EU, USA, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 159

According to Woodward (2002:185) economic aid is serving three basic purposes:
1. Reviving the economy to buy confidence in the peace process;
2. Funding to implement specific commitments laid down in the peace agreement;
3. Laying economic foundations necessary to sustain peace over the longer term.

158 For example, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates that participated with a small troop in KFOR built a hospital in Vucitrn that served the local population (Reinhardt 2002:467).

159 Financial aid by the EU between 1991-1999: Bosnia-Herzegovina: 2,061.87 m €, Croatia 353.76 m €, FR Yugoslavia: 471.80 m €, Macedonia 403.89 m €, Regional Cooperation 462.15 m €. Member states of the EU gave to Bosnia-Herzegovina: 507.90 m €, Croatia 1,165.9 0m €, FR Yugoslavia: 712.40 m €, Macedonia 178.20 m €, which sums up to 16,956 million € by the European Union to former Yugoslavia (Polzer 2000:143pp).
For Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1995 several donor conferences were held which decided on substantial multilateral and bilateral aid (see Schneckener 2003:57pp). The Office of the High Commissioner (OHR) was also involved with privatisation of enterprises, and with making economic contracts.

In Kosovo, UNMIK (see below) took over the administration of the entire public sector, handling the management of 370 socially owned enterprises, and sold some of them, for example the Trepca Mines, to international firms (Pugh 2000:10, Del Re 2003:88).

After the war in Kosovo in 1999 the EU created the Stability Pact for South East Europe that targeted not only all countries in former Yugoslavia, but all South-East Europe including Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary etc. It is based on the assumption that only economic recovery and democratisation would bring sustainable peace to the region. In three so-called tables it deals with Democracy and Human Rights, Economic Development and Security. Its goals are trust building and to further regional solidarity and cooperation of the countries in the region, strengthen tolerance, democratisation, human rights etc, improve the security in the region, support economic recovery and market economy, and eventually bring the countries closer to Europe (see Stability Pact 2001).

Some of the donors also engaged in direct help, for example offering micro-credits like the World Bank did in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Pugh 2000:13). In Kosovo after the NATO war a number of European financial institutes and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD) together founded a Micro Enterprise Bank to provide loans to small enterprises (Behrens 2002:136, CORE 2002, Reinhardt 2002:349).

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4.3.1.6 Transitional Justice

The term ‘transitional justice’ emerged in the 1990s (Buckley-Zistel 2007). It is defined as

a range of approaches that societies undertake to reckon with legacies of widespread or systematic human rights abuse as they move from a period of violent conflict or oppression towards peace, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for individual and collective rights. (International Center for Transitional Justice 2008a)

Several recent publications on the issue that all seek to give an overview of the different (judicial and non-judicial) approaches more or less agree (while using slightly varying terminology) on the following list of activities (Buckley-Zistel 2007, International Center for Transitional Justice 2008a, Zupan 2007): Fact-finding and documentation, lustration, truth commissions; prosecution of perpetrators of human rights abuse before both national and international courts; victims’ reparation; ‘dealing with the past’, including working with victims on traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms; establishment of memorials and museums; and – to be discussed in this study under the sub-section ‘rebuilding public institutions’ - institutional reform and formal and non-formal education.

The OSCE and the UN have been the two international organisations most closely involved in human rights monitoring, together with a number of civil society actors. From the side of governments, especially the Special Envoy sent by the Secretary General of the United Nations and his reports played an important role, as did reports by the CSCE / OSCE (see Krech 1997:71, Lucarelli 2000:38pp).

Special mention needs to be made of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague that was created by the United Nations (UN Security Council No 827 in May 1993) during the war in Bosnia. 162 163 Its purposes are

162 ICTY’s full name is: “International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of the International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991”.

163 Other activities on transitional justice have been undertaken by the national governments. In Serbia, President Kostunica established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in February 2002. It had a three-year mandate but was disbanded in February 2003 without having undertaken any substantial research (International Center for Transitional Justice 2008c, ‘Keine Chance auf Versoehnung’ 2003, ‘Yugoslavia to set up ‘truth commission’ on war crimes’ 2001). In 2003 however, a War Crimes Chamber at the Belgrade District Court was established in 2003 and in 2004 opened the first trial concerning the killing of some 200 people seized from a hospital in
to bring to justice persons allegedly responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law, to render justice to the victims, to deter further crimes, [and] to contribute to the restoration of peace by promoting reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia (United Nations 2004a).

It deals with grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide and crimes against humanity if they were committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. The first trial took place in 1996. The ICTY is meant to have finished its work by 2010. In 1999, it indicted Milosevic as a war criminal. He was finally arrested in 2001 but died during trial. Several other serious perpetrators are still free.\footnote{By 2008, the ICTY had indicted a total of 161 individuals, and 48 had been sentenced (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2008).}

4.3.1.7 State-building, Democratisation and Civil Society Support

These tasks are today considered essential elements of peace-building. The basic objectives are to restore or establish security (mainly through a reform of the security sector), the establishment of a statehood in line with rules and procedures of modern democracy (multi-party elections, a constitution granting equal rights to all citizens etc.), and guarantee of welfare (including social services, schooling, economic reforms etc.) (see Call and Cousens 2007, Kritz 2007). It is also the probably the most political and value-loaded type of peace-building because it is shaped by particular assumptions of how the interveners think a society should function. Democracy aid, while being an element of international politics since the 1960s, became especially fashionable after 1989 in the context of the revolutions in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union.

Vukovar (Croatia) in 1991. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, there have been two short-termed truth commissions mostly doing fact finding on Srebrenica and the siege of Sarajevo, and the establishment of a War Crimes Chamber created with the direct involvement of the ICTY (International Center for Transitional Justice 2008c, Orentlicher 2008:62pp).

For illustration, there has been no legislation other than in Serbia in 2003, but there was no real access for victims to secret files. In Croatia and Macedonia, personal files kept by state security are “in principle” accessible (Zupan 2007:332).

\footnote{Bosnian-Serb President Karadjic was until July 2008 on the top of that list when he was arrested in Serbia.}

4. Governmental Interventions

Carothers (1999:87pp) speaks of a ‘democracy template’ with three categories: elections, state institutions and civil society which, in the case of civil society interveners, is often translated into financial and other support for oppositional parties, independent media and oppositional NGOs (see also McMahon 2001). This kind of aid has provided in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, which were put under international administration (see below), as well as in those countries that remained independent (Macedonia, FR Yugoslavia, Croatia). The difference is that in the quasi-protectorates the external state actors were more or less free to mould institutions and processes as they saw fit, while they had to be more circumspect in the independent countries, in order not to be accused of meddling.

Schneckener (2008) distinguishes four general strategies of state-building. Elements of at least the last three can be found in the former Yugoslavia:

1. Liberalisation first: democratisation and free markets, based on the observation that democracies tend not to go to war against each other. Economic liberalisation and early elections have been among the first targets of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2. Security first: Demobilisation, security sector reform, training of military and police, reform of courts, creation of peace economies, dealing with organised crime. This strategy is mostly pursued by Great Britain and partly the United Nations in their peace-keeping missions, and it can be clearly recognised as the approach taken on Kosovo.

3. Institutionalisation first: Strengthening of legitimate and effective structures on national as local level.

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167 For instance, the OSCE encountered this kind of problem in Croatia in the late 1990s (see OSCE 2004e). As a consequence interventions were couched in terms of provision of advice and support rather than the direct implementation of specific peace-building programmes. It is interesting to note that involvement in capacity building for civil society organisations and agencies only came to the forefront of the agenda of state actors at the end of the 1990s.

168 See Call and Cousens 2007 for a discussion of the thesis of ‘democratic peace’.

169 The reform of the security sector is considered to be an important part of the rebuilding of a functioning state. It includes police, courts, prisons, rewriting of laws, capacity training and also support of the military (King, Dorn and Hodes 2002:38).
4. Civil society first: Support of parties, NGOs and independent media.\(^{170}\)

Involvement in capacity-building for civil society organisations and agencies only came to the forefront of the agenda of state actors at the end of the 1990s. This approach has found its clearest expression in the interventions on the political system in Serbia. There state and non-state actors focused on civil society, including independent media and oppositional parties, actively working towards regime change (see Pugh 2000 and chapter 7.7).\(^{171}\) For civil society support, the work of the OSCE is a good example - by the end of the 1990s it had missions in almost all countries of former Yugoslavia.\(^{172}\) In addition, many state actors also played the role of funders for projects that targeted civil society.

\(^{170}\) In several cases actors from the international community even set up media of their own rather than supporting existing ones. For example they tried in Bosnia-Herzegovina to create networks of electronic media. In 1991, there were 54 radio stations and 5 TV. In 1997 these numbers had risen to 156 radio and 52 TV. At beginning of 2001, there were 210 radio and 71 TV (Udovicic 2001). Most of these networks failed. For example the Open Broadcast Network OBN that was set up after 1995 at the state level to overcome the division into the two entities cost US$20 million before it folded down (Rhodes 2007:23, Topic 2007:175). In 2004, the strategy was revised and support focused again on self-initiated radio and television stations (see Popovic 2004).

\(^{171}\) That led the EU in late 1999 even to target municipalities ruled by the opposition by making them the sole beneficiaries of a programme called ‘Energy for Democracy’, receiving heating oil. Only after fall of Milosevic was that programme extended to the whole of Serbia (Pugh 2000:11, Dragovic-Soso 2003:129).

\(^{172}\) Generally speaking the missions’ purposes have been twofold: to facilitate the political processes that are intended to prevent or settle conflicts, and to ensure that the OSCE community is kept informed of developments in the countries where missions are present (OSCE 1999c:45).

In the area of former Yugoslavia, there have been several missions since 1992: The first two OSCE missions were the ‘CSCE Missions of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina’ established in summer 1992; and the OSCE ‘Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje’ established in September 1992. The first one had to leave the country in July 1993 when FR Yugoslavia - reacting to the sanctions against it and its de-facto exclusion from the CSCE - refused to renew its permission to stay. Later, other missions were sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996 onwards), the Republic of Croatia (since 1996), Kosovo (since 1999) and Serbia and Montenegro (since 2001). Most of them had a rather strong peace-building element together with a smaller early warning and monitoring (peace-keeping) mandate. They undertook tasks such as preparation and conduct of elections, civil society development, human and minority rights monitoring and support, rule of law development including supporting the fight of organised crime, police training, political advising, confidence building through various inter-ethnic projects, education, media development, advising and assistance to the government to increase representation of non-majority communities in public administration, support of military and public enterprises (Macedonia), monitoring and support refugee return (Croatia), institutions-building, public administration reform, anti-corruption support, election organisation and supervision. (For the different missions, see OSCE 1999c and 2004a –g.)
4. Governmental Interventions

4.3.1.8 Peace and Dialogue

‘Peace and dialogue’ is a category that has been created to describe all those activities that took place with the explicit goal of promoting peace and reconciliation without linking this objective to activities of social work, aid or civil society support. It is often funded by state actors (governments, EU) but otherwise mostly to be found in the activities of civil society actors.

4.3.1.9 Cultural Activities

As with ‘Peace and Dialogue’ above, this category like the before mentioned category seems to have been largely limited to civil society interveners.

4.3.2 International Administration (‘Protectorates’)

The regions and countries put under international administration form a special case in the former Yugoslavia. While UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia, was set up with a strict timeline as a transitional arrangement, the international missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have been much longer-term and more open-ended. Both have been the object of intensive study.

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173 The governance structures set up in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina governance structures give the international administration the power to overrule the democratically elected government of the areas. But the term ‘protectorate’ is often shunned though more and more used also in official texts, for example by the German Ministry for Development (Bundesministerium fuer wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 2004) that speaks of a ‘liberal protectorate’. Cousens and Cater (2001:129) talk of a ‘creeping protectorate’, Pugh (2000:2) uses the term protectorate without any qualification. One official term is ‘assisted state’.

174 A fourth one was the European Union Administration in Mostar (EUAM) during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It has been a special case, resulting from the otherwise failed efforts of ICFY to get the parties to agree to the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan in August 1993. That was a plan to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into three ethnic areas, with Mostar that has always been almost half Muslim, half Croatian with a smaller Serb minority as well, being put under EU administration for two years. Only the agreement on Mostar was signed, and former Mayor of Bremen (Germany) Hans Koschnick got appointed as EU administrator. The goal of the international administration was to normalise the situation between (Muslim) East and (Croat) West Mostar and deal with the ethnic split, plan for democratic elections at the end of the mandate, and give humanitarian assistance. The administration in these two years achieved some small progress like freedom of movement between the two parts of Mostar, reconstruction, a joint police but overall met with much resistance from the side of the Croats in West Mostar. A real unification of West and East Mostar did not take place, and violence was always a possibility. Koschnick stepped down in 1996 after disagreements with the EU on how to handle the situation. After the end of the two years of EUAM, the administration of Mostar was integrated into the overall international administration of
4.3.2.1 UNTAES

UNTAES was a complex UN mission with 5,000 soldiers and approximately 1,000 observers and civilian personnel, with a two year mandate (1996-1997) and located in the remaining Serb-held area after Croatia had reoccupied the other parts of so-called Serb Krajina in 1995. It was established by the UN Security Council (UNSCR 1037) with the Basic Agreement concluded in Erdut in November 1995 between Croatia and the Serb government in the Eastern UNPA zone. Its overall goal was to peacefully reintegrate that area into Croatia safeguarding its original multi-ethnic character. Its tasks were to supervise and facilitate demilitarisation; monitor voluntary and safe return of refugees and displaced; contribute by its presence to the maintenance of peace and security and otherwise assist in the implementation of the Erdut Agreement (see Grabner 1997, Rappold 1997, Large n.d.:110pp, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:58pp, Schoups 2001). After the end of UNTAES, the area was reintegrated into Croatia in January 2008 without the feared massive emigration by the Serbian population.

UNTAES is widely considered one of the most successful UN peace support missions: It found good cooperation from the conflicting parties, had a clear and time-limited mandate, sufficient resources, and support from both international governmental actors and excellent cooperation with local and international NGOs (Kruhonja 2002, Schoups 2001:391pp).

4.3.2.2 International Administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The international administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina was established under the Dayton Agreement. The civil administration is headed by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) who is an individual nominated by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), a group of 55 countries and international organisations (see Troebst

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In December 1997 the PIC increased the rights of the OHR, being dissatisfied with the speed of the changes implemented so far. Since then the OHR has had (and used) much more enforcement power, for example removing Bosnian public officials from office who in his eyes violated the Dayton Agreement or legal commitments, and imposing laws as he saw fit if the Bosnian legislative bodies failed to do so (see Chandler 1999, Knaus 2001b, International Crisis Group 2003g, Schneckener 2003:61).

Some important changes were enforced by the OHR against the will of many of the local politicians. The introduction of a common currency, common flag, licence plates that did not indicate the origin of the car have had an impact, bringing the two entities (Federation and Serbian Republic) closer together.

A large number of international actors have shared in the tasks of the peace implementation: NATO (military peace-keeping through IFOR/SFOR), OSCE (responsible for regional stabilisation, human rights, and elections), and the UN (United Nation Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina - UNMIBH) are the three major ones. Besides these, also the EU, IMF, World Bank, the European Court for Human Rights, the Council of Europe, UNHCR, the European Court for Human Rights and others have been assigned tasks under the Dayton treaty (see Cousens and Cater 2001, Ducasse-Rogier 2003, Schneckener 2004).

4.3.2.3 Kosovo

The protectorate in Kosovo is based on UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Unlike in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international organisations were put into a clear hierarchy with the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) being the lead organisation (though without control over KFOR). UNHCR was made responsible for humanitarian assistance (so-called pillar one, phased out in 2000). UNMIK in addition to its coordination role has been made responsible for dealing with civil administration, justice and international police (pillar two). The OSCE (OSCE Mission in Kosovo - OMIK) became responsible for democratisation and institution-building, human rights promotion and monitoring, and for elections (pillar three).

176 The PIC is seen as a successor to ICFY.
The EU was charged with the so-called pillar four: reconstruction and economic development.\textsuperscript{177}

As to refugee return, the situation in Kosovo was very different from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here, the Albanian refugees returned on their own immediately after the war, and even faster than UNHCR would have liked them to do. The problem in Kosovo has been more that NATO and UNMIK failed to provide a stable security environment for the ethnic minorities - Serbs and Roma in particular. Perhaps 125,000 Serbs have left Kosovo since the war of 1999, and the events in 2004 as well as in early 2008 after the declaration of independence of Kosovo have demonstrated that the threat of ethnic violence has not been overcome.\textsuperscript{178} (In addition to the literature cited above, see Dannreuther 2001:265, Matveeva and Paes 2003:29, Salihu et al. 2004.)

\section*{4.3.3 Peace-building: How much is enough?}

It is very difficult to evaluate the peace-building efforts undertaken by the international community without including the contribution of civil society. Aside from the administration of the international protectorates almost all peace-building has been a joint effort of state and non-state actors. For that reason, I would like to refer to the conclusions of chapter 7 and just remark in very general terms that peace-building in the area under study still has a long way to go. There certainly have been serious changes and improvements over the last ten or fifteen years, mostly in regard to state-building and a decrease in the likelihood of new violence. The peace agreements have held, and clear progress in refugee return and reconstruction has been made. On the other hand, the ethnic antagonisms have not been overcome, not all conflicts have found a peaceful settlement yet (see the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo against the will of Serbia). The economic situation in most countries is disastrous, with high rates of unemployment, migration by better

\textsuperscript{177} In the first phase (‘emergency phase’) most agencies focused on urgent humanitarian needs (shelter, fuel, food, water) to help the returnees survive the winter 1999-2000. In the next ‘transition’ phase, the international interveners moved along the ‘relief-to-development’ continuum. The third phase, ‘consolidation’ began with the formation of the provincial government in March 2002 (Llamazares and Reynolds Levy 2003:7pp).

\textsuperscript{178} If the figure of 125,000 Serbs is accurate is not clear – UNHCR is using the figures given by the Serbian government. (Verbal reference by Howard Clark.)
educated youth, and a major source of income coming from international sources, while organised crime is flourishing. Democratisation is in fact more formal than real (see for example Gallagher 2005, the contributions in Dvornik and Solioz 2007 and in Fischer (ed.) 2007, Fischer 2007e and Gromes 2007).

4.4 Addressing Other External Actors: Protest and Advocacy

This chapter has so far provided an overview of the most important instruments that could be categorised under one the ‘grand strategies’ of peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building. In addition, there have however also been activities that did not directly target the conflict and the antagonists but rather other intervening actors: Though international actors tried to coordinate their efforts, at most points of crisis (meaning mainly the periods 1991-1995, and 1998-1999) there was a lively and partly public discussion under way between different states about how to proceed, and to criticise and influence each others’ approaches.

There were different lines of disagreements that led to public (or discreet) protests and to advocacy among the international state interveners:

- Within the EC, one of the main disagreements was the early approach to the dissolution of Yugoslavia (see above). At various other times too, parts of the EC/EU were at loggerheads with each other. The most public example was in July 1992 when the EC negotiator and ICFY co-chair Lord Owen wrote to British Prime Minister John Major urging the use of NATO to enforce a cease-fire. The next day his letter was published on the front page of a major London newspaper, the Evening Standard, causing great political irritation (see Kaufman 2002:96pp).

- The EC/EU and the USA were often in disagreement on how to handle the conflict in Bosnia. Between 1993 and 1995, the USA tried to convince its EU partners to lifting of the arms embargo and conducting air strikes. That was regularly rejected by those EU countries contributing troops to UNPROFOR since they were concerned about the security of their troops (see Clark 2001:37, Hadzic 2003, Kaufman 2002:100, Krech 1997:82, Lucarelli 2000:44 pp, Meder and Reimann 1996:13, Owen 1995:xvi, Sloan 1998:50).

In 1993 Europeans accused the new Clinton administration of undermining the Vance-Owen peace plan the EC-UN negotiators were trying to get signed (see
The West (meaning the EU and USA) has had sharp disagreements with Russia regarding the attitude towards Serbia. Russian governments have always expressed political sympathy for Belgrade leading in 1995 to strong protests against the expansion of NATO bombing (see Markovic 2000:205, Meder and Reimann 1996:27, Sloan 1998:77pp). This conflict became more intense in 1998 and especially 1999 around the NATO intervention in Kosovo/Serbia, going beyond the exchange of diplomatic notes and public statements: Russia suspended its membership in the NATO Partnership for Peace, and immediately KFOR was established, Russian troops stole a march on NATO by occupying Prishtina Airport directly after the end of the war on 12 June 1999, almost causing a confrontation with NATO forces (see Mueller 1999:68 and 162, Zitzlaff 1999:53, Buckley 2001:157).

Between Islamic countries and “the West” there were tensions regarding what the Islamic countries saw as a lack of support for the Bosnian (‘Muslim’) government (see Krech 1997:77, Mellenthin 1992). The OIC continuously demanded – also in the United Nations – to lift the arms embargo and to use ‘all necessary means’ to end the war.

4.5 Prevention

Prevention is a goal inherent in all three ‘grand strategies’ rather than a strategy on its own. Stopping current and preventing new violence almost always go hand in hand where conflicts tend to spread from one geographical area to the next. Prevention warrants discussion especially because it played a role in a number of civil society activities, especially in advocacy work trying to warn the international state community about new possible areas of war and imploring them to take early action.

The conflicts in former Yugoslavia are not an example of early warning and early crisis management at its best. There was some warning – from diplomatic sources, secret services as well as some NGOs like Helsinki Watch and Amnesty International - but little action before 1991 (see Zimmermann 1996:58pp, 82pp, Gow 1997:204, Lucarelli 2000:16, Eiff 2002:155). When the conflicts first became visible
in 1990, members of the international community did little more than meeting with both representatives from Belgrade and the republics threatening secession. Rather, the focus in 1990 – one year after the break-down of socialism in Eastern Europe - seems to have been on ‘democratisation’, meaning pushing for multi-party elections and free market trade. The only genuine preventive measure was the offer of some financial aid by the EC, IMF and USA (see Lampe 2000:328 and 355, Gallagher 2003:39pp). The USA warned the Yugoslav government not to take any violent steps to prevent secession, but also made it clear that they wanted a one-state solution (see Woodward 1995:154pp, 383, Zimmermann 1996:100, 122pp).

The first six months of 1991 then saw a string of visitors coming to Belgrade, sometimes also stopping by in Ljubljana and Zagreb, appealing to the conflicting parties to resolve their differences peacefully, and offering new economic incentives. But all these came far too late to influence the process.

After the violent response to the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, the CSCE activated its newly created crisis mechanism in June 1991. However, it was sidelined by the EC which took over mediation. The CSCE then...

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181 In early March a delegation of the Council of Europe came, and soon after an EC Troika (representatives of the past, present and future EC presidency) visited Belgrade. They offered some ‘carrots’ in form of prolongation of the financial aid (credits) until 1995 and to increase them by 30% to 1.5 billion German Marks (around 750 million Euros). In early May EC President Delors and Prime Minister of Luxembourg Santer visited Belgrade and also met with Slovenian president Kucan. Delors promised to request US$4,5 Billion in aid from the EC in support of Yugoslavia’s commitment to political reform. Italy in May argued for an aid packet to Belgrade – a policy which it reversed after visits by Kucan and Tudjman in early June. The last visitor before the declarations of independence then was US Secretary of State Baker who came on 21st of June, stating that the US would support a democratic and undivided Yugoslavia, and would not recognise unilateral secessionist moves. See Woodward 1995:161, Zimmermann 1996:133pp, Holbrooke 1998:27, Eisermann 2000:33, Markovic 2000:18pp, Judah 2002, Kaufman 2002: xiv and 67.

182 This crisis mechanism consisted first of a request of clarification on what was going on by the government of Yugoslavia. The second step then was to call a meeting (in July) of the CSCE Council of the Senior Officials in Vienna. This meeting agreed on an Urgent Appeal for a ceasefire in Slovenia, to conduct a diplomatic mission to Yugoslavia for mediation, and offered the sending of an observer mission. Two later emergency meetings in August and September 1991 repeated the calls for ceasefires and negotiations, and adopted the arms embargo of the EC. See
started to focus more on the situation within what became in 1992 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In the case of Kosovo the general perception within the territory and from many critics outside is that Kosovo did not receive any international attention before 1998. This is not entirely correct. The Council of Foreign Ministers and the Commission of the EC/EU were certainly interested in Kosovo from 1991 on, and frequently called on FR Yugoslavia to restore the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The CSCE sent one of its first long-term missions in 1992-93 to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina had to withdraw it when Belgrade did not extend its permission in summer 1993, while a special Working Group set up by the ICFY also accompanied the processes there from 1992 onward (see Becker 1991:944pp, Woodward 1995:175, 295, Meder and Reimann 1996:4pp, Libal 1997:17, Troebst 1998:26, Weller 1999:18, Lucarelli 2000:19, Markovic 2000:54pp). The Kosovo issue also played a central role when the EU decided in 1997 to set up a Conflict Prevention Network whose main function was as a think-tank on conflict prevention and early warning for the EC Commission. However, decisive action was only taken by the international community when the nonviolent movement had broken down and was replaced by an armed uprising in 1998.

Macedonia is often cited as a successful example of prevention because it was not drawn into the wars in the 1990s. This is mostly credited to the long-term human rights work of the OSCE in the country, and the presence of the first-ever preventive peace-keeping force since end of 1992. However there were few signs of early action in response to indicators of possible conflict after 1999 such as the influx of about 350,000 Kosovar refugees, including the relocation of UCK fighters from Kosovo to Macedonia (UNHCR 1999c, Vankovska 2002:5, International Crisis Group 2004c). Two years later, however, there was a prompt and determined

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183 The CPN was directed at that time by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Eberhausen, and commissioned pilot studies on Zaire and Kosovo (see Troebst 1998:51.)

reaction from the side of the international community when violence eventually broke out in 2001 (see Gallagher 2005).

4.6 Conclusions

This chapter has focussed on the effects of the interventions by international state actors on the conflict on the ground, characterised above all by intensive mediation efforts, military intervention and the commitment of enormous financial resources of which the total sum remains unknown. The picture drawn is one of successes and failures – the open violence eventually was (more or less) controlled, but usually late and coming with a high price that mostly the local population had to pay, and the post-war environment is riddled with economic and social problems.

One important observation of particular relevance later in this study when looking at the activities of civil society actors is that violence was the easiest means to attract international attention. This is especially true for Kosovo which had been very much on the back-burner of international attention. The conflict there was seen through the lens of human rights and minority law rather than as the case of a majority population struggling with unarmed means for its independence. One of the Kosovo-Albanian negotiating team concludes:

> The break-up of the former Yugoslavia has demonstrated that only war attracts the attention of the great powers. Only the use of violence serves as a catalyst for political solution, compelling the West to rush in to prevent conflict spreading throughout the region (Surroi 2001).

This observation is definitely a challenge for those seeking nonviolent alternatives. Furthermore, however, violence was not only a recipe for local actors to attract attention but also often the only recognised means of solving conflict. As argued above, the general lesson most state actors took from the former Yugoslavia was ‘our interventions need to be based on a credible military threat and military capacity’. Therefore the successes of civilian peace-keeping in the region (see 4.2.2) were largely ignored. Instead, military forces were deployed to protect international civilian personnel even in contexts where there was very little threat as in Macedonia 2001.

In this sense, the conflicts in former Yugoslavia did damage far beyond its primary victims in the countries in war. The conflicts, and the ways they were handled by the
international interveners strengthened the position of those who can only imagine international politics being successful when based on violence.

In the next chapters in discussing the contributions of civil society actors to the interventions in the former Yugoslavia, we will frequently notice how this tension between violent and nonviolent approaches shaped the overall picture of what was done (or not done) in regard to dealing with the violent conflicts in this area.
5. Working Towards a Settlement of Conflict: Peace-making by Civil Society Actors

Having looked at the core concepts relating to conflict intervention, the history of the area of former Yugoslavia and the interventions undertaken by state actors, it is now time to turn to the activities of civil society actors. In this and the next chapters I will describe these activities using the overarching categories introduced in the previous chapter: the three ‘grand strategies’ of peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building, plus the more instrumental strategy of information, protest and advocacy that aims to influence other intervening actors.

Peace-making, the topic of this chapter, has been defined as working as an external party towards a settlement of the conflict through either law, negotiation or the exercise of violence and/or other forms of power. There are not many publications discussing the contribution of civil society actors on peace-making in the former Yugoslavia. Besides *The War Next Door* by Judith Large (n.d.) and two small books on Kosovo (Troebst 1998, l’Abate 1997) most publications dealing with civil society actors focus on (mostly post-war) peace-building.

Looking at the different examples found, they all fall into the category of peace-making by negotiation in a wider sense. It seems feasible to categorise them according to the level of society they targeted, following Lederach’s (1997:38pp) distinction between top, middle-range and grassroots leadership in conflict. Top level mediation aims at direct impact, expecting the leaders to change their behaviour. Initiatives targeting the middle-range leadership are based on much more indirect mechanisms, be it influencing those who then can influence the decision-makers (e.g. second-track problem-solving workshops), or be it supporting and/or influencing the opponents of the decision-makers in the hope that there will be sooner or later a change in power. And at the grassroots level, most conflict settlement efforts were not focused on the overall conflict as much as addressing more concrete matters at hand or the situation in a particular locality or municipality.
5. Peace-making by Civil Society Actors

5.1 Top Level Peace-making

The most important cases here are the mediation by the former US President Jimmy Carter in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Catholic Community of Sant’Egidio in the Kosovo conflict.\(^{185}\)

5.1.1 Jimmy Carter in Bosnia-Herzegovina

After the end of his term as President, Jimmy Carter together with his wife Rosalynn founded in 1982 a NGO called the Carter Center, based in Atlanta, USA, to “advance human rights and alleviate unnecessary human suffering, seeking to prevent and resolve conflicts, enhance freedom and democracy, and improve health” (The Carter Center 2008, Mission Statement). As an elder statesman, Carter himself has offered mediation services in a number of conflicts.

In the former Yugoslavia Carter got involved in December 1994, mediating a temporary four month cease-fire agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Owen 1995:309pp, Sloan 1998:37pp, Weiss 1999:124, Markovic 2000:183pp). The agreement was made in response to a six-point peace plan proposed by Bosnian Serb President Karadjic in a CNN interview on 14 December, Carter visiting both Bosnian leaders - Izetbegovic in Sarajevo and Karadjic in Pale - as well as President Milosevic in Belgrade.\(^{186}\) Carter reasoned that it would be easier to reach an agreement on a temporary cease-fire than getting all sides to commit to a formal overall peace plan. Such a temporary agreement, he hoped, could then be the first step towards substantive peace talks.

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\(^{185}\) There have been some few others. For example Owen (1995:242) mentions a private citizen, a Serb by birth, living in Paris. Being a successful publisher, he was, in Owen’s words, always ready to host private meetings with Yugoslavs. He did arrange such a meeting between Muslims and Serbs in Geneva in December 1993, and with Krajsnik in January 1994. Unfortunately I have not been able to find any other source on his activities.

A case of another high-profile individual mediating was US Senator Jesse Jackson. In May 1999, during the NATO was on the FR Yugoslavia, he negotiated the release of three US soldiers taken prisoner by Belgrade (Clark 2001:288p).

\(^{186}\) Owen (1995:309) believes that there was prior communication between Karadjic and Carter, speaking of a ‘prearranged statement’ by Carter in which he announced he would visit Pale after the CNN interview.
The mediation effort was coordinated with the United Nations, and included a four months truce meant to last from January to May, a separation of forces, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the inter-positioning of UNPROFOR along the line of confrontation, freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and UNHCR, the exchange of detainees, and compliance with earlier agreements concerning Sarajevo, Gorazde and Srebenica.\(^{187}\)

The ceasefire held de facto only until March-April 1995. By that spring, both parties had regrouped and started new military campaigns, beginning with a Bosnian Government offensive near Tuzla (Sloan 1998:38). I am not aware of any deeper evaluation of Carter’s initiative but, looking at the events in later 1995, see no indication that the cease-fire was a first step towards the all-encompassing (Dayton) peace talks as Carter had hoped. Its main positive outcomes lay probably on the humanitarian side, helping people to get over the winter in Bosnia without the additional hardship of actual fighting.

5.1.2 Communità di Sant’Egidio in Kosovo

The second high-level mediation was about another conflict the Kosovo conflict. The Communità di Sant'Egidio is a Catholic lay organisation often considered to be an instrument of informal diplomacy of the Vatican (Weller 1999:127).\(^{188}\) Established in 1968 as a humanitarian organisation, today it has around 30,000-50,000 volunteers worldwide. Through its commitment to inter-religious and ecumenical dialogue, the Community has built up a reputation for mediation although, as most mediation happens outside the public sphere, not very much is known about this side of their work. Their biggest success has been mediation in the Mozambique conflict in 1989 – 1992 (see Paffenholz 2001c, Cereghini and Sighele 2002:126-137). They were also

\(^{187}\) The Contact Group however seems to have had mixed feeling about Carter’s initiative because their policy at that point was that there were to be no negotiations before all sides committed formally to the peace plan the Group had devised. And the Bosnian President Izetbegovic and his government were unhappy about Carter speaking with the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs in their capital Pale, thereby giving them legitimization. On the other hand Owen claims that he and his co-chief negotiator Stoltenberg took, in Owen’s words, ‘a positive attitude to this’ (Owen 1995:309).

\(^{188}\) The Community’s webpage has little information on their political work. See http://www.santegidio.org/ [accessed 22 April 2008].
involved in Guatemala and Algeria, and had been active doing humanitarian work in Albania since the 1980s.

The Community’s work in Albania provided the basis for involvement in Kosovo. President Rugova visited their Community in Italy in 1993.\textsuperscript{189} In 1996-98 the Communità di Sant’Egidio mediated between the Kosovar leadership and President Milosevic on the re-opening of the Albanian schools (see de Vrieze 2002:291 and 87pp.\textsuperscript{190}) The closing of Albanian-language schools and the university in Prishtina by Serbia was not only highly contentious but of symbolic importance to the conflict. The Community called their work ‘help for dialogue and communication’, not using the term mediation.\textsuperscript{191} According to l’Abate (1997:21, 89), they first created a list of problems faced by the civilian population in Kosovo, then chose the issue of education as being most suitable to deal with first, and then had a number of meetings with both sides at different levels, helping them to exchange materials and proposals.

This mediation, which was supported by both the EU and the USA, was successful insofar as it led to an agreement for the reopening of schools signed by Milosevic and Rugova in Belgrade on 1 September 1996.\textsuperscript{192} A mixed Serb-Albanian group was set up to negotiate its implementation but at first failed to do so.\textsuperscript{193}

In summer 1997 San Egidio renewed its mediation attempts, and managed to get the working group to meet in October 1997 and February 1998. In March 1998 an Implementation Agreement on Education was signed that planned the reopening of the Prishtina University in several steps, as well as the reopening of elementary and

\textsuperscript{189} The Kosovo conflict had continued throughout the 1990s in the form of open state repression and nonviolent resistance against the Serbian rule by the Kosovo Albanians (see chapter 3).


\textsuperscript{191} Probably due to the diverse meanings of the term ‘mediation’ which is often understood to be a negotiation effort with a very active and dominant negotiator. See Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{192} It immediately earned international recognition and in the next year was often referred to in official documents of intergovernmental bodies (EU, Contact Group, USA, Council of Europe, OSCE, WEU).

\textsuperscript{193} Troebst (1999:78) maintains that the agreement was flawed with technical mistakes and weaknesses, for example there were different translations in Albanian and Serbian language, with the Serbian version not mentioning university students. It was also unclear if students would return to state-run education or if the university buildings would be turned over to them. And there was no time-table for implementation.
5. Peace-making by Civil Society Actors

high schools, and naming Sant’ Egidio as the institution to assist with the different steps to be taken, including ‘finding a solution for possible problems which could emerge’ in the context of the reopening of schools.\textsuperscript{194} Eventually the university buildings were handed over in 1998 (after having been vandalised, see Clark 2000:157).

5.2 Middle Level Peace-making

At this level of society, it was possible to distinguish three different approaches to peace-making: problem-solving workshops, creation of safe spaces for ongoing dialogue between middle-level opposition leaders, and the propagation of possible solutions by international civil society actors.

5.2.1 Problem-solving Workshops

Middle level peace-making in the context of the former Yugoslavia mostly took the form of what is called second-track problem-solving workshops. A well-established method, their basic idea is to bring together influential personalities from all sides in the hope that they would develop a more positive attitude towards opponents through meeting face-to-face, come up with possible solutions of the conflict at large, and filter these up to the decision-makers on their respective side.\textsuperscript{195}

In my survey of external interventions in the former Yugoslavia there were many examples of such initiatives, using comparable methods if not the exact term ‘problem-solving workshop’. Most were focused on the Kosovo conflict, but there has been also at least one case in Croatia. To give just four examples:

- The International Helsinki Federation (IHF), an international organisation monitoring the compliance with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, has had three national committees in FR Yugoslavia, in Serbia, Montenegro

\textsuperscript{194} The texts of both agreements are documented in Weller 1999:93-94.

\textsuperscript{195} The method was first identified and described by Herbert Kelman (see Kelman 1996). Several international NGOs, among them International Alert and the Berghof Center are practitioners of the approach in various parts of the world.
and Kosovo. It was therefore in a good position to support peace-making in the Kosovo conflict. Among other activities, it helped - with support of the Executive Director of the IHF - to arrange a meeting of Serbian and Kosovo Albanian intellectuals in Montenegro in June 1997, with a follow-up meeting in Prishtina 20 February 1998. The meetings ended with an appeal for a peaceful solution and continued dialogue (Troebst 1998:95p).

- The German Bertelsmann Foundation is a foundation of a publishing house which engages in advocacy work on different national and international issues, advising the European Union and individual governments. Between 1996 and 1998 they (together with the Munich University Research Group on European Affairs) ran a project on Kosovo, bringing together seven Kosovo Albanian and Serbian intellectuals in several meetings where in small groups they discussed and later published recommendations on questions such as how to improve the given situation, how to achieve an extended autonomy and how to realise independence (l’Abate 1997:107pp, Troebst 1998:88pp).

- After the end of the NATO war of 1999 the US Institute for Peace (USIP), a congress-funded quasi-NGO (‘Quango’) from the USA, facilitated meetings between a spectrum of Albanian and Serb political and community leaders, discussing a wide range of topics concerning reconstruction and co-habitation (de Vrieze 2002:298).

- Large (n.d.:75) mentions one case of a mediation attempt in Croatia in 1995 by the German Foundation Die Schwelle (The Threshold) who sought to bring together representatives from Baranja and Osijek for ‘a negotiation process parallel to that of Erdut’. The goal of The Threshold according to Large was to have a people’s agreement supporting what the high level negotiators hammered out in Erdut, but the attempt failed.

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196 ‘Erdut’ was the agreement on Eastern Slavonia which allowed a peaceful reintegration of that part of Croatia into Croatia under the supervision of a UN Mission in 1996-1997.
5.2.2 Supporting the Political Opposition

Support to the opposition – political parties, NGOs, independent media, other leaders – may fall under the categories of peace-making or of peace-building, depending on the context and the objectives of the activity. The literature usually treats this as a typical approach in state-building and democratisation (see Carothers 1999, Call and Cousens 2007). As such it will be discussed further in the chapter on peace-building. However, I would argue that supporting the political opposition could also be considered an element of peace-making, namely when the goal is to help the opposition formulate alternative solutions to the conflict or suggestions on approaches how to settle it.

The difference from problem-solving workshops is less the method than the assumption about how to achieve an impact: Problem-solving workshops normally address people who are part of or close to the current regime and government, hoping that to influence decisions at their level. Creation of safe spaces for meetings and ongoing dialogue between middle-level opposition leaders implies expectations of either a future change of government, or pressure that the opposition puts on the regime in order to force it to change its politics.

In the case studied here, there have been several examples of this approach, mostly in the form of supporting the establishment of permanent institutions or round tables of oppositional politicians and/ or civil society leaders from the different countries of former Yugoslavia. Perhaps the two most important of them will be presented here: the Verona Forum and the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly.

5.2.2.1 Verona Forum

The Verona Forum was created in 1992 and brought together oppositional politicians and NGO and media representatives for consultations and ongoing work on political alternatives to war (see Schweitzer 1992, Langer 1993, Langer 1995, Large n.d.:5).

It began with a ‘Forum for Peace and Reconciliation in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia’, a conference organised by two Green politicians, the late South Tyrolean member of the European Parliament Alexander Langer, and the Austrian MP Marijana Grandits. They invited around 50 people from oppositional parties and
civil society organisations from all countries of the former Yugoslavia to meet for three days in September 1992 in Verona. The conference was also attended by about the same number of international civil society representatives, among them the International Helsinki Federation, the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly and a number of national groups and organisations. The goal of the conference was to discuss new ideas for peace and reconciliation, to initiate and support a positive dialogue between the ‘democratic and peace oriented’ forces in all states, and to impact the international peace process.

The conference agreed on a final declaration that called for the protection of individual human rights, demanded the creation of a UN protectorate for Bosnia-Herzegovina and immediate international recognition of Macedonia, and also called for negotiations on Vojvodina and Kosovo. Many other items remained controversial, starting from the question of a military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the issue of sanctions against Serbia, possible sanctions against Croatia, to the question of the status of Kosovo.

The conference decided to set up permanent structures of dialogue, calling itself Verona Forum, led by an international steering committee of people from the former Yugoslavia and third party countries. This Committee met for some time quite intensively by phone or using other conferences as an occasion for personal meetings. Over the next year, it also planned and conducted several activities such as other conferences and round tables, supported free media and established a permanent coordination and communication in the European Parliament. It played an important role in bringing the democratic opposition of the different countries together (Coletti et al. 2007).

5.2.2.2 Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly

The second permanent structure that served for the exchange and development of possible solutions among politicians and civil society leaders of the former

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197 I lack definite information on when the Steering Committee dissolved. The latest activities that I found were in 1997 (European Parliament 1997).

198 Many of these activities, however, I would rather rate under peace-building.
Yugoslavia was the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (HCA). The HCA has been an international umbrella consisting of civil society representatives from all the OSCE countries, understanding itself as a civil society mirror of the Helsinki Final Act from 1975 (CSCE). It was founded in 1990 with a conference in Prague, and throughout the first half of the 1990s held regular international conferences. In the later 1990s its importance diminished and eventually the international office in Prague was closed. Today there are still some national branches (France, Greece) but no visible activities of the international any more.

The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia was a major focus of attention for the HCA, with its first two co-chairs Sonia Licht (Serbia) and Mary Kaldor (Britain) both having a special commitment to the area. The HCA had members from civil society groups in FR Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia. It served as a space where civil society leaders of the different countries could come together and exchange their views and discuss matters of common concern. One typical event was the ‘Citizens and Municipal Peace Conference’ held in Ohrid, Macedonia, in November 1992. The chair of that conference, Mient Jan Faber, wrote afterwards:

Ohrid was not a peace conference of like-minded people. Or maybe it is better to say that although everyone was in favour of peace, the majority of the participants from the Balkans were highly aware that they belonged to ethnic groups, and therefore were ‘separated’ from one another. Albanians from Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia united forces; Serbs formed their own clusters; Macedonians energetically went around seeking support for their national policy to become internationally recognised. Thanks to some pressure and above all the persistence of the participants from outside the Balkans, the conference adopted a plan which was explicitly and exclusively based on the protection of human beings and multi-ethnic communities. (Faber 1993:14)

199 The HCA like the Verona Forum was multi-functional. Many of its activities rather fell under protest and advocacy or peace-building. For example they organised in September 1991 a Peace Caravan with 400 people from 30 countries travelling from Slovenia through Croatia, Bosnia to Serbia that was focussing on awareness raising of its international participants (see Vack 1996:27, 210 and other sources quoted in chapter 8). There were also many conferences and delegations, appeals and proposals etc. (Solioz 1993). The HCA Youth Network founded in 1997 in Bosnia-Herzegovina brings youth from all Bosnia together for seminars, conferences and trainings (Kaiser 1994, Bekkering 1997, Bekkering 2000:192, Stovel 2000:29, Du Pont 2002:240).
5. Peace-making by Civil Society Actors

5.2.3 Seeking to Influence the Conflict Parties Through Suggesting Solutions

There have been a number of international organisations that initiated conferences and wrote and published papers suggesting solutions to the conflicts—for example the International Crisis Group, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy or the Aspen Institute Berlin. They usually addressed their suggestions to both local actors and international interveners. L’Abate (1997) and Troebst (1998) both have described a number of such initiatives regarding the Kosovo conflict. The point is that while papers were usually based on fact-finding missions, and conferences usually had participation from people from the region, in most cases the main target group seems to have been rather the international interveners, not the governments or oppositional actors in the countries in conflict (Haensel and Stobbe 2002:25). These therefore would fall rather under the category of advocacy work, treated in this study here as a strategy in its own right, and are further described in chapter 8. I would argue that suggesting solutions to the conflict should be categorised as part of peace-making only if the addressees are clearly the parties in conflict.

One example of a group that sought to do this is the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research (TFF), based in Sweden.200 They developed a method their head Jan Øberg calls ‘conflict mitigation’ (see Clark 2000:162, L’Abate 1997:49pp, Øberg 1994, Transnational Foundation 2000, Troebst 1998:85pp).201 By that they mean a multi-pronged and multi-step approach. It begins with exploratory research missions to meet with politicians and NGO representatives from all sides. Based on the findings of these missions they then write draft reports, often containing proposals for solutions that are suggested to them during the visits. They share these with the people they met, as well as making them public, and invite the conflict parties to comment on them. The philosophy behind this approach is that people ‘own’ their conflicts and therefore need to be supported in the process of solving them themselves rather than an external party presenting ready-made solutions (Øberg 1994:147).

200 For some of the other examples given by Troebst and L’Abate it is on the basis of the survey undertaken not clear if they had such contact or not, and therefore their work is not described here in detail.

201 Like Search for Common Ground they have had also a number of projects that would be considered peace-building projects.
Kosovo has been one of their major foci right from 1992 on. To give just one example, in 1996 they proposed a three year UN Temporary Authority for Kosovo comparable with UNTAES, then being established in Eastern Slavonia, in order to make space for peace-building efforts and a ‘Helsinki-Process’ for all the Balkans (Troebst 1998:85).

5.3 Grassroots Level Peace-making

Peace-making is most easily identified when the actors involved belong to the high or middle level of society. In the sample collected for this study, there have been many examples of grassroots dialogue meetings and encounters. However, I would place most of them under peace-building because their objectives were to improve the relations and create a better understanding between people from different sides of the conflict divide. (It must be remembered that these ‘grand strategies’ are not defined by the type of activity undertaken - for example ‘dialogue’ - but by the objectives and function of these activities. Few of these initiatives/interventions were concerned with the pursuance of the peace-making task of concrete steps towards a solution or settlement of the conflict(s).)

In the literature it has been observed that if in a violent conflict there is peace-making at grassroots level that deserves this name, it is usually undertaken by local ‘embedded’ actors (see chapter 2 for the concept of embedded actors), not by international ones (see Wake 2005, Paffenholz and Spurk 2006). Also its impact is

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202 Ropers distinguished four types of dialogue, one of which is “dialogue as pre-negotiation”. But this type is based at the middle level of society and includes problem-solving workshops and the like (Ropers 2004:179). The other three – “dialogue as grassroots peace building and interpersonal reconciliation”, “dialogue projects combined with individual capacity building”, and “dialogue projects combines with institution building, networking, and practical projects” fall under peace-building.

203 However, international actors often engage in what is called ‘micro negotiations’ or, in the language of the United Nations, ‘humanitarian negotiations’ (Goodwin 2001:122pp, McHugh and Bessler 2006). This refers to concrete negotiations on the ground, dealing with local matters, and is often needed in order to fulfil the mandate of the organisation in question, for example negotiating permission to deliver goods to IDPs in a certain area. In the words of Jan Egeland in the preface to a recent UN guide to ‘humanitarian negotiations’: “Every day, humanitarian workers are faced with situations that require some form of negotiation, from seeking agreement on how best to access those in need, to reaching an understanding with other actors of how best to protect civilians in times of armed conflict” (cited in McHugh and Bessler 2006:iii). This is clearly related to local-level peace-making but the scope of its impact is even more limited.
rarely the conflict at large but rather the concrete manifestation of the conflict at local level, though there have been exceptions to this second observation in other parts of the world. 204 Although the activities of local civil society have not been the primary focus of this study here, by including such ‘embedded’ parties who intervene in the conflict in their own country in a study on conflict intervention, I hope to counteract any false impression that on the ground there was only conflict and war, and peace only came from abroad.

There is one case of such local peace-making documented. It took place in Gorski Kotar, a mixed Croat-Serb region close to Rijeka in Croatia (Wintersteiner 1994:226). In November or December 1991 a Croat village and a Serb village, two villages linked by a traditional friendship, started to build barricades – which in other parts of Croatia had been the prelude to open fighting. In spite of strong reservations by the others in his village a retired Croatian philosophy professor who belonged to the leadership of his village went together with two other people went over to the Serb village. Promising that his village would remove its barricades, he convinced the other village to do likewise. After that visit, his village dismantled its barricades. In January he returned to the Serb village. Despite the tension and distrust finally also the Serb village removed its barricades, and answered with a counter visit in May. Since then the two villages continued good relations, the project of a ‘peace school’ was born (see chapter 7), and a peace memorial created.

5.4 Conclusions

Thousands of NGOs and other non-state actors have involved themselves in one way or another in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, given what we know today about the possibilities and restrictions civil society faces when intervening in

To give one example: from 1998 on Pax Christi Germany ran a community project in the small town of Benkovac, in the Croatian Krajina. Their peace workers mediated between a Serbian family returning to their house (which they had fled during the 1995 Croatian reconquest) and the ethnic Croatian family who had lost their own home and moved in here. After some ‘shuttle’ mediation both sides agreed to meet and developed an understanding that they shared a problem. The result was that they both shared the house for some time (Meyer 2000:314).

conflicts, it is not surprising to see that there have been very few activities which would fall under the category of peace-making. Basically, there have been in this chapter five main types of activities distinguished:

1. High level mediation, aiming at finding a solution to issues related to the ‘big conflict’.

2. Second track conflict-solving workshops, aiming at the middle-level leadership with the expectation that peace-making suggestions would ‘trickle up’ to the top-level leaderships.

3. Creation of safe spaces for ongoing dialogue between middle-level opposition leaders, with the expectation that they would be instrumental in bringing about a power change and then their voice would count.

4. Activities aiming at bringing proposals for solutions to the forefront of discussion in the target countries, with both power-holders and opposition as target groups.

5. Grassroots mediation seeking to find solutions for conflicts at local or regional level, seeking to stop or prevent violence.

If the approaches here are compared with those of state actors, it becomes obvious that they all fall under the subcategory of peace-making by negotiation. That does not mean that civil society actors in general do not have means of pressure at their disposal, though these usually will remain below the level of direct physical enforcement: There are instruments, such as boycotts, that attempt to apply pressure in favour of a certain a solution (peace-making by violence or power) but they have to the knowledge of the author not played a role for civil society actors in the case studied here.

The high-level and middle level peace-making examples have several things in common, though the basis for comparison is probably too small for any real generalisation:

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205 See chapter 2 for the varying terminology of this type of work.
206 Rather there have been a number of organisations acting consciously against the state-imposed embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by taking (sometimes even clandestinely) humanitarian aid or material support for NGOs into that country.
They were conducted by mediators with an established name. They were either led by personalities who because of their previous or current public political role had access to political leaders (Carter, Langer, Grandsits) or had a longer history of discreet mediation in other conflicts (Sant’ Egidio).

They mostly pursued limited goals (not solving whole conflict but only one step or aspect).

They were undertaken discreetly, without accompanying publicity.

They did not use ‘sticks and carrots’.

They were coordinated with and supported by state actors.

The two high-level mediations were successful looking at the immediate outcome though neither of the two was of longer-lasting impact. The middle level examples show little success that can be easily grasped and offered as an example. On the basis of the information collected, it can only be speculated that there was a longer-term effect achieved through the different workshops and meetings in the field of longer-term peace-building because people became acquainted with each other and began to develop some trust.

The grassroots peace-making is mostly dealing not with the conflict at large but with localised or otherwise limited issues which are related to the overall conflict, but whose solution would not mean an end to that overall conflict.

This rather short chapter looked at peace-making, one of Galtung’s three ‘grand peace strategies’. The next chapter will turn to the second of these strategies, peace-keeping, which shares with peace-making its comparative small number of examples.
6. Preventing and Stopping Violence: Peace-keeping by Civil Society Actors

The function of peace-keeping has been defined as the prevention of direct violence through influence or control of the behaviour of potential perpetrators.\(^{207}\)

There were many instances of military peace-keeping as well as unarmed peace-keeping by state actors in the area of the former Yugoslavia (see chapter 4.2). However, peace-keeping by civil society actors was – unlike the situation in some other countries - relatively rare. Preventing and stopping violence by addressing the potential perpetrators has mostly been just one function among several of the different projects and organisations in question.\(^{208}\)

As to the sources, there is quite good documentation on several of these projects through books and articles, but to my knowledge no publication discussing ‘peace-keeping by civilian actors’ specifically in the area of former Yugoslavia.

The following analysis distinguishes between three different kinds of civil society peace-keeping projects.

1. Longer-term projects,
2. Projects assuming protective roles in certain situations, and

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\(^{207}\) That is the difference to other forms of protection that target rather the victims than the perpetrators. To give an example: Finding a safe place for a refugee to stay means to protect him or her against further violence. But it is not peace-keeping but an action of humanitarian relief that has been categorised in this study as peace-building. The same is true of the protection work of the International Committee of the Red Cross. During the wars in Croatia and Bosnia they regularly negotiated the exchange of detainees and visited Prisoners of War (see Morillon 1993:151p, Mijovic 2001:172, King, Dorn and Hodes 2002:28p). So for example they made it possible in September 2002 that 1,600 former detainees from Bosnian camps were evacuated to Karlovac in spite of Croatia first being unwilling to accept them (Owen 1995:55), and soon after in October played a crucial role in the agreement by all warring parties in Bosnia to set free all prisoners of war (Krech 1997:73, Markovic 2000:70).

\(^{208}\) Those interested in studying civilian peace-keeping would need to look to other cases: Israel/Palestine, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Indonesia, and a number of Latin American countries where protective accompaniment has become a standard strategy for nonviolent interveners. In the last ten years there has been a growth both of practical experience and of theoretical reflection on civilian peace-keeping little known in the 1990s. That it received less attention before than is already indicated by the fact that – aside of perhaps a few articles in magazines and the book edited by Hare and Blumberg (1977) - the first scientific studies on this topic only came out in the middle of the 1990s: Buettner (1995), Schirch (1995), Weber (1996), Coy (1997) and Mahony and Eguren 1997 are the first ones I am aware of. See also Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber 2000, Schweitzer \textit{et al.} 2001, Schirch 2006 and Mahony 2006 for overviews over such projects.
3. Short-term inter-positioning projects like peace marches and the like.

6.1 An Organisation with a Longer-Term Peace-keeping Mandate: The Balkan Peace Team

There is only one example of an organisation that had a longer-term peace-keeping mandate: The volunteer project Balkan Peace Team (BPT) that was working with small teams of 2-5 people each in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between 1994 and 2001.\footnote{The Balkan Peace Team was founded and run by a group of mainly European-based peace organisations, among them War Resisters' International, International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung, Oesterreichische Friedensdienste, Dutch Mennonite Ex-Yugoslavia Working Group, Collectif du jumelage (Geneva), Mouvement pour une alternative nonviolente, Brethren Service and (with a somewhat special status) Peace Brigades International. Its coordinating office was based in Germany.} BPT’s overall goal was a wide one: to “promote a peaceful development by maintaining a permanent presence of international volunteers in some crisis areas” (Schweitzer and Clark 2002:29). Protection and support of dialogue were its two foci. In Croatia protection was more important, whilst in Serbia and Kosovo the priority was the support of dialogue between civil society activists. A mandate with six working areas included two points that clearly fall into the area of peace-keeping:

- acts as international observer at the scene of incidents or potential flashpoints;
- Escorts individuals or maintains a presence in threatening situations (Schweitzer and Clark 2002:29).\footnote{The other points were identifying possibilities for dialogue, serving as a channel for non-partisan information from the region, assisting in the promotion of human rights, and contributing skills for example through trainings.}

In Croatia between 1994 and 1999, BPT operated under the name of Otvorene Oci (Open Eyes) deploying two teams of volunteers, one in Zagreb (or Karlovac for part of the time) and the other in Split. There were two main issues around which Otvorene Oci’s peace-keeping activities revolved:

The first was the issue of illegal house evictions which was a focus of concern for a number of local human rights groups. In the first years after independence, the Croatian state (or local authorities) tried to evict tenants from flats that had belonged to the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army. Victims were usually ethnic Serbs. Accompanying
local human rights activists to evictions was one of the first protection-related activities Otvorene Oci undertook in 1994 (see Balkan Peace Team 1994, 1995 and 1996a, Mueller 2006:48). When called to an eviction, BPT volunteers usually did not only come by themselves but also called upon other international agencies and media to be present as well. In several cases the police aborted their attempts to evict the tenant when they found that internationals were present in the flat.

The second was monitoring the situation in the former Krajina (UN Protected Areas West and South) after the reoccupation by Croatia in 1995, and again the accompaniment of local activists to the area. In Western Slavonia, BPT together with volunteers from other international projects entered the area within a few days of the reconquest, seeking to establish a continuous presence of observers. One volunteer spent two nights in the house of a local politician who was considered to be threatened (see Mueller 2006:63). Both in Mueller (2006) and Schweitzer and Clark (2002), as well as in the BPT newsletters and special reports (for example Balkan Peace Team 1995 and 1996a), a number of further examples of accompaniment of local activist in this context can be found:

- A volunteer from BPT Karlovac accompanied a human right activist to Western Slavonia for an exploratory mission researching human rights violations and killings (Mueller 2006:64).

- BPT Split in and after 1995 sought to maintain a regular presence in the area around Knin, and made a point of visiting villages in the area and inquiring after people’s well-being, specially of the elderly Serbs who stayed behind when the Croatian army reoccupied the territory (Mueller 2006:69pp, Schweitzer and Clark 2002:7, 30pp).

- The Split team accompanied in 1996 an activist from Split when a family from a village in the former ‘Sector South’ reported the bombing of their houses on the Croatian Statehood Day. The activist and BPT accompanied a representative of the family to the police to inquire about the investigation, and they talked with other international organisations including the ECMM. Afterwards, BPT wrote a public report that was distributed through the international BPT member organisations as well as to international actors in Croatia (see Balkan Peace Team 1996e, Mueller 2006:96pp).
In another case, the team accompanied an activist from the (Croatian) Helsinki Committee in a visit to two Serbian monasteries in Krajina in order to assess their needs (Balkan Peace Team 1996d).

To assess BPT’s strategy, two other points need to be mentioned. The first is BPT’s limited ability to develop ‘international clout’. BPT was influenced by Peace Brigade International’s theory of unarmed deterrence:

International accompaniment can succeed in deterring attacks because the decision makers behind these attacks seldom want a bad international image. They don’t want the world to know about what they are doing. They don’t want diplomats making them uncomfortable mentioning human rights problems in their meetings. They don’t want to read in the international press that they are being called monsters or criminals. They will avoid all that if they can. (Mahony 2004:7)

For that reason, at least BPT member organisations expected to build up similar international influence and support (see Balkan Peace Team Coordinating Committee 1998). However, in the event, other than through its member organisations, very little was done in this respect, partly because of simple lack of resources (see Schweitzer and Clark 2002:21 and 39). How much that affected BPT’s efficacy is not clear.

The second point is BPT’s relationship to the international missions, especially UNPROFOR and EC: Other than in the context of exchanging information or having to request permission to enter certain areas, BPT kept a conscious distance from them. This was partly due to the fact that BPT was an initiative of a coalition of pacifist groups that as a matter of principle did not wish any cooperation with armed actors or governments. But it was also due to BPT’s practical experience in the field. In Croatia (and to a lesser degree in Serbia) the international state actors (UN, EC/EU etc) were not well liked, and so not being identified with them gave a strategic advantage to the operation on the ground (Schweitzer and Clark 2002:38).

211 Though not being the first or only organisation practising protective accompaniment or intercessionary peace-keeping in Schirch’s terminology, it is Peace Brigades International who elaborated this technique the most, and whose name is most linked to accompaniment. According to this deterrence theory, the protective effect of international presence is that of an indirect threat – the threat with an international reaction in case an attack or human rights violation occurs in the presence of the international monitor / accompanier, thereby increasing the political cost. See Mahony and Eguren 1997 and Mahony 2004 and 2006.

212 Just to remark on the term ‘pacifist’: I use this term to describe certain groups in a way it is often used in Germany, that is more or less a synonym for ‘nonviolent’ but with a more political
6.2 Projects Assuming Peace-keeping Roles Incidentally in Certain Situations

In the last years and in the context of the discussion on human security, it has become more widely recognised that civilian protection may be a function to be fulfilled by aid and development organisations operating in insecure environments, even though their mandate does not foresee this (see Slim and Bonwick 2005, Mahony 2006, O’Callaghan and Pantuliano 2007). While the theoretical acknowledgment may have still been mostly lacking in the earlier 1990s, in practice many organisations found themselves challenged with issues of direct protection.

- International volunteers working in refugee camps in Croatia (see 7.4.1) provided by their presence a certain protection especially for Muslim refugees, as Ruez (1994:74) confirms. The Muslim refugees were merely tolerated in Croatia, and the international presence (and the publicity due to their presence) prevented or mitigated police actions in the camps.

- A second example would be the International Volunteer Project Pakrac. This was a youth and reconstruction project in Croatia run by a Croatian NGO in cooperation with the UN (see 7.3.2.1). After the reoccupation of Western Slavonia in 1995, some other international volunteers in addition to BPT maintained a presence in houses of the minority of Serbs who had not fled during the offensive and were now threatened (see Balkan Peace Team 1996b, Committee for Conflict Transformation Support 2001).

- Especially in the early years after the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, peace-building projects working there found themselves sometimes challenged by the possibility of interethnic violence especially in the context of refugee and IDP return. While they usually tended to call to IFOR / SFOR in for such cases - for example to escort people visiting graveyards - there were also situations where the presence of the civilian peace or development workers directly provided some protection. So for example one peace worker from the German Civil Peace Service in Banja Luka looked after an elderly widow who had returned to her pre-war apartment but was afraid of being attacked and evicted again (see Pax Christi 2003).
According to Lambach (2004:8), in Kosovo after 1999, staff from the German Forum Civil Peace Service though otherwise cooperating with KFOR preferred to accompany Serbian returnees themselves in spite of security concerns rather than calling KFOR because they feared that KFOR’s presence would provoke extremist forces.

Many local NGOs, especially the women, anti-war and human rights groups had international volunteers working with them. Sometimes these volunteers were deployed by a peace service organisation, sometimes they just came on their own (see 7.7.5.2). As several activists from Croatia confirmed in personal talks and interviews conducted at the occasion of a War Resisters’ International meeting in Ohrid 2004, having these internationals around gave the local activists protection.

6.3 Short-term Inter-positioning Projects

The third type of activities with clear peace-keeping functions have been a number of ‘peace marches’ that took place between 1992 and 1995 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as one small action in Kosovo in 1998. They can all be classified as a form of ‘inter-positioning’ (see Schirch 1995). The basic idea of inter-positioning is to stand between two warring parties and stop the violence because these parties would hopefully refrain from attack knowing that the first casualties would be the nonviolent activists. However, most of the examples presented below tended to prioritise ‘witnessing’ and ‘expressing solidarity’, with the inter-positioning function as secondary though clearly recognizable.

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213 I am not counting the 1991 Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly ’peace caravan’ among their number because its objectives were public protest and education of the international participants (see Buro 1997:122p, Vack 1996:27, 210).

214 I have personal knowledge of three of the actions described in this chapter, having participated in ’¡Solidarity for Peace’ and ’Mir Sada’ as well as co-organised ’Sjeme Mira’.

215 “Witnessing” refers to a Christian concept. Generally it means expressing one’s beliefs in public. For nonviolent groups it implies furthermore the expression of the nonviolent approach and convictions the group professes. “Public witness is an intentional way of offering our peace perspective to the wider community”, write Christian Peacemaker Teams ( [online] at <http://www.cpt.org/about/faq#21> [20.1.2009]), one of the evangelical nonviolent Christian groups standing for this approach.
6.3.1 Inter-positioning in the Bosnian War

In September 1992 a small group of about 20 participants going went to Sarajevo (Laubenthal 1992, World Peace and Relief Team n.d., World Peace and Relief Team 1993, Schweitzer 1994:59). It was organised by the World Peace and Relief Team (WPRT), a small humanitarian / peace organisation set up by a British citizen living in Austria. The founder and his co-worker and wife, a Fellowship of Reconciliation Austria employee, had been involved in an earlier inter-positioning project, the Gulf Peace Team, in 1991. The approach of WPRT was to combine humanitarian aid with peace action. They travelled to Sarajevo by road, and then carried out humanitarian work, mostly in the hospital, for four weeks. Their hope was that their presence would constitute a buffer between the armed forces, but there is no indication that this goal was achieved beyond the fact that they were allowed to go in and out of Sarajevo in safety (see World Peace and Relief Team n.d. and 1992).

In December 1992 there was a peace ‘caravan’ with the title ‘Solidarity for Peace in Sarajevo’ which was much larger, having about 500 participants, mostly Italians with perhaps 30 from other countries like USA, Belgium and Germany (see Beati i costruttori di pace 1992, War Resisters International 1994:6, Schirch 1995, Schweitzer et al. 2001-chapter 2, Una risposta alla violenza (n.d.), Cavagna 2007). It was organised by the Catholic Italian organisation Beati i costruttori di pace, founded in 1985 by a Catholic priest named Don Albino Bizzotto, and working in many parts of the world. Like WPRT, they sought to combine humanitarian aid with peace work and from 1992 onwards they had a small permanent team of volunteers in Sarajevo. The goals of the December 1992 intervention – a 24 hour visit to Sarajevo - were moderate, and did not assume that they would be able to stop the war. They were

- to promote a peaceful solution of the conflict, to demonstrate that the search for peace is not an exclusive function of governments, be witness to violations of human rights and to living conditions and will to peace of people affected by war. (Beati i costruttori di pace 1992)

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217 For today’s activities, see http://www.beati.org. The page however does not include any documents on the peace caravans described here.
But one of its effects was a 24-hour cease-fire in Sarajevo because the Serbian forces stopped shelling the town for the time the caravan was in Sarajevo, so it can be argued that there was some de-facto inter-positioning by the peace caravan.

In August 1993 Beati i costruttori di pace joined forces with the French humanitarian organisation Equilibre for another, even larger peace caravan with around 3,000 participants under the name Mir Sada / We share one peace (see Tonnis and Carlen 1993, Papini 1995, Schirch 1995, Mueller and Buettner 1998, Schweitzer 2000a, Cozzoli 2002). As in December 1992, there was to be a bus caravan to Sarajevo, with a smaller group of activists intending to stay some time in the Serbian-controlled territory.\footnote{The original plan had been to create three peace camps, one in each ethnic region of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with 60-80 participants in each camp, and staying for one to two weeks.} To the goals of the previous Solidarity for Peace was added an element of trying to enforce a cease-fire by the presence of the caravan (see Papini 1995:67).

About 2,000 people from Italy, France, USA, Japan, Germany, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Greece, Sweden, Norway and the Czech Republic gathered in Split, Croatia for the four-week project.\footnote{3,000 according to some sources for example Tonnis and Carlen 1993.} However, various factors - including disagreement on the goals as well as differences in the risk assessment - caused a falling out between the two organisers soon after a first group of buses had left Split and entered Bosnia, and Equilibre decided to quit the action. One for Equilibre’s changed risk analysis was that, in addition to the fighting in central Bosnia, the USA had now announced that they were prepared to attack Serbian positions south-east of Sarajevo (Tonnis and Carlen 1993). Shortly afterwards Beati i costruttori also decided to abandon the journey and return to Split because of military action on the road ahead. Only a small group with a couple of vehicles travelled on by themselves, not accepting the authority of the organisers and without their backing. A couple of other buses travelled later from Split to Mostar where a demonstration was held in the Croatian part of the town.

The evaluation of the project is contested. While the organisers considered the visit an outright success (personal knowledge), many participants saw it as a failure since Sarajevo was not reached. As I saw it at that time, the reasons for Mir Sada not achieving its goals were

- imprecision about the goals;
- flawed structure of organisation and decision-making;
- mistakes in relationship to the local peace groups, and
- lack of preparation of the participants. (Schweitzer 2000a)

Local peace and anti-war groups tended to be generally very critical about these peace caravans, as was reflected in an evaluation by War Resisters’ International one and a half years later. Referring to the December 1992 and the August 1993 actions the report observed:

Each action has tended to have a powerful personal impact on participants, but less on the situation. The actions tended to express vague, rather general sentiments; the larger actions were an organisational nightmare. Consultation with local groups was also a weakness (War Resisters’ International 1994:6; see also Schirch 1995:65pp on the same issue).

After these international projects, Beati costruttori di pace continued to experiment with inter-positioning:220:

- During a peace demonstration somewhat later in 1993 a group of activists tried to cross symbolically a bridge between the Muslim and Serbian part of Sarajevo. The action went dramatically wrong, and one of the activists of Beati costruttori di pace was killed by gun fire (Cavagna 2007).

- In September 1994, more than 100 people visited Sarajevo to express solidarity with the people who suffered from war, and to symbolically offer a form of anticipated accompaniment to the Pope (who they were demanding should also visit Sarajevo) (Cozzoli 2002:174).

- In August 1995, 200 people wanted to repeat a visit but were stopped in 15 km distance from Sarajevo (Cozzoli 2002:174).

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220 There was one more international peace march: 'Sjeme Mira' ('Seed of Peace'), set up in December 1993 by around 20 US-American, Dutch and German participants of Mir Sada who, being dissatisfied with how Mir Sada had worked out, wanted to do a smaller action of their own (Schirch 1995; Mueller and Buettner 1998, Schweitzer et al. 2001chapter 2). The group comprised primarily of activists from Catholic Workers US and the German Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung (Federation for Social Defence) travelled in several vehicles for two weeks through southern Bosnia and Herzegovina, distributing leaflets and some humanitarian aid, and tried to make contacts with people who appeared open towards peace. Its goals were not so much inter-positioning as promoting peace and witnessing the situation. The action as such has been evaluated mostly positively by its participants, but like its predecessors did not leave any lasting impact.

221 While the media immediately blamed a Serbian sniper, Beati costruttori di pace rather assumes that the bullet that killed Gabriele Moreno Locatelli came from the Muslim side. See Cavagna 2007.
6. Peace-keeping by Civil Society Actors

6.3.2 Inter-positioning in Kosovo

Prevention of violence through international presence later came up again in the context of the Kosovo conflict:

In March 1998, the US-American nonviolent group Peaceworkers, an organisation with a long history of direct nonviolent action, sent a delegation to Kosovo in solidarity with the Kosovar students of the University of Prishtina demonstrating in for the reopening of the university and for political freedom (see Hartsough 1996, Hartsough 1998, Peaceworkers 1998, Hartsough 2008). Five of the US-American activists were arrested and deported after a few days in jail. Their action falls under the category of peace-keeping insofar as it was quite explicitly based on methods of inter-positioning and international presence as understood by the initiator David Hartsough. Peaceworkers hoped that their international presence would help provide protection to the Albanian nonviolent protesters and help make peaceful change possible in Kosovo (Hartsough 2008).

6.3.3 Relationship to Other Actors

To conclude this section, two additional observations need to be made. The first is the issue of ‘international clout’. The public relations work around the different marches varied, but at least the main ones undertaken by Beati i costruttori di pace were well documented in Italian and partly also other international media.

The second is about the relations to state actors, especially UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina: To access Sarajevo was at that time not possible without at least being tolerated by UNPROFOR that controlled the access to the no-man’s land between the Serbian circle and the government-held inner part of Sarajevo. Therefore, the caravans were announced to UNPROFOR and they gave some degree of support, at least in terms of opening the road so that the convoys could pass. As I remember, there were also offers by UNPROFOR to accompany the bus caravans in the same manner as they accompanied UNHCR convoys, but these offers were turned down to

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222 It also had an aspect of protest and advocacy since called people to make protests to the Yugoslav and US president, and to send support messages to the students in Kosovo.

223 And being a Catholic organisation, Beati i costruttori di pace had access to official channels of the Catholic Church.
emphasise the nonviolent and non-partisan position of the interveners.

6.4 Conclusions

Compared to the activities described in the later chapters on peace-building and protest and advocacy, there have been only very few examples of nonviolent peace-keeping by civil society actors in the case study. Three types were distinguished:

1. Longer-term projects with peace-keeping as part of the mandate, with Balkan Peace Team in Croatia being the only example;
2. Protection activities by projects that were about other objectives but who took a role in protection when the situation warranted it;
3. Short-term inter-positioning projects.

Unlike in countries where there are NGOs (international or local) whose main roles are protective accompaniment or monitoring and presence, there were no civil society projects that focussed exclusively on such peace-keeping functions (see footnote 2 this chapter). As with peace-making, civil society peace-keeping was dealing with two different contexts: the ‘conflict at large’ (seeking to stop the war through inter-positioning), and concrete protection of specific people in specific locations (protective presence and accompaniment). The different methods used match well what has been identified in other studies, especially the comparative work by Slim and Bonwick (2005) and Mahony (2006):

- Deterrence through international clout, or rather: connectedness to other international actors.\(^{224}\)
- Protection through building connections to potential perpetrators on the ground.
- In addition it is clear that internationals have a symbolic power as ‘untouchables’ whether or not they could mobilise international clout (BPT in Croatia was not strong on the latter, but nevertheless was able to protect).

\(^{224}\) However, deterrence is not the only strategy in protection. Slim and Bonwick (2005) and the authors of the Nonviolent Peaceforce Feasibility study (Schweitzer et al. 2001) came to the conclusion that there were alternative sources of protection than deterrence, for example respect for the intervener because of his/ her identity (age, gender, country of origin), his/her role and whom s/he represents (e.g. the UN), law and tradition (e.g. ethics of hospitality), and simply building up trust with all sides.
Other observations to be made are:

- The function of protection has sometimes benefitted from being combined with other types of activities, such as civil society support, humanitarian aid or dialogue work. The connections to different actors made in the course of these other activities could be used when protection was called for. This is clearly shown by the example of BPT as well as of the incidental protection work. The relationship to the international governmental interveners, especially the military peace-keepers, is ambivalent. It seems that the overall ideological orientation of those running projects which they as demonstrating an alternative to military intervention (see the chapter on protest and advocacy) played as much a role as the situation on the ground. Projects run by pacifist groups kept a clear distance and maintained cooperation at a minimal level, which they also justified by finding better acceptance on the ground (BPT). Other – human rights, humanitarian and also peace service organisations – displayed generally a higher degree of cooperation with the military forces (for example seeking out the military peace-keepers as first option for protection), but again there was in the sample one case where this was not done because of the group in question felt that accompaniment by the military increased instead of lowered the risk.  

Those projects hoping to stop the violence by inter-positioning themselves mostly had very limited success. While their presence indeed in at least some cases led to a reduction of the fighting, the short-term character of their stay made it easy for the combatants to allow for such a break in the fighting without it having a real influence on the conflict. This is not surprising and confirms the findings from other studies (see Weber 2000, Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber 2000, Schweitzer et al. 2001).

Inter-positioning with the goal of simply stopping a war has never worked so far for a variety of reasons that have both to do with the character of modern war and with the logistical challenges ‘peace armies’ face.  

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225 This picture is not surprising taking later cases like for example Afghanistan where a number of NGOs seek to maintain their distance to the international military because being seen as connected to them would increase their risk and jeopardise the work they are doing (Lambach 2004). See also VENRO (2003) for a general statement on the issue.

226 The Gulf Peace Team in the desert had the attacking air force flying over their heads to Baghdad. And most other ‘peace army’ initiatives never got beyond the planning stage because of insurmountable logistical problems (finance, transportation, access to the war area).
On the other hand the remark needs to be made that it may be ‘unfair’ to evaluate these projects only in regard to stopping violence. They all had other goals as well, foremost expressing solidarity and reporting what they saw back home, while those actions carried out by the Catholic organisation Beati i costruttori di pace also had a strong religious element of ‘bearing witness’ in a spiritual sense that cannot be measured by hard-core social science impact indicators.

Projects dealing with concrete threats of violence in a more limited context have had overall more success. The evaluations of the work of Balkan Peace Team show that it played a constructive role in protection in Croatia.

The question if ‘civilian peace-keeping works’ is of course a wider question that was already addressed in chapter 4, acknowledging that the major projects of civilian peace-keeping in former Yugoslavia were not undertaken by civil society but by state actors (see 4.2.2).
7. Peace-building by Civil Society Actors

7. Dealing with the Causes and Consequences of Violence:
Peace-building by Civil Society Actors

Peace-building has to address both the causes and consequences of violent conflict: Material destruction, and non-physical damage such as traumatisation, hatred towards those seen as belonging to ‘the enemy’, break-down of relationships, and the weakening or malfunctioning of structures and institutions. It includes all those activities that address structural issues, relationships between the conflict parties or otherwise seek to reverse the destructive processes of conflict and war, and is by far the category with the greatest variety and largest number of activities. Peace-building is often defined as beginning only after a cease-fire has been agreed (see Boutros-Ghali 1995, Lewer 1999). However the findings in this case study show clearly what was already suggested in chapter 2.2.4.3, namely that the same activities and strategies can be found – only perhaps less frequently - in early stages of crisis escalation and even during war times.

Peace-building activities have been reasonably well documented, including evaluations of individual projects and a few meta evaluations and studies about one or the other type of activity. In addition, I have used minutes of coordination meetings, leaflets and other ephemeral material.

As to the presentation of the findings in this category, I decided to first try to sketch the overall picture in each of nine sub-categories of peace-building identified (see chapter 2.2.4.3) in order not to allow examples that may be interesting but not typical to distort the understanding of what has taken place. For examples, I have looked for either ‘good practice’ or activities that were somewhat out of the ordinary.

7.1 Humanitarian Relief

In chapter 2.2.4.3 it was argued that helping people to survive a war is a first step to reversing its destructive processes, and for that reason aid can be considered part of peace-building. Humanitarian relief and support of IDPs and refugees has been one of the major areas of activities by international civil society in the former Yugoslavia.
7.1.1 Material Humanitarian Aid

During the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, two NGOs played a major role as collection points and transmitters of aid to the Muslim and Croat parts of the country: the Catholic Caritas and the Bosnian-Muslim Merhamet (Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1996, different minutes of the [Ex-]Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis). They and other large humanitarian NGOs almost all closely cooperated with UNHCR which coordinated the transports into Bosnia-Herzegovina and the airlift to Sarajevo.

What made the relief efforts in the period of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina special compared to other conflicts is the extent of small private initiatives that went beyond sending money to the accounts of the established aid organisations. An almost uncountable number of small citizen groups collected food, clothes, medicine, tools or other items, and either sent it with one of the larger agencies, or hired a truck of their own to drive it down (see Schmitz 1998:12). The survey conducted for this study identified around 200 groups in Europe and North America being involved in such work, and there is reason to believe that this is only a tiny percentage of the total number. For Germany alone, Klaus Vack, a peace activist whose organisation, the Komitee fuer Grundrechte und Demokratie (Committee for Basic Rights and Democracy), was very involved in humanitarian aid claims that there were 1,700 German groups who rendered aid to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1991 and 1995 (Vack 1996:14 and 41).

Aside from collecting money and/or buying and sending material aid, NGOs and citizens’ groups were also involved in a number of other humanitarian activities.

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227 Variously known as (Ex-)Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis, ‘Koordinierungskreis Jugoslawienarbeit’, or ‘Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis’ (including in the minutes of the meetings), this coordination circle met in Germany almost every month. from 1992 to 1995, exchanging information about the work of different humanitarian and political initiatives. Regardless of how a particular set of minutes are headed, they will be referred to as "(Ex-) Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis". Most projects have been addressed on multiple occasions at these meetings – therefore this summary reference that will be given in several places of this chapter.

228 According to Cutts (1999:6), by the end of 1995 there were over 250 international humanitarian organisations operating under the UNHCR ‘umbrella’, with ICRC being the only major humanitarian organisation to operate outside its framework.

229 This picture is different from that of the Kosovo crisis and war 1998-1999 where there was a lot of protest but not as much individual relief work other than that of established large humanitarian NGOs and of the diaspora communities, though some of the smaller groups that had engaged in relief during the Bosnia war reactivated their efforts and brought relief to refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania.
during and after the wars of that period: Establishing soup kitchens, equipping hospitals or sending doctors and nurses to increase the number of personnel working there, or bringing wounded children or adults for treatment to third countries.

The motives of these groups certainly varied. Many did it out of purely humanitarian reasons – feeling compelled to help in the face of the reports of suffering, because they had relatives in the region or in some cases also just because they used to spend holidays in Yugoslavia and knew people personally. “We must do something”, “We cannot watch” were key phrases to be found again and again in the descriptions of various small groups.230

Others, especially groups with a background in the peace movement, mixed humanitarian with political motives. An example is the German Komitee fuer Grundrechte und Demokratie. When the conflicts in former Yugoslavia started, they began to organise humanitarian aid after having participated in the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly’s Peace Caravan in November 1991.231 They saw humanitarian aid in the context of their protest against the war and as propaganda against military action:

> When a war has started and surpassed a certain border, then a dynamic of aggression once started cannot be stopped, unless there are strong forces within the country. In such a situation a weak peace movement can only help people in certain fields. The other is to support those forces interested in peace where bloody conflicts hold sway (Vack 1996:41, translation CS).

This approach was shared by many other citizens’ groups that combined aid with peace-related activities. for example, the Antikriegshaus Sievershausen, a small group from Northern Germany, conscientiously took the aid they collected to all ethnic groups, making a priority of delivering to Serbian victims of war in order to counter-act the prevalent view in Germany that “the Serbs” were the perpetrators and “the Croats” and “the Muslims” the victims.232 They hoped that through the contacts between the parties that they had to facilitate in order to reach the various

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230 See for example Scotto 2001 for Communità /Associazione Papa Giovanni XXIIIrd, and Arbeitskreis Jugoslawienkonflikt 1995 for the group with the same name in Trier/Germany.

231 That caravan travelled throughout Yugoslavia demonstrating for peace and meeting anti-war groups in all republics.

232 The Serbian parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina received comparatively little aid from the international community though there were some NGOs that made a point of delivering aid to all sides. As far as I know, it has been mostly the Serbian and Yugoslav Red Cross Societies that filled the gap here, with support from UNHCR (Mercier 1995:128pp).
destinations of their aid longer-term relationships between the ethnic groups after the war would be possible (Antikriegshaus Sievershausen 1995:244).

7.1.2 Sheltering Refugees and Displaced

7.1.2.1 The Overall Picture

As explained in chapter 3, there are no reliable figures for the total of those who were displaced or became refugees during the wars. Estimates speak of 3 million for the Croatian/Bosnian wars in total, up to 1.4 million IDPs and refugees from Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, and 150,000 seeking to escape violence in Macedonia 2001.

Between 1992 and 1995 large refugee camps were created in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, fewer in FR Yugoslavia, either run by UNHCR, the governments of the host countries, or larger NGOs. When the readiness of Croatia to accept Bosnian (Muslim) refugees came to an end, many people were sent on to other third countries in Europe, or even North America or Australia and New Zealand.

During the NATO war on FR Yugoslavia in 1999, the high numbers of Kosovo-Albanian refugees overwhelmed the neighbouring countries. In Albania and Macedonia, UNHCR together with the World Food Programme, NATO and around 180 to 200 NGOs had to deal with some 800,000 refugees in several hundred camps (see UNHCR 1999a, Wilkinson 2001).

The role of civil society actors has not been limited to be partner of international organisations in running refugee and IDP camps. They also have been

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233 Serbia received hundred thousands of refugees from Bosnia and Croatia. The FR Yugoslavia at the end of the year 2000 hosted still about 390,000 refugees (Wilkinson 2001), or according to the United States Committee for Refugees (2001) even 484,000 of whom close to 290,000 had come from Croatia and 190,000 from Bosnia. In 2007 it were still over 100,000 according to Klincov (n.d.).

234 Many people also found a place to stay either with families, or moving into empty houses left by those who had fled in the other direction. The regulation of ownership and eventual return of the original owners to their houses has been one of the major tasks in reconstruction in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

235 Partners of UNHCR in Macedonia were among others Action Contre la Faim, American Refugee Committee, Arbeiter Samariter Bund, Care Australia, Catholic Relief Services, Centro Regionale d’Intervento per la Cooperazione, Danish Refugee Council, HELP, International Catholic Migration Commission, International Center for Migration Policy Development, IFCR, International Medical Corps, International Rescue Committee, Intersos, Italian Consortium for Solidarity, Mercy Corps International, Norwegian Refugee Council and Oxfam (UNHCR 1999a).
• supporting refugees that had come to third countries;\textsuperscript{236} and
• They facilitated access of refugees to third countries. This last type of initiative will be described in the following section.

7.1.2.2 Helping People to Escape

In 1993 the plight of those displaced by the war became known to the wider public through intensive media reporting. Many were without adequate shelter in the already overwhelmed neighbouring countries, or still in Bosnia finding that their homes suddenly lay in ‘enemy territory’ and facing immediate expulsion or worse. The first response of civil society in the western European countries was to appeal to their governments to accept larger numbers of refugees, but the EC countries proved to be very hesitant and, when eventually agreeing on quotas, these were considered to be too low by many people in civil society (see 8.2.3). For that reason, in some countries citizens started initiatives to enable displaced to gain entry outside the official ‘quota system’. The example on which I have the best documentation is a German initiative, but there were comparable efforts in several European countries.

In autumn 1993 several German groups, mostly with a peace movement background, came together to found a new initiative first called Survive the Winter, soon renamed Survive the War. This initiative used a gap in the German immigration laws. People from non-EU countries could get a three-month visa if they were invited personally by a resident who guaranteed the costs of their stay. Through the network of its supporters and through public appeals, Survive the War found hundreds of individuals, families and local groups, both ethnic Germans and people with a migration background from the area to personally invite refugees.\textsuperscript{237} These refugees were either identified in camps in Croatia or later in (quite risky) trips undertaken to areas in Serbian-controlled parts of Bosnia where Muslim minorities were trapped. These invitees usually first stayed with their ‘sponsors’, and then obtained permission to remain since, once in the country, they could not be deported because

\textsuperscript{236} For example SOS telephone lines, advice centres, psychological support etc. Sometimes groups also sought to hide people who were threatened with eviction (for example Kosovo Albanians or Serbs). See Baglioni 2001:227, Pax Christi Nederland (ed.) 1995 and the minutes of the (Ex-)Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis in Germany.

\textsuperscript{237} Later, people were also sent on to partners in Sweden and other countries.
of humanitarian concerns. The initiative soon had to build its own transit camp close to Zagreb where at some times several hundred people stayed - the average in 1995 was 300. Before the end of 1995, Survive the War had helped almost 8,000 mostly Muslim Bosnians to escape (see Den Krieg ueberleben 1995 and 1998, and the minutes of the (Ex)-Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis 1993, 1994 and 1995).

7.1.3 Summary: Relief Work - Almost a Social Movement

For reasons of space, it is almost impossible to do justice to the enormous humanitarian aid efforts undertaken by thousands of groups in response to the first years of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. While in terms of the impact on the ground, certainly the large organisations (both state and non-state) were more important, for a study on civil society interventions the spontaneous direct help by many small groups and individual citizens are of special interest. I think that the aid they organised and delivered can be considered an important expression of a social movement responding to the conflicts. While this question of a movement will be discussed further in chapter 8, it could be noted already here that it was as visible and present as it was heterogeneous in nature: Purely humanitarian motives (often mixed with implicit or explicit criticism of governmental efforts that were considered insufficient), political motives to help one or the other side identified as the victims of aggression, and motivations to help to overcome the conflict through the aid activity were at least three stand points clearly distinguishable.

7.2 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of Combatants

As mentioned briefly in chapter 4, DDR has mostly been the responsibility of the international military peace-keepers and the civilian administration where there was one set up, sometimes with the aid of private mercenary firms. Civil society actors – NGOs – have played a role mostly in the third phase, the reintegration of soldiers. Many offered vocational training for former soldiers. Veterans have also been a target group for psycho-social trauma care, and for projects in the context of ‘dealing with the past’. This kind of work on reintegration of soldiers, however, may be better

\(^{238}\) Often the refugees found work and were able to support themselves.
placed in the peace-building categories on reconstruction, economic recovery and social/psycho-social work, with veterans just being another target group, and will be presented below.

7.3 Reconstruction and Refugee Return

The category ‘reconstruction’ refers to the physical rehabilitation (repair or rebuilding) of houses, roads and infrastructure (water, electricity etc.). Reconstruction has usually been closely linked with material aid as well with the return of IDPs and refugees. In the following section I will first sketch the overall picture, and then turn to one special type of reconstruction project that combined physical reconstruction with all sorts of community activities.

7.3.1 The Overall Picture

It would be a misconception to assume that reconstruction only started after cease-fire agreements were signed. NGOs were active in many areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina long before the end of 1995.\textsuperscript{239} After the end of the war, the countries hosting refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia wished them to return which in consequence boosted reconstruction efforts after 1995. Large and small INGOs acted as implementing partners for UNHCR or for individual governments (see Pezer 2002:240pp). The same picture developed after the Kosovo war of 1999.

7.3.2 ‘Social Reconstruction’ and Other Projects with Complex Mandates

7.3.2.1 ‘Social Reconstruction’ in Pakrac

Pakrac is a small town of 10,000 Serbs and Croats in Western Slavonia, Croatia, that was heavily damaged during the fighting in 1991. With the cease-fire it became divided with a Croatian sector in the centre of town and a Serbian part on the outskirts belonging to the Serb-controlled areas, with UN peace-keepers on both

\textsuperscript{239} For example the Schweizerische Arbeiterhilfswerk (Swiss Workers Aid) established 18 reconstruction projects between 1994 and 1995, as a result of which 2,800 people were able to return to their villages (Wenger and Perovic 1995:34pp)
sides of the line between Croatian and Serbian controlled territory. Different UN bodies (Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, UNDP, UNPROFOR) initiated a peace-building project called a ‘social reconstruction’ project. It sought to implement thoughts that General-Secretary Boutros-Ghali had just formulated in his Agenda For Peace (1992). The idea was to normalize as quickly as possible the inter-ethnic relations between the conflict parties, to contribute through concrete projects of cooperation to the social and economic development of the region, and to help with reconstruction and stabilization of the economic structures. It was hoped that refugees and IDPs would be able to return quickly and live in peaceful co-existence (Boehm 2001:181).

In early 1993, UNDP invited several NGOs, both local and international, to participate in the social reconstruction efforts. The analysis here will focus on one of the projects, the Pakrac Volunteer Project. The Croatian partner of UNDP was the Antiratne Kampanje (Antiwar Campaign Croatia –ARK.). ARK recruited both Croatian and international volunteers for the project, directly or through international partner organisations. By 1997 about 500 international volunteers (average age

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240 The UN Social Reconstruction Project did not only consist of the Pakrac Volunteer Project. Care Austria, Austrian Peace Services, Help Age International and UN bodies (UNPROFOR, UN Civil Affairs, UN Police Force) also were involved in it at certain times or throughout the running of the project. UNPROFOR ran check-point meetings, a Parcel Delivery Programme and a Village Visitation Programme, and also helped with the rebuilding of infrastructure (water, electricity, gas, telephone) Help International financed a visiting programme that allowed teams of social workers to visit several hundred of elderly people on both sides of the border. CARE started a project of physical reconstruction of houses, while building materials and tools were financed by a Dutch Foundation (Stichting Fluchteling). This project also ran into problems, and the project could not be carried out as originally planned (the reconstruction of one particular street) but the materials were used by the Volunteer Project and Croatian Workers Brigades’ for reconstruction in the town. CARE later then helped to rebuild 33 houses on the Serbian side of the town, and established a revolving fund with the local communities to finance reconstruction. On the Croatian part 100 houses were renovated, but on the Serbian side this number could not be reached due to the lack of building materials. CARE’s involvement came to an end with the reoccupation of Western Slavonia, the director of the Serbian CARE timer yard losing his life while fleeing (Boehm 2001:185pp).


242 ARK is an umbrella peace organisation that was founded in 1991 soon after the conflicts in former Yugoslavia developed, with members in Zagreb and in several other Croatian towns (Osijek, Rijeka, Split).

243 Partners were Service Civil International, International Voluntary Service, Brethren Service, Cotravaux (France), Medjugorije Appeal (Britain), Christian Peace Service and Komitee fuer Grundrechte und Demokratie (both Germany), Group for a Switzerland without an Army -GsoA (Switzerland), Suncokret and Austrian Peace Services.
23-24) had worked in the Croatian part of Pakrac (Boehm 2001:196). They worked on the cleaning and repair of public and private buildings and of a wastewater pipeline. They harvested corn, collected wood for school winter heating, started a youth club giving among other things English lessons, organised sports activities and a jazz dance group. They visited elderly and solitary people, cared for children, set up a weekly local radio show, installed a computer-network in the local school, produced an e-mail news letter and a paper newsletter, and gave workshops on peace education for teachers and elder pupils. A women’s group they initiated began to distribute humanitarian aid, to run a laundry and have some other income-generating work through knitting and sewing.

Wilson, who worked himself in the project and afterwards wrote an evaluation of it (that unfortunately remains unpublished), describes the basic idea of ‘social reconstruction’ as follows:

> Spontaneous contacts were gradually extended and systematised, building a base in the 'Croatian' community founded on seemingly innocuous activities (playing with children, language lessons...). Long term volunteers then acted as catalysts in the much more difficult coalescing of a few Pakracani around particular issues and needs, in some cases in groups such as a youth club, women’s group, or interests such as a school-based email project. … Over the next three years these initiatives in turn became springboards for social development and a diverse set of activities and trainings aimed at 'empowering' groups and individuals. (Committee for Conflict Transformation Support 2001)

Having peaceful co-existence as its wider goal, the Volunteer Project sought to work also on the Serbian side of the town. But attempts to cross the border and work on the Serbian side met with many difficulties and little acceptance by the Croats in
Therefore ARK made contact with the Center for Antiwar Action in Belgrade, an activist group not unlike ARK’s members. Part of the Center was the group MOST that worked with refugees and IDPs, combining humanitarian and psycho-social aid with the goal of helping people to handle the conflicts more constructively (see Grupa Most n.d.). MOST joined the Pakrac project in 1994. Their style of work was very different from that of the international volunteer project on the Croatian side. They only used Yugoslav volunteers, and had a much smaller number of people in the field at any given time (in summer 1994: 5). They stayed with families, seeing this “as the best way to gain the confidence and friendship of these people” (Stanisic 1994:4). Most of their work was with children, but there were also group activities with adults. They started a ‘House of Friendship’ project that they used for workshops on nonviolent conflict resolution, English language lessons, handicraft courses, sports tournaments and other similar activities. For a school they provided books and other teaching materials as well as tennis shoes for children. The women’s group produced handicrafts and collected mushrooms and tea and sold it in Belgrade, organised seeds for agricultural products in addition to other activities.

When in May 1995 Croatia re-occupied Western Slavonia, this work was interrupted, though MOST tried to stay in contact, and among other things started to document the casualties of the military operation (Stanisic 1994, Centar za antiratnu akciju 1995, Santic 1995, Boehm 2001).

The project on the Croatian side continued for some time. But hampered by lack of funding (international donors more and more focused on Bosnia), the reduced need for physical assistance and ongoing managerial problems made ARK in 1997 decide to close the project (see Bozicevic 1997, Committee for Conflict Transformation Support 2001).

244 Although the volunteers were also used as messengers – as were UN and other NGO staff - by those who had relatives on the other side, carrying parcels and letters (Wilson 1997, Boehm 2001, Committee for Conflict Transformation Support 2001).

245 By the end of 1995, the youth club and the women’s group had become independent structures. An Information Centre Pakrac was created together with other NGOs and UN to provide the population with legal and other advice. Conflict transformation training was offered through a group that grew out of ARK for nonviolent trainings, calling itself ‘Miramida, and which in 1996 grew into the Centre for Peace Studies. When the Pakrac project closed, the Centre left Pakrac and continued its work in Zagreb.
The evaluation of the volunteer project is mixed. The physical reconstruction seems to have gone well, and a number of houses were rebuilt. The women’s groups and the youth club are two other tangible outcomes, and continued their existence after the end of the Volunteer Project Pakrac.

The wider goal of making a contribution to reconciliation between the Serb and the Croatian part of town must be considered to have mostly failed. Even before 1995 when the Croatian military action changed the basic situation, the Croatian inhabitants of Pakrac showed little understanding of the project’s non-partisan approach. Indeed, threats of serious physical violence were made against Croatians working with the project. (Wilson 2007). Nevertheless, Boehm concluded that whilst it did not reach its goal to normalise the relations between the two populations, it however was able to contribute to the relations between both sides. So were those Serbs who had participated in the project mostly those who stayed when Croatia reoccupied the territory in May 1995 (Boehm 2001:205).246

7.3.2.2 Social Reconstruction’ and Other Complex Projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo

In 1995, some former international volunteers from Pakrac founded a reconstruction project in Gornji Vakuf in Central Bosnia with UNDP funding. Like the Pakrac project, the project in Gornji Vakuf worked at the grassroots’ level, combining physical reconstruction with social work with youth, war invalids and women on both sides of the divided town. Its basic assumptions were that the political success of the Croat-Muslim Federation ultimately would depend on reconciliation at the grassroots level, that social normalisation was the first step towards that goal, and that the presence of international volunteers would help toward achieving it (see

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246 In addition, a number of concrete problems and conflicts could often be traced to the use of short-term young and inexperienced volunteers (Committee for Conflict Transformation Support 2001, Wilson 2007). On the other hand, Boehm (2001:196) thinks that the most important contribution of the volunteers was through their idealism and their working together with local people. Being young themselves, they reached the young generation, and their presence had a positive impact on the population traumatised by war.

Some other INGOs pursued similar projects but with professional (local and international) staff rather than international volunteers and without using the term ‘social reconstruction’. What their work had in common with the UNDP-supported projects of ‘social reconstruction’ was their multi-faceted character, combining physical reconstruction with economic incentives, vocational training and with multi-ethnic social work mostly with children, youth and women.\(^{248}\)

### 7.3.3 Summary: Reconstruction Work - A Highly Conflict-sensitive Task

Projects combining physical reconstruction with peace work have mostly been evaluated positively – provided that the international staff involved had the necessary experience and skills (which was not always the case when young volunteers were used). In general, however, other reconstruction efforts have met with a number of problems. Often refugees were favoured in programmes over those people who had stayed during the war which increased the tensions between these two groups.

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\(^{247}\) Soon after, the UNDP also started a third project of ‘social reconstruction’ in Travnik (Central Bosnia). Where among other things c. 520 houses were rebuilt, mainly for returnees from EU countries, as well as roads repaired. The basic issue in Travnik was to build houses for those IDPs who occupied the homes of refugees, thus freeing accommodation and bringing refugee returnees back to Travnik. See Engberg and Stubbs 1998, Demichelis 1998, Pierce and Stubbs 2000.

\(^{248}\) An example is Pax Christi Germany’s project in Zenica in Central Bosnia (Kukla 2003, Schiel 2002, Pax Christi and Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst n.d., Pax Christi n.d.). Pax Christi had been in the area since 1995, working with volunteers in a refugee camp. From 1997 they had one or two longer-term staff in Zenica, and started to focus on the issue of IDPs and their eventual return. The main focus of their work was to support IDPs from four camps and two barracks in and around Zenica, seeking to empower them to make a positive decision to return to their home community even if that was now controlled by another ethnic group, and to prevent irreversible dependency. Other goals were to reduce social tensions in Zenica, increase the readiness to live together with people from other ethnic groups, and thereby contribute to prevent further violent conflict. The Pax Christi staff tried in conversations with IDPs to reduce their fear, negotiated with the administration in the villages they came from, provided building materials and quite early on in the project set up a carpentry workshop. Pax Christi also supported people who had returned with regular visits, connected them if necessary to psychological aid, aided them in their dealing with authorities, linked people to reconstruction programmes of other INGOs and also rebuilt 160 houses and apartments with funding from the German Foreign Ministry and private donations. Through such activities they supported the return of 267 families.

Their second area was social work in two housing complexes in Zenica inhabited by returnees (from Germany), war widows, veterans and Roma. There they supported a kindergarten, conducted house visits, gave sewing and computer courses and set up regular meetings for women and men. As a concrete success they reported that they managed to convince a Muslim-Croat women’s group and a Serbian women’s group to meet. The project ended in 2003.
Another problem was the different approaches by different NGOs on how to conduct reconstruction projects. For example, Kleck (2007a:111 pp) describes how in the Republika Srpska some NGOs rebuilt houses and handed them over ready while other agencies only gave building materials which caused ill-will among the returnees. A third problem was how to choose whose houses were to be rebuilt. When the internationals made the decision, it was often on the basis of abstract figures rather than on real need. Thus, in the Bosnian Federation, aid from 1994 tended to be distributed equally 50:50 to Bosnian Muslims and Croats, regardless of local demographics or the extent of damage (Demiche lis 1998). When the internationals left the decision to the local authorities, they had to overlook the fact that the system was frequently abused. The result sometimes was that people got houses rebuilt they did not need but either sold on or used as ’holiday homes’ since they were in fact living abroad. 249

An assessment of peace-building work in Kosovo by the Collaborative Learning Projects found comparable problems: For example, when the water system of one ethnically mixed village was repaired, it was overlooked that the reservoir was located in the Albanian sector ”As a result, every time the pump broke down, tensions between K-Albanians and K-Serbs escalated“ (CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects 2006:45).

7.4 Social and Psycho-social Work

In the survey of peace-building activities, three common types of activities were: international volunteers working with refugees and IDPs in camps, social work with young people, and psycho-therapeutic work, mostly with women. They are important

249 Demichelis (1998) gives an example from Gornji Vakuf One NGO tried to implement a ‘Federation–building and multi-ethnic reconciliation project’ by repairing structures and infrastructure for joint use by Muslims and Croats, and the World Bank financed the repair of some other buildings. For the project they had to secure authorization of the city’s two mayors but these seem to have had only the interest of their ethnic group in mind, trading four (formerly ethnically mixed) central urban apartment buildings that after their repair were used only by one ethnic group. The reconstruction priorities were not those of the people, the project became called “the politicians project”. Vocational training was also rejected by the population because the trainers did not come from the area and were only from one ethnic group. In the end the NGO left with two buildings unfinished.
areas of peace-building by civil society actors, and especially the last two are usually considered to be of special relevance for dealing with conflict.\textsuperscript{250}

7.4.1 Social Support for Refugees in Camps

Some volunteer peace services and other NGOs found a special niche in providing social support for refugees and IDPs living in camps. This was a field often neglected by those running the camps who were struggling to maintain the basic physical services. Large numbers of short-term volunteers worked in camps during the time of the Bosnia war, playing with children, organising sports, language lessons and discos for teenagers, having coffee with elderly people, setting up handicraft circles of women (the products often were sold abroad, thereby giving the women knitting socks or other items some little income).\textsuperscript{251}

The main goal of such work was to mitigate the effects of war and enable grassroots participation in psycho-social post-war recovery. Volunteers who reported about their work also mentioned ‘help people to overcome grief’, ‘signal of solidarity with the fate of the refugees’, ‘a chance for learning and doing for volunteers in an international context’, ‘a signal for the people back home that we do not have to remain helpless onlookers’. Ruez (1994:74) writes that the atmosphere in the camps clearly improved, the aggression of children and young people was reduced, and

\textsuperscript{250} See different manuals and books on peace-building, e.g. Reychler and Paffenholz (eds.) 2001, Aktionsgemeinschaft Dienst fuer den Frieden (ed) 2008.


The first initiative to undertake this type of work off was the Croatian /international organisation Suncekret, founded on the initiative of a Dutch volunteer with the Antiratne Kampanje Croatia (see CFD 1993a, Ex-Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis 1993, Ochsenstein 1994, Anti-War Campaign Croatia 1995, Berndt 1996, Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1996, Vack 1996a and 1996b, Large n.d.:33). It began by inviting international volunteers of all ages to come to Croatia to work for three weeks in the camps. Soon this became an organisation of its own called Suncekret (Sunflower). A number of international organisations supported Suncekret by recruiting volunteers to work side by side with Croatian volunteers. By summer 1993, Suncekret already had 400 domestic volunteers and 1000 foreign volunteers from 34 international organisations and from 19 European countries plus the USA, Canada and Australia. By 1996 this figure had risen to 2,000 international volunteers. When Suncekret found that the permanent change of volunteers became a problem, they deployed longer-term volunteers, and also increased their professional staff.

In addition to Suncekret, soon comparable work was done by a number of other international NGOs in camps in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well, while FR Yugoslavia’s visa restrictions made larger international presence in that country impossible (see Le Meut 1994, Bauer and Muller 1996:157, Krauß 1996, Tullio and Vertucci 2002, Clark 2003b).
adults found new courage. In addition, the presence of the internationals also was a certain protection for the refugees.

### 7.4.2 Youth Work

Children and youth have been one of the prime target groups in NGO peace-building in all countries of former Yugoslavia, because they “offer strong potential for social innovation and therefore a promising target group for reconciliation work” (Fischer 2007c:234). In Kosovo, half of the population is under 25 years which gave NGOs an additional reason for concentrating on young people there (Llamazares and Reynolds Levy 2003).

Many INGOs initiated youth centres. Some of these projects have been well documented through publications by people involved in the work and/or studies made about them. In Jaice, the German Friedenskreis Halle (Peace Circle Halle) worked between 1996 and 1998/99 together with the International Mennonite Organisation in setting up and running a youth club (see Krauß 1996, Kurschat 1998, Friedenskreis Halle 1999, Weishaup 1999, Fischer and Tumler 2000, Kurschat 2000, Weishaup 2000, Klotz 2002a). They organised games for children, parties, concerts, English and German language classes, photography and computer courses. After overcoming some initial problems of acceptance in the community and the eventual withdrawal of the Mennonites, the Centre was quite successful and brought Muslim and Croat youth together through the various activities. One indicator used is that the young people decided to form a mixed Croat-Muslim football team (before the war there had been two ethnic teams).

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252 The Friedenskreis Halle (FK Halle) is a peace group from Eastern Germany that like so many other peace groups got involved in practical work in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.

253 Another example is 'Mladi Most' in Mostar founded by Aktion Suehnezeichen - Friedensdienste (ASF - Action Reconciliation Service for Peace). ASF is a peace service that was founded after World War II and since then has been sending young volunteers mostly to work with victims of the Nazi regime, for example in Israel and at the sites of German concentration camps in Eastern Europe as a sign of atonement. Today, they have a world-wide programme. See <http://www.asf-ev.de/en/introduction/> [17.7.2008].

In 1994, when Mostar was put under international administration, they opened a youth centre ‘Mladi Most’ (‘Youth Bridge’) in the Western (Croatian) part of the divided town (see Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1996, Fischer and Tumler 2000:24p, Scotto 2002 chapter 7). It was first a youth club with programmes similar to that in Jaice (language, music, arts, literature, discussion groups). In 1997 it was closed for some months and then re-opened with a new concept, only
The basic idea in these and – as far as I could discern from the material available – most youth clubs or centres has been to promote interethnic contact and eventual reconciliation as well as empowerment of young people to work actively on shaping their future. Typical of this commitment is the following:

We wanted to build an island for the children and youth for whom living in war had become normal because they barely have known anything else, an island where the conflicts between the ethnic groups that their parents modelled and passed on could not reach them. Or where they could learn to handle these conflicts differently than is usual in the world of the adults. (Friedenskreis Halle 1999, translation CS)

Kurschat (1998, 2000), a social worker by training, calls this kind of youth work ‘multi-ethnic or multi-communal social work’. Having himself worked in Jaice, Kurschat lists a multitude of activities typical of social workers but with the implicit function of bringing people together across ethnic or other perceived lines of conflict. According to him, this creates a neutral space or protected area in which people, independent of their ethnic or religious identities, come and do things together, such as attending a computer course or playing football. Furthering reconciliation is rarely made explicit as an objective for fear that approach ethnic divisions directly would be polarising (Kurschat 2000:59). Rather than making ‘the conflict’ the issue to meet about, the activities are used to reflect on group processes and one’s own behaviour, and thereby deal with the conflict indirectly.254

The establishment of youth centres was not the only youth-related activity. The following three types of activities were rather frequent in the sample, and basically pursued the same strategy of bringing together young people from different ethnic backgrounds, hoping that playing and working together would help to overcome the conflict. Some of them were short-term ‘one-offs’, but others were of a more long-term nature.

- Meetings and conferences of young people: A good example for such an activity having a sustainable outcome is an international encounter for young people between 12 and 18 years in 1993 organised by Norwegian People’s Aid in the framework of its youth project ‘Young Voices’. Out of that meeting grew a youth offering programmes (with many cultural activities – music, film, theatre) but not being a meeting point anymore. In 2000 the centre moved to East Mostar (the Muslim sector), and was turned into a local organisation with the name ‘Alternative Seminar Space for Youth Reconciliation’.

254 Though these examples are all from Bosnia-Herzegovina, similar work has been undertaken also in the other countries, in particular in Kosovo.
movement with groups in different ex-Yugoslav countries, the ‘Post Pessimists’ who maintained links across the ethnic conflict lines throughout the 1990s.  

- Youth magazines: These sometimes were a product of youth centres, but there have also been separate projects. For example did the mentioned German ‘Schueler helfen leben’ finance a Bosnia-wide paper (Nepitani) that was launched in March 1997 as a bimonthly distributing 4,000 copies gratis. In 2000-2001 it was replaced by a new magazine, *IZA*, that also tackles political subjects (Fischer and Tumler 2000:36p, Stovel 2000, Scotto 2002, ‘Vermintes Gebiet’ 2002).

- Holiday camps for children and youth: This was one of the activities of the Komitee fuer Grundrechte und Demokratie. Between 1994 and 2003, a total of 16,500 children from the different sides of the conflict had taken part in these annual summer camps where they mostly engaged in activities like sports, swimming, excursions, dancing, singing and playing (Dieter 2004:6, Vack 1996).

7.4.3 Psycho-social Assistance

As already shown in some other examples, many relief organisations developed specific techniques, tools and programmes for intervention in the former Yugoslavia. One of them was psycho-social programmes mostly targeting women. The projects pursued different approaches, ranging from individual medical care and psychological counselling to group therapy, women’s self-help groups, women’s groups primarily engaged in income-generating activities, literacy courses or other types of recreational or educational activities (Agger *et al* 1999:17pp, 66). Today,

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255 Norwegian People’s Aid continued to support their work, for example by organizing a conference specially for youth from the FR Yugoslavia in 1994 in Austria, where besides people from Pristina Belgrade and Subotica also participants from Bosnia (Tuzla) and Croatia (Zagreb) came. During the 10-day meeting that was co-led by Austrian psychologists, they worked on a newspaper, a film and a radio programme. Some months later a third meeting took place in Norway again in which also refugees from Norway participated (Jugend-Netzwerk Europa 1998, Royal Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2001, Broughton 2002:273, Du Pont 2002:240, Large n.d.79 and 91).

256 Other organisations have been Beati I costruttori di pace, Classes internationales de Paix, Comuni Padovani per la Pace since before 1994, Corazon del Mundo (Spain), IFIAS (Germany), Peace Bridge Basel, War Child (Britain).
psycho-social care is recognised by international donors as one of the standard categories in peace-building support because of its relationship as explained by Agger et al.:

The overall aim of psycho-social assistance is to promote human rights, reconciliation, and psycho-social well-being. Methods for achieving this should aim at supporting already existing protective social and psychological factors, and reducing the stress factors at different levels of intervention (Agger et al. 1999).

One of the main drivers for this type of work was the reports on mass rapes of Bosnian (Muslim) women and the existence of ‘rape camps’ where women were kept by (Serbian) soldiers that went through the mass media in autumn 1992. Many women’s groups, both local and international, responded to these reports with fact finding missions and concrete projects on the ground. From the beginning of 1993, international funding for rape victims, mental health and psycho-social assistance started flowing into the region, facilitated mostly through international NGOs.

The initial objective of most programmes was to assist rape victims, but soon it turned out that either the figures were highly exaggerated, and/or women were not willing to let themselves be identified as having suffered from rape. Therefore gradually NGOs reframed their objectives so that they offered assistance to traumatised women and children in general (Agger et al. 1999:24).

Many organisations held trainings or workshops on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the area and/or placed individual psychotherapists in the field.

Another widespread approach was to set up gynaecological clinics and shelters offering both medical and psychological care for traumatised women. To my knowledge the first (international) one was started by a German-based gynaecologist who opened a clinic in Zenica. With her supporters from a women’s initiative, Scheherazade, she formed a new NGO called Medica Mondiale that is still active and has branched out to other conflict areas. The centre in Zenica besides offering medical and psychological care gave humanitarian aid to women and their families, and conducted psycho-social programmes. Opened in 1993, it had space for 20

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257 Pupavac mentions that “psycho-social became a catch term which is rarely defined, and that aid agencies “express confusion over its meaning and the activities it covers” (203:158).

258 The first reports extrapolated from the existing figures, assuming that the ‘real figure’ was many times as high as the cases documented. See chapter 8.


Comparable work has also taken place in Serbia and Montenegro – traumatisation and rape took place on all sides of the conflict and was not, as some international media made believe at that time, limited to people from one side being the perpetrators and those from the other the victims. 261

Many of the projects went beyond dealing with the trauma women had suffered – be it from rape, losing their husbands or families to ‘mere’ displacement. They sought to empower the women to reorganise their life, (re-)gain trust and confidence, re-build social networks and develop income-generating perspectives, realizing that solving these problems also did a lot to help with regaining psychological balance. In a 1997 workshop of women involved in this kind of work from the different parts of former Yugoslavia this was summarised as follows:

We have to understand the constant and necessary link between economic survival strategies and psycho social work, never sacrificing one for the other (Medienhilfe Ex-Jugoslawien 1997).

The centres often also engaged in activities that brought people of different ethnicity and all age groups together, just like the different projects described in the earlier sections of this chapter did.

Evaluations of psycho-social projects found that the projects made a significant humanitarian contribution, supported self-esteem and counter-acted loneliness, contributed to social stability through creating opportunities in a safe environment for the re-establishment of social networks, skill-building (literacy) and trust, as well as in some cases helping with income generation (Agger, Vuk and Mimica 1995, Agger et al. 1999, Pupavac 2003). On the other hand they criticise that - at least in

260 Other comparable centres have been Vive Zene in Tuzla (run by another German organisation since 1993, see Vive Zene 1995, Smillie 1996), Amica supported by Italian, Swiss and German organisations working in Tuzla, Bijeljina and Vlastenica (see Wenger and Perovic 1995, Friedenskooperative 1996, Smillie 1996, Fischer and Tumler 2000:20, ICVA 2000), Zene Zenama in Sarajevo (see Kleck 2007b), and Norwegian’s People’s Aid that set up a clinic in Zenica and supported another centre in Tuzla (Agger et al 1999, ICVA 2000, Scotto 2002). Many of the centres sooner or later became local NGOs. Amica for example became ‘Prijateljice’ at the end of the 1990s.

261 The group MOST that grew out of the Belgrade Centre for Anti-War Action has already been mentioned. An international group has been Medact that assisted with trauma intervention programmes in Belgrade, and devised “caring for carers” inputs for staff at refugee centres in Serbia (Large n.d.:79).
the four projects Agger’s teams evaluated in Bosnia-Herzegovina - little real participation by beneficiaries was to be found. They generally were seen as helpless and too traumatised, which was strengthened by a strong focus on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder rather than approaching the problems from a human rights point of view (Agger et al 1999:62pp).

While that study from 1999 concluded that the projects also contributed to the training of health professionals and the modernisation of mental health policy and practice in the countries concerned, other authors have raised doubts over what they see as the assumption of the ‘universal relevance of Anglo-American psycho-social models’, even suggesting that such intervention ‘may hinder spontaneous recovery from traumatic situations’ (Pupavac 2003, see also Belloni 2000).

7.4.4 Summary: Social and Psycho-social Work - Between Good Will and Professionalism

Under this peace-building category of social and psycho-social work quite different approaches and types of activities were collected. On the one side there have been the professional services NGOs offered in the fields of youth work, work with women, trauma etc. On the other side there has been – as was the case with humanitarian aid and reconstruction – much involvement by untrained international volunteers and activities by groups without much (if any) track record in the type of service they offered. This supports once more the thesis of the movement character of part of the international response to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. And it, of course, also poses serious questions regarding the overall impact of the various efforts on the people and the conflicts on the ground. The evaluations available tend to draw a mixed picture here, noting some success but also problems and shortcomings (compare for example the section above on psycho-social work for examples). I will return to these questions later in the overall conclusions to this chapter.
7.5 Economic Recovery

Economic recovery is a field in which states and international organisations like IMF and World Bank have played a larger role than civil society actors (see chapter 4). The general driving motive in this area is that economic foundations are necessary to sustain longer-term peace, and that short-term recovery buys confidence in the peace process (see Woodward 2002:185).

Very few NGOs have had the financial means for large financial grants. Most NGOs in that field rather concentrated on funding projects of implementing partners, giving micro credits, conducting vocational training or giving material help to set up small business (like farming animals, tools etc). To give some examples for illustration:

- The Church World Service would seek to involve beneficiaries in its work. Hence, for example, if approached by someone for a cow, they would ask that person to gather 15 people from their village who also needed a cow, and then go to market with them to buy cows (United Institute for Peace 2003).

- The Italian Associazione Sprofondo founded in 1995 a cooperative bank as an inter-ethnic project in Sarajevo (Banca del lavoro o gruppi di collaborazione) (Tullio and Vertucci 2002).

- Other examples for income-generating projects (knitting and sewing by women refugees, carpentry workshops) have already been mentioned in the context of the ‘social reconstruction’ and the therapeutic women’s centres.

- Vocational training has been another typical activity of civil society actors. Very often these trainings took place in a context of multi-ethnic cooperation, the organisers seeking to make sure that ‘former enemies’ attended them together, and thereby also contributing to reconciliation (see CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects 2006 for Kosovo).

Concerning the conflict-related ‘side effect’ of economic programmes, the CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects (2006) evaluated programmes in Kosovo according

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262 Trade Unions need to be mentioned as a separate civil society actor in the context of economic recovery. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, an umbrella organisation, started working in former Yugoslavia at beginning of 1990s when free trade unions were founded throughout Eastern Europe, seeking to support the fledgling market economy. After the war, they opened an office in Sarajevo that is responsible for all South East Europe. Their work consists of advising trade union confederations and implementing capacity building programmes, and they form a link between trade union movement and international institutions (Fischer 2007b).
to whether their work had any impact with regard to the interethnic violence that had erupted in 2004. They found that interethnic business relationships created with the help of international actors tended to be immune to the violence: However, they also remark critically that the relationships did not lead to the people involved taking action against the violence – the cooperation was limited to the strictly economic field.

7.6 Transitional Justice and Human Rights Documentation

Transitional justice (see chapter 4.3.1.6) has been a field of peace-building which was dominated by governmental actors (e.g. the creation of the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia), with NGOs in a more merely supporting role. Civil Society actors could be found mostly in the fields of human rights documentation and ‘dealing with the past’.

7.6.1 Fact-finding and Documentation of Abuses

Over the years, a large number of NGOs have been involved in human rights documentation, both groups for whom human rights reporting is their main mission, and groups that came across human rights violation in the course of their work and reported on them. Examples of the first would be Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International (Human Rights Watch n.d., 2000 and 2003). Amnesty was monitoring the human rights situation in Yugoslavia already long before 1991 (see Woodward 1995:182). During the wars, they also reported on systematic taking of

263 Human rights investigation and reporting is a category of activities that do not easily fit under one of the three ‘grand strategies’ because most of the projects and missions dealing with human rights have two aspects: the establishment of longer-term ‘rule of law’, with the collection of facts for prosecution and reparation on the one hand, and the immediate and middle-term prevention of violations on the other hand. The line between monitoring and active protection is a thin one. The collection of data itself can play a protective role since it may deter perpetrators (see Benedek 2001:213 and Mahony 2006:3 and 91pp), though Benedek (2001:211) remarks that this may also lead to disappointments when people expect monitors to intervene but there mandate does not allow it.

264 Before 1991, they published reports on prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in Serbia, ill-treatment and torture in Kosovo, use of force by JNA and VRS forces for displacement of populations.
hostages and their ill-treatment, and sexual violations of Muslim women as a weapon of war (Mercier 1995:111).265

7.6.2 Dealing With the Past

Alongside human rights monitoring, ‘dealing with the past’ has probably been the field with most involvement by external civil society actors. One example would be the veterans’ project by the Centre for Nonviolent Action (CNA). The CNA could be considered one of the ‘embedded’ interveners in conflict – a mostly local organisation though initiated by an international group.266 In addition to their main focus - nonviolence training - in 2002 CNA started a project with war veterans under the title ‘Dealing with the Past’. Their motivation has been to offer an alternative approach to the issue that in the discourse in the countries of former Yugoslavia is heavily dominated by what happens at the ICTY in The Hague, and that sometimes leads to feelings of victimisation and nationalist sentiments rather than to increased willingness to face the past.

Their concrete objectives were building a pool of former combatants who would be constructively engaged in a process of self-critical public debate on the past, raising public awareness on the need to confront the past as a means of future violence prevention (Wils 2004). “How I found myself in war and how to reach sustainable peace” was the title given to 14 public forums held between 2002 and 2004 in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro where war veterans – identified by the CND


Especially important have been the different local human rights organisations in the various countries, e.g. the local Amnesty International and Helsinki Committee for Human Rights groups, the Humanitarian Law Fund (Serbia), the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedom (Kosovo), Forum for Human Rights (Macedonia), different member organisations of the Antiratne Kampanje Croatia, Documenta (Zagreb), Research and Documentation Center (Sarajevo) and many more (see Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung 1995, International Center for Transitional Justice 2008c).

266 The CNA was initiated in 1997 by a Serbian nonviolence trainer who had come as a conscientious objector to Germany and worked with the German nonviolence training centre Kurve Wustrow. He went in 1997 to Sarajevo in a pilot project for the Civil Peace Service scheme to set up what was first a project office of Kurve Wustrow. Very soon the CNA became an independent NGO with offices in Sarajevo and Belgrade, supported by the Kurve Wustrow under the Civil Peace Service scheme, and by the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management which has been accompanying the project since its beginnings with participatory evaluations.
through their training work – were invited to speak. Most of the forums went well though there have occasionally also been interruptions by veterans’ organisations.

7.6.3 Summary: Transitional Justice and Human Rights Monitoring - An Important Task for Both Civil Society and Governmental Actors

This field of activity perhaps more than some others requires the close cooperation of state and non-state actors. As was shown in chapter 4 and here in section 7.6, probably the main activities in this field come from the side of state actors. But civil society actors, engaged in human rights documentation and in helping to find alternative avenues towards dealing with the past, play an important subsidiary role. In many cases their expertise on the ground is essential because official governmental monitoring and fact-finding missions are usually either short-term or not as familiar with the situation as NGOs which maintain a presence on the ground for a much longer period. And while ‘dealing with the past’ through unofficial channels is certainly not well developed in the area of former Yugoslavia (unlike some other countries, see Buckley-Zistel 2005), projects like the one by CNA show that there is some space for such approaches.

7.7 State-building, Democratisation and Civil Society Support

Rebuilding public institutions, state-building, democratisation and civil society support is a vast category of many different approaches and activities. It is an area where both state and civil society actors can be found. In the following sections I will look at rebuilding of public institutions, support for political parties and elections, media support, support of local NGOs and – a topic closely related to the others but still different - ‘solidarity work’ with groups and movements in the former Yugoslavia.
7.7.1 Rebuilding Public Institutions

I use the term ‘public institutions’ as a broad category including all the infrastructure of a state – from the security sector to tax and customs system to schools and kindergartens.

Apart from their involvement in human rights training, civil society actors figure comparatively little in security sector reform with the exception that some NGOs play a role in police training.

As to civilian institutions, schools have attracted particular interest from international civil society. To illustrate this point with just one example, taken from the work of the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), a large US organisation with multiple programmes reaching from material aid to the support of reconciliation: In Macedonia where CRS have been active since 1993, their activities include helping to establish a national Parent-Teacher Association (PTA). Their goal was to use the common concern of school education to bring the different ethnic communities together. In a three-year programme starting in 1995-96 financed by a US$ 1,2 million USAID grant, they helped to set up local Parent-Teacher-Associations as well as a national steering committee. Local communities were responsible for raising funds and obtaining supplies and local services (for example to do repairs in schools) to match CRS’s contributions. CRS in addition conducted regional awareness training workshops. Through the PTAs, the project succeeded in fostering inter-ethnic cooperation, increased the participation of women, and provided safe 

267 Human rights counselling and training has been an almost standard activity in post-war situations all over the area, and conducted by both state actors (OSCE for example) and NGOs.

268 There have been NGOs involved in police training (for example SIPRI and the Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute in Kosovo, see CORE 2002:55). One large NGO focusing on legal reform has been the American Bar Association (ABA). ABA claims to be the largest voluntary professional organisation in the world with more than 400,000 members, aiming “to be the national representative of the legal profession, serving the public and the profession by promoting justice, professional excellence and respect for the law” (American Bar Association 2008). After the end of the war in Bosnia, they started an international project, the Central European Law Initiative (CELI). Its objective was to advance the rule of law in the world by supporting the legal reform process in Central Europe and the former Soviet countries. In Bosnia CELI first aimed to help to reintegrate the legal systems of the Federation and the Serbian Republic but that was impossible at that time. By 2002 ABA had held 42 training workshops and completed 23 legal assessments on topics ranging from foreign investment to the juridical organisation (Riskin 1999, CORE 2002:55, King, Dorn and Hodes 2002:23pp).

Another example would be the seconding of a staff person from the Bradford Department of Peace Studies to the Vushtrin Police Academy in Kosovo after 1999 (verbal information by Howard Clark).
space for community problem solving. Leatherman (1999) writes that for the success of the project it was important that CRS was already known and trusted through its humanitarian assistance that gave it an entry point to the different communities. Other helpful factors were positive media coverage, the high esteem in which US citizens were held in Macedonia (the project staff included US citizens), and the ‘demonstration effect’ of the success of the first associations (see Leatherman 1999, Leatherman et al. 1999:149,166 and 173, Miall 1999, Ackermann 2000:149).

7.7.2 Political Parties and Democratic Elections

Support for ‘democratic’ political parties and elections are a field in which both state and non-state actors have been working. In the protectorates, it has fallen to the international administration to design a (new) electoral system, and implement or later oversee the conduct of elections. In independent countries state actors were involved with advice and monitoring (see the work of the OSCE described in chapter 4). In both scenarios, large amounts of money have been channelled over the years to what were considered oppositional or democratic parties, sometimes directly, sometimes through INGOs (among them so-called ‘quasi-NGOs’ because of their strong link to governmental institutions). Otherwise the main role of international civil society organisations (meaning here mostly NGOs, party foundations and political parties themselves) in this field has been to advise state bodies, educate voters, and monitor elections (see also Carothers 1999:123pp, Bose 2002:218pp).

269 Examples for other activities related to schools include:

- The German group Schueler Helfen Leben (Pupils Help to Live) worked in Bosnia-Herzegovina on models for self-representation of school pupils, so-called student councils. (Fischer and Tumler 2000:36p, Emrich and Rickerts 2007).
- Contacts made between schools or individual classes in other countries and schools in the area of former Yugoslavia. Sometimes this took the form of ‘twinning’. So for example promoted the Italian Berretti Bianchi school partnerships between Aleksinac (Serbia) and Seravezza (Italy) after the war of 1999 (l’Abate 2002b, Tullio and Vertucci 2002).
- Providing materials and training methods of peace education has been another activity, for example Beati i costruttori di pace in Kosovo after 1999 (see l’Abate 2002b) and United Methodist Committee on Relief in Bosnia (see Demichelis 1998, Riskin 1999).
- The German group Susanna Lipovac/ Kinderberg e.V. set up in the late 1990s an educational web domain on peace education for all Yugoslavia (Fischer and Tumler 2000:34).

270 In Germany, the political foundations attached to the major political parties have been a major channel of support. They have all been active in the area of former Yugoslavia, supporting oppositional parties (mostly also independent media and local NGOs) with money, networking and
7.7.3 Media Support

The support for independent media began right with the conflicts in 1991, with both civil society and state actors such as the EU Commission and OSCE heavily involved in it.

The mass media in all countries of former Yugoslavia (with the possible exception of Slovenia) have traditionally been close to those who ruled. When Yugoslavia fell apart and a wave of nationalism accompanied the armed confrontations, these media fuelled the tension through what can be termed 'hate speech' - justifying or even inciting violence against 'the enemy' who was often portrayed in long-thought-dead stereotypes from World War II. But in all countries there have also been both print and electronic media, often founded between 1989 and 1991, that tried to send out another message, promoting pluralistic values, criticizing their own government and its politics.271

Rhodes (2007) who conducted a meta-evaluation of ten years of media support in the region found different objectives for media support, falling in two main categories, namely changing society and media-specific goals. Simplifying his findings and adding on from other sources, I would like to distinguish three main goals here:

• The first was through the support of media that were considered as ‘oppositional’ or ‘democratic’ to contribute to changing the society and influencing the politics in the target country. "Media support is – intrinsically – among the most politicized forms of foreign aid", Rhodes states correctly (2007:16). This goal has motivated the media support throughout the 1990s especially in FR Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

• The second goal, overtly pursued in Bosnia and Kosovo after the wars, but also

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271 Among them were Radio B92 and newspaper Vreme in FR Yugoslavia, Radio 101 and the papers Feral Tribune and Arzk in Croatia, Monitor and Radio Antenna in Montenegro, Koha Ditore and Zeri in Kosovo, and Dani and Oslobodjenje in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see Rhodes 2007:20).
in Macedonia after the 2001 Ohrid agreement, was to build media that would be independent and 'objective' and that would “contribute to peace by providing objective (non-inflamatory) information and providing open debate on important peace issues” (CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects 2006:13). In addition, the international actors sometimes wanted to support media with multi-ethnic staff and programme as an element of the multi-ethnic society that they wanted to encourage.

- The third set of goals covered professional standards, accountability and self-regulation, etc, especially as a theme of media support in the protectorates.

The main activities of media support from the side of civil society have been the following:

- Financial support and the donation of equipment;
- Training for journalists;
- Advising on media laws and regulatory frameworks;
- Networking between media and journalists from different countries, and with international networks;
- Creation of local media or media programs by international actors or under their influence: This activity has been more characteristic of state actors (see chapter

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Rhodes describes two other types of activities, mostly to be found in state actor interventions: reform of legal and regulatory frameworks and support for media institutions. See also Topic (2007:157pp) for that type of work in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

One of the major - if not the major - civil society supporter of such media has been the Open Society Institute (OSI). It was founded in 1993 by the American-Hungarian multimillionaire and philanthropist George Soros to support his already existing work of supporting democratic transition in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Open Society Institute 2008). The Open Society Institute set up regional offices in most of the countries of former Yugoslavia, mostly registering as local NGOs under the name of Open Society Fund. Their general objective has been to build a strong and diverse civil society. To that purpose, among other activities (for example furthering human rights and rule of law) financial support to local NGOs and existing independent media was given, and training for journalists offered (Bekkering 1997, Clark 2000:110, Lund 2000c:194, ICVA 2000, Stovel 2000:30, Fond Otvoreno Drustvo Bosne I Hercegovine 2001, Sali-Terzic 2001, Large n.d.:142).

To give one example: in 1992 the European Citizens’ Forum and the international radio network FERL (European Federation of Free Radios) invited in 1992 journalists to Rijeka for a conference on free media. The outcome was the founding of an alternative information network of journalists (Alternativna Informativna Mreza - AIM) from the area and support for the regional Croatian-Italian radio Rijeka-Fiume (Alpe Adria 1993). AIM has throughout the period under study been an important actor in independent and critical reporting.
7. Peace-building by Civil Society Actors

4), but there are also civil society organizations using this instrument.275.

- Support for media institutions (media centres, journalist associations or unions etc.)

As to the outcomes of media support in general, Rhodes found that the impact of assistance to media has been substantial, as demonstrated by increased respect for human rights, existence of independent media, free flow of information, improved professional standards among others (2007:8), and was an effective way to promote pluralism (2007:34). Material support in particular he judges as very relevant and efficient, especially when donors had a local presence and the financial means for substantial support (Rhodes 2007:19pp). It can be assumed that without that international support most independent media would not have made it through the 1990s. Though some media eventually closed down (like Arkzin or Nasa Borba), the journalists trained by working for them now often have important roles in the new media or in political life. He found however a lack of donor coordination which led to larger numbers of new ‘independent’ media competing for international support. The funding available led to a plethora of new media founded because there was money of which many were not able to survive (2007:20).

7.7.4 Support of Local NGOs

Besides media support, the support of local NGOs is a field with intense activities of civil society actors in the peace-building subcategory of state-building, democratization and civil society.

The support of local groups that were founded either before 1991 or later (but independently of the interventions by external parties) needs to be distinguished from that of new local NGOs founded solely for the purpose of becoming implementing

275 Search for Common Ground produced and broadcast in 1994 a series of interactive radio programmes to promote peace and reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Riskin 1999, Search for Common Ground n.d.). And in 1992-93, Reporters sans Frontières and the French organisation Droits de Parole ran a radio station from a ship in international waters at the Dalmatian coast, seeking to broadcast unbiased information to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. But this project had to stop when the International Telecommunications Union forbade its emissions (Mercier 1995:xvi, 143).
partners for a programme or project devised by the international organisation. However, there are no very firm boundaries between the two categories since NGOs mushroomed all over the area in the 1990s, and many that started out as an international initiative became stable locally-led groups (for example the mentioned Centre for Nonviolent Action in Sarajevo and the Open Society Fund). This section will deal with support to those groups and movements – mostly anti-war, feminist, human rights groups - that were clearly under local leadership and pursued a wider agenda than just running one particular programme or project funded from abroad.

General support for the groups took mostly the form of financial aid, sending international volunteers to work with them, networking and training. The first three instruments are dealt with in this section. Training for NGOs will be discussed in the next section on ‘peace and dialogue’ because it is very difficult to separate them from trainings for a wider circle of participants.

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276 The latter happened either right from the beginning of a project or, more usually, in the context of ‘handing over the project into local hands’ which is a standard international strategy to secure sustainability.

277 Before 1991, with the exception of Slovenia, Yugoslav civil society was relatively weak, although there were certain traditional organisations like unions and humanitarian groups, as well as intellectual circles in the large university towns. This picture changed in 1990-91 with the liberalisation in most republics and the first multi-party elections (see chapter 3). When the danger of war became obvious, and especially after the violence in Slovenia in July 1991, there was a short-lived peace movement in summer 1991 with demonstrations in larger towns, issuing peace appeals and founding new groups. But with the rapidescalation in Croatia that autumn the new and old groups found themselves on different sides of military as well as mental frontlines. From 1991 on, civil society in all (soon: former) Yugoslav republics has had five main constituents: independent media, anti-war groups (they preferred that term to ‘peace’), women and feminist groups, human rights groups, and organisations engaging in humanitarian work. Sometimes a single group would include elements of those, as Antiratne Kampanje (Croatia), the Centre for Antiwar Action in Belgrade and Women in Black (Belgrade).

278 There were also other kinds of services intended to help local NGOs, from opening a library/info point (ICVA 2000), the provision of legal advice, providing meeting space (a Japanese group financed a meeting house close to Sarajevo for the youth network Nesto Vise (Fischer and Tumler 2000:41), vehicles and driving, making print materials for local groups available, printing articles written by local groups, offering translation services, and raising their international reputation by giving awards to local activists (for example in 1997 the Norwegian Endowment for Freedom awarded its Andrey Sakharov Preis to Vesna Pesic, the founder of the Centre for Antiwar Action in Belgrade and president of the smallest of the three parties that made up the Zajedno coaliton (see Centar za antiratnu akciju ed. 1997).
7.7.4.1 Financial and Material Aid to Anti-War, Women’s and Human Rights Groups

Groups from the Western peace movement in 1991-92 quickly identified partners in the former Yugoslav countries, and almost all of them at one time or the other collected donations for their work, and often delivered it in person. The mentioned Komitee fuer Grundrechte und Demokratie alone in 1991 donated 120,000 DM (about 60,000 €) to more than a dozen peace groups and media. Other groups donated computers, fax machines, books and the like, or helped to translate international books into the local languages (see Pax Christi Nederland 1995, Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1996, Vack 1996a and 1996b).

Aid came also from larger and professional NGOs and foundations. For example, in 1999 the Heinrich-Boell-Foundation, a foundation of the German Green party that was active on the conflicts since 1992, opened a regional office in Sarajevo. By 2001 they were supporting 37 projects, mostly run by local NGOs. Among them were the Women in Black and Women Infoteka, two well-known women’s organisations in the area (Heinrich-Boell-Stiftung 2001b).  

7.7.4.2 Sending International Volunteers

Many organisations sent volunteers to work with local NGOs, and in addition there were also a number of unattached internationals finding their way to the offices of these groups, and sometimes staying for months if not years. In Europe and North America there were a number of pre-existing organisations seeking to work for peace and reconciliation through offering volunteer work and international exchange, most

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279 Larger NGOs and foundations served as intermediaries or funding conduits to international state donors that often gave them money than to the local group directly, mostly for administratival reasons. So Sweden, for example, financed all its work with NGOs in the region through Swedish NGOs (see Duffield 1996). Other countries gave grants directly, for example Canada, France and Netherlands (see Smillie 1996).

280 The difference to projects like Balkan Peace Team (see chapter 6), or later the work of the German Civil Peace Service is that these volunteers worked as supporters of the local groups, not as non-partisan externals. In that they can much more be compared with solidarity work international brigades did in Latin America in the 1980s than with the professional peace-building undertaken by the large international NGOs in the area.
of them Christian-based volunteer peace services.\textsuperscript{281} In the context of the wars in former Yugoslavia, the renewed interest in that type of work led to a new wave of volunteer services, under the umbrella term of ‘civil peace services’, joining these older agencies. Already mentioned in this study were Austrian Peace Services and the German Civil Peace Service. These new services were much more strongly focussing on ‘peace’ which does not mean that they excluded humanitarian aid or social services, but rather that they put this kind of work into the explicit framework of peace-building.\textsuperscript{282}

Almost all anti-war and human rights groups in the area had at least one international volunteer in their office since 1991 or 1992. These volunteers helped with a variety of tasks, not least important of which were maintaining international links and translating materials.

Pete Haemmerle, one of the key people in Austrian Peace Services (OEFD) as well as the Balkan Peace Team, wrote in two assessments of the work of the OEFD that the work of peace services is effective in peace-building at the middle and grassroots level of society. In some cases they were able to prevent violence although peace services of course could not stop wars. But they could build bridges, protect human rights and help to overcome feelings of hopelessness (Haemmerle 1998 and 2001).

\textit{7.7.4.3 Networking and Linking}

Networking was a function played by many internationals who worked closely with local groups. There were at least four directions for such networking:

- Between local groups and the local authorities: A group that consistently named linking as an important function of its work was the Balkan Peace Team (see Schweitzer and Clark 2002:30, Mueller 2004). Internationals often found it easier to access to such authorities. When BPT volunteers accompanied local activists in Croatia, they were met immediately by senior police or judges (Young 1998).

\textsuperscript{281} Besides supporting local NGOs, many of them worked in refugee camps, in youth centres or social reconstruction projects (see above).

\textsuperscript{282} There is today a European Network Civil Peace Service (EN.CPS) meeting once a year for exchange of information and discussion of various topics, e.g. training standards. See European Network Civil Peace Services (n.d.).
• Between local groups and the ‘international community’ working in the country, be it state or INGOs: For example, the main mandate of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) in Bosnia-Herzegovina was to foster communication and cooperation among the NGOs and to facilitate a coherent NGO interface with the representation of common issues to IFOR, OHR, UNHCR, OSCE, World Bank and other multinational institutions, governments, cantonal and municipal governments (quoted in Smillie 1996:49).

ICVA supported local NGOs through a variety of means: networking, exchange of information, training, advocacy, arranging meetings for local NGOs in its office, helping international organisations to identify candidates for training abroad, running a library and information centre, publishing a bulletin *NGO News*, being an intermediary for the EU PHARE programme, etc. Among others it initiated the Sarajevo NGO Council, the Tuzla NGO Reference Group and the Banja Luka Local NGO Forum (see Stubbs 1996b, Bekkering 1997, ICVA 2000).

• Between groups in ‘enemy territory’ in times when travel or contact was impossible, or groups shy to seek direct contact fearing a bad reception: When in late 1991 contact between Croatia and Serbia was almost fully interrupted, internationals were still able to travel from one country to the other, and pass messages, take letters or help to organise meetings in third countries (see Schweitzer 1991 and 1992).²⁸³

• Between local groups and international civil society: Many international networks made contact with groups in former Yugoslavia, or were approached by local groups who had heard of them. Foremost of them were various women and peace networks like Women in Black, IPPNW, International Women Network for Peace, International Fellowship of Reconciliation, War Resisters’ International (see the archives of the WRI website, www.wri-irg.org).

²⁸³ One special project in this context was the creation of an e-mail network throughout the former Yugoslavia in 1992-93, at a time when e-mail was a new technology with which most people were unfamiliar. An activist from the German Federation for Social Defence together with some other peace groups in Europe (Tilburg za mir, Group for a Switzerland Without an Army), and - later financed partly by the Soros Foundation - helped to set up the ZAMIR network with mailboxes in Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, and from 1994 on also in Sarajevo, linking 150 groups and individuals with each other (Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung 1992, n.d.-a, n.d.-c, Schweitzer 1994:57, Large n.d.:142, Tilburg za Mir n.d.).

Before ZAMIR was operational, a fax bridge set up with the help of activists in Vienna served the same purpose (Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1994), as did the office of War Resisters’ International (see the archives of the WRI website, www.wri-irg.org).

Another activity in this context was to invite representatives of local groups, media, parties and intellectuals to conferences, speaking events and the like (see Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1996, National Peace Council, Tullio and Vertucci 2002).

• Between local groups from different conflict areas: At least two different international groups have facilitated contact of activists from former Yugoslavia, especially Kosovo, with Northern Ireland, obviously feeling that the two conflict regions had things in common: Under the name of KONI a body of Pax Christi Germany (Bistumsstelle Rottenburg-Stuttgart) together with the Forum Civil Peace Service developed since 2000 a dialogue programme between Serbian, Albanian and Slavic Muslims from four towns in Kosovo with North Irish ‘Cross-community workers’ (Pax Christi et al. 2000, Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst 2002).285 Several years earlier, in 1995, the British trainers’ network Committee for Conflict Transformation Support (CCTS) organised a study trip to Northern Ireland for activists from Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia.

The networking function has rarely been highlighted when international civil society groups describe their activities. At best, it is mentioned as one function among several. I think that this underestimates the importance of this role. The linking and networking is a function of vital importance for civil society because it leads to a discourse and transfer of experiences and knowledge. It is a method of empowerment because local and international groups are finding themselves as equal partners in

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284 There were also professional organisations like a German Umbrella of ‘democratic scientists’ (Bund der demokratischen WissenschaftlerInnen –BDWi) who started cooperation with the Serbian initiative ‘Responsibility for the Future’ (Jovanovic 2001), and cooperation between international journalists (see below).

285 The Forum Civil Peace Service (CPS) is a German umbrella organisation that was founded in 1996 to promote a peace service of professional ‘peace experts’, comparable to development services. Its first activities were trainings for such ‘experts’. Pax Christi Germany which had been sending volunteers to the former Yugoslavia since 1992, was one of the organisations setting up pilot projects for the civil peace service. From 1999 on, there was then state funding for the CPS, and then the Forum CPS administered projects for some of its member organisations as well as sending own staff to the field. Pax Christi was the initiator of projects in Zenica and Banja Luka in Bosnia, and Benkovac in Croatia (see Bauer and Muller 1996, Pax Christi International 1996b, Ruessmann 1999b, Ruessmann 1999c, ICVA 2000, Meyer 2000, Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst 2002, Schiel 2002, Kukla 2003, Pax Christi 2003, Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst n.d.-b).
international networks rather than in a relationship of donor and recipient. And it builds bridges when direct contacts are difficult because either one side does not take the other seriously (often the case when local NGOs have to deal with international organisations or local authorities), or because people do not dare to make direct contact for fear of being rejected (such was the case, at least early on, with anti-war groups caught up on different sides of the war). On general terms however, the observation by Mendelson (2002) who researched NGO support in different countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia needs to be taken seriously that intense involvement in international networks also can distract local groups from their own issues, although I have found little evidence of this problem in the area under study.

7.7.5 Solidarity Work

Solidarity work is of course a form of support for local groups. The reason why it has been made a section of its own is that unlike the general support described before it focussed on particular issues whose goals are shared by the international interveners—issues like the right to refuse to military service, or a struggle for independence or regime change.

7.7.5.1 Support for Those Avoiding Military Service

Support for conscientious objectors, deserters and draft evaders were an issue for international antimilitarist and pacifist groups. There were an estimated 300,000 of such men, the majority of them probably from the FR Yugoslavia, followed by Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Friedrich 1995). Partly this support took the form of protest and advocacy in third countries where governments and the EU were lobbied to grant them asylum (see chapter 8). In the area of the former Yugoslavia, concrete support to hide or flee the countries was given.

286 There were some women volunteers in some of the armies but no draft or other pressure on women to join the military in the countries in question.
War Resisters’ International (WRI) was the international umbrella organisation whose members played a crucial role in this.\textsuperscript{287} It had contact with a youth group in Slovenia since the late 1970s, supporting them in the 1980s in their struggle for recognition of the right of conscientious objection. When the wars then began, WRI and its network of member organisations got involved in multiple activities of support and solidarity, ranging from training through to support of conscientious objectors and draft evaders. Local groups were the first contact of those seeking to escape or avoid military service, for example Women in Black in Belgrade or the Antiwar Campaign in Croatia. Partner organisations from abroad such as the Hungarian peace and human rights organisation Alba Koer helped them to cross the border to third countries and received them there, or sent them on to other countries. A deserters’ network linked to WRI was crucial in coordinating these international efforts that often had an element of civil disobedience since the European countries were hesitant to recognise avoidance of military service as a reason for asylum.\textsuperscript{288}

The high number of those who avoided military service undoubtedly had an impact on the conflicts. It played an important role very early on during the violent conflict in Slovenia and then the war in Croatia because many men then still serving in the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) left for patriotic reasons, often joining the newly formed armies of the secessionist republics, but seriously damaging the ability of the JNA to wage effective warfare in summer 1991. Later many from FR Yugoslavia and Croatia sought to escape military service, especially if that meant being sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina – something that both countries did though officially always denying the fact. Friedrich, one of the coordinators of the International Deserter’s Network, thinks that “even if the mass desertion in Yugoslavia was not the cause for achieving a cease-fire agreement, it certainly contributed to a questioning of the ability to continue the war” (Friedrich 1996: 188).

\textsuperscript{287} WRI was founded after World War I of pacifist groups united around the issue of refusing military service.

\textsuperscript{288} The deserters’ network was founded in 1993 and had in 1996 member groups in 13 European countries, combining concrete support of deserters with advocacy work for the right of asylum. See War Resisters’ International 1994 and 1998a, Friedrich 1995, Friedrich 1996.
7.7.5.2 Solidarity with Kosovo – the Activities in Kosovo

The nonviolent character of the resistance movement in Kosovo appealed to a number of groups and organizations interested in and committed to nonviolent resistance themselves.\textsuperscript{289} Once more, War Resisters’ International was one focus, another was certain groups in particular from the French and Italian language area.\textsuperscript{290} This work had two sides: advocacy and public information work abroad that will be described in the next chapter, and concrete activities with the Kosovar organisations in Kosovo.

As an example of work in Kosovo I would like to sketch the work of the Campagna per una soluzione nonviolenta del problema del Kossovo (Campaign for a Nonviolent Solution of the Problem of Kosovo). It was a coordination of different Italian NGOs that was initiated in 1992 by Albert l’Abate, a well-known nonviolent researcher-activist from the University of Florence (see Troebst 1998:97pp, l’Abate 1997:7-8, 22 and 59pp, Marcon 2000:144, l’Abate 2002-b).\textsuperscript{291} After two years of publicity work, organising delegations to Belgrade and Kosovo, and other work more focussed on the international and Italian public, in 1995 they started trying to establish a permanent presence in Prishtina under the name of a ‘Peace Embassy’.

Since the FR Yugoslavia and especially Kosovo were difficult to access for foreigners planning to stay for any length of time (the first volunteer sent there in 1995 had to leave after three months), they only succeeded in having one or two permanent staff there from August 1997 until 1998. The objectives of the Peace Embassy were human rights monitoring, creating a meeting place for people of different nations, cultures, political orientations and religions, facilitating intercultural relations, finding common denominators between Albanians and Serbs; supporting networking between Albanians and the pacifist groups in Serbia and

\textsuperscript{289} It was nonviolent until in 1997/98 the armed Kosovo Liberation Army took over the de-facto leadership of the movement, and started to determine its strategies.

\textsuperscript{290} Mouvement pour une alternative non-violente, Centre Martin Luther King in Switzerland, Helsinki Citizens Assembly Geneva, the Collectif du jumelage Geneva-Prishtina and the Campagna Kossovo in Italy were the main groups identified in the survey.

\textsuperscript{291} The organisations coordinating the Campagna were MIR (Fellowship of Reconciliation Italy), Pax Christi, Beati i Costruttori di Pace, Agimi-Caritas di Otranto, and it was also supported by the Movimento Nonviolento, the Segretaria Nazionale per la Difesa Popolare Nonviolenta and a regional government (Regione Val d’Aosta).
supporting twinning of Italian and Kosovar schools and organisations (l’Abate 2002b). It is difficult to assess what if any role the international support by these rather small and radical nonviolent groups played for the resistance in Kosovo. Larger NGOs other than some humanitarian (Caritas, working with the organisation Mother Theresa) were rare in Kosovo. The Open Society Fund supported some media, but otherwise there was no significant financial or other political support of the movement. The Kosovo-Albanian resistance was mostly financed by the Albanian diaspora (see Clark 2000). The nonviolent strategy as represented by President Rugova and Shkelzen Maliqi (Maliqi, 1995, n.d.-a, and -b) was developed without international counselling or training. War Resisters’ International twice was approached (in 1992-93 and 1998) for a training in nonviolent action but in the end the plans fell through because each time the local side for security reasons cancelled the preparations (see War Resisters’ International 1994 and 2002). Thus, on the whole, it may be concluded that the solidarity work did not play an essential role for the struggle in Kosovo other than helping them with propagating their objectives abroad (see chapter 8).

7.7.5.3 Overthrowing the Yugoslav Government

In contrast, the overthrow of the Milosevic regime in October 2000 by a nonviolent mass movement led by the students’ movement Otpor is a success story of nonviolent resistance, though rather contested in regard to the role played by

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292 Their work as that of the other groups involved in Kosovo solidarity was slowed down in the 1998 events and the fact that the struggle had become a violent one, and then fully interrupted by the NATO war against FR Yugoslavia. But after that war they mostly picked up the contacts. The Mouvement pour une alternative non-violente (which was also a member organisation of Balkan Peace Team) in 2001 began a Civil Peace Service project in Mitrovica, and the Campagna opened a ‘Centre for Friendship Between the People’, and continued with different dialogue activities (between ethnic groups, youth, religious leaders and schools).

293 A ‘counterfactual’ question is worth addressing: what if there had been more international engagement by civil society, perhaps including setting up a large international presence in Kosovo for nonviolent peace-keeping, as urged by the US organisation Peaceworkers in 1998 (see chapter 6.3.2). Perhaps at an earlier stage such support could have prevented the movement from turning violent and still helped it to achieve its goals. If, as I believe, there were real chances missed, international civil society shares the burden of responsibility for the events that eventually led to the NATO war of 1999.
international support. In August 2000, as national elections approached, Otpor launched an anti-Milosevic campaign with the slogan ‘he is finished’. On the election day, the 24 September, more than 30,000 volunteers monitored some 10,000 polling stations. The strategy Otpor pursued was to call for massive participation in the elections, and – assuming that it would be likely that Milosevic would try to rig the results – collect proof for any irregularities and use them for public protest (Nenadic and Belcevic 2006:15). Immediately after the election, the opposition parties declared their candidate Vojislav Kostunica as victor, while Milosevic claimed that neither had the majority. In response, the opposition called for a general strike that was full in force after a few days. On 5 October, hundred thousands of protesters assembled on the streets of Belgrade, storming the parliament and state-run television and radio stations, mostly without using violence. On October 6 Milosevic acknowledged defeat.

The successful overthrow of the Milosevic regime is probably the clearest example of the interplay between three sides: a vibrant local protest movement, democratisation policies by international governments and large INGOs close to these governments, and international nonviolent grassroots movements as the third component.

There had been protest against the Milosevic regime throughout the 1990s, mostly led by oppositional parties and students. Independent media like Radio B92 and anti-war and feminist groups like the Centre for Antiwar Action and Women in Black received support by the international civil society throughout the 1990s. They received financial aid, had volunteers working with them and were closely linked to different international networks. There have also been trainings that discussed nonviolent action strategies throughout the 1990s (see Bund fuer Soziale

294 Otpor (meaning ‘resistance’) was founded in autumn 1998 by a small group of students who had been active in the previous protests of winter 1996-97 (see 3.4). The protests began in September 1999 with rallies in 20 cities, asking Milosevic to resign. The police reacted with violence but the protests continued, though the numbers dwindled for some time as the political opposition started to fragment once more. However, between November 1999 and early 2000, Otpor developed a national-wide but decentralised organisation trying to avoid exposing leaders which would have made repression easier. In May 2000, 18 political parties united to form a new coalition calling itself Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS).

Verteidigung 1993, Large n.d.:100). But for most of the time this support was given mostly by small international NGOs being part of the peace movements of their respective countries who collected donations among their membership and supporters. Only a few large organisations with ample financial resources, like the Soros Foundation (see above), were engaged in this field. This situation changed after the NATO war, due to Western governments’ new interest in supporting regime change in Belgrade making resources available in quantities previously unimagined. For ‘democracy aid’, the USA alone spent US$10 million in 1999 and US$31 million in 2000, money that was spent on sponsoring meetings and trainings or went mostly to oppositional parties and municipalities, NGOs and media (Carothers 2001:3). A proportion of that money was channelled through a small number of US QUANGOs, the National Endowment for Democracy, the already mentioned National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International Republican Institute (IRI) being the three most important ones. Carothers (2001) estimates that the level of EU aid in these two years was similar, also about US$40 million. Besides money, the material support included office equipment, and also protest materials (IRI paid for 2.5 million ‘he is finished’-stickers, t-shirts and sprays).

The second element of international support for Otpor consisted of conferences, trainings and workshops. Some commentators attribute these events with a pivotal role in the overthrow of Milosevic. In July 1999, the EastWest Institute (EWI) organised a conference in Bratislava, right after the end of the Yugoslavia-Kosovo war, with the title “The Future of the FR Yugoslavia in the context of post war reconstruction” (see Mathews 2001). Participants included people from the political opposition, trade unions, NGOs and media, as well as key figures from the

295 The relationship between the FR Yugoslavia and the Western world had improved after the Dayton Agreement. The sanctions were mostly abolished, and Milosevic was seen by many as a guarantee for stability in the region. Only after the NATO war of 1999 this changed, and EU and USA agreed that it was time for a regime change in Serbia/FYugoslavia, combining economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation including the indictment of Milosevic by ICTY, and democracy aid (see Carothers 2001 and chapter 4 of this study).


297 The EastWest-Institute is a think tank founded in 1980, involving a number of elder statesmen (among them George W. Bush Sr. and Helmut Kohl), and, with offices today in USA, Belgium and Russia. It set up a task force working on FR Yugoslavia, engaging both in international advocacy work and concrete work with actors on the ground.
EU, Council of Europe and OSCE. The subject of the discussion was how to achieve a ‘free and democratic’ society. EWI then organised a series of meetings between September 1999 and February 2000 that brought the Community for Change into contacts with international actors like the Council of Europe, and the Community held meetings in Belgrade which soon became an important forum for opposition groups. In July 2000 a new conference in Bratislava decided to work on common visions for the elections. Soon after the new party ‘DOS’ was formed and Kostunica nominated as presidential candidate.

From 31 March 2000 to 3 April, again in Budapest, IRI held a training for 20 or 30 Otpor activists. As trainer they had Robert Helvey, a close colleague of Gene Sharp at the Albert Einstein Institution, a NGO that since 1983 had been “dedicated to advancing the study and use of strategic nonviolent action in conflicts throughout the world”, having worked with resistance and pro-democracy groups in many countries of the world (Albert Einstein Institution 2008). Helvey presented a toolbox of methods and strategies for nonviolent revolution that obviously was very influential (the Otpor successor CANVAS is still relying heavily on this methodology as can be seen by their website).

In summer 2000 IRI then organised trainings for election observers in Szeged, on the Hungary-Yugoslav border. They trained about 400 monitors who went back and trained another 15,000 (other sources speak of 20,000).

These – the money and the trainings – were the main international support that the movement against Milosevic received. For its part, Otpor tried to keep it secret at the time, fearing a backlash if it was known - opposition was anyway portrayed by the regime as being directed from abroad. After Milosevic’s overthrow when it became known, this caused a big outcry in Serbia and also abroad. Even today, for many

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298 Two initiatives were launched as a result of the conference: A group called Community for Change that understood itself as a consortium of pro-democracy forces; and a Task Force to assist the Community for Change and to develop a comprehensive action plan. EWI served as its Secretariat.

299 Another workshop often referred to in this context took place in October 1999 in Budapest, organised by NDI. Activists, among them Otpor members from Serbia, received there a closed-door briefing by Doug Schoen, a Democrat who talked about an opinion poll conducted by a US firm. This showed that Milosevic had a 70% negative rating among Serbian voters, but that opposition leaders didn’t fare much better. He recommended Kostunica as the one with the least negative rating.

300 The Center for Civic Initiatives in Belgrade translated Gene Sharp’s monograph From Dictatorship to Democracy and distributed 5,500 copies.
leftists Otpor (and other Eastern European groups struggling to overthrow their governments) are puppets of the US government.\textsuperscript{301}

To assess the role and importance of the international support, it must be asked why the movement in 2000 succeeded and what was different compared to the earlier attempts to overthrow the regime.

With Mauro (2002:327) I would see the economic devastation of the country resulting from the war, the sanctions, and the failure of the government to introduce economic reforms as one cluster of factors. Other reasons were the military and diplomatic defeat in all the wars that Milosevic had waged (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo); the unification of the opposition parties, proper organisation of the election campaign, effective election monitoring; and the readiness of Serbia’s citizens to push through their electoral will, even at the cost of confrontation with the police and the army.

Otpor members and other local activists are convinced that without external support, Milosevic would still have been toppled, only perhaps later. However, media reports from that time state that these same activists considered the foreign support received as ‘critical’. The financial aid may here may not have been as vital (though helpful and in case of the independent media essential throughout the 1990s) as the strategic conferences and trainings. Mathews, referring to the EWI meetings, comments:

\begin{quote}
It is difficult to know to what extent the Bratislava Process contributed to the successful overthrow of the Milosevic regime. However, members of the Task Force, some of whom are now members of the government, privately attest to the importance of the initiative, pointing out that it did provide the first real opportunity for the pro-democracy forces to meet and coalesce around a common strategy (Mathews 2001: 13)
\end{quote}

An indicator for that is that unlike 1996-97, the movement applied a clear and unified strategy, and consciously involved many parts of society into the protest movement.

\textsuperscript{301} A number of leftist websites pursue this topic, with authors that promote conspiracy theories not only about Europe but Latin America, Burma and other places as well:
http://www.trend.infopartisan.net/trd0607/t360607.html,

Examples for articles of that vein are Meyssan 2007 and Israel / Varkevisser n.d. See also http://www.b92.net/eng/news/comments.php?nav_id=42936, B92 blog discussion that reflects the Otpor issues.
Neither was the case in the earlier protests. I believe it not to be far-fetched to assume that this was an outcome of the strategic teachings by the Albert Einstein Institution (see also Carothers 2001, Mathews 2001:17). But the revolution was in my eyes nevertheless a local one, aided but not engineered. Zunes (2008) who has studied revolutionary movements all over the world states that the very fact that it was a mass movement and not a coup is proof of that. He also thinks that in spite of the support there was little understanding generally within the international community of the nonviolent movement (a phenomenon that is not surprising considering that the nonviolent movement in Kosovo met with similar ignorance).\(^{302}\)

### 7.7.6: Summary: State-building, Democratisation and Civil Society Support - A Highly Political Agenda

In this last section very different approaches may seem to have been lumped together. At first glance, an international NGO advising a fledgling government on how to set up a tax system has little in common with a group of war resisters engaging in semi-clandestine work to help deserters flee their country. Nevertheless, both are part of state-building, democratisation and civil society support. In fact, the difference is not the position the external party takes towards the government in the target country as may be assumed at first glance. The solidarity movement with Kosovo had a very positive relationship to the Kosovar government under Rugova, and as described above the EU and USA started to seriously engage in furthering regime change in the FR Yugoslavia after the Kosovo war of 1999. The differences in approach perhaps arise partly from the position external civil society actors takes in regard to their own governments (and alliances of states). Supporting deserters— in spite of some good-will declarations, (see chapter 8) – has not been high on the agenda of the Western governments, and also the Kosovo issue was mostly seen from purely human rights or crisis prevention stand-points, not from a point of view of sympathy to the goals of the Kosovar movement.\(^{303}\)

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\(^{302}\) He reported being told by Otpor leaders that the CIA even offered some of them earlier in 2000 guns which they rejected.

\(^{303}\) There is of course a middle field: Financing or training independent media and NGOs in particular is a field that found support by both Western governments and civil society groups within these countries. Here the political agendas of civil society and governments were not that different.
7.8 Promoting Peace Skills and Dialogue

Of course almost all peace-building has to do with peace and dialogue. So this heading must not be misunderstood. It concerns those activities and strategies that pursue peace work, dialogue or reconciliation without linking these activities or goals to other activities like social work or reconstruction aid (see above).

7.8.1 Training in Peace Skills

Education and training in relation to ‘peace skills’ was a widespread activity organised by both state and non-state actors. CDA calls it “one of the most popular approaches to peacebuilding programming” (CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects 2006:11), and in an earlier paper the same organisation wrote.

Trainings in peace skills are one of the most common methods by which international, national, and local agencies work for peace. Trainings, like other educational activities, are seen to inform people’s efforts by providing new ideas and skills. Or they are seen to catalyze people to see possibilities for action where they thought things were hopeless, and to undertake activities that will help bring about peace. (CDAINC 2002)

Stovel (2000) who studied NGOs and peace education in Bosnia lists a wide spectrum of educational programmes covering active learning training for teachers, inter-community cooperation, human rights education, ‘political literacy’, diversity appreciation, education on stereotyping and prejudice, trauma healing workshops, conflict resolution training, peace education, media literacy and inter-group mixing.

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304 The term ‘peace skills’ was borrowed from the Issue Papers of the project “Reflecting on Peace Practice” by the Collaborative of Development Action, see CDAINC 2002).

305 Almost identically, the CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects (2006) found in Kosovo training in conflict resolution, human rights, nonviolent communication and related topics in all the communities visited for their study.

Large (n.d.:88pp) in her study describes some different approaches to training and related conflict resolution work, and also quotes examples of training agendas. On the basis of these three studies and what I found in the survey of trainings materials, it seems to me that while differing in detail, the following list of topics were most common in the trainings:

- Personal issues (identity, self-esteem, handling anger, trauma healing);
- Spirituality (depending on who gave the training – ranging from traditional Christianity to more New-Age related approaches);
- Group processes (working in a team, decision-making and leadership in groups, issues of coordination and conflicts between groups or within one group);
- Dialogue, communication, prejudice reduction and interethic reconciliation.
Training was an activity in which both local and international groups engaged. Already mentioned for their work with war veterans have been the Centre for Nonviolent Action in Sarajevo and Belgrade, and the Croatian group Miramida that developed out of the social reconstruction project in Pakrac.\textsuperscript{306}

Probably the first groups to facilitate trainings in nonviolence in the region were War Resisters’ International (WRI) and the German Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung (Federation for Social Defence-BSV; see War Resisters’ International 1994, Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung n.d.-c).\textsuperscript{307} As mentioned above, WRI had maintained contacts with a group in Slovenia in the 1980s. When the conflicts began, WRI activists, among them one whose home organisation was the BSV, visited Slovenia in summer 1991 and met there also with Croatian activists from a small ecology group called Green Action who were just starting up an anti-war group. They had heard that there was something like ‘training for nonviolence’ and wished to try it out. The German group sent three trainers down soon after in October 1991 during the war in Croatia for a first three- or four day training that was mostly meant to show the local activists what nonviolence training was about. After that training, the organisers also visited Belgrade, mostly motivated by the need to see the ‘other side’

Depending on the topic of the training, there were also:

- Nonviolent action and campaigning
- ‘Political and media literacy’;
- various topics of special interest to the group trained, e.g. human rights, gender, community development, fundraising, management, psychological counselling etc.
- Special methods or approaches on dealing with conflict have included nonviolent communication (Marshall Rosenberg), Alternatives to Violence (a Quaker programme originally conceived for working with prison inmates), Active Listening, Alternative Dispute Resolution, and mediation.
- Training of trainers in these various types of training has played an important role.

Another example for a mixed local-international initiative is the Peace School in Gorski Kotar/ Mrkopalj in Croatia. Gorski Kotar was already introduced, in 5.3 above as an example as an example of a local mediator preventing violence in his region. In consequence of the early prevention of violence, several villages in the region started to co-operate, and become an example in Croatia for moderate politics. These activities became known beyond the Croatian borders, and especially attracted the engagement of Austrian and Swiss peace activists. From 1993 on they helped to organise a ‘peace school’ for children, teacher and adults. From 1996-97 on the activities expanded with the arrival of two conscientious objectors from Austrian Peace Service working with the school on a permanent basis. In 1999 and later, the Peace School also conducted one-week seminars in other places in the region like the Vojvodina, Maribor, and Banja Luka (see Wintersteiner 1994 , Tiffinger and Tiffinger 1998, Tiffinger 1999, Tiffinger 2000, Austrian Peace Service 2001, Pucher 2001, OEsterreichische Friedensdienste n.d.).

This description is also partly based on personal memory having been the mentioned link between WRI and BSV, and being with the first trainers’ group in October 1991.
of the conflict. Their meeting with the Centre for Antiwar Action in Belgrade resulted in more trainings also in Serbia in 1992, as well as follow-up trainings with other groups in Croatia, given by trainers approached through BSV or the WRI network.  

It is not easy to evaluate trainings beyond a first feedback by participants on what they liked and did not like about the seminar. I would like to start with a quote of a Serbian grassroots’ activist working with MOST, the group previously mentioned as the Serbian counterpart in the Pakrac project:

And how did my peace activism start? In 1991, I was a young psychologist, unemployed for four years, and a mother of two small children. In the former Yugoslavia, the only country I had, the war and the fallout began. …This is when an unusual thing happened: my friend and former professor … invited me to attend a strange seminar on mediation and nonviolent conflict transformation. …After the seminar, some new vistas opened before me, new views on conflict in general, so that the conflict in our country too assumed another dimension; I understood that this was not only happening to us, even though I had a hard time accepting it. Wishing to share this unique experience with our colleagues and to introduce them to these ideas, we organised the first local seminar for the interested people who ‘shared our ideas’. And this is how it all began, this is how the MOST group was created, the group that has since, in the fifteen years that followed (these past fifteen years), made and still makes an invaluable contribution to the promotion of the ideas of peace and tolerance among people, through various aspects of education (Kijevcacic 2007:55).

Similar observations were made in the two training evaluation meetings that took place in 1993 and 1995 in Hungary and Austria, where trainers and activists from the former Yugoslavia met with trainers from abroad (Schweitzer 1993c, Exchange Meeting Among Conflict Resolution Trainers and Peace Educators 1995, Large

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Some of the British trainers later formed the Committee for Conflict Transformation Support (until 1997 Coordinating Committee for Conflict Resolution Training in Europe). The CCTS is a British group (with some international links and contacts) that was set up after discussions about training needs at the second Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly in Bratislava in March 1992. Later that year trainers related to the new Committee visited Croatia, in particular the young group in Osijek with which one of the trainers, a well-known Quaker mediator, from then on formed a close relationship (Nikolic 1993:439, Anti-War Campaign Croatia 1995:233, Clark n.d., Large n.d.:7,39p and 99).

From 1992 on, trainers from CCTS regularly went to the region to conduct trainings in issues like mediation, conflict resolution etc, and also participated in two evaluation meetings with trainers and activists from the area of former Yugoslavia. In 1995 a Northern Irish member of the Committee organised an exchange project in form of a visit of peacemakers from former Yugoslavia for eleven days to Northern Ireland to learn about the problems and reconciliation work in that country.
n.d.:91): The first and foremost effect of the trainings was personal change and empowerment.\textsuperscript{309}

But there definitely often were two further outcomes, as was also found in Kosovo after 1999:

- There often was change of attitudes towards the other ethnic group(s), people starting to be more relaxed with them, stereotypes and ‘enemy images’ broken down. (CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects 2006:38).

How long lasting and stable such changes of attitudes were remains an unanswered question however. That would require evaluations that covered a longer period of time.

- In several cases, trainings, especially the early ones, played a role in the formation and strategic planning of new groups (see the quote above, Schweitzer 1993c, Exchange Meeting Among Conflict Resolution Trainers and Peace Educators 1995). This definitely qualifies as impact as it is understood by evaluators because it has longer-term and sustainable effects (see Rubin 1995, Paffenholz and Reychler 2007).

7.8.2 Dialogue Projects

In the conclusions of this chapter will be discussed what different strategies and methods interveners used in order to promote inter-ethnic cooperation and eventual reconciliation. The promotion of ‘dialogue’ is (just) one of the tools for that purpose. In this section here I will look at those projects and programmes that pursued ‘dialogue pure’, or dialogue for the sake for dialogue, meaning that it was not linked to any other type of activity, be it reconstruction or social work. Also excluded here are the types of encounters that were described under middle level peace-making.

\textsuperscript{309} Sometimes, this may have been the only outcome, as CDA suspects in its Reflecting on Peace Processes project of the CDA that published a general paper about the role and impact of trainings in peace processes (CDAINC 2002). That paper confirms on a more general level what was found for the trainings in former Yugoslavia:

People often report that trainings have changed their lives and given them crucial skills that they then use in their own organisations, work, family, and personal lives. However, there is equally evidence that these skills usually stop at the level of the individual—that people do not subsequently train others in those skills as was originally intended, or go on to undertake new peace activities. (CDAINC 2002)
The difference between the two is the purpose: if the objective of a meeting is to concretely discuss solutions to the conflict, or if the purpose is generally to develop understanding for each other’s views. That there is a grey area here does probably not need extra mention.\textsuperscript{310}

Generally the promotion of dialogue can be defined as providing opportunities (meetings, structures, processes, a ‘dialogue space’) for direct contact and communication between people from opposing sides. [Agencies] believe that, if well managed, dialogue will lead to mutual understanding and moderation of views (Olson 2001).

Dialogue in this context usually refers to two components of a groups’ or an individual’s identity: the ethnic identity (inter-ethnic dialogue) or the religious (inter-religious dialogue). At least in the case of former Yugoslavia these two were, as far as I could see, usually clearly separated.\textsuperscript{311}

\textbf{7.8.2.1 Inter-ethnic Dialogue}

Many encounters, especially of oppositional, feminist and anti-war groups (be it seminars, workshops, or just ‘meetings’) took place without needing any mediation by international actors. But there have also been cases where such meetings would perhaps not have taken place if there hadn’t been groups or individuals from the international civil society making them possible through ‘good offices’ or what at the high level would be called ‘shuttle mediation’, visiting groups based in the different countries at war and encouraging them to meet.\textsuperscript{312}

\textsuperscript{310} In Olson’s (2001) terminology: “dialogues focused on civil society”. In Duffield’s (1996) it would be the first of his two approaches, arranging appropriate conferences and workshops to bring people together. (The other approach he names is training in conflict resolution based on ‘clarifying mistaken perceptions and providing psychological and social skills for defusing potentially tense situations’.) See also Ropers 2004 for different types of dialogue.

\textsuperscript{311} Though religion was an ethnic marker, so that when for example Muslims and Orthodox Christians talked with each other, it meant mostly ethnic Muslims (since Muslims are considered an ethnicity) and Serbs. The same with Catholics who are mostly identified with Croats.

\textsuperscript{312} See Large (nd:92) who lists as topics for such meetings 1. issues of co-ordination within anti-war movements; 2. clashes with local authorities over questions of eviction and minority rights; 3. differences with central governments.
One example is the work of the Nansen Academy (Norway) that helped to create the Nansen Dialogue Network which uses inter-ethnic dialogue as a tool for peaceful conflict transformation. Its mission statement reads as follows:

§ Nansen Dialogue will, through applying the ideas and skills of dialogue, empower people who live in conflict situations to contribute to peaceful conflict transformation, and democratic development with promotion of human rights.

§ Nansen Dialogue is marked by the wish to provide a neutral and open space where the different actors in a serious conflict can meet face to face in truthful and honest communication. The aim is to break down enemy images, as well as to increase understanding of each other’s positions, interests and needs. Facilitators and lecturers try to stimulate the cognitive analysis of the conflict itself and the experience of “the other’s” position. The focus is not on who is right or most guilty, but on how to build respect for democratic principles, human rights and peaceful conflict resolution for future improvement of society. These principles are to be an alternative in political organisation to national chauvinism and ethnic loyalty (Nansen Academy 2008).

The work of the Nansen Academy grew continuously from its beginnings with a first seminar for 14 Bosnian students in Lillehammer in 1995. In 1998, both Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians attend their 10 week courses, followed up by workshops. The attendees remained in contact, and the groups functioned throughout the hostilities of 1998, until 1999 both communities were for some time dissolved (Clark 2000:142), but took up work later again.314

The main activities of the network are the organization of meetings. So for example they held in 2000 a seminar on relations between Montenegro and Serbia, and in 2001 a roundtable on attitudes of young people about the status of Montenegro. Until 2000, they have had 165 participants in total (Broughton 2002:273, Nansen Academy 2008, Nansen Dijalog Centar 2008, Stallaerts 2002:317).315

313 The Nansen Academy is an institution of humanistic orientation founded in 1938 to counter the growth of totalitarian ideologies in Europe. Its main programme nowadays is adult education in philosophy and arts for students with different political, religious and cultural backgrounds. Its Department of Dialogue and Peacebuilding offers inter-ethnic dialogue seminars for various target groups, mainly from ex-Yugoslavia, but also from other conflict areas (Nansen Academy 2008).

314 Today, in 2008, the Nansen Dialogue Network has offices in the Nansen Academy and in Oslo and Nansen Dialogue Centres in ten cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia, many of them founded in 2000 or later.

315 Another example, with the participants probably being on the borderline between middle and grassroots’ level were the dialogue support Balkan Peace Team (BPT) gave to civil society groups in Serbia and Kosovo. In 1997, the team that had part-time bases both in Belgrade and Pristina was instrumental in bringing together Serbian anti-war activists from Nis (south Serbia), students
The promotion of dialogue has not been limited to the area of former Yugoslavia. Many initiatives in third countries working on the conflict sought contact to diaspora groups from the region. In the survey, there were a number of small citizens’ groups that had this among their list of activities. In their dialogue efforts, a third side usually came in: people from the host community. The reports from such events indicate that it not always was easy to bring groups from the different sides together, but that some groups succeeded. (for example Balkan Peace Team promoting dialogue between Serbian and Kosovar students, see Mueller 2004).

7.8.2.2 Inter-religious Dialogue

In the survey on the former Yugoslavia some activities can be categorised as inter-religious dialogue, both high-level meetings between religious leaders, and cross-community dialogue, ecumenical masses etc. at the grassroots. Sometimes this dialogue happened between two of the faith groups, sometimes several came together. As in the Middle East conflict area, protagonists of inter-religious dialogue have tended to point out that the main traditional religions in the area (Islam, Orthodox and Catholic Christianity and Judaism) all belong to the Abrahamic tradition (see Steele 2002:75). There were efforts for such dialogue right from 1992 on, for example by the Conference of European Churches (Gruppe fuer eine Schweiz ohne Armee 1992b). An example for bringing together leaders of these four communities is a meeting the World Conference of Religion and Peace brokered in October 1996 and which led to the establishment of an Inter-Religious Council in

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316 Balkan Peace Team was introduced in chapter 6 on peace-keeping.

317 Brajovic defines as follows: “inter-religious dialogue is a formal process in which authoritative members of at least two religious communities come together for an extended and serious discussion of the beliefs and practices that separate the communities” (Brajovic 2007:187).

### 7.8.3 Peace Projects’ With Complex Mandates

There were a number of projects that undertook a wide range of activities under the explicit headline of ‘peace work’. The multi-pronged approach they share with the ‘social reconstruction’ projects described above in 7.3.2, but unlike them material aid has played only a minimal or no role at all. Rather typically three areas of work are combined:

- Support of civil society groups.
- Social work, identifying projects or places that then could also be used as a vehicle to further the goal of inter-ethnic collaboration. Often these are youth centres as described above, but also other places or objects were chosen – as for instance did Balkan Peace Team France (the successor of the international BPT) choose a library in Mitrovica (Kosovo) for its work from 2001 onwards (Balkan Peace Team France 2001, 2002a and 2002b, Clark 2003b).
- Training in peace skills and/or promotion of inter-ethnic dialogue.

As an example for such complex projects, I would like to describe the Osijek Peace Teams, a local ‘embedded’ intervener:

Osijek Peace Teams was a project founded by Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights Osijek, Croatia, that was founded in 1992. This peace team project

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318 An example for grassroots’ activities is a German group Oekumenischer Dienst im Konziliaren Prozess – Schalomdiakonat (Ecumenical Service in the Conciliatory Process- Shalom Diakonia). They are a group with a mostly Protestant background, and train lay people to work full-time for peace and reconciliation, accompanying those who graduate from their courses in their later work. At least in the former Yugoslavia, that work has often had an aspect of inter-religious dialogue. Thus two of its members organised inter-religious contacts, prayers, visits and seminars in Sarajevo and Republika Srpska (Voß 2000:125, Putevi Mira 2003). Also activities of inter-religious dialogue also took place among the diaspora in third countries. For example, in 1992 two young Franciscans brought together three groups in Cologne, Germany - Christlich-islamische Gesellschaft in Koeln, Franziskaner Koeln and Zajedno Pomoci, a group that was founded out of the prayer initiative to organise humanitarian aid for Central Bosnia) – to begin publicly praying for peace in Bosnia for Muslims, Jews and Christians (Neitzert 1996, Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1994).

319 Another example for this approach though coming to the area in numbers only after the period under study and deployed by several German development and peace service organisations have been the German Civil Peace Services financed by the German Ministry for Development. See Konsortium Ziviler Friedensdienst 2006 and Footnote 285.
began with the support of the Swedish Life and Peace Institute, who financed it, and Austrian Peace Services, who deployed international volunteers to work with the Croatian volunteers recruited through the Osijek Centre (for the following, see Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights Osijek 2001a and b).\textsuperscript{320} The project officially began in 1998 with the end of the UNTAES mission in Eastern Slavonia which meant the withdrawal of many international support structures. But there was a pilot Listening Project already from 1996 where people were interviewed about the peace efforts, the return of former neighbours and future co-habitation.\textsuperscript{321}

The first (10-week) training for the Osijek Peace Teams took place in summer 1998, the concrete work started in 1999, with usually one international volunteer (from September 1999 mostly coming from Austrian Peace Services) being placed in a team with several local people. Teams were deployed to several small towns or villages, living in the local communities. In Dalje, for example, they helped to set up a youth club, organised a youth summer camp for youth from Croatia and Austria and supported a school partnership with an Austrian school. In Okucani, besides workshops with children and the formation of a youth group there have also been workshops with women, a hiking club, activities to embellish the village, a psychological series of workshops for war veterans and five ecumenical services with catholic orthodox and Adventist priests. Other activities included regular legal counselling, help with dealing with authorities, courses and seminars on diverse topics (from computers to languages, election monitoring to de-mining), help to reconstruct libraries or sports halls and special activities for the reintegration of returnees or disadvantaged ethnic groups like Roma (see Reiter 2000).

As to the evaluation, initially local people had a hard time understanding the purpose of the project, expecting material humanitarian aid, and not seeing how seminars could help to improve their situation especially in view of the ‘danger’ in meeting people of the other nationality. However, as the project became better understood, it


\textsuperscript{321} By the term of Listening Project is meant a specific method developed as far as I know in the USA where interviewers ask people about their opinions on critical issues, allowing people to express and vent their own thoughts and feelings. This is seen as a tool for coming to terms with a difficult situation. Sometimes the intereners take what they are hearing in the interviews as basis for identifying concrete needs that then are met by more practical interventions (for example planning of concrete aid), but sometimes ‘listening’ remains a tool of its own. The Osijek Peace Teams based many of their interventions on such Listening Projects.
became more successful. An external evaluation showed the listening programme, along with other activities, empowering those who had been implementing it as well as those being listened to,

in the way that it reduced their prejudices and fears of the other nationality, it raised the communication with the other nationality to a higher level, and it increased their motivation to participate in peace activities (Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights Osijek 2001b:107);

The summary of the evaluation published by Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights Osijek (2001b:116pp) lists a very large number of further general and specific achievements, as well as areas that need improvement, the latter mostly raising issues around management, project monitoring, training and preparedness of staff.

7.8.4 Summary: Promoting Peace Skills and Dialogue Work - Only One Approach in Peace-building

There have been many more examples of peace and dialogue work than could be mentioned in this chapter. Especially external civil society groups with a peace movement or nonviolence movement background tended to engage in this field. In the coming chapter on advocacy work I will show how this interest shaped discussions and the institutionalisation of new programmatic funding and types of projects in these third countries. However, from what has been described in this chapter so far, it is clear that such ‘peace work pure’ is only one strategy in peace-building. As most other approaches it displays a list of success stories (like Nansen) as well as considerable lack of impact in other cases.

7.9 Cultural Activities

This last category of peace-building activities is relatively small. There were meetings and workshops of artists, for example Italian writers meeting Bosnian writers, financed by the Italian Fondo Alberto Moravia (Marcon 2000:14). The Austrian Peace Service supported in 1998 a ten-day workshop of painters with a dozen artists from Vojvodina, the Krajina, Slowakia and Romania. The paintings
were sold and the money donated for refugees (Buchmayer 1998, Eckert and Ellensohn 1999).

Many NGOs engaged in the organisation of sports events, often in the context of other work (see the International Volunteer Project Pakrac described above; ICVA 2000).

Similarly, concerts, theatre plays and readings were a popular activity, often linked with the message of ‘peace’. So organised for example the Open Society Fund in Belgrade in 1992 a ‘Music of Peace’ festival (Large n.d.:55). In a somewhat different spirit, Greek artists came to solidarity concerts in Belgrade on invitation of the Greek-Serb Friendship Association in 1992 (Michas 2002:19,24,34). Joan Baez gave a solidarity concert in May 1993 in Sarajevo (Morillon 1993:187). And Pax Christi Flanders and Netherlands organised a multicultural music festival together with the Musicians Without Borders in summer 2000 in several towns in Kosovo, as well as a festival in Macedonia. (De Vrieze 2002:298, Lubbers and Wagenaar 2001).

Another typical activity was to invite artists to third countries, publish CDs of local musicians, or to organise exhibitions. So did for example the small local citizens’ group Bosnien-Forum Singen prepare an exhibition by painters of all ethnic groups, calling it ‘exhibition of reconciliation’ (Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1996, Berdi 1996).

Some NGOs or other donors sought to establish more permanent institutions to support arts. For example, the German-Bosnian-Herzegovinan Society in Travnik set up an artist-in-residence programme to revive the cultural scene, where artists were sponsored to stay for up to three month in the centre if they committed to work creatively for the community (Fischer and Tumler 2000:25pp).

Many of the organisers of the events or other projects here argued – as much as could be discerned from the material available - that their work contributed to the development of the country or region in question, and also to reconciliation because it targeted the different ethnic, formerly enemy, groups.
7.10 Conclusions

Peace-building activities by civil society actors were described in nine categories: 1. relief work, 2. disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of soldiers (DDR), 3. reconstruction and refugee return, 4. social and psycho-social work, 5. economic recovery, 6. transitional justice and human rights documentation, 7. state-building, democratisation and civil society support, 8. promoting peace skills and dialogue and 9. cultural activities.

The actors in peace-building have ranged from small informal citizens’ groups to large organisations that can compete in terms of outreach and resources with state actors. In this chapter here I have tried to make sure to include those actors who in chapter 2.3.1 were called ‘embedded’ actors, meaning local groups seeking to intervene in the conflicts in their own or in a neighbouring country (like Osijek Peace Teams, Centre for Nonviolent Action Sarajevo, MOST etc) not only because they have done (and are mostly still doing) interesting and successful work, but also because this category tends to be overlooked. Peace-building still too often translates to people coming from abroad. Another observation that has repeatedly been made throughout the chapter (especially in the sections on relief, social work, civil society support and solidarity work) is the enormous number of small citizen groups and initiatives with a peace movement background that became active supporting war victims and civil society groups in the former Yugoslavia. The degree of activities in this field justifies use of the concept of a movement of support – a question that will be taken up again in chapter 8.

As to target groups of aid, it can be observed that there were some groups clearly favoured, while others were neglected. Main target groups have been women, refugees/IDPs and youth, because they were considered as being either being particularly affected by war or (in the case of youth) particularly open for reconciliation efforts. Often neglected were elderly people, former soldiers, and sometimes also generally those who had stayed during the wars rather than to flee. Some civil society interveners were conscious of this fact and tried to include these

322 In the case of the former Yugoslavia here it could not be claimed that these locals in fact were more important than the internationals – for such a claim there were simply too many internationals. But there are other countries around the world (for example the Philippines) where the relationship is indeed reversed.
groups (for example, building homes for senior people or working with veterans), but generally it can be noticed that this happened rather late compared to the aid to the other groups (see Sali-Terzic 2001:143).

7.10.1 The Main Instruments of Civil Society Peace-building

On an abstract level, the main instruments used by civil society actors were

1. Material aid (humanitarian relief, building materials, materials for income-generating projects, money, etc);

2. Information (training of various sorts, from vocational training to training how to overthrow a dictator, documentation of human rights violations);

3. Other non-physical support (all the different activities involving intervening actors working with local people, be it institution-building, or working with youth, traumatised people, local NGOs, refugees etc.)

In general, there are two more instruments of peace-building: 4. force and 5. law, but both were more or less been prerogatives of state actors, though being supported occasionally by civil society actors.323

In some cases, as shown in the sections on support of refugees and deserters, civil society groups have turned to methods of civil disobedience, defying the laws and regulations of sometimes several states (both in former Yugoslavia and the laws of the country they lived in) to help people escape from the war.

7.10.2 The Main Goals of Civil Society Peace-Building

These instruments were used to achieve a limited number of general goals and objectives listed below, matching rather well the three functions of peace-building listed in chapter 2: reversing the destructive processes of war through various forms of aid (goal 1), addressing relationships (goal 2), and dealing with structural issues, in particular state and civil society reform (goal 3).

323 Examples of force would be the international administration in the protectorates opening roads and access to villages for refugee return, firing politicians and closing media who did not comply with the administration, e.g. worked against refugee return or continued to promote ethnic hatred. The best example for the instrument of law is the International Tribunal (ICTY).
7. Peace-building by Civil Society Actors

7.10.2.1 Meet Basic Needs Like Food, Housing and Health

This was the primary objective in humanitarian relief, reconstruction, medical and psychological aid projects. It mostly had an approach focused on individuals.

Compared with what is happening in many countries in the southern hemisphere, the relief efforts in the war-affected countries can be considered a success by humanitarian standards in spite of the fact that not all areas were always reached, and people in isolated places suffered serious shortages.\(^{324}\)

There have, however, been definite issues around ‘doing harm’ in relief, reconstruction and economic development aid:

- Often relief organizations during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina were made to give part of their relief to paramilitaries controlling access to the regions they wanted to reach.

- Humanitarian aid when channeled through local elites (as was often done) increased their power, and invited in many cases bribery by potential recipients (see Belloni 2000:6).

- The sheer amount of aid coming especially to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo certainly had negative effects on social-economic development: its negative impact on the labor market included ‘creaming off’ qualified local workers to earn much higher salaries with international bodies, while aid agencies met responsibilities that otherwise would have been the state’s, (see Schneckener 2003:58). Pugh (1998:4) speaks of fostering “aid junkies”, while Woodward (2002:199pp) also mentions economic distortions introduced by international presence.

- At several instances in the text I refer to projects that contributing to tensions in communities rather than dissolving them – for example different actors having different policies on reconstructing houses in one and the same community.

- Both in reconstruction and relief another sore issue often was how to choose the recipients. There seems to were no ‘golden way’: For example, if outside

\(^{324}\) There was some discussion on whether the relief efforts prolonged the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see Burg and Shoup 1999:400, Friedenspolitische Perspektiven im ehemaligen Jugoslawien 1995). From an ethical point of view I find it impossible to accept that argument since what it proposes is not intervening to alleviate concrete suffering on the assumption that in so doing a more abstract future suffering could be turned aside.
interveners simply distributed housing materials equally among the ethnic groups independent of need, they had problems to justify their choices either in regard of their own objective to help those most in need, or vis-à-vis the local authorities. However, if they consulted the local authorities and asked them to do the choosing, this often opened the way to bribery and advantage-taking by certain groups.

7.10.2.2 Promote Inter-ethnic Cooperation and Reconciliation

I was struck by how the goal of interethnic cooperation or reconciliation of the different ethnic groups penetrated almost all peace-building activities. It seems (and could be demonstrated by numerous quotes) that most intervening actors (including the state actors) considered the ethnic splits the main problem to overcome, assuming that if there was co-habitation and co-operation, future violence would be prevented. This objective was clearly stated as the primary one in a number projects and programmes (for example the dialogue projects, many of the trainings and the work of the civil peace services). In many other cases it was not the ‘official’ or declared primary objective (that was e.g. reconstruction, return or setting up a youth centre) but the basic goal that the interveners pursued, almost using the declared objective as a ‘Trojan Horse’. Examples are the ‘social reconstruction’ projects, most of the youth work, some economic programmes as well as many civil society building efforts. One observation repeatedly made in the context of such projects was that the other (more material) work done by the internationals was

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325 This was also observed by Cox:

All international strategies in Bosnia are based on assumptions as to the extent of these ethnic divisions, and whether they are a permanent or transient feature of the social environment. Every international programme has an ethnic dimension to it, whether the programme is expressly designed to promote ethnic reconciliation or merely meets with obstacles presented by ethnic conflict. International strategic planning can be analysed along a spectrum from ethnic reintegration on the one side, which assumes that ethnic identity can ultimately be removed from the political process, to ethnic accommodation on the other, whereby ethnicity is assumed to be a quasi-permanent feature of the region, to be controlled or contained within political structures (Cox 1998:7).

326 Ryan (1995:134pp) has called this strategy ‘contact plus the pursuit of superordinate goals’, including among others joint activities (for example youth clubs, sports, reconstruction efforts), economic interdependence by furthering small trade between the ethnic groups, and the creation of multi-ethnic institutions (for example community centres, NGOs, media). See also CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects 2006:11.
essential for them to build up trust, and be able to work on inter-ethnic cooperation. It gave them legitimization and access under circumstances when people found it hard to understand what somebody wanted who did not distribute material aid or build something, and also helped them avoid to speak in the first place about ‘peace’ or ‘reconciliation’.

Many actors found that that term ‘reconciliation’ was not generally well received in the area. Many people felt that it was just asking too much, and that it imposed foreign agendas not shared by the local community. In response some of the international actors decided to make reconciliation a long-term ultimate goal rather than a concrete project objective that was shared immediately with the recipients of a project (see Committee for Conflict Transformation Support 2001). Others, especially those active in the social movements, rejected the implied analysis, arguing that the conflicts were not ethnic in nature but political, and that therefore reconciliation between the ethnic groups was not the appropriate approach.

Given the omnipresence of this goal, hard evidence of success is astonishingly modest. Sometimes organisations mention concrete indicators like that there was now a multi-ethnic foot-ball team or women’s group. Even the US Institute for Peace (2003) named as indicators for reconciliation that a Sarajevan folk singer planned a concert in Banja Luka, that the Herzegovinan (Croat) coach of the national football team expressed his intention to include Serbs, and that a Bosnian Serb winner of a national beauty contest declared that she would represent her homeland Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than the Serbian Republic. While each of such cases of course are nice to cite, they mean in my eyes very little in regard to overall society-wide attitudes, and even less regarding the question if the ethnic gaps had been bridged to a degree that they could not be re-opened. The pre-1991 history of Yugoslavia itself shows that cooperation in peace times is different from developing relations that withstand the future potential for violence: periods of ethnic violence were several times followed by periods where the conflicts became latent and ethnic identity went into the background. More recently, in Kosovo, the study by the Collaborative of Development Action on the influence peace-building projects a propos the March 2004 riots underlines this difference. Many peace-building programmes that achieved some level of inter-ethnic cooperation did not contribute significantly to the prevention or restraint of interethnic violence in the riots of 2004 (2006:60pp).
Most programming assumed that the transfer from individual-level change to more socio-political change would happen automatically. Agencies typically assumed that the results of their activities would automatically “spill over” into other domains of participants’ lives—that the profound personal and relationship changes catalysed by NGO activities would lead to changes in political attitudes and actions, or trickle out to influence others in the community or trickle up to influence key decision makers. Many assumed that participants who had had a transformative experience in the programme would spread their experience and changed attitudes to others – from family to colleagues to the community at large. The evidence gathered in this research suggests that this did not happen, at least not automatically, and that such “spill over” cannot be assumed (CDA- Collaborative Learning Projects 2006:47).

In Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia, ethnic cooperation to some degree was enforced by the international (state) interveners. In Kosovo, they have tried but barely succeeded – most Serbs and other ethnic minorities have preferred either to live in enclaves or have left the country altogether. To what extent civil society programmes have aided in changing attitudes is difficult to assess – the individual project reports (that often are about only one or a few specific communities) imply they did, but what the relationship if any is there to an overall change is impossible to say, nor is it possible to determine how much such changes would have occurred unaided over time, simply just based on local resources and without the direction of an international operation.

7.10.2.3 Restore a Functioning Society, State and Economy and Promote Political Change

This goal covers the various reconstruction and state-building efforts, the measures taken to develop a sustainable economy, as well as many projects designed to further independent media and civil society organisations. Clearly most of these activities did not happen from a non-partisan position but used the template of what the international interveners considered the best models.

Much has been written about the shortcomings and the sometimes erroneous assumptions in state-building and institution-building in the protectorates but my concern here is to discuss the role of civil society actors. They were mostly to be found in the category of ‘civil society building’ which could mean many different
things, from various ways of supporting local groups and media to networking, training or dialogue activities. This work was often accompanied by a somewhat vague picture of what civil society is - other than assuming that it somehow is important for sustainable peace (see Belloni 2000:10, McMahon 2001, Prendergast and Plumb 2002:327).  

Based on the survey, it seems to me that civil society support and state-building was effective where the international interveners had good knowledge of the situation on the ground, and started their work from a sound assessment of needs and cooperation with already existing groups rather than introducing plans devised abroad and then artificially setting up new NGOs to implement them. Purely material support – in spite of the risk of dependence which of course is a negative factor – and international networking and linking seem to be especially essential, with capacity-building and training being more debatable (see the negative findings in the evaluation of media support). Smillie mentions that many NGOs received the same training again and again. “For many, the problem is not ‘how to write a report’, but how to write six reports, in English, in six different formats every quarter, or even every month” (Smillie 1996:6).  

327 There are at least two very different concepts of civil society: one is the Eastern European developed in socialist times that sees civil society in contrast to the state, being ‘non-political’ in the meaning of party-politics. That was also the predominant understanding of civil society in the former Yugoslavia – for example most anti-war groups claimed to be ‘not political’ by which they meant not having relations to any political parties. The other view – probably more the Western European and US-American one - sees civil society in the tradition of de Tocqueville where democracy depends on checking the power of the state by what he calls a ‘political society’, and with much more tolerance and inclusiveness regarding political parties (Crook 2001). On the whole it seems to me that the second view was the predominant one in the interventions on former Yugoslavia, often meeting and sometimes conflicting with the ‘non-political’ view of local actors.  

328 Gagnon (1998 and 2002) studied five different NGOs that all pursued the goal of reconstructing civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He found that the most effective were those who used reconstruction projects as the focus, and those who focused on capacity-building for local NGOs. As less successful he rated party-building and civic education because it used the North American model and misunderstood the political reality in Bosnia. However, his small sample in my eyes really does not permit such general conclusions because their relative effectiveness or non-effectiveness may be explained by the identity of the individual interveners (the party builders was the US National Democratic Institute - no wonder that they used the US model). The positively rated NGO capacity-building was done by Delphi-STAR, a US women project very close to the grassroots and knowing exactly what the needs of civil society were. This was by far not the case with all capacity-building projects.  

329 Though there is also a danger to international networking, namely if it leads to the local groups being focused more on these international networks than on building local alliances (see Stubbs 2007:221).
Contrasting the examples of Kosovo and FR Yugoslavia I tried to argue above that determined support by international civil society made a difference, but that that kind of support was not always forthcoming. One observation in this context was that that goal was not limited to support of political parties and civil society, but also was on the agenda of many relief and reconstruction efforts, especially those by ‘non-professional’ interveners like peace movement groups.
8. Addressing Other External Actors: Public Information, Support Activities, Protest and Advocacy by Civil Society Actors

The activities described in the last three chapters on peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building have not exhausted the list of what was found in the survey. The omissions can be identified as:

- Information directed at the general public - media outside of former Yugoslavia and ‘pure research’ studying the conflicts;
- Activities supporting intervening actors - applied research, funding, coordination and capacity-building of other intervening external actors.
- Numerous activities of protest and advocacy targeting other intervening actors or the general public, seeking to inform them and/ or to change their behaviour;

In the first section of this chapter I will look at the role of media – both the mainstream mass media and so-called alternative media seeking to disseminate ‘other’ or ‘true’ information on the conflicts.\(^{330}\)

The second section of this chapter shortly addresses activities that support other interveners, for example training field staff or networking among intervening groups.

The main focus of this chapter lies on protest and advocacy by civil society actors that was taking place outside the conflict area. I use the term ‘advocacy’ to refer to efforts that seek to convince other actors (usually state actors) through means of information and dialogue to take or not take certain action. It is closely related to lobbying, except that lobbying may refer to the direct pursuit of the vested interests of the lobbying group (for example to lobby a Ministry to finance a training for conflict interveners that would be given by the lobbying group). Advocacy includes lobbying, but in addition entails activities like giving advice from which, if heeded, the advocating group would not directly profit (for example advising a government to deploy preventive peace-keeping forces in an area).

\(^{330}\) I am leaving out here the second type of actor involved in producing and disseminating information: the scientific studies produced in the academic world. The results of the numerous scientific studies have been quoted throughout this book, but a meta analysis of the research done, its approaches, interests and potential influence has been beyond the scope of this study, and therefore is not mentioned beyond this introduction.
Both protest and advocacy mushroomed in the second half of 1991 when the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia became violent. Protest and advocacy was not the 
sole prerogative of peace and related movements though they played an important 
role here. Aid organisations, human and minority rights groups, women’s groups, 
and of course diaspora organisations all raised their voices in the first years of the 
conflicts until the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The target of the protests 
was rarely the actors on the ground. Most protest and advocacy was directed at other 
intervening actors – the so-called ‘international community’ that was asked to take 
(or not take) certain action. Different issues were addressed and contradictory 
positions, for example both for and against military intervention, put forward. Protest 
developed again in late 1998 and in 1999 during the Kosovo war, but this time it was 
mostly the peace movement and related groups that carried the protest, and its focus 
was critique of the NATO intervention. And when in 2001 a civil war in Macedonia 
seemed to develop, it were also mostly these peace groups responding though their 
reactions and activities were only a shadow of what took place in 1989.

I divide the analysis of protest and advocacy into two parts: In the first part I will 
discuss the different issues with which they dealt. The second part then looks at the 
main instruments used. The sources used have been mostly publications and grey 
material by the actors themselves – other than two smaller publications by Schmitz 
(1998) and Large (n.d.).

This chapter is the last one describing the interventions of civil society actors in the 
former Yugoslavia. After completing the analysis of the different areas of activity, I 
will return in the conclusions to the question already raised in the preceding chapter, 
namely if there has been a social movement of its own forming on the wars in former 
Yugoslavia.
8.1 Disseminating Public Information: The Role of International Media

8.1.1 The Mainstream Mass Media

The role of ‘globalised’ media in conflict has become a topic for debate since at least the wars in Iraq in 1990-91. There is a discussion in media research on the amount and kind of political influence media can wield (the ‘CNN effect’, see Kent 2006:177pp), as Barker has observed:

Policymaking is a political process which is affected by various social and economic factors… and media systems play an integral role in shaping the social context in which policies are developed. Through the media, citizens learn how government policies will affect them, and governments gain feedback on their policies and programs. Media systems act as the primary conduit between those who might want to influence policy and the policymakers – controlling the scope of political discourse and regulating the flow of information. (Barker 2005:2)

The mainstream media from summer 1991 onwards were full of headlines and reports on the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia – random samples of newspapers from Britain, France, Italy, Spain and Germany indicate that there was virtually no day without mention of it in the major newspapers throughout these countries and probably all of Western Europe.

The US government at first tried to stay aloof and its change of attitude towards the war in Bosnia has largely been attributed to media influence. For example, it has been claimed that the pictures and reports of the Muslim detainees in the Bosnian Serb detention centre at Trnopolje in August 1992, and the pictures from the Sarajevo market bombing in February 1994 “led to changes in the application of foreign policies that have had a direct bearing on the war” (Weaver 1998, see also Kent 2006, Malik 2003). Gow (1997:215) mentions pressure from both the media and public opinion for the US to be involved, especially during spring 1993 when the Vance-Owen Plan was discussed. Media reports in 1992 and 1993 on the rapes of Bosnian women wielded a heavy influence, albeit using figures based on estimates.

331 There are many books as well as dozens of articles have been written on how media contributed to create the context in which foreign policy on the conflicts in former Yugoslavia (and other wars) operated. See Barker 2005, Zoellner 2005 and Kent 2006 for bibliographies on the topic.

332 TV reporting probably was of similar frequency but I have not been able to research their reporting.

333 Public opinion polling in that time showed that the majority of the US people wanted the government to intervene (see Gow 1997:215p).
and extrapolation that later turned out to be exaggerated (Meder and Reimann 1996:11, Chandler 1999:96, Lucarelli 2000:35).\textsuperscript{334} Kent (2006:4) attributes the provision of soldiers to UNPROFOR for purely humanitarian tasks as a direct effect of the ‘something must be done’ message promoted by the media.

An interesting side effect noted by Kent was the indirect influence of the reporting on Yugoslavia on other conflicts:

> It seems quite likely that US policymakers, in August 1992 after the Omarska camp story broke, perceived Somalia to be an easier intervention than getting involved in Bosnia, and more likely to achieve results and save lives (Kent 2006:214).

Other than these concrete examples, the main role of the mass media has probably been in agenda setting and ‘framing’, meaning influencing how what is happening is interpreted (see Kent 2006:194pp). One example of such framing would be the description of the Bosnian war and where to place the blame for what happened, namely summarily blaming ‘the Serbs’, directed from Belgrade, for a ‘war of aggression’\textsuperscript{335}

Of course the flow of influence is not one-way. Politicians (and others) also seek to influence public opinion through passing or withholding information to the media. This was particularly obvious in the Kosovo/FR Yugoslavia war in 1999 (see

\textsuperscript{334} Kent notes the same influences on the British government, and quotes Douglas Hurd’s ‘attack on the ‘something must be done’ school of journalism’, seeing a “consistent use of all media by politicians” (Kent 2006:2-3 and 208).

\textsuperscript{335} The interventions by the different actors were all guided by some implicit or explicit assumption on the character of the conflict (see Cox 1998:7pp, Kaufman 2001:4pp). In international government circles, two variants of the civil war/ethnic conflict paradigm were the most common. The first variant was to see the wars as a truly ethnic conflict with all sides to blame. The arms embargo against all republics of former Yugoslavia which was maintained (at least officially) until end of 1995 is maybe the best expression of this attitude. Most famous and often referred to is President Clinton reading Richard Kaplan’s \textit{Balkan Ghosts} and deciding that because of the intractability of the conflict there was nothing really he or anybody else could do (see Bernecker 2001). This may be more an anecdote handed down from author to author, but in general this view was shared by many – all violence in the area was seen as one single ‘civil war’.

The other variant which quickly came to dominate the politics of the international community put the blame on Serb nationalism, and therefore focussed its efforts on destroying the capabilities of ‘the Serbs’ to wage war. The sanctions against FR Yugoslavia, as well as the air strikes in Bosnia that targeted exclusively the Serbian troops, are examples for this. In both cases there was the general pretext that all sides were to be treated equally, and that misbehaviour from any side would lead to consequences, but in fact breaches of agreements by Croats and Bosniaks were usually only punished by declarations and at most by the threat of sanctions (see Woodward 1995:7pp, de Jonge Oudraat 1999:70).
A blatant example of the manipulation of the media by NATO was the reporting on the bombing of a civilian train in April 1999. NATO published a videotape showing the train moving very fast to prove that it was not possible to divert the missiles. Later it turned out that the video was played at three times the normal speed (Skoco and Woodger 2000:86).

According to Herman and Peterson (2000:113) CNN in particular served throughout the war as a reliable “de facto information partner” repeating the information fed to them by NATO without questioning it. This was in contrast to other media outlets such as the German paper Frankfurter Rundschau which at least put a warning in their paper every day that the information they received was restricted and therefore unreliable.

With regard to the British print media Hammond (2000) makes an interesting observation: The conservative press while supporting the British military expressed some caution and questions about the NATO war, but the more liberal section followed the Blair government in its emotionally loaded moral assessment of a ‘just war’. Public service broadcaster BBC maintained a more independent line, for example showing the effects of the NATO bombings on civilians. Also the mainstream media in other European countries basically supported the war as did their governments (with the exception of Greece) though in some countries critical voices may have been stronger than in the US and Britain (Deichmann 2000, Johnstone 2000b, Røn 2000, Hammond and Herman 2000). The Russian media mirrored similarly mostly the opposition of their government of the war although disagreeing over several issues like the position towards Milosevic, the significance of the war for Russia’s position in the world and the notion of Slavic fellow-feeling (Hammond, Nizamova and Savelieva 2000).

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336 According to Skoco and Woodger (2000:85), NATO did not have a sophisticated media strategy at the beginning of the war, being focussed on preparing for its 50th anniversary and expecting the bombing to be short and the media not to be very interested. When the war continued, NATO made efforts to correct this and by the end of the war it had a well functioning PR system in place.

337 From my own observation, that has not been the case for German media, though the same observation can be made in regard to the different political parties and their attitude to the war.
8.1.2 Alternative Media

The 1990s was the decade when the internet was developed. At the beginning of that decade there were only e-lists that featured information on the conflicts since 1991-92 (APC/Yugo/Antiwar and CL/Europe/Balkan were two such lists). The creation of websites and e-mail as a (mass) means of communication spread later.

NGOs were a significant source of ‘alternative’ information – that is, information that either could not be found in the mass media at all or that came with a different interpretation. They all reported regularly on the conflicts, mixing analysis, reports on actions their constituencies were engaged in, and reports on local groups in the region.

In addition there were also newly created magazines and publications: The Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly founded YugoFax in September 1992. At the beginning it was a printed paper that analyzed the progress of the war, examined the specific problems facing individual republics, covered the failure of the European Community to bring peace, and emphasised the importance of citizens’ initiatives in bringing about a resolution (Editorial of Yugofax 1992).

It cooperated with the Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR, based in London) that had begun a War Report during the second Gulf war. In 1992, YugoFax was merged with the revived War Report and became Yugo WarReport. Bulletin of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting. The speciality of IWPR’s reports was that it gave a voice to independent journalists from the area rather than sending out foreign journalists to do the reporting. The reports were published in English and in

338 Examples would be Pogrom as the magazine of the Gesellschaft fuer bedrohte Voelker (Society for Threatened People), Nonviolence Actualité, a magazine close to Mouvement pour une alternative non-violente (MAN), Peace News (WRI), ZAM-Zeitschrift fuer Antimilitarismus (Newspaper for Antimilitarismus) of the Austrian ‘Arge fuer Wehrdienstverweigerung und Gewaltfreiheit’ (a group supporting conscientious objection), Friedensforum (Netzwerk Friedenskooperative, Germany, an umbrella of German peace movement), The Nonviolent Activist (War Resisters’ League USA).

339 In 1992 it changed its name to Balkan War Report, and in 1998 after stopping the print version to IWPR’s Balkan Crisis Report, now sent out for free by e-mail (see War Report 1998). Today, the IWPR has expanded its reports also to other areas of the world (Caucasus, Africa, Philippines – see www.IWPR.net) but the Balkan has remained one of its foci.
Croatian/Serbian and Albanian, and clearly had twin targets: people in the region looking for independent information, and people in other countries.\(^{340}\)

As to the main functions of the alternative media, it can be said that they sought to address two, sometimes three target groups: their own constituency with the goal to inform them, shape their opinion and report what was done in their name; the wider public (as far as it could be reached), offering information that differed from what could be found in the mass media; and sometimes also the public in the crisis areas.

It is impossible to directly discern impact these alternative media had other than being a reference in the controversial debates on the conflicts. But the fact that IWPR has widened the range of its activities and is now offering the same kind of service with journalists from many countries and conflicts in the world could be considered an indicator that there is a need and a ‘market’ for that type of information.

### 8.2 To Support Interventions by Other Actors

Under this category which could be considered a form of ‘indirect intervention’ fall all those activities that have other intervening actors, not local actors in the former Yugoslavia as their target group, seeking to support their work in various ways: through applied research, money, networking, information gathering or capacity-building.

#### 8.2.1 Applied Research

Research institutes as actors are mentioned in three other sections of this study: Under peace-making because a few of them have engaged local actors actively in the

\(^{340}\) A somewhat similar approach was taken by the Group for a Switzerland without an Army (GSOA), an initiative that originally was founded to organise a referendum for the abolition of the Swiss Army end of the 1980s. They had good contacts to groups in the area of former Yugoslavia, and initiated a magazine they called Para Pacem in October 1992. Its objective was to document the activities of groups that work against the war in former Yugoslavia, [and to] give the non-nationalistic opposition committed to violence a voice especially in Switzerland. (Para Pacem 1996:2).

In c. 2001 the makers of the magazine created an independent NGO to continue the project under the new name Medienhilfe (media help).

The German Initiative fuer Frieden (IFIAS), an NGO very close to the Social Democrat party, for some time translated and distributed between 1992 and 1994 the magazine ARKzin of the Croatian anti-war movement (Initiative fuer Frieden 1994).
search of negotiated solutions, under ‘information’ above for ‘pure’ or non-applied research, and under advocacy (below) because many such institutes were providing advice to shape or influence the policy of (state) interveners. Another type is that kind of applied research that sought to directly support the work of interveners (both state and non-state) through expertise, evaluations and in a few cases action research.\textsuperscript{341}

\section*{8.2.2 Funding}

A very important issue for civil society actors is to find the funds for their work. Generally, there are five possible sources:

- Money already owned by them;\textsuperscript{342}
- Individual donations from small and large donors;\textsuperscript{343}
- Grants from governments and international organisations (EU, UN-organisations);\textsuperscript{344}
- Grants by other (often intermediate) foundations or agencies;\textsuperscript{345}
- Grants by companies.\textsuperscript{346}

\textsuperscript{341} One example would be the Life and Peace Institute in Uppsala (Sweden). At the beginning of the conflicts in 1992 it ran a research project on the role of the churches in the conflict, sending a researcher who at the same time taught at universities (Life and Peace Institute 1992).

\textsuperscript{342} An example here is the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Transformation that covers its core costs with funds donated by a private person, while grants - e.g. from the German Foreign Ministry - are sought for special projects.

\textsuperscript{343} An NGO almost exclusively relying on individual donations collected through its regular supporters and additional mass mailings is the German Komitee fuer Grundrechte und Demokratie (Komitee fuer Grundrechte und Demokratie 2008). Also the Balkan Peace Team (chapter 6) and the Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung relied heavily on donations from individuals (Balkan Peace Team 1999, Mueller 2006:191pp.)

\textsuperscript{344} See the UNDP-financed reconstruction projects described in chapter 7. Most Western countries have such agencies or at least funding schemes run either through their Foreign or their Development Ministries.

\textsuperscript{345} An example would be the Olof Palme International Centre in Sweden. The Swedish state agency SIDA wished to support local NGOs and independent media but sought international implementing partners to channel the money. An intermediate recipient was the Olof Palme International Centre that worked in the area since it was founded in 1992. It received its money from SIDA, and conducted its work - mostly about support of local peace initiatives - through local organisations (NGOs, independent trade unions, parties) as implementing partners. In 1998-99 it had more than 30 such partners that all were financially dependent on the Centre (Duffield 1996, Evensmo 2000).
Funding is usually mentioned as one of the first issues when discussing the challenges of the implementation of projects. Especially smaller organisations like Balkan Peace Team struggled to the degree of damaging the programme to find funds for their work (see Mueller 2006:191pp). And as with local NGOs, so too international NGOs depending on donors and grants had to deal with the annual grant schemes that made medium-term projects difficult, with the interests, expectations and directions of donors, and had to adapt their plans in order to receive grants.

8.2.3 Co-ordination and Networking

Co-ordination and networking between international actors also have to be counted as support activities. In the former Yugoslavia, it was often the role of the UNHCR to bring international NGOs together, and in Kosovo OMIK set up NGO Resource Centres in several regions of Kosovo (Antikriegshaus Sievershausen 1995, Woodward 1995:296, Lucarelli 2000:35, CORE 2002:54). But there were also NGOs playing an important role in co-ordination:

- The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) not only supported local NGOs (see chapter 7) but also extended its services to the co-ordination of international groups. For example it produced an annual address list of NGOs with information on the fields they are working in (ICVA 2000, Bekkering 1997, Stubbs 1996b).

- In several countries there were national meetings of organisations working on the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. In Britain the National Peace Council was hosting a Working Group to serve this purpose. In Germany there was a Coordinating Committee coordinated by the Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung and financed by the Green Party Foundation (Heinrich Boell Stiftung) that met regularly between November 1991 and December 1995.347

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346 Many organisations, for example the International Crisis Group have been combining several of the funding sources. In their report for 2007 they list 19 governmental donors from different parts of the world, 15 foundations and 14 companies in addition to also collecting individual donations (International Crisis Group 2008).

347 Usually it was attended by 10-20 participants from different groups, and exchanging about both the political assessment of the war situation, and about projects the participants were either planning or already carrying out (see the different minutes of the National Peace Council and of the (Ex-) Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis in the bibliography).
8.2.4 Organising Information Visits to the Area

There were a number of visits that were organised by groups with previous knowledge of the area to introduce others (either other NGO representatives, sometimes also politicians or media people) to the problems and conflicts of former Yugoslavia. Just to give one example: A peace researcher based in Linz (Austria) organised a delegation from Linz to Kosovo in 1993 in the context of an attempt to convince the town to enter a twinning relationship with Prishtina. The delegation took place after Linz had rejected that proposal of twinning but offered to finance the delegation instead. The report of the delegation was published and together with a slide show used for further public relations work. One result was that the town started to support the demand to put Kosovo under international administration (Steinweg 1994 and Steinweg ed. 1994).

8.2.5 Capacity-Building with Conflict Intervention Actors

In the survey I found several organisations, mostly grassroots’ peace organisations, which organised trainings for people planning to work in the region.\textsuperscript{348} The German Civil Peace Service - already mentioned in chapter 7 - was one. Since its work started in 1997, there were during the period under study usually two courses of about 4 months each year, with between 12 and 20 participants.\textsuperscript{349} Especially in the first years many participants went to the area of former Yugoslavia under the Civil Peace Service scheme or with comparable projects.\textsuperscript{350}

Training for nonviolent intervention is a topic that deserves deeper analysis and description because there have been many developments over the last ten years –

\textsuperscript{348} Civilians sent by state agencies at that time usually went without extra preparation. Nowadays that has changed with a number of governments having set up their own training courses for experts in ‘post-war peace-building’ as it is mostly called.

\textsuperscript{349} The structure of these courses at that time was a basic course of about 6-7 weeks, 3 weeks of internship, followed by another 2 weeks of the basic course, and then 2 weeks of ‘specialisation’ in topics like monitoring, mediation, building civil society, project management and others more. The basic courses covered topics like conflict analysis, working in a team, gender, peace building, nonviolence and dealing with trauma (see Wagner 2000, Knittel and Monsef 2001).

\textsuperscript{350} In Britain, Responding to Conflict in Woodbrooke offered 3 month courses once a year since 1991 that are mostly directed at people coming from conflict areas but also had participants who would qualify as external actors. In Austria, there have been since 1993 four-week International Peacekeeping Courses with mixed participants (both state and non-state) at the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution Stadtschlaining (see Schweitzer et al 2001, chapter 5).
both contents-wise with the growing experience of what is of practical use, and
number-wise with many new organisations world-wide engaging in comparable
trainings.\textsuperscript{351} Unfortunately this would go beyond the period and topic under study
here.

8.3 Protest and Advocacy: The Issues They Addressed

This and the following section 8.4 are turning to the third type of activity that
addresses other actors rather than intervening directly into the conflicts: protest and
advocacy. A lively public debate was one of the most striking elements of the whole
period of the wars in former Yugoslavia. We can identify three main periods:
between 1991 and 1995 (up to the Dayton and Erdut agreements), the Kosovo crisis

Mostly this protest was directed against other intervening actors. While there were no
mass demonstrations on the scale of the 1991 protests against the first Iraq war, it is
important to acknowledge that there were groups holding vigils and protests in front
of embassies of ex-Yugoslav countries, or writing appeals and statements and faxing
or mailing them to the actors in question.\textsuperscript{352} Some groups even went beyond that and
chose methods of civil disobedience to make their points. For example a small group
of activists from the mentioned Gesellschaft fuer bedrohte Volker that became
increasingly critical of Croatia’s involvement in the war in Bosnia, and so in 1993
‘occupied’ the Croatian Embassy in Berlin for one day and one night in protest
(Donat 1993).

Rather than giving a chronological account of the period under study, the following
description focuses on the topics and problems around which protest and advocacy
developed. Some of the issues only came up at certain moments, while others came
up more than once, or continued throughout the period. The section after that then
will look at the main instruments used.

\textsuperscript{351} For example Peaceworkers UK, Mouvement pour une alternative non-violente in France, Training
for Change in the USA, Patrir in Rumania, EPU Stadtschlaining in Austria (see ARCA 2008).

\textsuperscript{352} See the different minutes of the Ex-Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis for mention of such actions
in Germany, and Le Meut 1998 for one in France.
8.3.1 The Break-up of Yugoslavia and the Interpretation of the Conflicts

8.3.1.1 Early Interest in Yugoslavia

Before summer 1991, Yugoslavia was not on the agenda of many civil society groups. In the survey I found only two kinds of organisations that dealt with Yugoslavia and the growing tensions between its republics: One was international umbrella organisations that had members from the region like the already mentioned War Resisters’ International (WRI). WRI and the publication related to it, Peace News, started to report and warn of a possible violent crisis in 1990, but with the focus on seeking nonviolent alternatives and nonviolent defence in support of the movement, not speaking up against the secession (see War Resisters’ International 1991b, 1994 and 1998).

The other type were organisations that because of their mission and objectives were close to the issue. ‘Friendship’ organisations including migrants from Yugoslavia and members of the different host countries belonging to them, but also NGOs interested in ethnic and cultural minorities. One example is the German Gesellschaft fuer bedrohte Voelker (Society for Threatened People-GfbV). They supported the secession movements as ethnic groups seeking self-determination. In their eyes Yugoslavia had been an artificial construction that came to life only because of World War I and II (see Zuelich 1990).

8.3.1.2 Different Positions Towards the Break-up of Yugoslavia

In 1991, and retrospectively in later discussions, there have been different positions towards the break-up of Yugoslavia in international civil society:

- Groups and organisations and media supporting the secession (like the GfbV), or arguing that there was no other choice given ‘the threat of genocide’ as whose

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353 The GfbV was founded in 1970 by has its headquarters in Germany, with branches today in some other countries (Austria, Switzerland, South Tyrol/Italy, Luxemburg, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chile.)

354 During the wars, they compared the European politics with the ‘appeasement’ policy in 1938 that “levelled the road for Word War II and Auschwitz”, and demanded among other things a complete blockade of the borders of Serbia-Montenegro to Bosnia and Croatia, to secure militarily humanitarian aid and protection of people in the enclaves, an international tribunal for war crimes and to lift the arms embargo “against the legal Bosnian government troops”, as well as protesting against a possible division of Bosnia (Geismar 1994, Rohder 1993).
Groups that took a non-partisan view, emphasising the need for minority rights to be respected and the process to happen non-violently. Examples are the French Mouvement pour une alternative non-violente (MAN) or the German Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung (see Nonviolence Actualité 1993a, Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung 1992, 1993, n.d.-a and n.d.-c).

Groups and media that harshly criticised the break-up that many of them saw as being engineered by Germany and/or the EC as a whole. These latter voices became stronger over the years, and the theme of ‘socialist Yugoslavia being torn apart by the West’ is still a virulent topic in parts of the peace movement (see for example Hartmann 1999:43pp and the sources quoted below in the section on the Kosovo war).\(^{355}\)

8.3.1.3 Partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina

A related but still separate issue in this context has been the discussion that took place during the war of 1992-95 on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Especially the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (see chapter 5) was very engaged in demanding that Bosnia must not be divided on ethnic lines, speaking up against nationalism and attempts to divide the country through the different peace plans provided by the international community (Kaldor and Faber 1993, Kaldor 1994, Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly 1995). Instead, they suggested a protectorate for Bosnia (‘UN Transitional Authority’) based on an agreement by the warring parties long before the Contact Group started drafting its peace plan.

\(^{355}\) As a variant of this can be seen those groups and media (though numerically - irrelevant) that put the blame for the wars on the Croatian and Bosnian government. Kent summarises this position nicely for the British media until the mid 90s:

…the wars were seen as a pre-emptive assault by Serbian forces against first, a genocidal Croatian fascist government, then against a fundamentalist Muslim government intent on genocide against Serbs in Bosnia (Kent 2006:6).
8.3.2 Human Rights Violations and Prosecution of War Crimes

The issue of human rights violations and especially the mass rapes of Bosnian women that became known in late 1992 was one of the earliest topics for campaigning.\(^{356}\) Demands expressed were

- that raped women should be treated like male war victims in regard to reparations and compensation (see Ott 1992);

- that rape should be included in the list of war crimes, and perpetrators prosecuted by an international tribunal (see Wullweber 1993, Donnard 1994, Large n.d.:70);\(^{357}\)

- that persecution because of gender was recognised as sufficient grounds for the granting of asylum (Die GRÜENEN Bundesverband et al 1992, Internationale Fraueninitiative gegen die Gewalt an Frauen 1993, Frauen helfen Frauen n.d.).

Another special human rights issue was the right for conscientious objection and the protection of objectors, deserters and people who otherwise evaded military service. In the last chapter it has already been described that there was a grassroots’ network of like-minded groups, mostly related to War Resisters’ International that helped these people to hide, escape from the country that sought to draft them and supported them during their stay as refugees in third countries (see above 7.1.2.2). There were also activities of protest and advocacy on this issue. For example, in 1992 the European Civic Forum, an international organisation with members from East and West Europe collected signatures for a draft decision improving the juridical situation of deserters from armies of the former Yugoslavia, to be presented to the European Parliament.\(^{358}\) This collection of signatures took place in 16 countries. It probably was a factor in the positive decision of the European Parliament on 28 October 1993 in support of deserters (Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1994, Europäisches Parlament 1995, Jakobi-Schwan 1996:193).

\(^{356}\) As described in the last chapter, another reaction especially of women’s groups was to go to Croatia and Bosnia first for fact finding, and then setting up projects of practical aid for the victims (Medica, Vive Zene etc, see Ågger et al 1999).

\(^{357}\) This demand was also made in regard to human rights violations in general. Many organisations petitioned governments and UN in the early months of the Bosnian war to create an international tribunal to persecute these crimes (see for example Minnesota Coalition 1994).

\(^{358}\) The European Civic Forum was founded in 1989 mainly by members of the European Cooperative Longo Mai.
8.3.3 Acceptance of Refugees by Third Countries

Another campaigning issue was for the right of displaced people to flee to third countries outside the region. One example would be an appeal by the National Peace Council in the UK submitted to the Minister of Overseas Development on 28 July 1992:

Following reports in the press about the extent of the exodus of refugees from various regions of the republics of former Yugoslavia..., we are writing to lend support to the actions the British Government has taken to date in its contributions to the relief effort... .

At the same time we feel moved to say: could we not be doing more to help these desperate people... we appeal to you to reconsider the scale of our help to the victims of this bitter conflict... Surely it is now time for the UK, and other countries throughout Europe, to take responsibility for a tragic situation we can no longer avoid and reconsider suggestions for a quota system to enable the burdens consequent on this evil war to be more evenly shared. (National Peace Council 1992d)

This appeal stands for dozens if not hundreds of similar ones that were produced and published by many civil society organisations, for example by the above-mentioned Gesellschaft fuer bedrohte Voelker that campaigned for special status for war refugees (Hermes 1995), as did the French Mouvement pour une alternative non-violente (Carlen 1994, Le Meut 1995a).

8.3.4 Solidarity with Kosovo – the International Activities

A fourth issue addressed by civil society throughout most the 1990s was the nonviolent movement in Kosovo. In the last chapter already some solidarity activities that took place within Kosovo were described. The majority of these actions, however, took place not in Kosovo but abroad, addressing and appealing in particular to the Western European and the US governments to pay attention to Kosovo. In the

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359 There have been solidarity activities not only with Kosovo but with a variety of groups and movements in the former Yugoslavia, and not only with peace-minded and anti-nationalist groups. While protest that supported the different governments in the region was probably mostly led by diaspora groups, there have always also been people of non-Ex-Yugoslavia nationality been with these groups and joining their struggle (see as example the German-Croat Friendship Society described by Zuelich 1990).
following I would like to give a few examples for protest and advocacy in this context:

A Swiss group, a local branch of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly from Geneva, proposed in January 1993 a twinning between Geneva and Prishtina. They argued that the situation in Kosovo was explosive, human rights violated and the Albanian majority deprived of its rights, and suggested an international monitoring mission of INGOs to “support and protect the democratic and pacifist organisations in Kosovo, and alert international opinion in the event of provocation or threats” (Solioz 1993). Their suggestion was not an official twinning between Geneva and Prishtina, since Geneva as host of international conferences has a policy of neutrality, but a ‘civil society twinning’ involving the establishment of a ‘House for Peace, Human Rights and Reconciliation’ in Prishtina that could be supported by citizens associations in Geneva.  

The French Mouvement pour une alternative non-violente was interested in the civil resistance in Kosovo from 1992 onwards.  

In the next years they conducted some visits, and in their articles in NVA asked for solidarity with Kosovo (de Villeneuve 1993, Le Meut 1996, Nonviolence Actualité 1995b), as in the following example:

The only solution today will be to initiate a process of decolonization with a guarantee of the right for self-determination for the Kosovars. This process could be guaranteed by an international nonviolent interposition force that would be composed mostly with members of NGOs. First it is important to make the situation down there known, to inform the people and to appeal to the political decision-makers. The nonviolent resistance of Kosovo deserves an active support of the French and international public opinion (de Villeneuve 1993:5, translation CS).

They continued their work on Kosovo after the end of the Bosnia war. For example, in 1997 they campaigned for the Nobel Prize for Peace to be awarded to Kosovo’s President Rugova (‘Le Prix Nobel de la Paix 1996 pour Ibrahim Rugova’ 1997, Glorieux 1998).

In early 1998, they and some Italian organisations discussed how to support the maintenance of the civilian resistance (Glorieux 1998), and welcomed the OSCE

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360 In the following years, HCA Geneva became also a member organisation of the Balkan Peace Team, and continued their campaign for human and civic rights in Kosovo (see Schweitzer and Clark 2002).

361 At least that is the date it is first mentioned in the magazine Nonviolence Actualité (NVA) related to them (Le Meut 1992)
Kosovo Verification Mission which at least one of their activists also joined as a monitor (Le Meut 1998). During the Kosovo/Yugoslavia war, they protested the NATO bombing, but generally welcomed that the Serbian rule over Kosovo was broken (Carlen and Duchesne 1999).

8.3.5 Pro and Contra Military Intervention

One of the hottest controversies has concerned the use of military means to end the wars. This discussion began with the question of military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and became an outright protest movement when NATO decided to attack FR Yugoslavia in 1999. During the violence in Macedonia in 2001 and the response by NATO, protest came up again but because of the quick peaceful settlement of the developing civil war never went beyond statements of concern. The following section therefore will focus solely on the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

8.3.5.1 For and Against Military Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina

With the realization that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina would not end as quickly as the earlier conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia, and in the face of growing numbers of reports of atrocities and of the situation in beleaguered Sarajevo, many voices started to make themselves heard demanding a more decisive military commitment from the international community and/or at least lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian government.362 An example for such military action had just been set with the second Gulf War in 1991 where the UN and the Western countries had not hesitated to go to war to ‘liberate Kuwait’ and ‘restore international law’. The feeling of ‘something must be done’, ‘we cannot just continue to watch’ was not only the dominant message of almost all mass media in that time, but was also reflected in the demands and positions of many civil society groups.

362 Chapter 4.1.3 and 4.2 describe how the military engagement of the international community slowly increased between 1992 and 1995, starting out with a peace-keeping mission with a purely humanitarian mandate and monitoring of the arms’ embargo, and ending with a bombing campaign on Serb positions in Bosnia in 1995.
These demands for more military engagement cannot be identified with any particular political spectrum but tended to come from groups and political parties throughout the right-left-spectrum, including those from the peace, human rights and ecological movements. For example, the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly - that was introduced in chapter 5 - campaigned continuously for more military engagement of the western world (UN, NATO and European Union) to protect the UN-declared safe areas through a strengthened military engagement (see Kaldor 1994, Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly 1995). Many international peace organisations struggled very hard to find positions, sometimes the internal conflict between those who could imagine a military intervention and those who could not led to serious splits in organisations (see Schnettler, Wiese and Koerber 1995).

Some other peace organisations, however, retained a strict anti-militarist/pacifist position. For example, in 1992 War Resisters’ International and the International Fellowship of Reconciliation issued an open letter which I would like to quote in some length because it contains two points of the pacifist argument that was used by many groups: the danger of a military escalation caused by military intervention, and ulterior motives pursued by the international community when propagating military intervention.

Since the war spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina, there have been widespread calls for military intervention, even in letters from the anti-war movement in Sarajevo. The Bosnian government have pleaded for military intervention under the auspices of anybody willing to mount such an intervention and with goals ranging from escorting relief convoys or opening Sarajevo airport to disarming the former JNA and the paramilitaries…

Any use of military force -- no matter how limited it is intended to be -- introduces a different logic, a military logic offering a rationale for further, less limited use of additional military force…

363 The demand for military intervention was also raised by the majority of the anti-war, women’s and human rights groups in the former Yugoslavia – those groups that were the primary partners of the international civil society. In an open letter of anti-war groups to the international peace movement issued in April 1994 this disagreement was addressed. The signatories, activists from Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo, expressed their concern ‘that peace groups in Europe spoke up chiefly for nonviolence. The state of Bosnia-Herzegovina had to be defended with all means available’. (Offener Brief an die Friedensbewegungen 1996).

The other points in this letter were about the need for international support for their work, but that such support needed to come from groups being well-informed about the situation, criticizing mass actions like the HCA peace caravan or Mir Sada, and listing some specific common concerns like neofascism, need for support of war resisters, etc.
What begins with a small action - e.g. to secure the area around Sarajevo airport -- might, if the Western troops get involved in heavy fighting, become a major military intervention with tens of thousands of soldiers and much heavier arms than those currently used in former Yugoslavia… Every decision to use military force strengthens the general argument in favour of the military-based so-called "New World Order".

Since the end of the old East-West conflict, politicians and the military from Western countries are looking for new roles for their forces. Not only the JNA, but they too are fighting for their survival as an institution (War Resisters’ International and International Fellowship of Reconciliation 1992).

A third standard argument is missing in this statement which was often added to the other two points: the argument that not all other means had been exhausted, and that there were alternatives to military intervention. The reference to ‘alternatives’ meant more or less everything that civil society undertook on the ground in the conflict zones, from training in conflict resolution and mediation through practical solidarity work with anti-war groups in the region to much unconventional work with refugees and in reconstruction as it was described in chapter 7.364

Similar discussions - in Germany called the ‘pacifism debate’ - happened in most if not all European countries and North America, although of course the discourse and the influence of the different positions differed from country to country.365 For

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364 As an example I would like to cite the German Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung. It worked from 1991 onwards intensively on the conflicts of former Yugoslavia. An undated overview from c. 1993 lists as activities:

- Sending trainers for mediation and nonviolent conflict resolution to Zagreb, Osijek, Belgrade and Pancevo;
- Building up an electronic Mailbox network;
- Started research project to evaluate programmes of nonviolent conflict resolution;
- Participated in different international projects and conferences, for example Peace Island Vis, Peace Caravan, conferences of HCA, Verona-Forum;
- Supported partnerships between peace groups in Germany and former Yugoslavia;
- Joined the Solidarity for Peace Caravan to Sarajevo (Beati i costruttori di pace);
- Made an appeal asking people to accept a refugee or a family in their home;
- Initiated regularly meeting Coordination of all groups working on Yugoslavia;
- Members and staff of BSV give several times a week presentations and seminars talking about former Yugoslavia (Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung n.d.-c).

365 This debate has been and still is a mostly ethical one, drawing often on the Christian ‘just law’ concept (see Becker-Hinrichs 1999, Haensel and Stobbe 2002, Tenbergen 2000).

Another standard argument were comparisons to Germany under the Nazis and World War II. During the Bosnia war, especially in 1994-95 when the inner centres of Sarajevo and Tuzla were hit by grenades and the Eastern Bosnian protected areas attacked, President Milosevic was compared with Hitler like 1991 President Hussein. Europe’s politics in Bosnia got compared with
example German peace movement groups were also very critical of UN peace-
keeping.\footnote{366} In France and in Italy, there was much more support for UN Blue
Helmets. The line here was here rather drawn between Blue Helmets on the one side,
and NATO bombing on the other (Dufour 1994, Muller 1994).

8.3.5.2 The NATO War on FR Yugoslavia

The readiness of NATO to militarily intervene in the Kosovo conflict in autumn
1998 (the activation order), and then their attack on the FR Yugoslavia after the
failure of the Rambouillet negotiations in March 1999 saw a more unanimous protest
than the military interventions into the Bosnian war, probably because of several
reasons coming together: First, in spite of the reports in 1998 on the numbers of
displaced in Kosovo, there was not such a strong public pressure created of
‘something must be done’ as had been the case in relation to Bosnia. Second, there
was no UN decision covering the attack by NATO which made it illegal from the
point of view of international law, something that was pointed out by international
lawyers already before the beginning of the war (see Haensel and Stobbe
2002:86pp). Third, the war lasted for months, and the more pictures and reports came
out of air raids on Serbian towns and civilians falling victim to the attacks, the
stronger the criticism grew. Fourth, NATO was already ‘the bad guy’ in the eyes of
most in the peace and related movements. And finally, even many those who felt that
a military intervention was necessary were unhappy with NATO because no ground
troops were sent in to protect the Kosovo Albanians on the ground, leaving them to
the mercy of the Serbian troops.

\footnote{The reason probably was an ongoing campaign against a change of the German constitution that
would allow Germany to deploy troops outside of NATO area.}
This does not mean that there was no support for the war in international civil society including parts of the peace movement. One good example is the ‘Hague Appeal for Peace’: In May 1999, during the Yugoslavia/Kosovo war, a long-planned large international peace conference with this title took place in The Hague to commemorate the original Hague Peace Conference that took place one hundred years before (see Hague Appeal for Peace n.d.). Ten thousand peace activists from all over the world came together, and Kosovo was one of the main topics. Its 23-page final appeal includes two paragraphs that are of relevance in this context here because it documents how the majority of the participants viewed the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo and the role of the international community in them: It speaks of “recent outbreaks of genocide”, listing Bosnia and Kosovo alongside Rwanda and Cambodia, and among many other points demands the

speedy and effective intervention of humanitarian forces, subject to the prescriptions of the UN Charter, when civilians are threatened by genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and extreme national disasters (Hague Appeal for Peace 1999:5).

Those who condemned NATO’s attack were divided among themselves. The main contested point was the positioning to the struggle of the Kosovo-Albanians for independence. One side criticised the NATO attack but supported its eventual outcome, Kosovo being made an international protectorate. “For sure, the war declared on Serbia defends a just cause. But it does not suffice that a cause is just for a war to be just” wrote a well-known nonviolent activist and researcher, Jean-Marie Muller in early 1999 (Muller 1999b).

The other position perhaps most predominantly represented with some or many those on the political left displayed no understanding or sympathy for the cause of the Kosovo Albanians whom they sometimes just titled ‘terrorists’, and implicitly denied the oppression that took place in Kosovo in the 1990s as well as the presumed

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367 The discussion on just war and legitimization of the war because of the assumed ethnic cleansing planned by Belgrade played a role in the big churches and again – like in Bosnia – was more prominently represented by the (moderate – Social Democrat) left and Green parties (see Refalo 1999, Haensel and Stobbe 2002:56) than with the conservative Right.

368 It was initiated by the International Peace Bureau (IPB), the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), and the World Federalist Movement.

369 And still is, see for example the articles on the webpage of the Kasseler Friedensratschlag 2008 referring to Kosovo or its recognition as an independent country in early 2008.
threat of genocide. Instead, they accused the West (USA and Europe) to have wilfully split Yugoslavia that they saw as one of the last resorts of socialism in Europe (see Chossudovsky 2006, one of the spokespersons of this position).

8.4 The Main Instruments of Protest and Advocacy

In this following section I am leaving the particular issues around which protest and advocacy developed in the period under study, and turn to the forms this protest took: its instruments. To give a taste of the complexity of the activities, I would like to start this section with a quote. It is from a leader of a women's peace network organisation from the beginning of the Kosovo and Yugoslavia war 1999, and in my eyes is typical for the protest and advocacy activities in the European peace movements:

At the beginning there were individual telephone calls, then telefaxes and appeals piled up with the request to pass them on, to collect signatures, to write lobbying letters, to keep contact with the groups and organizations of the network. Then came requests to support demonstrations in Bonn,…Erfurt, Berlin. Then the pressure to participate in the daily vigil here in Bonn, to contact other women organizations,… to send around materials appeals by ourselves,… Finally there was the invitation to speak on the Erfurt congress of the Mothers Against the War.

There was need to deal fully with the political level: Letters to the Chancellor, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Defence, then the heads of the party fractions in Parliament, finally all MPs, as well as support letters for those MPs who had publicly declared their position against the war of attack of NATO. There was need to maintain contacts to the NGO scene and not to ignore citizens who were aghast…” (Frauen Netzwerk fuer Frieden 1999:3).

8.4.1 Instruments of Protest

8.4.1.1 Appeals

The most common activities of protest have been appeals, open letters and/or press releases. They were printed in the publications of the organisations issuing them,

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370 How dominant that view was and is varies from country to country. For example, in Britain it seems to be more marginal than it is in Germany (information by Andrew Rigby on Britain; for Germany see the webpages of the Kasseler Friedensratschlag 2008).
faxed to the media, put on e-mail lists or later in the 1990s on websites in the internet, and/or distributed as leaflets on the streets or at conferences. Generally, probably the following categories could be distinguished:

- Appeals “to end the war”, directed vaguely both to the international community and/or to the local actors.
- Appeals demanding specific certain action like granting asylum to objectors and deserters from former Yugoslav countries or creating safe havens in Bosnia-Herzegovina.\(^{372}\)
- Declarations primarily intended to express a position or a concern, for example support for or condemnation of an act.\(^{373}\)

The main functions of these instruments have been to express an opinion divergent of what the governments or the mass media subscribed to, and to suggest certain action the state actors should take. Besides that, they also had of course a function within their own constituency, contributing to the shaping of the opinion within it – and sometimes fighting over certain issues (see the ‘pacifism debate’ described above).

### 8.4.1.2 Public Events

Many NGOs and citizens groups organised evenings on the conflict in former Yugoslavia in general or certain aspects like “nonviolent alternatives”, “situation of COs” or the like. Sometimes there was just one speaker of the organizing group, sometimes there were panels with either speakers with contesting views, or shedding

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\(^{371}\) Some of the appeals and open letters were signed by many people. The collection of signatures was a means used by groups in order to emphasise the public support their respective demands had.

\(^{372}\) For example conducted the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly in 1992/93 a postcard campaign all over Europe and North America demanding safe havens in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and open borders for refugees. This campaign that according to the HCA was an idea of UN special envoy Tadeusz Mazowiecki had a response of nearly 300,000 postcards. The organisers attributed the decision of the UN to create safe areas to their initiative though deploring that they were “reservations for Muslims” and not what they had wanted (Faber 1993, Kaldor and Faber 1993).

\(^{373}\) There are numerous such declarations by the Catholic Church collected in Buchbender and Arnold (eds.) 2002:77-183.
light on different aspects of a topic. There have also been a number of invitations of speakers from the former Yugoslavia to speaking events and conferences abroad. 374

There have also been many conferences on the situation or aspects of it in European countries. 375 Sometimes they targeted local or national public, sometimes international impact was intended, for example by connecting conferences to ‘official events’. For example, in August 1992 the Institute for War and Peace Reporting and the British American Security Information Council invited leading opposition and minority leaders for a simultaneous alternative Conference to the London Conference (‘Citizens’ Movements. Alternative Paths to Peace’ 1992).

A somewhat special event - both regarding its size and the calibre of people involved - has been the ‘International Tribunal on the NATO-war against Yugoslavia’ taking place parallel as two events in the USA and in Germany in 2000. That Tribunal was organised and supported by a large number of organisations of different political orientation (nonviolent, women’s, leftist groups, as well as grassroots’ peace initiatives), with the US International Action Centre led by former US Attorney-General Ramsey Clark who also wrote the ‘bill of indictment’ as its initiator (see ‘Internationales Europaeisches Tribunal ueber den NATO-Krieg gegen Jugoslawien’ 2000, Kasseler Friedensratschlag 2000). A number of smaller conferences prepared the tribunals that accused NATO and the government leaders of those countries most actively involved in the attack on the FR Yugoslavia of breaking international law. 376

374 Several initiatives created photo exhibitions and showed them during evening events. This was not limited to larger organisations (for example the development organisation Christian Peace Service, that did an exhibition on children refugees, see CFD 1993) but also done by small local groups (Ex-Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis 1993).

There were also other related activities like presentations in schools. For example, the Italian humanitarian NGO INTERSOS worked in schools in Rome, informing on “The Children and the War”, and in November 1999 on refugees from Kosovo (Tullio and Vertucci 2002:214-215).

375 As conferences (in contrast to information evenings) are counted events that had more than one speaker, and lasted at least one day.

376 The list of 19 grievances starts with “Planning and Executing the Dismemberment, Segregation and Impoverishment of Yugoslavia”, includes concrete actions during the war (“Destroying and Damaging Economic, Social, Cultural, Medical, Diplomatic and Religious Resources, Properties and Facilities throughout Yugoslavia” and ends with “The Purpose of the US Actions Being to Dominate, Control and Exploit Yugoslavia, Its People and Its Resources. The Means of the US Being Military Power and Economic Coercion” (Kasseler Friedensratschlag 2000). Under “Relief Sought” the initiators suggested among other points the formation of a federation of all peoples in the region, the “strict prohibition on all forms of foreign interference with or disruption of efforts to establish unity, peace and stability in the Balkans”, the abolition of NATO and of the “illegal ad hoc international criminal tribunal for Yugoslavia” and the removal of all foreign troops from the Balkans.
The functions of these diverse public events have been different ones:

- Addressing a wider public for information-sharing (information evenings for example)
- Forming opinion within the own constituency (panels and conferences where speakers with different opinions were given a voice)
- Addressing the state actors, expressing protest or trying to otherwise influence them (conferences with participation of such actors, or with wider media coverage like the mentioned ‘tribunal’).

8.4.1.3 Demonstrations

One of the standard accusations against the peace movement during the time of the Bosnian war was that they did not hold demonstrations against the war. This observation which was shared by many – including activists in the peace movements themselves – is certainly correct, if leaving aside the traditional annual events that addressed aspects of the wars in former Yugoslavia, mostly the military engagement of the Western countries in them (see Friedensforum 1994). The numbers of participants however before 1999 did not come close to the numbers of the protests against the Iraq war of 1991 or the best times of the peace movements in the 1980s.

Andreas Buro, a long-term civil rights and peace activist and retired professor for political science wrote in an early article on this question:

But against what should we demonstrate here in Germany? The federal government and the EC have so far worked for a mitigation of the conflict with non-military means, though not always in the way we would have wanted them to do ... In reality the peace movement has a new task for which it is little prepared: How can solidarity that transcends borders be organised in Europe? (Buro 1992:26, translation CS).

More typical than larger demonstrations have been vigils or small demonstrations with perhaps less than 50 participants that have been conducted by many groups of different orientation (not only peace movement but also immigrant groups with their supporters and others).

The picture changed during the Yugoslavia/Kosovo war when in many countries large demonstrations were held against the NATO attack with several thousand

8.4.1.4 Legal Means

Several attempts have been made to use legal means against the NATO war on FR Yugoslavia, in order to force the international community to stop the war or at least to seek redress afterwards, but all remained without success.377 One example would be a complaint to ICTY by the American Association of Jurists together with jurists from Toronto. The Tribunal quickly rejected the complaint together with similar received from the FR Yugoslavia and a Russian Parliamentary Commission, feeling compelled to announce the rejection in a press release but without really giving any reasons (International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2000, see also Pinter 2000).

8.4.1.5 Other Public Actions

Aside from demonstrations, there have been other public actions over the decade. Again, it is only possible to name a few examples from a large amount of data collected on the civil society actors:

- Peace prayers (see the different minutes of the German (Ex-)Jugoslavien-Koordinierungskreis from the early 1990s),
- Symbolic actions. The GFbV for example planted in 1995 a ‘cemetery’ with wooden crosses remembering the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa close to Chancellor Kohl’s private home, demanding the lifting of the arms embargo (Martin 1995).
- Fasts and hunger strikes: For example, there was a hunger strike of five artists in

377 This is not a very common tool, but one that in some other cases has been used successfully, the most famous perhaps being the arrest of the former Chilenean dictator Pinochet in London because Spain had filed a suit against him.

378 Two other examples have been the following:

In the US, 31 congresspeople filed a lawsuit against President Clinton seeking an end to military strikes against Yugoslavia. The court rejected this motion as well as FR Yugoslavia’s seeking a legal order to halt the NATO Bombing at the International Court of Justice (Simons 1999).

In Germany five family members of civilian victims in the small town Varvarin went to court asking for compensation, but the court rejected their complaint (Kasseler Friedensratschlag 2003).
solidarity with Bosnia in France in August 1995. They referred to the ‘Avignon declaration’ signed by thousands of people at a festival of Avignon that demanded the resignation of Boutros-Ghali for incompetence, immediate action by the Hague Tribunal against the perpetrators of Srebrenica, the continued presence of the Blue Helmets in Bosnia, keeping up the international pressure against Serbia, “defence of the democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina”, and the lifting of the arms embargo (Nonviolence Actualité 1995a). 379

- Very few actions of civil disobedience were directed at representatives of the conflict parties except the ‘smuggling’ of refugees from the war areas into third countries (chapter 7.1.2.2). One was a nonviolent blockade of a British Air Basis in Germany (Brueggen close to Moenchengladbach) on the 18 April 1999.

### 8.4.2 Instruments of Advocacy Work

There is an overlap between this work and what has been described under ‘middle level’ approaches in the chapter on civil society peace-making (see 5.2). If the activity in question clearly had local actors as a main target group, then I categorised it as ‘peace-making’. If – as far as I could discern from the sources – the main target group were other internationals, I put it here under advocacy. However, there is a grey area because people from the region participated in some of the advocacy activities as well.

#### 8.4.2.1 Advocating and Lobbying For Political Options

The International Crisis Group (ICG), a private high level advocacy organisation founded by former diplomats and politicians, and having quite some influence in political circles, is a good example for advocacy work. 380 I am not aware of any study of the impact their recommendations to the international community had in general, but there are indicators that at least some of their reports on Bosnia wielded

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379 In 1999, several people conducted a fast between middle of May and beginning of June in Paris, “to appeal to the responsible politicians and as witness for peace in justice”. It was an action supported by many groups, among them MAN, Arche de Lanza del Vasto, Cun de Larzac, Church and Peace, Quakers, IFOR and others (Nonviolence Actualité 1999b).

380 In the bibliography there is a list of most of their publications concerning the former Yugoslavia.
influence: One was their critique of the Bosnian electoral system which according to Gagnon (1998:11) led the UN to reform the system to make an election of moderates more likely (International Crisis Group 1997b). Destexhe (2001) names the ICG report on Brcko (1999a) as a second report having been influential.\footnote{Other examples for advocacy work would be the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that made suggestions regarding Kosovo (Troebst 1998:91pp) and the European Stability Initiative (ESI, European Stability Initiative 2001, 2007) that wrote a number of expert reports on different issues. ESI is a non-profit research and policy institute, founded in 1999 by an international group of practitioners and experts, funded mostly by government and corporation grants. Its goal is to provide policy makers with analysis, and is claiming to have had “a substantial impact on international policy towards South Eastern Europe. Its advice was sought regularly by a range of policy makers across the region.” (European Stability Initiative n.d.).}

Other organizations, for example human rights organisations like the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights and the US-based Human Rights Watch, did not address peace-making in general but advocated for attention to human rights issues (see Troebst 1998:93pp) in general.\footnote{Baglioni 2001 distinguishes this type of work from that of advocacy groups but I would argue that it is advocacy as well, only on a more specific topic.}

Advocacy work has, of course, not been limited to those established organisations. Also new groups and organisations got involved in this type of work. One example would the (already cited) Verona Forum (see chapter 5.2.2.1) that also engaged in lobbying as a direct outcome of its work among representatives from the different countries of former Yugoslavia.\footnote{It established a permanent coordination and communication at the European Parliament in Brussels for that purpose.}

\section*{8.4.2.2 Institutionalizing ‘Civilian Alternatives’}

Very successful advocacy has taken place around the issue of civilian alternatives, though the issue in question here was not specific action on the conflicts in former Yugoslavia but the establishment of institutions and state funding supporting NGO’s working on conflict. This is probably the only case that could be considered a real success story in the field of protest and advocacy:

In Europe and North America, it was in the 1990s that the discussion on civil conflict resolution grew exponentially (Paffenholz 2001b, Weller 2007). The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were not the only international conflict triggering interest on how to solve or settle international conflicts – the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Iraq war, Somalia, Rwanda were
other key events in this decade. But there can be no doubt that Yugoslavia played an essential role in the debate both for the formulation of the need, and for examples on what kind of work could be envisaged. What was new in the 1990s has been that the scope of interest was broadened from peace-making (mediation, negotiation) to more encompassing approaches, and people searched for different tools to deal with conflict without violence. One focus of these alternatives has been the sending of civilians to conflict areas to support peace processes (see Schirch 1995). The reasons for the popularity of this approach were probably two factors – the formal resemblance to the sending of the military (‘send civilians instead of soldiers’), and that it allowed a comparatively easy and direct access to work on the conflicts – easier than for example trying to influence the high-level leadership.

Under the heading of ‘Civil Peace Service’ Europe-wide initiatives first in Germany and some years later also in the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, France and Italy sought to establish a new type of service situated somewhere between the older volunteer services for youth, alternative service to military service, the work of established development organisations and peace teams (see Truger 1996, Centro Studi Difesa Civile 1998, Balkan Peace Team 2000, Trittmann 2000, Schweitzer et al 2001, War Resisters’ International 2004a).

The initiatives in the different countries varied a lot, with some working on training alone (Netherlands), others finding a niche for volunteer services in the context of the abolition of military draft in their country (France, Italy), and in Germany an ‘expert service’ was established comparable to the established development cooperation services, only focussed on dealing with conflict. The German example is well documented, and therefore I would like to describe it as an example of the complexity of successful advocacy work that managed to convince a government to institutionalize a new instrument and budget line that exclusively focuses on conflict resolution work:

The development of a Civil Peace Service in Germany started in 1991 with a declaration and subsequent work of the Protestant Church of Berlin-Brandenburg

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The above-mentioned Federation for Social Defence took up the concept and until 1994 developed its own version of it, gathering together a diverse group of supportive organisations and individuals of different political orientation. Eventually, in 1996, this coalition became a NGO of its own, the Forum Civil Peace Service. The Civil Peace Service as envisaged at that time was planned to be ‘large-scale’, having the goal to develop a pool of 100,000 people within 20 years. Trittman (2000) describes in detail the lobbying that began in 1995. First individual politicians from all parties were contacted who were known to be open to this thinking. The result was a proposal in the Parliament, submitted by a small number of MPs from all parties just after the Dayton Agreement. This was to train within two years 200 experts in conflict resolution to be sent to Bosnia. After this proposal was rejected, a new opening was found when one of the bundeslaender (states) - North-Rhine Westphalia that had just formed a new government of Social Democrats and Greens - showed interest in supporting conflict resolution and a peace corps. It decided to fund from 1997 onwards a suggested four-month training for what the German initiators by then called ‘peace experts’ (today the official English translation is ‘peace consultants’), having in the meanwhile abandoned the concept of sending large numbers of people. The first courses were offered by two umbrella organisations, the Forum CPS and the umbrella of the Protestant Peace and Development Services in Germany, AGDF (see Wagner 2000 for a description of the development of the first courses).

Parallel to these efforts to establish training courses, lobbying at the federal level continued in the form of conferences and round tables to which state representatives were invited. Public events made the concept known, and intensive liaison with the existing volunteer and development service organisation was required to convince them of the need for such a new service. In 1997 the Parliament organised a hearing on the subject; but again, under the conservative government of that time, there was no opening for institutionalisation. In all these discussions, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia played the role of the prime example for the need of such work. In late 1998, with the change of government from the conservatives to a Social-Democrat--Green coalition, this changed. When forming the coalition, both parties agreed to support ‘an infrastructure for crisis prevention and civil conflict resolution, including the deployment of ‘peace experts’ or ‘peace consultants’. A (still-existing)
instrument and a budget line ‘Civil Peace Service’ was created, based in the Ministry of Development.\footnote{Until end of 2008, about 470 ‘peace experts’ have been sent to about 45 countries. The annual budget increased over these years from 5.3 million € to 19 million €. See Bundesministerium fuer wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 2008b, Kortmann 2009.} Of course, the Civil Peace Service was not created as an instrument to intervene in the conflicts of the former Yugoslavia though the first projects funded mostly took place there. However, without the impetus of these conflicts, the establishment of such an instrument would probably not have taken place.

8.5 Conclusions

This chapter has sought to give an impression of what civil society actors did aside from direct project work in former Yugoslavia. The picture that emerged has been one of intensive public debate, with two foci of actors: The first were the mass media that not only played a crucial role in forming public opinion, but also stood in a reciprocal relationship with the political actors who both were influenced by them, and sought to influence what was reported on their actions.

The second focus was those groups and organisations engaged in public protest and advocacy work. Besides the peace movement that was probably the strongest in this type of activity there have been also other groups and organisations involved – human rights and women's organisations have been mentioned in particular. But while they shared discontent with what the state interveners did, the contents of what they protested and lobbied for or against varied a lot. In fact, contradictory objectives have been pursued: for or against (more) military intervention, and for or against the secession of republics or autonomous regions being perhaps the most contested fields, often setting not only civil society actors against state actors, but disagreements within civil society as well.

8.5.1 Protest, Advocacy and Work on the Ground

One of the noteworthy points is that many actors combined protest and advocacy with work in the area of former Yugoslavia, be it humanitarian aid, human rights
monitoring or one or several of the multiple other activities described in the last chapters. That is not unusual for large agencies – with very few exceptions humanitarian aid, development and conflict transformation agencies engage in advocacy work from time to time. However, in this survey there have been many small groups, mostly from the peace and the feminist movement, for whom the order of activities was reversed. Their starting point has been work in their home countries, not the work in the field. Many peace groups, for example, had just gone through a period of intense protests against the US-led attack in early 1991 on Iraq after Iraq had occupied Kuwait (the so-called 2nd Iraq war). But then during the first years of the wars in former Yugoslavia they added direct work in the field as was described in the earlier chapters to the plethora of their activities, some of them explicitly explaining that they preferred such work over protest against the war back home (see Buro 1992).

The means the groups used were mostly ‘traditional’ - appeals, public events, information through alternative media, vigils, advocacy work and, much more rarely, mass protest on the streets. Civil disobedience occurred but was not prominent, and never went beyond the symbolic.\textsuperscript{386}

\section*{8.5.2 The Functions of Public Information, Support, Protest and Advocacy}

Public information, protest and advocacy had different functions:

- Expressing disagreement with the action of state actors (governments, UN, NATO);
- Informing their own constituency;
- Struggling for shaping a consensus position within their own constituency;
- Informing wider public (usually on a ‘truth’ different than what the political leaders or the mass media pronounced); and
- Seeking enforcement of a certain act (stopping the war on Yugoslavia, paying recompensation to victims) through engaging the legal system.

\textsuperscript{386} As far as I can tell, there have been no civil disobedience acts that were considerably disruptive or effectively threatened to withdraw power from the state actors.
Support activities (training, funding etc) were activities that sought to empower other actors to intervene in the conflicts. Without such indirect intervention, work in the field would probably have been impossible. In several places, in particular in Chapter 6 on peace-building, it has been mentioned how otherwise well-intentioned projects suffered from the use of field staff without adequate skills. And lack of coordination between NGOs led to contradictory and even harmful consequences, for example when different donors competed with each other or pursued different policies in regard to choosing beneficiaries of humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts.387

8.5.3 Relationship Between International and Local Civil Society

An important issue is the relationship between the international groups (NGOs) that claimed to work in solidarity with local anti-war groups/civil society, and these local groups. On the one hand, international civil society helped the local civil society by giving them a voice internationally through translating and reprinting articles, statements and the like, by creating alternative media where critical journalists from the region could publish, and by inviting their speakers abroad to give presentations. On the other hand, there has been a clear disagreement between those groups and many of their pacifist supporters on the matter of military intervention. The local groups generally were in favour of military action by the international community while the pacifist organisations among their friends abroad had a problem with it (see the two open letters from the local groups and from War Resisters’ International quoted above).388

387 The whole of support activities fall under the wider issue of building and maintaining an infrastructure of conflict intervention. The need for such an infrastructure has become increasingly acknowledged in the last ten years, and is reflected in many policy debates both among state and non-state actors (see for example the entries in the Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation and Reychler and Paffenholz 2001). It is not far-fetched to argue that the experiences intervening actors made in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s played an important role as a background for this discussion.

388 This is also partly true for the Kosovo solidarity work. It may not be too far-fetched to assume that the concrete support the local groups received at the same time from the internationals was the reason that local activists lived with these disagreements, while the internationals appreciated the work of the local groups and valued the existence of local partners too much to let this disagreement to stand in their way.
8.5.4 A ‘Yugoslavia Movement’

Were the conflicts in former Yugoslavia nothing more than a new topic existing movements like the peace movement addressed? Or is it possible to speak of an international social movement that formed itself around the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (a ‘Yugoslavia movement’)? And if so, what kind of movement was it? Or was it not one movement but several?

There is no single definition of social movements that is shared by all those studying social movements. The definition that I prefer comes from Dieter Rucht. He speaks of

systems of action of mobilized networks of groups and organizations that are of a certain duration and based on collective identity, and seek to promote, prevent or undo social change with the means of protest (Rucht 2007:15, translation CS).

Most authors see social movements particularly active in the field of collective protest.

Social movements can be interpreted as the rational and purposeful efforts of people who are not represented in institutional politics, and who collectively and publicly express their demands in order to influence public policy making (Kolb 2005:34).

Most movements focus on issues in their own society. Those that are dealing with issues abroad are usually described under the terminology of ‘solidarity movements’ or ‘transnational movements’ (see Passy 2001).

In the case of the former Yugoslavia, there are two arguments speaking in favour of considering it a movement of its own:

1. The fact that there were many new groups emerging during the first year of the wars in 1991 and 1992, as the survey on interventions clearly shows.
2. The sheer amount of activities by civil society actors here, ranging from organizing direct help to protest and other work back home.

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389 See also Rucht 2002, Tilly 2004.
390 Passy (2001:5) defines solidarity movements as follows: “Individuals who are involved in this movement defend the interests, rights, and identities of others”, not benefiting directly from their participation in collective action. Sometimes also the term ‘altruistic movements’ is used. See Burstein 1999, Guigni 1999 and also the articles in Guigni and Passy (eds) 2001 on ‘political altruism’.
Therefore I would argue that there cannot be any doubt that there has been a special movement on the former Yugoslavia, and that it cannot be just subsumed under ‘peace movement’ as for example Schmitz (1998) does. This movement had aspects of both solidarity movements and of national protest movements: It was a solidarity movement insofar as there was a lot of support of local civil society. Also the intense engagement in humanitarian aid, though being a different kind of solidarity, is often counted as an activity of what some authors call ‘altruistic movements’ (see Burstein 1999, Guigni 1999 and the articles in Guigni and Passy 2001). And it was a protest movement focussing on the politics ‘at home’ addressing the interventions of governments and international organisations.

That there were contrasting and contending views on what to do about the conflict does not invalid this assessment about there having been a ‘Yugoslavia movement’, at least when following Giugni who points out that

social movements are complex sets of groups, organizations, and actions that may have different goals as well as different strategies for reaching their aims (Guigni 1999:xx).

That would mean that movements do not have to speak with one voice, nor actually pursue the same goals. This ‘Yugoslavia movement’ was a movement that was neither fully a solidarity movement, nor a protest movement targeting the politics of the home countries of the civil society actors but had elements of both, uniting them in a manner hitherto unknown.

8.5.5 The Impact of Public Information, Protest and Advocacy

Last not least it needs to be asked what influence did the information, protest and advocacy activities have on the political decision-makers?

For the mass media, it has been assessed that there definitely was an influence on politics even though how it exactly came about, and how decisive it was remains contested.

For advocacy in its strict sense of the word, some examples have been given above on its successful application, with the establishment of state-funded civil peace services throughout Europe being perhaps the most relevant and long-lasting outcome.
More difficult is to assess what role the protest activities played. Researchers of international movements and NGOs have rarely been able to make a convincing case for the impact of protest, because the question of attribution is extremely sensitive and complex. Study of consequences of social movements considered “one of the most neglected topics in the literature” (Guigni 1999:xivp, see also Meyer 1999).

In the literature on former Yugoslavia, some very generalised assessments can be found, like ‘pacifism’ being blamed for a late military intervention in Bosnia, or human rights reports by NGOs causing local perpetrators to harden their position in order to portray themselves more successfully as misunderstood or maligned by the international community (Fitzduff and Church 2004:11, citing Anderson 1999). There are few indicators that there was much impact from the side of those challenging military means beyond the public debate on how to respond to the war in Bosnia. The balance went rather in favour of fast and decisive military action or at least the readiness to apply such means, as the case of Macedonia 2001 shows. The reasons for these developments are, of course, very complex, with the contribution of those parts of civil society that demanded ‘humanitarian intervention’ probably being a small one compared to the interests and power politics of NATO and the European Union respectively the nations leading in each of the two alliances.

This chapter has tried to show that intervention does not necessarily require physical presence in the conflict area. The heated discussions and the intensive lobbying that accompanied the direct work in the former Yugoslavia were more than just a ‘background noise’ to the work on the ground. In many ways it shaped the motivation as well as the focus of what civil society actors undertook, and in turn the experiences made on the ground were fed back to the discussions in the home countries.
9. Conclusions: Strategies of Intervention by Civil Society Actors in Protracted Violent Conflict

The preceding chapters have described a multitude of activities of civil society actors, categorised by ‘grand strategies’ of peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-building and ‘public information, support, and protest and advocacy’. In the ‘grand strategy’ of peace-making only few cases of mediation involving political leaders were found, dealing with particular aspects or moments of conflicts. Civil society actors were shown to have access to the high level leadership only if they either came from a peer position (elder statesmen like Jimmy Carter who mediated in Bosnia), or have established their credentials as honest brokers in long-term work (Sant’ Egidio mediating between Serbia and Kosovo). Though the two cases presented (a cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina and an agreement on re-opening of schools in Kosovo) were not of lasting impact, they showed that civil society mediators can make a difference where official negotiators fail. Much more frequent have been different kinds of second-track workshops and comparable meetings that targeted either influential people belonging to the respective current regime, or – more often in the case under study - the political and civil society opposition. Equally grouped under peace-making have been so-called micro negotiations and mediation at local or regional level.

Like peace-making, civil society peace-keeping was dealing with two different contexts: the ‘conflict at large’, and with concrete protection of concrete persons at certain places and times. Three types of peace-keeping were found in this sample: A longer-term project with peace-keeping as one – but not the only – element of its mandate (Balkan Peace Team), protection activities by projects pursuing other objectives but who assumed a role in protection when the situation warranted it, and short-term interpositioning projects (the different peace ‘caravans’ in Bosnia) – the latter with rather doubtful outcomes. For the issue of what civilian peace-keeping can achieve as an alternative to military peace-keeping, a better picture arises by including the civilian monitoring missions sent to the area by international state actors (ECMM, KVM). However, the evaluation of civilian peace-keeping remains contested with contrary conclusions being drawn from the examples – while one side
sees ample proof that protection needs armed force, the other believes that the admittedly limited successes of the civilian missions are indicators for a hitherto untapped potential of nonviolent peace-keeping.

As the different size of the chapters indicates already, civil society peace-making and peace-keeping were rare in the former Yugoslavia compared to peace-building. Peace-building activities by civil society actors have been described in nine categories: 1. humanitarian relief, 2. disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers (DDR), 3. reconstruction and refugee return, 4. social and psycho-social work, 5. economic recovery, 6. transitional justice and human rights documentation, 7. state-building, democratisation and civil society support, 8. promoting peace skills and dialogue and 9. cultural activities. Generally speaking, of particular impact seem to have been multi-dimensional projects combining relief or reconstruction with social work or other forms of non-physical support, and support for civil society that oriented itself on the needs of the local groups and institutions already in place rather than artificially contributing to the creation of new ones. Further it was noticed that an overriding concern with interethnic cooperation and reconciliation that dominated much of the work seems to have had only modest outcomes if measured on the professed higher goal of preventing future violence.

Regarding what civil society actors did aside from direct project work in former Yugoslavia, the picture that emerged has been one of intense public debate in the mass media and protest and advocacy targeting the international (state) community. It was concluded that it is possible to speak of a social movement on the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The probably main positive outcome of these debates and struggles has been a much increased interest in and support for civil conflict transformation by both non-state and state actors.  

This final chapter here will not repeat in further detail what was already concluded in the chapters on each of the different strategies. Rather, it takes one step back and tries to make some further more general observations regarding conflict interventions in the area of former Yugoslavia. The chapter falls into two parts. The first part looks once more at the work of civil society interveners, their instruments, goals and

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391 Unfortunately, in addition to or in spite of the equally increased reliance on military means by state actors that can be observed in the last ten years as well.
strategies, as well as the question of ‘do no harm’ – or rather: the instances where civil society intervention did harm. The second part comes back to the general framework of conflict intervention with the three ‘grand strategies’ presented in chapter 2. Based on the findings of this case study here, an expansion of that model is suggested. The final remarks then comment on the role of civil society actors in conflict intervention, and express the need of further case studies of other areas in order to confirm some of the findings and conclusions.

9.1 On the Work of Civil Society Interveners

9.1.1 A Wide Range of Instruments of Intervention

The survey on interventions in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia that was the basis for this study identifies about 230 methods or instruments of intervention by non-state actors (including actors that would not be considered civil society). This list that can be found in appendix 1 and is certainly far from complete. To develop a systematic overview as did Gene Sharp (1973) for methods of nonviolent actions, the survey would have to be expanded to project work in other conflict areas. Nevertheless, a certain picture has developed, with the distinction between the functions of peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-building and information/protest/advocacy proving to be a framework that is not ideal but useful enough to categorise the vast majority of functions that activities fulfilled.392

Another important observation to be made regards exclusiveness versus combining different approaches. While most programmes run by governments or international organisations have had no problem with mixing different approaches and strategies, NGOs and citizens’ group – with the exception of some large established INGOs - tended towards a single focus approach. In the area of former Yugoslavia, many of them had only one particular activity, be it humanitarian aid, training work, setting up one youth centre or the like. In a sample of 420 citizens’ groups and NGOs mainly from European countries, the following distribution was found. Humanitarian

392 The support activities described in chapter 8 are left out here since they are the basis for working in the other strategies.

And to avoid a misunderstanding here it needs to be emphasised that this is about functions, not about projects. Many civil society projects were multi-purpose or multi-functional, pursuing more than one strategy at the same time.
aid for the purpose of this comparison has been separated from other peace-building activities. The total figures are of no importance, but the picture is documented here because I believe it shows a tendency.

Table 5) Combination of Strategies

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Aid (189)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace-building (124)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace-making (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace-keeping (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest &amp; Advocacy (40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid and Peace-building (64)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid and Peace-making (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid and Peace-keeping (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid and Protest &amp; Advv. (30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace-building and Peace-making (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace-building and Peace-keeping (6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace-building and Protest &amp; Adv. (10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid and Peace-building and Peace-keeping (13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The picture probably holds few surprises for those familiar with grassroots work in conflict areas. Those using only one approach or type of activity are clearly more than those combining different types (358:62). Aid and other types of peace-building activities are those most usually combined, although a more detailed analysis would show that there is some chronological sequence to it: Many small groups started with aid and later branched out into other types of work. Civilian peace-keeping work as mentioned above could only be found in combination with other approaches – a finding that cannot be generalised since in other conflict areas there are NGOs that fully concentrate on peace-keeping. The rather high number of those who combined either aid or other peace-building work with protest fall, as described in the last chapter, in two categories: on the one hand, those whose primary mandate was work in the field and who engaged in advocacy when needed to support or protect that work, and on the other hand movement organisations traditionally more at home with protest and advocacy but who added work in the field to their activities in the course of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia.

9.1.2 Much Help But Not Enough Empowerment: Some Final Observations
Regarding Goals and Strategies

9.1.2.1 On the Goals Pursued

The multiple goals that intervening civil society actors pursued in order to have an impact on the ground can be generalised and reduced to a few basic objectives, pursued sometimes with more than one strategy:

- Stop the war and/or prevent future violence from re-occurring. This is an overall goal of the vast majority of activities in all ‘grand strategies’.

In peace-making, to

- Contribute to a political solution of the ‘conflicts at large’ (e.g. high-level and middle level peace-making, advocacy work).
- Find solutions for concrete manifestations of the overall conflicts or related matters at the purview of those at middle or grassroots’ level negotiating about them (e.g. trying to ensure that certain villages do not participate in fighting, as did happen in some instances in Croatia).

In peace-keeping and some forms of peace-building, to

- Protect people from violence (e.g. protective accompaniment, helping people to flee war and to return safely).

In peace-building, to

- Meet basic needs like food, housing and health.
- Promote interethnic cooperation and reconciliation.
- Restore a functioning society, state and economy and promote political change.
- A second set of goals can be identified aiming more to influence the international political debate and the intervening states than directly addressing the parties on the ground: Influence the actions of international state actors in regard to the conflict, in particular here demanding either
  a) establishing faster and more decisive military intervention to protect human rights and prevent genocide
  b) ‘civilising’ international politics by promoting nonviolent methods of intervention and the non-use of military force.
• Advocate for institutional support for activities of civil society.\textsuperscript{394}

In the previous chapters much was said about the degree to which organisations succeeded in achieving these goals. In a nutshell: It is a picture of very mixed results. Immediate material aid helped people to survive the war, but on the other hand the economic situation in the war-torn countries remained poor. With the exception of Slovenia and to a certain degree Croatia that thrives on tourism, most countries are still highly dependent on international financial aid. There have been projects that took care of the physical reconstruction, projects that without doubt protected local activists and citizens against violence, and projects that had a positive impact regarding overcoming the traumata of war and rebuilding civil life. But on the other side there are the disillusioning findings on the question of whether peace-building made a difference in Kosovo 2004 (CDA -Collaborative Learning Projects 2006), and also a general lack of convincing evidence that all the work on interethnic reconciliation has had impact beyond short-term successes like mixed football teams or women's groups. Local civil society groups grew in all countries in spite of the hostile political situation in the 1990s, and in one case even managed to overthrow their repressive regime. On the other hand, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have shown that intense support of civil society, especially if that meant initiating new NGOs to become implementing partners for international programmes, does not automatically lead to more democracy and liberal values (see Fischer 2008, and the section below on ‘doing harm’).

9.1.2.2 On the Role Assumptions on the Causes of the Conflict Played

The analysis and assumptions of civil society actors about the conflict played an important role in the development of strategies and activities. Many civil society

\textsuperscript{394} Besides these motives for intervention, there have been organisational or individual agendas that clearly played an important role:

• The altruistic impetus of ‘something must be done’, the need to help (mostly to be found in the grassroots’ relief efforts).
• Show through examples that civilian/nonviolent methods of dealing with conflict ‘work’ and deserve (state) support
• Satisfy the stakeholders of an organisation by showing that the organisation responds to these conflicts that are high on the international agenda.
• Have projects that attract funding (and thereby often also secure the economic survival of the own organisation).
actors espoused the ethnic paradigm, assuming that the ethnic conflict was either the cause of the conflicts, or at least the most obvious and relevant block on the path to a peaceful future and the prevention of future violence (see Duffield 1999:142). An expression of dealing with the ethnic paradigm have been the overriding concern with ‘multi-ethnicity’ in all programmes, and the multitude of projects like trainings in prejudice reduction, nonviolent communication or other tools designed to overcome identity conflicts.

Only some organisations have argued that this approach often was not particularly helpful because the ethnic divide played less of a role than other divides, be it political divides or conflicts between refugees and those who stayed during the war, (see Kurschat 1998).

Other groups, often those part of the Western peace movement, followed the interpretation of local oppositional intellectuals by blaming the elites of all sides for the conflict that used (and often first awakened) nationalism for the pursuit of their own goals (see Kaldor 2001, Woodward 1995). Some even maintained that it was no ethnic conflict at all and that people had always lived together peacefully. This approach found expression, for example, by delivering aid consciously to all sides of the conflict, and/or by civil society support protecting and empowering local groups to stand up against these elites.

Still others more or less accepted the official explanations and views predominant in the media and statements of politicians at the time, using terms like ‘the Serb-occupied Bosnia’ (as if there had been no Serbs in Bosnia), ‘war of conquest’ etc., and directing their support (be it advocacy or aid) only to the side(s) they perceived as the victims.\(^\text{395}\)

Leftist groups tended to interpret the wars as an imperialist scheme to defeat socialism seen as being represented by Milosevic’s Yugoslavia, and therefore concentrated their focus on making the official politicians’ stand point of that country being heard, and rejecting any kind of foreign intervention into the conflicts, often including that of civil society.

But the survey also showed that at least from the side of small and new civil society groups, there was often little analysis of the conflict at all. All-too-often activities

\(^{395}\) I have a number of leaflets collected that express such views.
were chosen on the basis of a felt need ‘to do something’, or unreflected assumptions which were rarely questioned. A result of the lack of good analysis was that strategies and activities seem to some degree have been more determined by what the civil society interveners thought they were good at doing (for example giving trainings in nonviolence or mediation) rather than assessing what was really needed. The saying that to the person who has a hammer every problem looks like a nail unfortunately has found ample examples in this case, and emphasises the plea by Anderson and Olson (2003) to start with an analysis of what is needed for ‘Peace Writ Large’ as they put it (see also Paffenholz and Reychler 2007).

9.1.2.3 Doing Harm

The interventions in the former Yugoslavia have unfortunately produced a long list of examples on how international actors can do harm through their interventions. Doing harm is not a prerogative of state actors. Although it may be a bit disheartening to finish the study with such a long list of negatives, naming them is important because each of them directly translates into lessons for future interventions.

1. One large issue is the very mixed consequences international intervention has had for local civil society. On the one hand, the international support for oppositional groups and independent media was very important for the work of these groups (see chapter 7). On the other hand, however, the influx of internationals willing to spend great quantities of money on relief, reconstruction, trauma support or ‘civil society building’ led to several negative outcomes. (See for the following Duffield 1996, Edwards and Hulme 1998, Stubbs 1999, 2000 and 2007, Smillie and Todorovic 2001, Broughton and Fraenkel 2002:27, Cooley and Ron 2002, De Vrieze 2002, Du Pont 2002:239, Lyons 2007:67, Sejfija 2007:134p.)

- Projects were undertaken and many NGOs were being founded just because there was money (often called ‘seed money’) available, in order to get a share of this new source of income. In all countries hundreds of NGOs sprang up, but few of them were independent of one particular donor, and few were effective. According to the Local Democracy Agency in Tuzla, in Bosnia-Herzegovina a total of 8,000 NGOs were officially registered as
‘humanitarian organisations’ between 1992 and 2001, and around 30,000 projects undertaken (Sejfija 2007:125). In Kosovo, at the beginning of the new decade more than 2,000 local NGOs had registered. Most of these new NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were ‘service’ or ‘third sector’ NGOs. And the phenomenon is not restricted to the protectorates. Broughton (2002) for example counted in Macedonia “hundreds of NGOs” of that type.

- Many international NGOs have been conducting their projects through local implementing partners. But in many cases the local partners were only fig leaves established for meeting the requirements of international donors but without any real say or influence on the shape of the projects.396

- The NGO sector became a labour market. While on the one hand this could be seen as a contribution to income-generation in a desperate economic situation, on the other hand it made the concept of voluntary work highly unpopular, more unpopular that it was before. (Volunteerism anyway was not well developed in the former Yugoslavia.) The fact that there were now sources for getting remuneration for almost any kind of work, including activism, led to a set-up where work was often only done if it could be paid for (e. g. there are many stories that people expected to be paid to participate in conferences or trainings). If civil society is defined as a sector thriving on voluntary commitment by citizens, then this phenomenon is clearly counter-productive.

- There have been both processes of professionalization and de-professionalization, especially in the sector of social welfare. On the one hand, work that in other circumstances would be traditionally volunteer work became paid work and therefore professional, but on the other hand crowds of untrained people or people with only a short training on conflict resolution skills but without an adequate professional background entered the fields of social work and psychological assistance.

396Llamazares and Reynolds Levy 2003 (quoting Sarah C. White 2000:144) distinguish several categories of partner relationships: ‘Nominal participation’ where local partners are mostly only symbolic or named in funding applications because that is a requirement by international donors, ‘instrumental participation’ where local partners are seen as a way to increase efficiency, ‘representative participation’ where local people’s interests and needs shape the project, and ‘transformative participation’ where empowerment is both means and end of process.
• Another point here is ‘projectisation’, meaning that most of the work had to be framed as projects suitable for the short-term cycles (usually one year, sometimes two or three) of international funding (see Stubbs 2000). After the end of a grant, the current work had to be abandoned or rephrased to meet the requirements of being a new ‘project’ because rarely funders were willing to engage in the same work over a longer period. Most of them saw themselves rather in the role of somebody ‘enabling something new to get off the ground’, but forgot (or chose to forget) that there were few alternative sources for existing work to be funded (e.g. almost no governmental money, no local private donors).

• Stubbs (2007:221) also observed a new division between service-providing NGOs and ‘the supposedly superior ‘conscience or advocacy-oriented NGOs’.

• Competition and lack of coordination among international organisations led to parallel projects (more than one youth centre in a smaller community, different policies of how to finance reconstruction, etc), or on the contrary to a situation where different actors ‘passed the buck’, and in the end no one took responsibility for a matter (see Kriesberg 2001:419).

• Last not least, the dependency on international funding in some cases has threatened to undermine the political independence and the credibility of local civil society (see the case of Otpor in chapter 7).

2. A second area of concern caused by the presence of state and non-state actors has been the economic side (see Cooley and Ron 2002, Gagnon 1998b, Hansen 2000, Stubbs 1999, 2000 and 2007):

• Prices (for example for rent) increased astronomically.

• The local labour market and salary levels were distorted with, for example, a driver of an international agency earning more than a judge employed by the national authorities.

• In consequence, qualified people tended to work for the internationals rather than helping directly to rebuild their country. Just not to be misunderstood: In a situation of extreme poverty and high unemployment where whole families depend often on the income of one person, people have little choice than to
9. Conclusions

go for the best-paid job. The problem and the blame lie with the internationals for not being mindful of these problems.

3. A third issue has been that civil society agents began taking care of all kinds of social and welfare services that in a functioning country are the responsibility of the state. International or local NGOs became providers of social services, services exclusively funded by international sources. When the international money was reduced or stopped coming, often the services were discontinued (see Edwards and Hulme 1998).\textsuperscript{397}

4. A fourth issue is the symbolic side of the international intervention – a side Mary B. Anderson in her ‘do no harm’ concept sets much store by. For the case under study here it may be observed that the support did not always empower local people but sometimes also led to disempowerment.

- The knowledge of being dependent on international aid is not only a fact that neither the local governments nor local civil society could disregard, but people are also always reminded of it on the symbolic level by the overwhelming presence of road signs and plaques advertising donors all over the place, from youth centres to private homes.

- The same disempowerment can be found in the areas of security and law: Security in the protectorates has become a task of the international military rather than a responsibility of the local law enforcement agencies.

- The persecution of war crimes for many years was relegated solely to the International Tribunal that generally is only then criticised if it opens a case against someone of their ‘own’ ethnicity, but welcomed as long as it persecutes those of the ‘others’.

5. A fifth point, already discussed in Chapter 7 is the overriding concern with the ‘ethnic conflict’ from the side of many interveners. It has to be asked if this overriding focus of so many projects may not have strengthened rather than lessened identification along ethnic lines, especially if – as was the case certainly in the first years – many well-meaning but naïve international groups without much if any knowledge about the local culture and politics but a heavy baggage of anti-

\textsuperscript{397} That international funding dwindles always is the case some years after a cease-fire: in Bosnia-Herzegovina it happened from c. 1999 on, and also from Kosovo the caravan has started to move to Afghanistan and Iraq.
nationalist sentiment started to work on ‘reconciliation’.

A small number of critical authors have asked the question what the difference is between the international politics in the former Yugoslavia, especially in the protectorates, and earlier colonial politics. Roland Paris (2002) compares the protectorates with the era of the “mission civilisatrice” (the belief that European imperial powers had the duty to ‘civilise’ their overseas possessions) of the colonial area, and also Stubbs (a.a.O.) compares it with colonial politics. Chandler, one of the sharpest critics of the protectorates, states:

“‘White Man’s Burden’ today appears recast in the liberal language of ‘ethical’ foreign policy, rights protection and ‘civil society’” (Chandler 1999:3).

I think that their point is a valid one. While seen from the point of international law, the situation is of course different because today’s control of other countries is based on international law and meant to be a transitional phase before the country returns to independence. But on the ideological side the attitudes are not that dissimilar. The (Western) interveners mostly imported their way of doing things: They taught them, they modelled them, and sometimes even enforced them with the help of their military. And this was (is) not a privilege of the state actors alone — the civil society actors on the ground were playing a big role here as well through the simple fact of their presence, with the exception of course that they did not have means of direct enforcement available.

9.1.3 Relationship Between Governmental and Non-state Actors

Generally, relations between international interveners were characterised by a mixture of conflict and cooperation. While there was always the usual mutual criticism - either on particulars or general policies (see chapter 8) - and even some cases of civil society actors openly defying state actors in acts of civil disobedience, in the overriding number of projects cooperation between non-state and state actors was dominant. Three types of relationships can be distinguished:

- The first is a funding one – state agencies funding NGO work as many European

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398 At least in theory. If the practice would always confirm it is debatable when thinking for example of the long-term economic exploitation contracts the USA have made with Iraq.
governments, the US and Canada did.\textsuperscript{399}

- The second would be that of NGOs becoming an implementing partner for an international organisation such as UNHCR, or carrying out programmes that were in the interest of their government but which the government did not wish to take of itself.\textsuperscript{400}

- The third (that often goes together with a funding relationship) would be a positive relationship to the state actors present on the ground, for example using their influence and potential for the application of force in controversial cases of refugee/IDP return.

9. 2 On the Theoretical Framework of Conflict Intervention

9.2.1 The Hypotheses on Conflict Intervention

In chapter 1 a number of often-held assumptions on conflict intervention by civil society actors were listed. On the basis of the data found in this case study, the following conclusions can be drawn:

9.2.1.1 Different Actors having Different Instruments and Strategies Available

The first hypotheses concerned different actors having different instruments and strategies of conflict intervention available. Hypothesis 1.a) had been that civil society actors are mostly involved in peace-building, and play an essential role there. This assumption has found ample documentation in this case study.

It was also found that they had indeed only a very limited role in finding negotiated solutions at the governmental level (1.b) - the only clear-cut case being Sant’Egidio mediating in the Kosovo conflict.

\textsuperscript{399} For example Swedish SIDA, Canadian CIDA, Norwegian People’s Aid (see Evensmo 2000, Duffield 1996, Du Pont 2002:239, Large n.d.).

\textsuperscript{400} The difference to a mere funding relation is that here the international organisation defines the programme, and the NGO is carrying it out. In other funding relationships, it is usually the funded organisation that is applying for the funding, describing a programme.
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9.2.1.2 Levels of Society Related to Instruments and Strategies

The second hypothesis was that different levels of society (top level, middle range, grassroots) require different instruments and strategies of intervention. This hypothesis is difficult to substantiate. While it is undoubtedly true for the top level (to which civil society actors as mentioned have only limited access), middle and grassroots’ level approaches have been – with the exception of peace-making - in many areas hard to distinguish, so that a conclusion for all strategies of intervention is difficult. In peace-making, the strategies and approaches chosen clearly varied depending on the level of society targeted. But in peace-keeping and peace-building the difference seems rather to have been the geographical range of the initiatives: there were projects targeting the whole country (e.g. building up parent-teacher-associations), projects targeting certain regions (e.g. Eastern Slavonia), and projects from which only the population of one particular town or even only part of a town benefited (e.g. youth centres).

9.2.1.3 Stages of Conflict and Instruments and Strategies

The third hypothesis had been that different stages of conflict escalation warrant different instruments and strategies of intervention – or that different methods vary in their effectiveness depending on when they are used. In the chapters on the individual strategies, the assumption has been rejected that any of the ‘grand strategies’ should be identified with only one particular stage in the conflict cycle:

- Peace-making was shown to be a rather complex affair, with at least one ‘peace’ being made while other conflicts in the same region went on simultaneously (Croat-Muslim war in Bosnia).
- Peace-keeping took place both before, during and after violent conflict (e.g. Balkan Peace Team being in Croatia before, during and after the reoccupation of

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401 In appendix 2 the distribution of certain activities over some years, in each case including years of war and years after war is displayed: Training in Croatia between 1991 and 1995, trauma work in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1991 and 1998, youth centres in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1991 and 1998 and physical reconstruction in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1991 and 1997.
9. Conclusions

While numerically the tendency indeed showed peace-building activities to increase after cease-fires, there were a significant number of examples of it taking place during war and/or even before the conflicts became violent.

As to the subthesis 3.a) that the more escalated a conflict is, the more coercion/force is needed in order to intervene successfully, this question was discussed in chapter 4. The result was that empirically in most cases this matches the strategy used by the international (state) interveners. But there also have been exceptions that question if that hypothesis is always true, or if it is not rather a self-fulfilling prophecy: The war between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina was ended by a negotiated settlement without obvious ‘sticks’ (see chapter 4.1.3).

The last sub-thesis, 3.b) that stated that nonviolent peace building and development projects are only possible before a conflict escalates to war, and in the post-war period, has been clearly falsified as amply shown by the number of such activities undertaken in war times (see Appendix 2 for some examples).

9.2.2 A Widened Framework for Categorising Conflict Intervention

I would like now to return to the question of the ‘grand strategies’ that have been used to categorise the interventions into the conflicts of former Yugoslavia. They were introduced in chapter 2, and in the chapters describing each of them observations were made regarding the following criteria:

- the problem they deal with,
- the function they have,
- the frequency in which they can be found in each conflict stage,
- the target group of the intervention,
- and the instruments used.

Here at the end of the study I would like now to summarise the findings regarding these criteria, and as a conclusion suggest a description of the framework of four

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402 Better-known examples would be found if looking at state actors - the international military peacekeeping missions: The preventive mission in Macedonia, UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war there, and the different UN NATO-led missions after the end of the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.
‘grand strategies’ of conflict intervention. This framework is meant not to refer to civil society actors alone but to all actors in conflict intervention.

9.2.1.1 The Problem They Deal With and the Function of Each Strategy

Peace-making is dealing with the problem of perceived incompatibilities of interest, with the function to find a negotiated solution.

The problem peace-keeping is dealing with is (potential, I would like to add) violent behaviour, with its function being the control, prevention or reduction of violence.

Peace-building is about the causes and consequences of violent conflict and war: Material destruction, what could be called non-physical destruction (social and psycho-social consequences of war), and lack of structures and relationships necessary for sustainable peace with justice. It has three different though related functions: It addresses relationships, it deals with structural matters (for example what comes with ‘democratisation’), and as the third function ‘dealing with the destructive processes that accompany war’ (aid, reconstruction) has been added.

The problems information, protest and advocacy deal with as defined here is a) lack of knowledge about what is happening, and b) the behaviour of other intervening actors. Its functions are information, the expression of disagreement with the actions of other actors, advising them what to do (instead), and seeking enforcement of a certain action through law.

9.2.1.2 Their Presence and Frequency in Different Conflict Stages

As to the conflict stage, this chart here can only describe what was found in this case study. For other conflicts, the situation is different. In the former Yugoslavia, peace-making was mostly undertaken when the conflict had already escalated to violence, with it being comparatively rare before and after war. Peace-keeping was found in all stages of escalation. Peace-building took mostly place after war but to a perhaps surprising degree also during war (see above). In the phase before escalation it was comparatively rare. Protest and advocacy like the headlines in the mass media tended to follow the ‘burning issues’, meaning that it was mostly found during the times of open war.
9. Conclusions

9.2.1.3 The Level of Society Targeted

In general the intervening actors taken all together targeted all levels of society – top leadership, middle and grassroots’ level. However, the degree and frequency in which each of these levels were targeted varied considerably. For state actors (including international actors like the United Nations etc.) typically governments were the target group of peace-making, while civil society actors can be found more frequently dealing with middle or grassroots levels.

In peace-keeping, state actors usually dealt with the ‘conflict at large’ having the military and other armed forces as their target group. Civil society actors also tried to do so (see the different interpositioning projects), but more typically – and more successfully – their target group were violence-prone groups and individuals, and more concrete conflicts within the overall conflict (for example human rights violations and their perpetrators).

In peace-building, state actors tended to focus more on macro-programmes either dealing with structural changes, or reaching whole categories of population (‘the’ refugees, ‘the’ school children, etc), while civil society actors could be found both in the macro sphere and in having small-scale localised projects that did not reach beyond the particular town, village or small target group they worked with.\footnote{I differ here from Ryan who assumes that the target group of peace-building are the ‘ordinary people, and peace-building being about trying to build bridges between them (1995:129).}

Public information became much more frequent and intense when a conflict had become violent, and the same is true for protest and advocacy, their target groups being the public in general, intervening actors and also the own constituency.

9.2.1.4 The Instruments Used

The last factor to describe these four strategies are the instruments used. Peace-making has three: Law, negotiation and force.

Peace-keeping as well has three. Force, deterrence and reference to international law, and relationship-building.

Peace-building displays a wide range of instruments. Basically, looking at their basic characteristics, these activities fall into five major sets: Material aid (humanitarian aid, development and reconstruction, and infrastructure), training, demobilisation (military, community conflict management, and reconciliation), social work (counselling, psychotherapy, and similar), and psychological and medical care.
aid, reconstruction), information (through training, advice), non-physical support (e.g. social work, psychological aid, facilitation of dialogue etc.), law (transitional justice) and again force, namely when changes were enforced by police or military in the international protectorates. A sixth which only was found very occasionally in the survey was civil disobedience.

The different instruments used in the fourth macro-strategy (information, support, protest and advocacy) can likewise be summarised as being either information, material aid, immaterial support, protest, persuasion or law. Civil disobedience as an effective means to escalate protest has been very rare in the case study.

9.2.1.5 Summary

Table 6 on the next page, summarising what is said above, is a development from a chart by Ryan (1995:104) who distinguishes only problem, strategy and target group.
## Table 6) Strategies of Conflict Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Peace-making</th>
<th>Peace-keeping</th>
<th>Peace-building</th>
<th>Public Information, Support, Protest and Advocacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived incompatibilities of interest</td>
<td>(Potential) violent behaviour</td>
<td>Destruction (material and immaterial/social) and lack of structures and relations necessary for sustainable peace with justice</td>
<td>a) Lack of knowledge about the events in the conflict b) Behaviour of other intervening actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function (s)</th>
<th>Peace-making</th>
<th>Peace-keeping</th>
<th>Peace-building</th>
<th>Public Information, Support, Protest and Advocacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finding a negotiated solution; dealing with the interests and positions of conflict parties</td>
<td>Control, prevent or reduce violence</td>
<td>Deal with the destructive processes that accompany war</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency in conflict stages</th>
<th>Peace-making</th>
<th>Peace-keeping</th>
<th>Peace-building</th>
<th>Public Information, Support, Protest and Advocacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most frequent during escalated conflict; more rare before escalation to violence and after cease-fire</td>
<td>In all stages.</td>
<td>Most frequent after cease-fire but also much present during war; more rare in this case before war</td>
<td>Most frequent during war.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target groups chosen by state actors</th>
<th>Peace-making</th>
<th>Peace-keeping</th>
<th>Peace-building</th>
<th>Public Information, Support, Protest and Advocacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governments, leaders</td>
<td>Military, armed forces</td>
<td>State and large categories of population</td>
<td>Governments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target groups chosen by non-state actors</th>
<th>Peace-making</th>
<th>Peace-keeping</th>
<th>Peace-building</th>
<th>Public Information, Support, Protest and Advocacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mostly middle and grass-root level, rarely governments</td>
<td>Military, armed forces; violence-prone groups and individuals, death squads etc.</td>
<td>Both large categories of population (rarely state) and specific groups and locations</td>
<td>Governments, international organisations; ‘society’ in general, own constituency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Character of Instruments used</th>
<th>Peace-making</th>
<th>Peace-keeping</th>
<th>Peace-building</th>
<th>Public Information, Support, Protest and Advocacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Force</td>
<td>Material aid</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(Civil disobedience)
9.3 The Role of Civil Society Actors in Conflict Intervention

In spite of the increased interest in civilian conflict intervention, there is still no full clarity or agreement on what the role of civil society actors in this field is (see Fischer 2008 for a recent summary on the debate, and Paffenholz and Spurk 2006). On the basis of the case studied here – that in many ways preceded this debate which only started around the end of the 1990s – the following observations can be made:

1. Civil society actors have been complementing the work of state actors in many ways.
   - They worked as their implementing partners (see the section on reconstruction in Chapter 7);
   - They took care of issues and needs that the state actors were not able to deal with and therefore were glad to delegate to civil society (e.g. doing social work in refugee camps, or many of the peace-building projects in the protectorates after the wars) for which governments rather financed NGOs than seeking to implement them themselves;
   - They often were those with the better grounded information since they worked at grassroots level and therefore often became welcome sources for information.

2. They were the avant-garde for approaches, strategies and local partners later pursued or sought out by state actors. This is particularly evident for much of the civil society support where non-state actors clearly came first and only later were joined by OSCE, UN and governments. But it is also true in general for most of what are now well-recognised instruments of civil conflict intervention (or post-war peace-building, or conflict prevention, or whatever the official terms used by governments and international organisations are). It was civil society that practised them first, and through setting positive examples ‘mainstreamed’ them.

3. In some cases, they have been able to control or correct actions by governments through advocacy or direct action (e.g. helping war evaders and bringing refugees to third countries).

4. The study supports the position taken recently by some researchers doing comparative studies of cases of conflict intervention regarding the limited role
dialogue and reconciliation work by civil society actors plays for dealing with the overall conflicts (see Paffenholz and Spurk 2006, Paffenholz 2009a). The meagre impact that could be found regarding these efforts indicates that there is no strong relationship between these efforts and an overall positive change in society and prevention of future violence.

9.4 Some Final Thoughts

Looking back at the period studied, and the innumerable activities of state and non-state actors: Which way does the balance go? Was it worth the effort? On the positive side, it seems that the post-Yugoslav countries are moving towards a sustainable peace, and that in spite of still existing tensions and some serious problems ethnic minorities face, wars of the extent of the 1990s look more and more unlikely.

On the other side, was all the effort, and the vast amount of money spent on dealing with the conflicts of the area really necessary? Would not the same have been achieved with less, and doing less harm on the way? Would - as some people argue - financial aid in the 1980s have prevented all the wars? Would a different international response in 1991 have changed things? Would a quicker and more decisive military action in Bosnia-Herzegovina have ended the war earlier, and more pressure on FR Yugoslavia to let Kosovo go prevented the war there? What would have happened if there had been a conscious effort to limit intervention to nonviolent instruments? Much has been written in favour of these options, but as far as I know nobody so far has really systematically worked on such an alternative or counterfactual history. Also this study here cannot fill this gap but can only remark that it may be worth a study of its own.

It is today fashionable to point out that civil society is nothing good *per se*, but as Barnes (2005:9) put it civil society groups “can be a factor in war as well as a force for peace”, a point also quoted by Fischer (2008:241) and raised by Fisher and

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404 On this issue, the publication of a comparative study led by Paffenholz (2009b9 is announced whose findings have been preliminary summarized in Paffenholz 2009a

405 There are tools developed in social sciences for such judgements on unreal (potential) developments. See Horsky 1968 and Mueller 1995:34pp.
9. Conclusions

Zimina (2008). The long and perhaps discouraging list of problems above under the heading of ‘doing harm’ certainly emphasises this point. If I were to formulate just one lesson from this case study it would be to say that everybody who starts working on a conflict – be it in his/her own country or in another country – starts immediately to become an actor involved in it, and thereby begins to share in the responsibility for whatever happens next. This is something that sometimes may be overlooked when regarding the huge discrepancies of resources and power between civil society and state actors, a discrepancy that in spite of more and more money going to civil society actors has not changed fundamentally. The challenge civil society actors – from large professional NGOs to small informal citizens’ groups – face is to become a ‘force for peace’. That goal can potentially be achieved, as this case study has illustrated. Perhaps the basic recipe is not that difficult after all: it is ‘put first analysis and listening to the local civil society, and then see if among the instruments you have available are some that are useful in the situation. If you do not have such instruments or are not familiar enough with them, then rather don’t get involved but share your analysis with others who have the capacity to play a useful role.’

Other than that, the warning needs to be expressed that as contexts are different, so successful programmes need to differ. What may ‘work’ in one context may be absolutely the wrong approach in the next one – that is one point about which almost all comparative studies and meta evaluations of conflict intervention agree (see Paffenholz and Spurk 2006, Schweitzer 2009). For that reason the findings of this study here must not be generalised too much. While many observations probably are rather general – as are the instruments – only future comprehensive studies on other countries and the role of civil society actors in their conflicts may in the end show which of the lessons and findings from this area are historical or geographical singular, and which are not.
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Appendix 1. Instruments of Conflict Intervention

The following inventory is a direct result of the survey of state and non-state actor interventions in the area of former Yugoslavia. It does include activities that have not been mentioned in the case study, and also a few standard methods that have not been applied in the area of the former Yugoslavia. These are put in brackets. Referenced are only those that have not been described in the study.

1. Peace-making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Actors</th>
<th>Non-state Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Law</td>
<td>(International Court settling conflict)(^{406})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Negotiation</td>
<td>Activate institutions of Early Warning and Early Crisis Management(^{407})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good offices</td>
<td>Good offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shuttle mediation</td>
<td>Shuttle mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure mediation at high level(^{409})</td>
<td>Pure mediation at all levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use existing umbrella organisations to discuss issues</td>
<td>Use existing umbrella organisations to discuss issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-level conferences without immediate direct meeting of conflict parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face-to-face negotiation at high level, facilitated and/or led by internationals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declarations and appeals(^{410})</td>
<td>Grassroots protest and appeals directed at the governments and other leaders of the countries in conflict.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{406}\) Did not happen in case study.

\(^{407}\) CSCE mechanism initiated in 1991.

\(^{408}\) This has not happened (to my knowledge) in this case here with the exception of some discussion and public action by the War Resisters’ International Council in 1990. However, there are examples from other parts of the world (for example Nonviolent Peaceforce in the Philippines, see www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org).

\(^{409}\) The EC mediated in conflict between Italy and Slovenia between 1992 and 1997 (Lampe 2000:394).

\(^{410}\) Declarations and appeals are one of the most common instruments of diplomatic relations, both in normal times, but growing in number in crisis.

Functions may be:
- Express concerns and warnings
- Inform public and other governments on positions taken
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment of permanent institutions and round tables of governments</th>
<th>Permanent institutions or round tables of oppositional politicians and/or civil society leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establish Standing Conferences</td>
<td>Propose (alternative) peace plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propose structural solutions (secession or solutions within existing borders, e.g. autonomy models)</td>
<td>Propose structural solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-track meetings / conferences seeking to develop solutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer Membership in International Institutions and Cooperation Agreements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-negotiations</td>
<td>Micro-negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation Talks&lt;sup&gt;411&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inofficial Meetings Between Negotiators and Conflict Parties&lt;sup&gt;412&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitration&lt;sup&gt;413&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Force (includes pressure)</td>
<td>Recall ambassadors, close consulates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish No-flight zone</td>
<td>Boycott by citizens&lt;sup&gt;414&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms embargo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil embargo</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Withdraw support</td>
<td>Withdraw support&lt;sup&gt;415&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade sanctions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ban on investments in sanctioned country</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Freeze assets in other countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ban on cultural exchanges (participation in sports events)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Travel ban</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Stop issuing visa for certain personally identified individuals</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Support as reward&lt;sup&gt;416&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air force, marine or army for surveillance of sanctions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air force, marine or army for enforcement of sanctions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bombing as a sanction/punishment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct manoeuvres as warning&lt;sup&gt;417&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>411</sup> For example the Peace Implementation Council that met regularly to discuss the progress made on the Dayton Peace Agreement.

<sup>412</sup> On 28.-29 November 1992 the co-chairmen Owen and Vance paid a visit, said to be “private” to President Tudjman at Brioni. According to Owen they accepted the invitation in order to discuss ‘some of the more challenging concepts’ (Owen 1995:xiv, 72).

<sup>413</sup> The two cases in the survey are the Badinter Commission 1991, and an international arbitration decision to transfer the Brcko district in BiH from RS control to a condominium to share with Bosniak-Croat Federation (Egger 1999:19, Partos 2001:51).

<sup>414</sup> Not used in this case.

<sup>415</sup> NGOs have withdrawn their support, e.g. stopped relief efforts after attacks on them and/or at least threatened to do so. An example is the ICRC that interrupted its work in Bosnia-Herzegovina for several months in 1992 after a convoy was attacked (Mercier 1995).

<sup>416</sup> For example the ‘Energy for Democracy’-programme of the EU in winter 1999/2000.
### Appendix 1: Instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instruments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms deliveries (legal or illegal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training of local forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send military advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send mercenaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send / come as mercenaries or join int'l volunteer brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air strikes to directly force a conflict party to lay down its arms and to agree to a ceasefire / peace treaty by destroying its (military) resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct land operations to directly force a conflict party to lay down its arms and to agree to a ceasefire / peace treaty by destroying its (military) resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with local troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing permanent military presence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2. Peace-keeping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Actors</th>
<th>Non-state Actors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send military peace-keepers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send civilian peace-keepers</td>
<td>Send civilian peace-keepers (peace teams, monitoring missions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Monitoring Missions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send International Police as peacekeepers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send Military Observers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance of cease-fires</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament of soldiers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation of troops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of demilitarized zones and 'safe areas'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed protection of humanitarian aid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open blocked roads, remove check points by armed forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accompany IDPs and refugees, or ethnic minorities</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect international military and civilian personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By Non-violent</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterrence and reference to international law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence in situations where human rights violations may happen</td>
<td>Presence in situations where human rights violations may happen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring of courts, refugee camps, communities, regions, POWs</td>
<td>Monitoring of courts, refugee camps, communities, regions, POWs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

417 As warnings. For example, NATO expanded its military exercises with Albania and Macedonia as a warning to FRY (Kaufman 2002:159).

418 There have been such international units in both the Croatian and the Bosnian wars. Some may have come with the ‘support’ of their government (for example from Iran), others came clearly on their own, like a Bosnian Serb paramilitary group calling themselves the “Heroes” at the Sarajevo airport. Among them were Japanese, Russians and one American (Meder/Reimann 1996:10, Tibi 1997, Rose 1998:65). Think also of the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War 1936-37.

419 For example did KFOR accompany Serb children to school in Kosovo after the 1999 war.
Appendix 1: Instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Publish findings</td>
<td>Publish findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange of detainees and PoW</td>
<td>Exchange of detainees and PoW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpositioning of armed or unarmed forces to prevent violence</td>
<td>Interpositioning of unarmed forces by staying in threatened area to prevent violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpositioning by a moving caravan of activists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Relationship-Building</td>
<td>Contact-building in communities (often peace-building activities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Network or bridging of local activists with other international actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bridging local activists to authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Make international law known to conflict parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use military peace-keepers for relief and civil reconstruction tasks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media work, press releases, establish own mass media to explain mission</td>
<td>Media work, press releases, establish own (probably not:mass) media to explain mission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. Peace-building

#### 3.1 General, multi-purpose

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material aid</th>
<th>State Actors</th>
<th>Non-state Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collect donations for various projects and activities</td>
<td>Collect donations for various projects and activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-physical support</td>
<td>Longterm missions for peace-building purposes</td>
<td>Civil peace service projects with well-qualified staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Send short-term volunteers</td>
<td>Send long-term volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Twinning of municipalities</td>
<td>Support twinning of municipalities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.2 Humanitarian Relief

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material aid</th>
<th>State Actors</th>
<th>Non-state Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finance relief goods: food, medicine, clothes, etc.</td>
<td>Collect money for relief goods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collect material relief goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport relief goods</td>
<td>Transport relief goods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver relief goods</td>
<td>Deliver relief goods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

420 Not only ICRC, also ECMM involved themselves in this in BiH.
421 E.g. radio station that SFOR had in BiH)
422 OSCE mission. Mostly for transitional justice and state-building tasks.
423 Mostly for social and psycho-social support and civil society building.
424 For humanitarian, reconstruction or civil society building purposes.
425 For humanitarian, reconstruction or civil society building purposes.
### Appendix 1: Instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set up and run camps for refugees &amp; IDPs</th>
<th>Set up and run camps for refugees &amp; IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finance stay of refugees in third country</td>
<td>Finance stay of refugees in third country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish medical facilities and services</td>
<td>Establish medical facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Soup kitchens)</td>
<td>Set up soup kitchens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Set up orphanages)</td>
<td>Set up orphanages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Set up child care and kindergardens)</td>
<td>Set up child care and kindergardens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host refugees in private homes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Searching for missing persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counselling, advise of refugees and IDPs</td>
<td>Counselling, advise of refugees and IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-physical support</td>
<td>Evacuation of threatened people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive refugees in third countries</td>
<td>Support refugees in third countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send volunteers as humanitarian workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bring wounded children or adults for treatment to third countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOS telephones</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Give war refugees legal status in third country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expand asylum reasons (e.g. rape, desertion)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil disobedience</td>
<td>Hide refugees threatened with deportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bring refugees to third country against will of that country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Smuggle refugees (e.g. deserters) out of country to help them escape persecution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.3 Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of soldiers (DDR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Actors</th>
<th>Non-state Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material aid</td>
<td>(Financial incentives to hand in weapons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial aid for reintegration</td>
<td>Financial aid for reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Training of veterans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on re-integration schemes (financial aid, etc)</td>
<td>Information on re-integration schemes (financial aid, etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force</td>
<td>Collect weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Set up storage centres for weapons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

426 ICRC (Mercier 1995).

427 UNHCR evacuates Croats and Muslims from Serb-held areas in Bosnia and Croatia (Mercier 1995:151)
### 3.4 Reconstruction and refugee return

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Actors</th>
<th>Non-state Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material aid</td>
<td>Physical reconstruction of houses by internationals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical reconstruction of infrastructure (roads, energy, water) by internationals</td>
<td>Physical reconstruction of infrastructure (roads, energy, water) by internationals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide building materials</td>
<td>Provide building materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide money for salaries for construction workers</td>
<td>Provide money for salaries for construction workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide seeds, machinery / tools for income-generating projects</td>
<td>Provide seeds, machinery / tools for income-generating projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial support of senior people</td>
<td>Financial support of senior people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Help with harvest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide fuel, wood etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>(legal and other) advise for returnees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Legal and other) advise for returnees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Link people to reconstruction programmes by other actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-physical support</td>
<td>Mine awareness training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Check-point meetings between people from territories that cannot be visited by people from the ‘other side’.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parcel delivery programme across borders that locals cannot cross</td>
<td>Take messages, letters, perhaps parcels across borders that locals cannot cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village visitation programme across borders that locals cannot cross</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force</td>
<td>Deport refugees after end of war</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.5 Social and psycho-social work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Actors</th>
<th>Non-state Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material aid</td>
<td>Finance local women groups for their work in psychological care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finance local women groups for their work in psychological care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Build home for elderly people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Educate children in refugee camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Educate children in refugee camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Language lessons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literacy courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Computer lessons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training in trauma therapy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Handicraft courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Photography courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Computer courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-physical support</td>
<td>House visits to clients (e.g. elderly people)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social work in camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Play with children (in camps or communities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organise discos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 1: Instruments

| Work with women and men’s groups, set them up |
| Establish youth clubs and youth centres |
| Establish internet cafés |
| Organise sports activities and tournaments |
| Newspaper, film and radio programmes with youth |
| Programmatic activities in youth clubs other than sports and education |
| Organise holiday camps for children and youth |
| Establish shelters for traumatized women (and children) |
| Meetings and conferences of young people |
| International youth exchange |
| Psycho-social workshops |
| Individual trauma therapy |
| Group trauma therapy |
| SOS telephones |
| Twinning projects of schools |
| Set up family mediation projects |

3.6 Economic recovery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Actors</th>
<th>Non-state Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material aid</td>
<td>Large-scale credit to governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery / tools and resources for income-generation projects</td>
<td>Machinery / tools and resources for income-generation projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants to governments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor conferences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support / insure private investments</td>
<td>Investment by private firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish banks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt relief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-credit schemes</td>
<td>Micro-credit schemes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Financial advising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational training</td>
<td>Vocational training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-physical support</td>
<td>Trade agreements, give trade advantages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduce new currency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatisation schemes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote special branches of economic development (e.g. ecological tourism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organise trade union work</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.7 Transitional Justice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Actors</th>
<th>Non-state Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>International Police as advisors and trainers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 1: Instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human rights reporting</th>
<th>Human rights reporting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training of personnel in the juridical system (police, judges, prison wards etc)</td>
<td>Training of personnel in the juridical system (police, judges, prison wards etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counselling of citizens</td>
<td>Counselling of citizens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Non-physical support**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human rights reporting</th>
<th>Human rights reporting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support establishment of local courts</td>
<td>Support establishment of local courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights monitoring missions / projects (general)</td>
<td>Human rights monitoring missions / projects (general)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring of police</td>
<td>Monitoring of police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring of courts</td>
<td>Monitoring of courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help to set up truth commissions</td>
<td>Help to set up truth commissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help to establish lustration</td>
<td>Help to establish lustration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish human rights centres</td>
<td>Establish human rights centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination of special rapporteurs or High Commissioners</td>
<td>Support victims’ reparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public events discussion dealing with the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support publications, films etc. on dealing with the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support establishment of memorials and museums</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Law**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human rights reporting</th>
<th>Human rights reporting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Create human rights institutions</td>
<td>Support work of the tribunal through fact-finding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation of war crimes and criminals</td>
<td>Establish special tribunal for war crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish special tribunal for war crimes</td>
<td>Support work of the tribunal through fact-finding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use other international courts for persecution of war crimes</td>
<td>Support establishment of local courts dealing with war crimes and human rights violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support establishment of local courts dealing with war crimes and human rights violations</td>
<td>Support establishment of local courts dealing with war crimes and human rights violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer amnesties</td>
<td>Offer amnesties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human rights reporting</th>
<th>Human rights reporting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pressure on countries to extradite suspects</td>
<td>Pressure on countries to extradite suspects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrests of suspected war criminals by international forces</td>
<td>Arrests of suspected war criminals by international forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.8 State-building, democratisation and civil society support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Actors</th>
<th>Non-state Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material aid</td>
<td>Non-state Actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance reforms</td>
<td>Finance reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equip military (weapons, vehicles etc) (legal or illegal)</td>
<td>Fundraise for local groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance oppositional / democratic parties</td>
<td>Finance oppositional / democratic parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donation of of electronic equipment or paper for media</td>
<td>Donation of of electronic equipment or paper for media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance independent media</td>
<td>Finance independent media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide books, laboratories and other teaching materials</td>
<td>Provide books, laboratories and other teaching materials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

428 UN rapporteur, CSCE/ OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stipend programme for students</th>
<th>Stipend programme for students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donate computers and office</td>
<td>Donate computers and office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equipment</td>
<td>equipment for parties and NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training of security sector</td>
<td>Training of security sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personnel (police, judges,</td>
<td>personnel (police, judges,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prison wards, local</td>
<td>prison wards, local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military forces)</td>
<td>military forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voter education</strong></td>
<td><strong>Voter education</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train oppositional or</td>
<td>Train oppositional or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democratic parties</td>
<td>democratic parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Train election monitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train journalists</td>
<td>Train journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advising on media laws and</td>
<td>Advising on media laws and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regulatory frameworks</td>
<td>regulatory frameworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send military advisors</td>
<td>Advise students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human rights training</strong></td>
<td><strong>Human rights training</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-physical</td>
<td>Creation of interim government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support</td>
<td>Implement central government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help to establish civil</td>
<td>Help to establish civil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administration</td>
<td>administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft laws</td>
<td>Draft laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto decisions made by</td>
<td>Initiate or support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national parliaments or</td>
<td>institutional reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationals in national</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>institutions 430</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deploy international police</td>
<td>Deploy international police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with executive functions</td>
<td>with executive functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Run prisons 431</td>
<td>Run prisons 431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set up or advise on tax</td>
<td>Advise on tax system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>system</td>
<td>Set up or advise on customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set up or advise on customs</td>
<td>Set up or advise on customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>system</td>
<td>system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help to establish juridical</td>
<td>Help to establish juridical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>system with police, courts</td>
<td>system with police, courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and prisons</td>
<td>and prisons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organise elections</td>
<td>Support election campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor elections</td>
<td>Monitor elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggest and / or support</td>
<td>Suggest and support conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conduct of referendum</td>
<td>of referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help people to regain</td>
<td>Help people to regain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>their personal documents</td>
<td>their personal documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help to establish schools</td>
<td>Institutions at / around</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>schools: pupils councils,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>parent-teacher associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>partnerships (twinning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Educational web-site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information centres on civic</td>
<td>Information centres on civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rights issues</td>
<td>rights issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

430 For example international judges in Bosnian Constitutional Court (Riegler 1999:30), and UNMIK sent international attorneys of law to Kosovo (Knoll/Molina 2002:162)

431 UNMIK Civil Administration took over responsibility for prison in Prizren (O’Neill 2002:70, 125pp).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Networking local groups or parties to international organisations and</td>
<td>Networking between local groups from different 'sides' of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>networks abroad</td>
<td>Communication aid for local groups: Establishment of international fax or e-mail networks across borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link local groups or parties to authorities</td>
<td>Link local groups or parties to internationals in country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking between local groups from different conflict areas</td>
<td>Invite delegations of NGOs or parties to third countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invite delegations of NGOs or parties to third countries</td>
<td>International volunteers to work with local groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide meeting space for local groups or parties</td>
<td>Provide transportation for local groups or parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translations for local groups</td>
<td>Build a meeting house for local groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make available non-commercial meeting venue for NGOs</td>
<td>Make available non-commercial meeting venue for NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Award prices to local activists, media etc.</td>
<td>Award prices to local activists, media etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publish internationally appeals or articles written by local groups</td>
<td>Public calls to desert / avoid military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open permanent base in conflict areas (e.g. OSCE missions)</td>
<td>Help establish data-base for administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help to establish higher education</td>
<td>Help to establish higher education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange of (university) teachers</td>
<td>Conduct campaigns on different educational issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bring students to third countries for education</td>
<td>Conduct summer universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct of scientists</td>
<td>Networking between media and journalists from different countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation of international meetings of journalists (and networks)</td>
<td>Organisation of international meetings of journalists (and networks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of media or media programmes by international actors</td>
<td>Creation of media or media programmes by international actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish or advise on media laws and frameworks</td>
<td>Advise on media laws and frameworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for media institutions: media centres, journalist associations or</td>
<td>Publish books or articles by local groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unions, self-regulatory bodies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3.9 Promoting Peace Skills and Dialogue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>State Actors</strong></th>
<th><strong>Non-state Actors</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Material aid</strong></td>
<td>Fund peace-related activities by local groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
<td>Training in 'peace skills': Methods of dealing with conflict (e.g. mediation, Alternatives to Violence, non-violent communication)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Physical support</strong></td>
<td>(Inter-ethnic) dialogue meetings / conferences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>State Actors</strong></th>
<th><strong>Non-state Actors</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Physical support</strong></td>
<td>Religious dialogue meetings / conferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Help to found dialogue groups / organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish peace teams / peace service teams</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.10 Cultural activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>State Actors</strong></th>
<th><strong>Non-state Actors</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Material aid</strong></td>
<td>Financial support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Physical support</strong></td>
<td>Organize meetings and workshops of artists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organize sports’ events</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Publish CDs by local artists</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Organise concerts, theatre plays etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>invite artists to third countries or to</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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432 e.g. OSCE in BiH
organise exhibitions

Sponsor/establish permanent institutions to support arts

4. Information, Protest and Advocacy

Here I would like to refer to Gene Sharp’s 198 method of nonviolent action (see Sharp 1973 and 2005).

In this survey only a small number of them were actually found.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Actors</th>
<th>Non-state Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public reports in mainstream mass media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alternative media reporting differently or on issues not present in mass media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Translate and publish articles etc by local groups abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Publish internationally appeals of local organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Pure research'</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Appeals &amp; Open Letters</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Press releases</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Press conferences</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flyers/folders</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Collect signatures under appeals</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Declarations expressing a position</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information Evenings</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Panel Discussions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conferences</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alternative ‘Tribunal’</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speaking tours of local activists</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information campaigns in schools</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Photo exhibitions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vigils</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace prayers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Symbolic nonviolent actions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fasts</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conferences for advocacy purposes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meetings with politicians and civil servants for advocacy purposes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish a permanent presence in capitals or at seat of international organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Law suits against governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil disobedience</td>
<td>Non-violent blockades of military installations (of interveners)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 5. Capacitate the Interveners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>State Actors</strong></th>
<th><strong>Non-state Actors</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material aid</td>
<td>Fund int’l NGOs</td>
<td>Fund other int’l NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Train international personnel</td>
<td>Train international personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports of Ambassadors, Envoys etc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Services research and reports</td>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation meetings of interveners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of Diplomatic Means</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigations, fact-finding missions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Investigations, fact-finding missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action research</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluations of projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of work inside country (usually international)</td>
<td>Coordination of work inside country (usually international)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordination of groups working on the conflict abroad (usually in one country)</td>
<td>Surveys</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surveys</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expertises</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Physical support</td>
<td>Scientific Conferences</td>
<td>Scientific Conferences</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Directories of interveners and projects</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Information visits for int’l politicians, activists, journalists etc. to area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Laws on volunteering</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Laws on sending workers abroad</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Laws enabling people to leave workplace quickly for emergency work abroad</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Laws allowing conscientious objectors to serve abroad</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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433 Either during regular meetings the interveners have anyway, or in extra meetings set up for the purpose. See the reports of the different negotiators, for example Owen 1995, Bildt 1998, Holbrooke 1998.

434 For example UNHCR coordination meetings. In 1996 the OSCE initiated a Round Table of all Youth Centres in Mostar which met every other week (Loskot 1997)
Appendix 2. Distribution of Certain Types of Activities During and After Wars

Training in peace skills

In Croatia the war raged mostly in the second half of 1991. From 1992 there was a cease-fire lasting until 1995 when the occupied parts of Croatia were militarily reunited with Croatia. The number of trainings in nonviolence, conflict resolution given by international non-state groups (NGOs and smaller citizens’ groups) found in the sample were 10 already in 1991, 8 in 1992, 11 in 1993 and 4 each in 1994 and 1995. Some of the 10 from 1991 also gave trainings later than 1991. The horizontal figures mean 1991, 1992 etc., the vertical figures are the numbers.435

Table 7) Training in peace skills

![Bar chart showing the distribution of trainings in peace skills from 1991 to 1995.]

435 The total amount of non-state organisations counted in the survey is 769.
Psycho-social workshops and trauma work in Bosnia-Herzegovina

While the numbers increased dramatically after the end of the war in 1995, there has been a considerable number before 1996 already.

Table 8) Psycho-social work

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Youth Centres

The same picture we have with Youth Centres and comparable youth work in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina taken together. Also here the numbers grew over the years but with a clear and larger than negligible number before 1996.

Table 9) Youth Centres

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Physical reconstruction

Organisations active in physical reconstruction of houses in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina show the following picture:

Table 10) Physical reconstruction